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GENERALITIES  ON  THE  ACTIVITY  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
l .l.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.1.  The  year  1973  covered by  this Report  was  the  first  for  the  enlarged Community 
of  Nine,  including  the United  Kingdom,  Ireland and  Denmark. 
1.1.2.  Coal  production in the  Community  in 1973  was  nearly  the  same  as  in 1972, 
at  270  million  tons  for  the year.  Table  1  gives  the details.  Production  in 
the  old  Community  of  Six fell  by  nearly  8%  continuing  the  trend of  recent years. 
The  rate of  decline  increased  in Belgium,  France  and  the  Netherlands,  but it 
was  lower  in Germany. 
This was  offset by  a  rise of  8.9%  in the  production  for  the  United  Kingdom  as 
compared with  1972,  as  the  latter year was  considerably affected by  the  prolonged 
miner's  strike,  which  resulted in a  loss  of  10,  757,  000  working days,  which  was 
equivalent  to  a  loss  of  22.4 million  tons.  1973  was  little affected by  industrial 
conflict. 
1.1.3.  For  the  Community  of Six,  there was  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  persons  employed 
by  10.2%,  but with  an  increase  in output per manshift of  2.5%.  In  the  U.!~.,  the 
reduction  in number  of  persons  employed  was  only  4.7%,  whilst output per manshift 
increased by  4%.  The  proportion of U.K.  output  produced  by  mechanised mining 
increased  by  7.0%  and  the  use  of  powered  supports  by  2.8%  (corresponding  figures 
for  the  Community  of  Six were  3.2%  and  1.8%). 
1.1.4  The  number  of  mines  closed  in  the  Community  of  Six was  11,  equivalent  to  a  loss 
of  10 million  tons  per  annum  of  capacity,  which  was  a  rather greater reduction 
than  in 1972.  In  the  U.K.  20  N.C.B.  mines  were  closed with  a  loss of  capacity 
of  2.4 million  tons. 
1.1.5.  It was  not possible  to  draw  up  figures  for  accidents  on  a  uniform basis  for  the 
entire Community  of  Nine.  A preliminary  study of  methods  to  harmonise  these 
statistics was  commenced  at  the  end of  1973,  but  pending  completion of  this, 
figures  are  given  for  the  Community  of Six in Tables  following  the  form  and 
criteria used  since  1971,  whilst  for  the U.K.,  statistics are  given in  the  custom-
ary  form  for  that  country.  The  figures  can be  summarised  as  follows  (1.5.1.1.). 
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D  B  F  I  N  U.K.  Eur  9  Eur  6 
(x) 
Production Million  tons.  1972  108,4  (1)  10.5  29.8  0.3  2.9  (1)  119.5  271.4  151.8 
Production Million  tons.  1973  103.4  (1)  8.8  25.7  0.002  1.8  (1)  130.2  270.0  139.7 
Reduction  % 1972  on  1971  -7.2  -4.2  -9.4  -41  -22.5  -18.8  -13.1  -7.9 
Reduction  % 1973  on  1972  -4.7  -15.8  -13.4  - -38.6  +8.9  -o.s  -8.0 
Output  per manshift Kg./Shift 
Underground  - 1972  4249  2638  2709  2801  3276  3460  3581  3663 
- 1973  4318  2550  2767  3505  3598  3678  3755 
1973  as  %ge  of  1972  +1.6  -3.3  +2.1  +7.0  +4.0  +2.7  +2.5 
Underground  workers  on  books 
Mid  1972  125.5  22.8  53.5  0.6  4.9  187.2  394.8  207.3 
Mid  1973  113.8  22.4  46.7  0.2  3.0  178.5  364.8  186.1 
Reduction  % 1972  on  1971  -7.2  -4.6  -10.8  -14.3  -17.0  -4.2  -6.4  -8.2 
Reduction  % ·i973  on  1972  -9.3  -1.8  -12.7  -66.7  -38.8  -4.7  -7.6  -10.2 
Number  of working  mines  at  the  end  of  1972  61  20  38  1  4  281  (2)  405  124 
Number  of working  mines  at  the  end  of  1973  52  18  36  - 2  261  (2)  369  108 
Capacity  abandonned  during  1973 
Millions  of Tons  p.a.  7.9  - - - - 2.4  10.3  7.9 
Stock  of  Coal  at  the  mines  end  of  1972  9.7  o.s  5.2  0.0  0.7  11.1  27.1  16.0 
Stock  of  Coal  at the  mines  end  of  1973  8.9  0.2  3.5  0.0  0.4  10.9  23.8  12.9 
Stocks  1972  as  %ge  of  1971  +38.6  +25  +8.3  - +16.7  +7.8  +16.8  +25 
Stocks  1973  as  %ge  of  1972  -8.2  -58.7  -33.3  - -37.4  -1.8  -12.2  -19.4 
Stocks  of  hard  coke  at  coking plants  at  the 
end  of  19 7  3  Mi 11ion  tons.  7.3  0.2  0.5  0.7  o.o  2.5  11.2  8.7 
1972  as  %ge  of  1971  +61. 1  - +16.7  - - +58.3  +48.8  +49.3 
1973  as  %ge  of  1972  -17.0  - -28.5  - - +33.3  -8.2  -15.5 
Percentage  of  output  produced  by 
mechanised  means. 
1972  95.2  87.2  84.7  - 87.3  91.1  91.7  92.4 
1973  95.5  86.7  86.9  - 87.3  98.1  93.2  95.6 
Percentage  of  Powered  Supports 
1972  55.4  40.3  37  - 38.9  89.6  67.6  50.3 
1973  55.5  48.1  40  - 50.4  92.4  71.5  52.1 
(1)  Mines  Administration~  Germany  1972  :  102.5  1973  :  97.3 
Netherland  1972  :  2.8  19?3  :  1.7 
(2)  N.C.B.  Mines 
(x)  !:roeland  inaluded 
Sources  :  Statistical Office  of  the  Community'  Statistical Telegram of  16.1.1974 
Mines  Administration 1.1.5.1. 
1.1.5.1.1. 
1.1.5.1.2. 
1.1.5.1.3. 
1.1.5.1.4. 
1.1.5.1.5. 
1.1.5.2. 
1.1.5.2. 
1.1.5.3. 
For  the  Community  of  Six: 
Accidents  resulting in absence  from  work  for  4  or more  days  to  20  days, 
were 37,384  for  a  total of  331.5 million manhours.  The  rate was 
112.77 per million man  hours  (mio/h);  in 1972  there were  40,376  accidents 
at a  rate of  109.31  per mio/h. 
Accidents  resulting in an absence  of  from  21  to  56  days  were  17,325 with  a 
rate of  52.26  per mio/h.  The  corresponding  figures  for  1972  were  18,531 
with  a  rate of  50.17  per mio/h. 
Accidents  resulting  in an  absence  from work  of more  than  56  days  were 
5,560 with  a  rate of  15.60 per mio/h. 
I~ total  there were  137  fatal  accidents  (9  of which  occurred  in one  incident) 
Wlth  a  r~te of 0.41  per mio/h.  In  1972  there were  147  fatal  accidents  ' 
(6  of wh1ch  occurred  in one  incident)  with  a  rate of 0.399  per mio/h. 
The  total  number  of  persons  injured  (including all  persons  having  more  than 
4  days  incapacity  and  fatalities)  was  60,406  at a  rate of  182.22 per million 
man  hours.  The  corresponding  figures  for  1972  were  64,187  with  a  rate of 
175.5 per million man  hours. 
For  the  United  Kingdom: 
The  number  of  persons  fataly  injured  in  1973  was  74,  and  of  these  30  were 
killed  in  3  accidents  causing multiple deaths.  The  rate was  0.241  per 
million manhours.  The  corresponding  figures  for  1972  were  57  persons  killed 
with no  accident  causing multiple fatalities;  The  rate of  0.15  per 100,000 
manshifts,  was  equivalent  to  a  rate of  about  0.21  per million man  hours. 
Details  and  comments  on  these statistics are  given in section V. 
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1.2.3. 
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1.2.  GENERAL  ACTIVITIES  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
The  year  1973  was  marked  by  4  collective accidents,  3  of which  occured  in the 
United Kingdom  and  1  in Germany:  an  inrush at Lofthouse  (U.K.)  on  27  March  1973 
(7  fatalities),  a  fall  of  roof at Seafield  (U.K.)  on  10  May  1973  (5  fatalities), 
a  winding  accident at Markham  (U.K.)  on  30  July  1973  (18  fatalities)  and  a 
rock burst at Sachsen  (Germany)  on  8  August  1973  (9  fatalities).  The  Mines 
Safety  and  Health Commission  has  started  to  study  these accidents.  It concluded 
the  study of  the outburst of  firedamp  which  occurred  on  7  November  1972 at Pit 
No.  25  at Monceau-Fontaine  (Belgium);  of  the  rock burst which  occured at 
Hannover  (Germany)  on  4  May  1971  (6  fatalities)  and  of  the outburst of  coal  and 
co2 which  occured at  the  Dauphine  collieries on  the  same  date  (8  fatalities). 
These  accidents  and  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  them  are described  in Section III, 
pages  22  - 28. 
On  6  February  1973  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  approved  a  report  on 
measures  for  improving  safety  in mine  shafts  and  roadways  employing  rope  haulage, 
as  well  as  a  memorandum  of  information necessary  for  the  examination of coal-
dust  explosions  or ignitions of  firedamp.  These  two  documents  were  annexed  to 
the preceding report  to  speed up  distribution  (annexes  V and  VII  of  the  lOth 
Report). 
On  22  June  1973  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  adopted  the  lOth Annual 
Report  which  has  been distributed  to  governments  and Community  authorities.  The 
European Parliament  examined  this  report on  17  January  1974  and  the Consultative 
Committee  of  the  ECSC  studied  the Annual  Report  issued by  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health Commission,  the  9th Report,  on  6  November  1973  for  the first  time.  This 
study was  the subject of  a  report  by  this  Committee,  Doc.  No.  A/3087/2/73. 
On  6  February  1973,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  resumed  study of  the 
question it had  first  taken up  in 1972  of  extending its competence  to  mines 
other  than coal  mines  and  to  other extractive industries,  and  agreed  on  extending 
it to all underground mining initially,  and  to all extractive industries  two 
years  later. 
The  decision  taken by  the  Commission  on  this question was  submitted  to  the Council 
of Ministers  as  one  of  the priority proposals  for action in  the  social  sector.  The 
draft decision of  the Council  (doc.  COM.(73)  2029)  of  30  November  1973  covered: 
- the  creation of  a  General  Committee  for  Safety at Work,  whose  competence  would 
extend  to all sectors,  normally  under  the  supervision of  the  Factory  Inspect-
orate,  but  excluding  the  extractive industries which  are normally  under  the 
supervision of  the  Mines  Inspectorate.  The  compos1t1on  and  the  modus  operandi 
of  this  General  Committee  would  be  based on  those  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission. 
- The  extension of  the  competence  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  to all 
the  extractive industries,  in the  two  stages  that it had  proposed.  The  terms 
of  reference  and  the  composition of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission would 
remain  unchanged. 
The  Council  is  to  take  a  decision on  this before June  1974,  after consulting  the 
European Parliament,  the  Economic  Committee  and  the  ECSC  Consultative Committee. 
The  Working  Parties  w~re hampered  in their activities by  the personnel  situation 
in  the  Secretariat which  lacked  two  principal  administrators;  one  having died  in 
September  1971  and  the other having retired on  1  July  1973.  Relative degrees  of 
priority were. established for· the  task already  determined  by  the Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Co~ission the  previous year  they w,re  reviewed  on  22  June  1973  when 
the  activity of  each Working  Party was  examined.  Fortunately,  the Secretariat 
received assistance  from  governmental  experts  and  testing centres  that offered to  take  over editorial work.  Finally,  progress  was  made  in some  fields  by 
holding  small meetings  for  which  the  cooperation of  the chairmen  of  Working 
Parties  and  Sub-committees  and  certain other experts was  enlisted. 
1.2.5.1.  Satisfactory progress  was  made  by  one  of  the  new  working  parties  (Ventila-
tion and  Firedamp)  but  that for  Roof  Control  had  to  suspend its act1v1t1es 
in  the  second half of  the year.  The  third  new  working party on  'Mechanization' 
was  not  able  to  meet. 
1.2.5.2.  The  small  group  charged with visiting mines  in which  outbursts  have  recently 
occurred  concluded  its visits, but has  not  yet  completed its report. 
1.2.5.3.  For  the  second year  running,  it was  not possible  to  act on  that section of  the 
Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission's  mandate which  covers  conditions of work 
such  as  noise,  vibration,  heat  and  light.  This  is  a  section that  the Mines 
Safety  and  Health  Commission  considers  most  important  and  which  the  European 
Parliament would  also  like  to  see  studied. 
1. 2.6. 
1.2.7. 
1. 2.8. 
On  the other hand,  guide  lines  for  the  construction of  coal  getting and  drivage 
machines  as  regards  dust  depression were  drawn  up  and  submitted  to  the Working 
Party  on  'Health'  (in 1974). 
In  the  field of  dissemination of  information,  the Secretariat of  the Mines 
Safety  and  Health Commission  collaborated with  the National  Union of Mineworkers 
in organising  a  symposium at Newcastle-upon-Tyne  (U.K.)  for  trade union  ~epresent­
atives  of  the  Community  of  the  Nine.  This  \\'as  held  from  17  to  20  September  1973 
with  financial  support provided  from  the Commission's  budget.  Sixty regional 
trade union delegates  with their national  leaders  attended  this  session.  Under 
the motto  'Responsibility for  Safety',  the  technical  and  safety aspects  of work-
ing  in British mines  were  illustrated,  and  officials of  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health Commission  described  their current and  future work  as  well  as  the  work 
carried out  by  the  other divisions  of  the  'Industrial Safety  and  Health'  Direc-
torate.  All  the participants were  able  to visit highly mechanized  underground 
workings. 
Following  studies  by  the Working  Party  on  'Psychological  and  Sociological  Factors 
affecting Safety',  Community  safety  campaigns  organised under  the  aegis  of  the 
Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission were  held  in 4  coal  fields  (Ruhr,  Saar, 
Aachen  and  Campine),  and  preparations  have  been made  to  continue  this work  in 
France.  Financial  support  for  these  campaigns  has  amounted  to  a  total  of 
2,050,000  BFrs,  and  results  available  so  far  indicate  a  marked  decrease  in the 
number  of  accidents  (2.7.  Chapter  G). 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  held  two  meetings  in  1973  on  6th February 
and  21/22nd  June,  preceded by  two  meetings  of  the Restricted Committee,  on  5th 
February  and  25  May. 
The  Working  Parties  and  Committees  of Experts  met  47  times.  The  total  number 
of meetings  including  information meetings  and  syndicates,  rose  to  53. 
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2.1.1. 
SECTION  II 
ACTIVITY  OF  THE  WORKING  PARTIES 
2.1.  CHAPTER  A- 'RESCUE  ARRANGEMENTS,  MINE  FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  COMBUSTION' 
This  Working Party held  one  plenary meeting  on  22  May  1973,  preceded by  a  meeting 
of  the  sub-committee of  experts  on  'Rescue  arrangements'  on  21  May  1973.  Sub-
committees  of  experts  met  as  follows: 
'Conveyor belts':  15  meetings,  5  of which were  plenary; 
'Stabilisation of ventilation':  2  preparatory meetings; 
'Fire-resistant fluids':  8  meetings,  6  of  which were  resticted. 
In all,  27  meetings  were  devoted  to  the activities of  this  Working Party,  18  of 
which were  restricted. 
2.1.2.  Work  continued  on projects which  had  been in hand  for  some  time,  such  as 
that of  the  sub-committee of  experts  on  fire-resistant fluids,  and  projects 
begun  in  1972  in accordance with  the  new  mandate  given  to  the  Working  Party on 
26  March  1971  (Annex  III);  in particular the  study of  conveyor belts was  accorded 
absolute priority.  These  projects  are listed below. 
2.1.3.  Tests  and  Criteria of Flammability  of  conveyor belts  used  in coal  mines. 
2.1.3.1.  The  importance of  this  study  is  shown  by  the  fact  that fires  have occurred 
on  conveyor belts,  particularly  in Germany,  in  the  course of which belts were 
completely  burnt  although  they  satisfied  the  international  safety standard 
ISO  R  340  (1962),  the only  standard  in force  in Germany  and  France. 
2.1.3.2.  The  Working  Party  gave  a  sub-committee of  experts  the  task of  comparing  the 
various  flammability  standards  and  defining  new  criteria better adapted  to 
underground  conditions  than  the  ISO  standard. 
2.1.3.3.  The  sub-committee  compared  the  acceptance  tests  used  by  various  countries. 
At  the  present  time,  the  only  tests officially recognised  in Germany  and 
France  are based mainly  on  the  recommendations  contained  in ISO  R  340. 
However,  tests  have  been  conducted  in Germany  on fires  in  a  full-scale  exper-
imental  gallery,  and  work  is  continuing  to  develop  a  new  small-scale  test in 
a  laboratory  gallery. 
A  drum  friction test has  been  developed  in Belgium,  the Netherlands  and  the 
United Kingdom.  The  Belgians  and  the  Dutch  supplement  this  by  a  full-scale 
flammability  test of  a  piece of belt heated  by  a  propane  burner.  The  British 
supplementary  test is  somewhat  similar  to  the  ISO  R  340  test,  but is much 
more  severe  . 
2.1.3.4.  Comparative  tests were  made  in various  testing centres  of belts  from different 
countries,  and  the  results were  analysed. 
2.1.3.5.  Statistics were  compiled  on  fires  involving conveyor belts  for  the  period 
1  January  1960  to  31  December  1972  (470  fires  were  due  to  the  use  of  conveyor 
belts  and  the belts  themselves  were  affected in 190  cases). 
2.1.3.6.  In view of  the  urgency  of  the matter,  the  Committee  of  Experts  decided  to 
propose  the provisional  adoption of  the  drum  friction  test and  of  a  flammabil-ity test,  both of which  have  proved  effective in practice over  a  long period. 
Comparative  tests will  be  continued  in an  attempt  to  develop  a  laboratory  test 
of  the  same  reliability. 
At  the  end of  1973,  some  modifications  remained  to  be  made  to  these  tests,  as 
visits  to  Bretby,  Paturage  and  Dortmund  had  shown  that  they  did  not  take 
account of  certain new  developments.  The  draft  report by  the  Committee  of 
Experts  is  to  be  presented  to  the Working  Party  in March  1974  for  submission 
in due  course  to  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission. 
2.1.4.  Fire-resistant fluids 
2.1.4.1.  Mention was  made  in  the  lOth  Report  (page  15)  of differences  between  British 
tests  and  tests proposed  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  for  the 
Community  of  the  Six,  which  had  come  to  light when  these were  compared  in 1972, 
particularly concerning  the  objectives  of  flammability  tests. 
The  objective of  British tests  is  to  prevent  an existing fire  becoming worse 
and  to  limit  the  toxicity  and  density of  fumes,  whereas  in the  Community  of 
the  Six,  the  objective  is  to  achieve  the  highest possible  standard of  non-
inflammability.  Hence water-in-oil  emulsions  and  phosphate  esters  are  used  in 
Great  Britain which  do  not  satisfy  the  test  requirements  of  the Mines  Safety 
and  Health Commission proposals  for  the  Community  of Six. 
2.1.4.2.  On  22  June  1973,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission decided  that  these 
different criteria should be harmonized  as  soon  as  possible.  In  the  interim, 
the  group  of  experts  was  asked  to  draw  up  a  5th report  listing both  the 
criteria contained  in  the  4th  report  (Community  of  the  Six)  and  those  in  force 
in  the United  Kingdom  separately. 
The  criteria in  force  in the United  Kingdom  were  presented  in  the  same  general 
way  as  those  in  the  4th  report. 
2.1.4.3.  The  criteria contained  in the  4th  report are  now  being put  into practice, 
particularly as  regards  determination of  acute  toxicity by  thermal  decomposition 
of  anhydrous  fluids  (Type  D).  The  criteria and  testing methods  were  reviewed 
after comparing  the  results of  tests  carried out by  the Pharmakologischen 
Institutes of  the  university of  Hamburg  and  CERCHAR. 
2.1.4.4.  Tests  were  carried out  jointly by  these  two  institutes  to  develop  a  test of 
Chronic  toxicity for  organa-chlorides.  This  was  done  by  analysing  the  residue 
of  the  product  in organisms  on  the  one  hand,  and  by  analysing  the  effect of 
aerosols  conta1n1ng  the  chlorinated substances  in combination with  inhaled 
dust,  on  the  other. 
2.1.4.5.  The  Committee  of Medical  Experts  also  discussed proposals  for  determining  the 
neurotoxicity of phosphate  esters  on  the  lines  adopted  by  the Medical  Service 
of  the  NCB. 
Completing  the Fifth Report  is  a  matter of urgency,  particularly as  regards 
neurotoxicity,  as  it is becoming  increasingly  recognised  that  this  is  a  hazard 
in other industries  (e.g.  steel  and  automotive),  and  a  directive is  required 
by  all makers  of  such  fluids. 
2.1.5.  Stabilisation of ventilation in  the  event of fire 
2.1.5.1.  This  group  of  experts  held  only  three  restricted meetings. 
On  23  January  1973  experts  particularly qualified in th  computerised  calculation 
of ventilation met  at  the Lorraine Mining  Computer  Centre  in Merlebach  to 
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exchange  experience  in detecting stable and  unstable branches  in a  mine 
ventilation network. 
2.1.5.2.  On  12  March  1973,  three  experts  examined  practical measures  for  stabilising 
ventilation in the  event of  fire in underground  workings  with ascensionally 
ventilated airways. 
2.1.5.3.  The  other meeting of  12th September  1973  was  devoted  to  defining  the  task of 
two  independent  experts  of  summarising  and  adapting  all  the available results 
of  projects  for  inclusion in one  theoretical  and  practical  document. 
2.1.6.  Rescue  arrangements 
2.1.6.1.  In  addition,  the  experts  in this  field,  i.e.  heads  of mining  rescue  centres, 
met  on  21  May  1973  to  exchange  further  experience  on CO-filter self-rescuers 
and  acquaint  themselves  with  the progress  of  research into fireproof  clothing. 
2.1.6.2.  CO-filter self-rescuers 
British experience  in this  field,  which  goes  back  to  1967,  was  illustrated 
with  the  showing of  a  film. 
Reports  were  studied  on  the  use  of  self-rescuers  in mines  in Britain,  the 
Ruhr  and  the  Saar. 
The  reports  described  improvements  made  to  the  equipment,  especially 
wearability,  by  the  introduction of  a  cooling device maintaining  inhaled air 
at  a  comfortable  temperature when  the  CO  level was  high,  and  also  further 
desirable  improvements  for  example,  the  duration of use,  now  about  60  minutes, 
which might  be  increased  to  allow  for  longer  escape  routes. 
The  report also  analysed  the  results of  a  survey  on  the  circumstances  under 
which  self-rescuers  had  been worn  when  accidents  occurred underground,  and 
gave  an  estimate of  the  lives  saved  through  the  use  of self-rescuers. 
2.1.6. 3.  Fireproof  clothing 
The  heads  of mining  rescue  centres  familiarised  themselves  with  the  progress 
of  research concerning fireproof  clothing.  This  research project is subsidised 
by  the Commission  of  the  European Communities  at  the  request of  the Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Commission.  Criteria have  been defined  by  the Working  Party  on 
'Rescue  arrangements,  mine  fires  and  underground  combusion't  following  an 
accident  in the Mont-Cenis  mine  (Germany),  as  follows:  to  protect  rescue 
workers against burning  from  an  explosion developing  a  temperature of  1300° C 
for  6  seconds  and  a  pressure of  0.5  atmospheres,  the maximum  permissible 
temperature  inside  the  clothing being  60°  C. 
This  project was  taken over  by  the  following organisations: 
1.  CERHAR,  studying  the  degree of  incombustibility, 
2.  by  the Hauptstelle fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen,  Essen,  measuring  the heat 
flow  through  the  fabric  and  the  time  taken  for  the pain  threshold  to  be 
reached, 
3.  by  the  Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswezen  and 
4.  by  the  MALVOZ  Institute,  conducting full-scale  tests of wearability  and 
seeking ways  of  cooling  the wearer's  body. 
So  far  no  single fabric  has  been capable of  resisting 1300°  C  for  6  seconds 
and  the  time  taken  for  the  pain  threshold  to  be  reached has  not exceeded 
4  seconds. This  project  can only be  continued with  further  financial  assistance  and  this 
was  accepted  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  on  22  June  1973.  The 
need  for  this  grant was  endorsed. 
2.1.7.  On  22nd.  May  1973,  the  Working  Party  on  'Rescue Arrangements,  Mine  Fires,  and 
Underground  Combustion',  examined  (I)  progress  of  research  into mine  fires 
and  combustion  in  roadways  (II)  details of  equipment  available  for  rescuing 
trapped miners  by  the  drilling of  large holes  (III)  progress  of work  to 
establish tests  for  conveyor belts  (see  para.  2.1.3.).  It exchanged  experience 
upon  the  early detection of  fires,  heatings,  and  spontaneous  combustion,  and 
studied  the  rescue  operations which  followed  the  accident  at Lofthouse Mine. 
2.1.7.1.  Fires  and  Combustion  in Roadways 
2. 2 .1. 
2.2.2. 
2.2.3. 
2.2.4. 
The  research work  by  CERCHAR  on  spontaneous  combustion was  carried out both  in 
the  laboratory  and  on  site in mines.  Laboratory  tests were  aimed  at determi-
ning  the  susceptibility of  seams  to  combustion.  A test was  developed making 
use of  an  adiabatic  calorimeter;  70°  C was  determined  to  be  the  temperature 
of  no  return.  The  effect of pyrite and  certain bacteria was  studied as  well 
as  early detection by  means  of  gases  other  than  CO.  As  CO  appeared  to  be  the 
best  alarm signal,  work  was  carried out  on  site to  perfect UNOR  equipment, 
while  attemps  were  made  to  improve  detection methods  by  measuring  temperatures: 
by  thermocouples  underground  and  by  the Lorraine  infra-red  thermometer  above 
ground. 
A survey was  made  of  all places  in mines  in which  there was  a  concentration of 
hazardous  factors,  and  a  technique of  preventing fires  was  developed  by 
injecting bentonite behind  a  plaster guniting. 
Research  work  ~arried out at  the  Tremonia  experimental  mine  consisted of  t~sts 
in  the  new  7  m  underground  roadway  built inside  a  wider  roadway  on  smoke 
backflow  against  the  air current at  the  roof  to  determine  the maximum  length 
of  this  backflow  in relation  to  the  type  of  fire  and ventilation. 
The  tests were  also  intended  to  establish  the minimum  length of  a  fire-break 
zone  as  current regulations  in Germany  call for  150  m. 
2.2.  CHAPTER  B -
1WINDING  AND  GUIDE  ROPES
1 
This  Working  Party met  twice,  on  12  February  1973  at Luxembourg  and  on  12  and 
13  September  1973  at CERCHAR  and  at Lens  in France. 
On  12  February  1973  it discussed draft standard  safety directives  for  couplings, 
which  have  been under  consideration since  1969;  further  study of  this  subject 
was  held over  to  a  later meeting  to  allow  the British delegation  to  obtain 
translations of documents. 
The  Working Party party used  the  information collected on  two  visits  to  the 
United Kingdom  in  1972  by  comparing protective devices  and  techniques  used  in 
winding  and  haulage  in this  country with  those  on  the Continent;  particular 
attention was  paid  to  cage  guiding,  speed  regulation,  safety factors,  control 
of  rope  haulage,  rope  couplings,  determination of  the  coefficient of  friction 
for Koepe  driving pulleys  and  balance  ropes. 
The  visit to  CERCHAR  and  to  a  ropeworks  at Lens,  as  well  as  to  a  4-rope winding 
system with  automatic  control  in a  neighbouring mine  gave  the British delegation 
an  idea of  protective devices  and  techniques  used  on  the Continent. 
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2.3 .1. 
2.3.2. 
2.3.3. 
2.3.4. 
2.3.5. 
2.3.  CHAPTER  C - 'ELECTRIFICATION' 
This  Working Party held  one  plenary meeting at Heerlen  (Netherlands)  on 
14/15  June  1973  and  5  restricted meetings. 
At  Heerlen  the Working  Party  studied  a  new  phenomenon  involving high-tension 
cables  undergrond:  under  certain conditions,  sparking lasting several milli-
seconds  can occur between  the metallic sheath of  a  600  volt  cable  and  pit 
supports  when  power  is  switched  on or off.  The  sparks  are  capable of  igniting 
firedamp.  Earthing  the  sheaths  at  connection points  obviated  the  problem. 
During  this meeting,  the  Working Party adopted  a  report  on  'Haulage  powered  by 
linear motors',  a  traction system adapted  to  mine  conditions.  The  Working 
Party  concluded  that  this  new  system  can only be  encouraged  since no  sparks 
occur  in normal  operation,  the possibility of  abnormal  sparking is  remote, 
and  there are safety advantages  as  regards  both  the  electrocution and  the  fire 
hazard.  This  report  is  to  be  submitted  to  the Mines  Safety  and Health 
Commission  in 1974. 
The  4  restricted meetings  were  held  to  draw  up  a  draft  recommendation  and 
conclusions  on  the  composition of high-tension cables  and  associated safety 
devices;  this project has,  however,  not yet been  completed. 
The  mandate  on  standardisation of  regulations  covering  the  design,  installation 
and  use  of  electrical  equipment  and  on  approval  certificates was  reviewed  and 
slightly amended  during  the meeting  of  15  June  1973.  However,  it was  not 
possible  to  make  further progress  in  1973,  because  of  the  shortage of staff in 
the Secretariat. 
2. 4.  CHAPTER  D - I FLAt·1MABLE  DUSTS  I 
2.4.1.  This  Working  Party met  three  times,  on  30  January,  13  June  and  17  December  1973. 
2.4.2.  The  following  three  reports were  drafted: 
2.4.2.1.  Water barriers  for  containing  dust  explosions  underground 
2.4.2.1.1  This  report  describes  the  results  of  research work  and  tests  in Germany  on 
concentrated water barriers  of  the  conventional  type  and  on wide-action 
barriers of  a  new  type.  The  disaster at Luisenthal  in the  Saar  in  1962  gave 
particular impetus  to  this work. 
2.4.2.1.2 The  efficiency of  the barriers was  proved  in numerous  tests  in  the  Tremonia 
experimental  mine. 
2.4.2.1.3 The  report lists the  functional  advantages  of water over  stone dust:  smaller 
quantities of extinguishing agent,  ease of  transport  and  design,  negligible 
maintenance;  the  operating condition can be  readily  checked  from  the water 
level,  and  the water barrier can be more  easily adapted  to  the different  sizies 
and  shapes  of  roadways. 
2.4.2.1.4  The  Working  Party  recommends  wide distribution of  this  report  to  encourage 
other countries  to  use water barriers  of  this  type. 2.4.2.2.  Procedures  for neutralising dust using salt pastes,  powders,  and  flakes 
2.4.2.2.1./3.  The  Working  Party on  'Electrification'  studied  the deleterious  effects 
of  the salt used  in this  process,  upon  electrical  equipment.  (See  also 
Document  304/2/71  given in the Annex  IX  of  the  9th Report  of  the Mines  Safety 
and  Health Commission).  The  new  report  issued,  concludes  that if the 
hygroscopic  salts have  such  advantages  in the  containment  of  dust  explosions, 
the  minor  drawbacks  in the  electrical field  should  not  prevent  the  use of salts 
underground.  Meanwhile,  the  Working  Party on  Flammable  Dusts  studied  experi-
ence  gained  in  the  only  two  countries  using salt pastes  etc.,  (viz.  Germany 
and  the Netherlands). 
As  a  result of  these  studies,  the Working  Party  considered  that  the method  was 
efficient in neutralising dusts,  and  having  taken  account  of  the methods  to 
alleviate  the  corrosive effects of  the salts, it thought  that  this method  could 
be  added  to  other  steps  already  taken against  inflammable  dust underground. 
Thus  it believed  that other countries  should  adopt  these procedures,  and 
recommended  a  wide  distribution of  the  report,  in particular  to  personnel 
responsible for  the  control  of mining  operations. 
2.4.2.3.  Triggered barriers 
2.4.2.3.1.  The  Working  Party  considered  the  intermediate results of  research carried out 
by  the various  Community  experimental units,  which  had  worked  in close 
collaboration.  Following  proposals  by  the Mines  Safety  and Health Commission, 
work  programmes  were  co-ordinated;  there were  exchanges  of  ideas,  and  the 
results were  collated. 
2.4.2.3.2.  Current conclusions  are  that  triggered barriers  can be  more  effective  than 
conventional methods  at certain points  in  the  mine  such  as  advancing headings. 
A special  study  of  this  aspect has  been  completed  in France.  In Germany  and 
Great  Britain,  the  application  to  junctions between galleries,  and  at  face 
entries has  been  studied  and  also  considering  their application  to  limiting 
an  explosion  to  one  air circuit.  A continous  extinguishing device  which  could 
be  used at  these points  but might  also  have wider applications  is being 
developed  in Belgium. 
2.4.2.3.3.  The  Working  Party has  asked  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  to  ensure 
that  this  highly  interesting research project  is  actively pursued. 
2.4.3. 
It considers  that  testing complete  devices  underground  would  speed  up 
technological  development,  but  the  existing barriers would  of  course  be 
maintained  in situ.  The  experimental  devices  could  then be  tested under actual 
working  conditions.  Five  reports  drawn  up  by  research establishments  are 
annexed  to  this  document  to  give  the  technical  staff of mines  a  better idea 
of  the  research work  which  has  been  done. 
These  three  information reports will  be  submitted  to  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health Commission  in 1974  with  the  request  that  they  be  published  in the  11th 
Report  to  speed  up  wide  distribution.  (1) 
(1)  The  first  2  reports were  approved  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission 
on  22  January  and  the  3rd on  3  May  1974. 
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2. 6 .1. 
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2.6.3. 
2.5.  CHAPTER  E - 'JOINT  ACCIDENT  STATISTICS' 
This  Working  Party was  not  able  to  meet. 
To  assist  the Secretariat,  and  enable  the  Working  Party  to  carry out  the 
mandate  renewed  in  1972  (Annex  III),  an  e¥pert has  been  given  the  task of 
drawing  up  the  following  report: 
Research  into  the  systems  available both mathematical  and  statistical, most 
appropriate  to  mines  which will  permit  an  assessment  of  the  different rates 
of accident  on  a  time  base  and  between different countries  and  different 
coalfields. 
To  draw  up  a  report  to  be discussed by  the  Working Party on  'Accident 
Statistics'  which  should present a  statistical method  allowing  a  study  of  the 
actions  most  likely  to  prevent accidents. 
Research  into  the  correlation between  'blesses  graves'  accidents  (which  are 
defined  as  those  causing  incapacity  to  work  for  56  days  or more),  and  those 
which  cause  permanent  incapacity. 
To  compare  the  definitions  used  in  the classification of  accidents  used  in  the 
Community  of Six with  those  used  in  the United  Kingdom,  especially as  they 
affect  the  numbers  in  'Technical  Causes'  and  'Falls of  Ground',  etc. 
2.6.  CHAPTER  F - 'HEALTH' 
As  mentioned  under 1.2.5.3.,  this  Working Party was  not  able  to  meet  in 1973. 
However,  the  Sub-committee  of  experts which  had  drawn  up  a  report  in 1971 
on means  of  combatting dust  caused by  coal  getting and  heading machines 
revised  this  report with  a  view  to  publication,  in order  to  take  account  of 
the  rapid  development  of mining  techniques  and  British experience  in this 
field. 
The  document  is entitled  'Guide  lines  concerning  the  design  and  use  of  coal 
getting and  heading machines  relating  to  the  reduction of Airborne Dust'. 
A part of  this  document  contains  guide  lines  on  the  concept  and  design of 
machinery  in  the  form  of  specifications,  enabling  the mining  industry  to 
define  for manufacturers  its requirements  in  the  field of  dust control. 
It also  contains  guide  lines  for  the mining  industry on  the  correct use of 
this machinery. 
The  guide  lines  do  not  take  account of make  of dust  due  to  powered  supports 
and  underground  crushers.  These  subjects will  be  covered  in separate 
directives. 
This  document  is  to  be  submitted  to  the Working  Party on  'Health'  (1)  in 
1974  and  then  to  the Mines  Safety  and Health Commission  (2),  and  if possible 
will  be  annexed  to  the  11th Report. 
(1)  adopted  by  the  Working  Party  on  'Health'  on  14  February  1974 
(2)  adopted  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  on  3  May  1974 2. 7 .1. 
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2.7.  CHAPTER  G - 'PSYCHOLOGICAL  AND  STATISTICAL 
FACTORS  AFFECTING  SAFETY' 
This  Working  Party was  not  able  to  hold  a  plenary meeting  in 1973,  because 
of  the work  load which it would  have  placed on  the Secretariat. 
The  safety  campaign  experts  from  the  Working  Party did,  however,  JO~n the 
members  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  on  21.6.1973  at  a  lecture/ 
demonstration presented  by  the  SMRE  (Sheffield)  on  the  theme  'Keep  dust 
down'. 
This  was  part of  a  mobile  exhibition  v~s~t~ng various  British coalfields  and 
aimed  at making  officials  and  miners  more  aware  of certain aspects  of  safety 
and  health. 
Organised  in collaboration with  the National  Coal  Board,  the National  Union of 
Mine  Workers  and  the  Safety  in Mines  Research  Establishment,  such mobile 
exhibitions  have  already  been  seen by  10%  of all British  miners~ 
The  exhibition consists of  a  series of posters,  slides,  and  films  as  a  background 
to  a  lecture/demonstration which  illustrates  the most  important aspects  of  the 
subject.  There  is  also  a  collection of  dust  suppression equipment. 
Community  safety  campaigns  organised  in  the  coalfields  of  the Community  of  the 
Six under  the  aegis  of  the Mines  Safety  and Health Commission were  held  in 
1973  as  follows: 
In Germany,  the  theme  'Continuous  Conveyors'  was  pursued at  two  of  the  six 
mining  groups,  but was  not  completed  by  the  end  of  the year.  The  same 
campaign was  completed  in the  Saar,  and  a  report  evaluating  the  results  is 
being prepared.  All  conveyors  were  subjected  to  careful  inspection and 
improvements  were  effected where  necessary.  This  probably  led  to  a  better 
recognition of  the  hazards  by  the workmen  and  officials.  Initial results 
show  a  satisfactory reduction in the  number  of accidents. 
The  campaign  on  'Rock  fall  during drivage operations'  was  concluded  in  the 
Campine  coalfield in Belgium.  A report was  forwarded  to  the Secretariat of 
the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission;  a  decrease  in accidents  in this 
sector  in  the order of  30%  was  claimed. 
The  campaign  on  'Training on mechanized  equipment  and  accident  prevention'  in 
France was  started at  the  end  of 1973. 
The  Ruhr  industry  submitted  a  request  for  financial  assistance for  a  campaign 
on  'Dusts',  and  the Campine  region proposes  to  hold  a  campaign on  the  theme 
'Listing  the hazards  involved  in various  mining operations'. 
The  following  financial  aid was  given  in 1973: 
- Aachen: 
- Saar: 
- Campine: 
500,000  BFrs 
500,000  BFrs 
balance of  300,000  BFrs  (on  500,000  BFrs) 
-France  (3  coalfields):  agreed  award  of  750,000  BFrs  still to  be  paid. 
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2.8.  CHAPTER  H - 'VENTILATION  AND  FIRED~1P' 
This  Working Party held  two  plenary meetings  on  6  July  and  7  December  1973; 
two  meetings  of  experts  took place  on  2  March  and  5  October  1973. 
A group  of  experts  was  sent by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  to 
visit mines  in which outbursts  had  recently occurred.  These visits were  as 
follows:  on  20  March  to  pit No  25  at Monceau-Fontaine  (Belgium),  on  9  and 
10  April  to  the  Ibbenburen Mine  (Germany),  on  16  May  to  the Cynheidre Mine 
(U.K.)  and  on  25  and  26  October  1973  to  the Cevennes  collieries  (France). 
The  group  assembled  information obtained during its visits  to  the  four 
collieries. 
It is  currently preparing a  final  report  to  be  submitted  to  the Working 
Party,  and  subsequently  to  the Mines  Safety  and Health Commission,  in 1974. 
Considerable progress  has  been made  in the meetings  at Luxembourg  on  a 
directive accorded priority  treatment  in  the  terms  of  reference  (Annex  III) 
and  entitled:  'Directive  concerning  the  conditions  under which  the maximum 
permissible  firedamp  limits  may  be  raised by  exemption'. 
This  is  intended  to  give Mines  Inspectorates model  conditions  under which 
exemptions  from  regulations  governing  the maximum  permissible  firedamp  limits 
may  be  granted,  whilst maintaining  a  level  of  safety at least equivalent  to 
that  envisaged  by  pre-exemption regulations. 
These  conditions were  determined  by  analysing  the  results of: 
- a  survey of  regulations  in force  in  the  various  countries; 
- a  survey  of  the  exemption  granted  by  national  authorities  to  raise  the 
maximum  permissible  firedamp  limits;  the  conditions  under  which  these 
were  granted  and  the  experience  gained  from  their application in the  last 
five years.  This  directive should  be  ready  in  the first half of  1974,  and 
will  then be  submitted  to  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission. 
Finally,  in accordance with  a  request  from  the  European Parliament,  the 
Working  Party  studied  the  use of  firedamp  monitoring  instruments,  particularly 
hand-held  instruments. 
2.9.  CHAPTER  I  - 'MECHANIZATION' 
It was  not possible  to  hold  a  meeting  in 1973. 
Documents  asked  for  in  1972  were  assembled  on: 
- the  statutory provisions  concerning mechanization  in force  in each country; 
- this  documentation was  vast  and  complicated,  as  the provisions were  spread 
over  the  various  mining  disciplines; 
- lessons  to  be  drawn  from  typical  accidents  in working areas,  as  winning 
operations were  given priority. 
The  Working  Party will  resume  its activities  in 1974  (+). 
(+)  A meeting was  held on  8  March  1974 2~10.  CHAPTER  J  -
1ROOF  CONTROL• 
2.10.1.  This  Working  Party held  two  plenary meetings  on  17  January  and  2 April  1973 
a  group  of  experts  on  rock mechanics  met  on  26  February  1973. 
2.10.2.  It was  not  possible  to  hold  a  meeting  in  the  2nd  half of  the  year  owing 
to  the  departure  of  the  Working  Party's  secretary. 
2.10.3.  Since its creation in 1972,  the  Working  Party has  produced  two  interim 
reports: 
2.10.3.1.  The  first report  gives  comparative statistics of  fatal  and  serious  accidents 
due  to  falls  in the  Community  of  the  Six  and  in  the United Kingdom 
(Doc.  No.  604/2/73). 
2.10.3.2.  The  second  report  contains  a  comparison of  the main  factors  in mines  which 
clarify  the  accident statistics  (Doc.  No.  643/2/73). 
2.10.3.3.  The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  decided on  22  June  1973  to  publish 
these  in its 11th Report,  drawing  atten·tion  to  the Annex  to  Doc.  No. 
643/3/73 which  gives  the  summary  tables  for  roof-fall  accidents  in  the 
United  Kingdom;  these  tables  are  noteworthy  for  their detailed breakdown 
2.11.1. 
2.11.2. 
of  the  location of  the  accidents  (29  in number)  and  for  the  information  likely 
to  help  in identifying  the  causes.  The  survey  is well  suited  to  British 
working  conditions,  but  can not  be  applied  as  it stands  to  Continental  coal 
fields. 
2.11  CHAPTER  K -
1EFFECTS  OF  WORKING  TIME  ON  SAFETY  AT  WORK• 
On  22nd.  June  1973,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  requested  that 
this  Working  Party  resume  its activities, with  a  study of  the  influence  of 
shift times  on  safety,  and  if appropriate,  to  propose  different working hours. 
The  European Parliament  had  made  a  similar request. 
The  Secretariat was,  however,  not  able  to  satisfy this  request. 
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3.1.1. 
3.1.1.1. 
3.1.1.2. 
3.1.1.3. 
SECTION  III 
STUDY  OF  GROUP  ACCIDENTS 
3. 1.  ACCIDENTS  IN  1973 
Inrush at Lofthouse Colliery,  Outwood  (U.K.)  on  21  March  1973-
7  fatalities 
This  inrush of water occurred  in a  fairly flat  face  at  a  depth of  220  m, 
while  the  Flockton  seam,  0.85  m thick,  was  being worked  by  trepanner.  The 
inrush happened  when  a  face  in  the  seam  encountered  an  uncharted old 
working,  at least  100  years  old,  between  30  and  70  m from  the  mai"n  gate 
roadhead.  The  face  was  60  meters  from  the position of  an  old  shaft which 
extended  to  the  Flockton  seam,  but it was  not  known  that it had  been 
deepened  to  this  level.  Large  accumulations  of water  in the  upper measures 
of  an  abandoned  mine,  'Old Low  Laithes',  penetrated into  the  new  workings. 
Rescue workers  were  only  able  to  recover  one  body. 
Initial information on  this  accident was  submitted  to  the Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Commission  on  22  June  1973;  a  Public  Inquiry presided over 
by  Mr  CALDER  was  held  in May  1973  and  the official  report,  dated  30  August 
1973,  was  discussed  during  the meeting  of  22  January  1974. 
3.1.1.4.  The  following  are  the  recommendations  made  by  the Chief  Inspector of Mines 
and  Quarries,  and  the  conclusions  not  given  above. 
3.1.1.4.1.  (v)  import  decisions  relating  to  the  safe working of  the  mine  were  taken at 
the  planning  stage  by  surveyors  and  were  accepted by  the  manager  and  the 
Section  I  appointees  who  did  not  call for  and  examine  the  supporting 
information; 
(vi)  the  implications  of  the  environmental  changes  which  took  place  in the 
district in the weeks  immediately prior  to  the  inrush were  not fully 
appreciated. 
Recommendations 
I  recommend  that: 
(i)  in planning  for  the  extraction of  an area of  coal all  the  available 
evidence  should  be  listed and  attached  to  the  layout plan.  Minutes 
should  be  taken of all discussions  and  the  final  decisions  should  be 
recorded  and  should be  taken by  a  senior mining  engineer  carrying 
appropriate  responsibilities under  Section I  of  the Mines  and  Quarries 
Act  1954; 
(ii)  when  an area of  coal  under  consideration includes  old 
prior  to  1900,  the  utmost  care  should  be  taken  during 
investigation  to  ascertain their position and  extent. 
of positive information  the  coal  should  not be worked; 
shafts or workings 
the preliminary 
In  the  absence 
(iii)  approaches  to  the  Institute of Geological  Sciences  relating  to  areas  of 
coal  which  are  intended  to  be worked  should  be  accompanied  by  a  written 
request  for  information so  that  the  full  facilities of  the  Institute can 
be utilised; 
(iv)  the National  Coal  Board  and  the Institute of  Geological  Sciences  should 
set up  a  small  working  party  to  consider the  feasibility of preparing a 3.1. 2. 
3.1.2.1. 
3.1.2.2. 
catalogue of  old  geological  field  notebooks  and  other documents  to 
ensure  that  these  sources  of  information are not  overlooked; 
(v)  a  national  appeal  should  be  launched by  the Department of  Trade  and 
Industry  for  old mining  plans  held  in private hands  to be made  available 
for  copying; 
(vi)  the  development  of  equipment  capable of handling  fluids  with a  high 
solids  content  should be  pursued. 
Fall  of  roof  at  the  Seafield Colliery,  Kirkcaldy  (Fife,  Scotland)  on 
10  May  1973  - 5  fatalities 
The  accident occurred at a  face  180  m long at a  depth  of  500  m,  the  seam 
worked  being 1.70 m thick.  The  angle  of  lead was  170  and  the  full  dip  of 
the  strata 360  (1  in 1.4).  The  length of  the  fall  was  64  m. 
Initial information on  this  accident was  submitted  to  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health Commission  on  22  June  1973,  and  a  Public  Inquiry,  under  the direction 
of Mr  CALDER,  was  held  in August  1973. 
It was  not possible  to  study  the official  report,  dated  19  November  1973, 
before  22  January  1974.  The  conclusions  and  recommendations  of  this 
report are,  however,  given below. 
Conclusions 
I  conclude  that: 
(i)  An  extensive fall  of  roof  occurred  on  D.22  face  in the Dysart Main  seam 
extending  for  a  distance of  about  210  feet  and  displacing  61  powered 
supports. 
(ii)  The  fall started near  powered  support No.90  when  the  roof  beds  in  the 
waste  broke  down  heavily  and  over-ran several  powered  supports  on  the 
face  line at  a  point where  there were  natural  slips in  the  roof.  Bed 
separation of  the  immediate  roof  strata had  already  taken place at a 
well  defined  smooth  parting,  6!  to  8  feet  above  the  seam,  and  the effect 
of  the  first fall was  to  release  the  detached  roof which  broke over  the 
coalhead  and  collapsed  so  that  large blocks  of  roof  stone  slid down  and 
reeled out  the  supports,  pushing  them  downhill  and  backwards  into  the 
waste.  There  followed  a  progressive collapse of  roof  on  the  rise side. 
(iii)  The  supports  were  set on  an  irregular floor with  a  varying  thickness  of 
spillage coal  beneath  them  and  many  were  not fully pressurised  to  the 
roof.  In  addition,  12  were  not  connected  to  the  conveyor.  Because  of 
this  they  were  not  sufficiently stable for  the  inclinations on which 
they were  in use. 
(iv)  Much  of  the  trouble  arose  because  of horizon control difficulties with 
the  power  loaders  but  the  development  of  the  face  heading  to  a  height  in 
excess  of  the  maximum  extended height of  the powered  supports  was 
unsatisfactory.  The  supports  could  not be  fully  pressurised  to  the  roof 
and  this  allowed  bed  separation  to  occur  as  the  face  moved  away. 
(v)  The  development  of  the  face  at an  angle  of  lead of  17  degrees  produced  a 
steep  inclination in  the  line of  advance  and  this contributed  to  the  in-
stability of  the  supports  and  the  ease with which  they were  pushed  back 
into  the waste. 
(vi)  The  planning  arrangements  did  not  ensure  that  the most  stable  supports 
available in  the  area were  reserved  for  use  on  D.22  face. 
(vii)  The  supervision in the district was  not  up  to  the  standard  required  for 
modern  methods  of working  and,  in particular,  consultations between 
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district officials did not  ensure  that urgent unfinished  tasks,  such  as 
the  changing  of clevises,  received  the  attention necessary  for  prompt 
completion.  An  improvement  might  well  be  achived  by  the  adoption of 
shift working  by  Under Managers  as  provided  for  in Section  2  of  The 
Mines  Management  Act  1971. 
Recommendations  of  H.M.  Chief  Inspector of Mines  and  Quarries 
3.1.3. 
3.1.3.1. 
3.1.3.2. 
3.1.3.3. 
I  recommend  that: 
(i)  The  Committee  formed  to  study all aspects  of  the  working of  steep  seams 
in coal  mines  should  give  priority  to  the  design and  development  of  a 
purpose built powered  support  for  use  on  steep  faces. 
(ii)  The  National  Coal  Board  should  examine  critically its planning arrange-
ments  to  ensure  that  the most  suitable  type of  support is selected for 
steep  faces. 
(iii)  The  arrangements  for  the  approval  of  powered  supports  under Regulation 
16(2)  of  the  Coal  and  Other Mines  (Support)  Regulations  1966  should  be 
revised  to  ensure  that all supports  used  on  faces  in steep  seams  are  sub-
jected  to  additional  tests which  simulate  the  conditions  under  which 
they will  operate. 
(iv)  All  power  loading machines  used  on  steep  faces  should  be  fitted with 
steering underframes  and  consideration should  be  given  to  their automatic 
operation. 
(v)  The  research  to  improve  the  design,  loading characteristics  and  shielding 
of  shearer drums  should  be  given  a  higher degree of priority. 
(vi)  The  arrangements  for  supervision by  underground officials at modern 
highly mechanised mines  should  be  reviewed  to  ensure  that consultation 
at  change  of  shift is  adequate  and  that  an official,  statutorily appointed 
as  an  Under Manager,  is on  duty  on all production shifts. 
(vii)  Provision should be made  for  special  training facilities  for men  who  are 
to  be  employed  on  steep  faces. 
Winding  accident at Markham  near Chesterfield  (United  Kingdom)  on  30  July  1973  -
18  fatalities  and  11  persons  severely  injured 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission was  not  able  to  study  the initial report 
of  this  accident,  dated  10  September  1973,  until  22  January  1974. 
This  accident  was  also  the  object of  a  Public  Inquiry presided over by 
Mr  CALDER;  the official report was  not  available. 
The  causes  of  and  circumstances  attending  this  accident may  be  summed  up 
as  follows: 
Following  a  break  in  the  main  tension rod of  the  spring nest  for  the  brake 
assembly,  a  descending  cage  containing  29  workmen  could  not  be  braked  and 
ran  into  the  landing at  the  bottom of  a  400  m shaft.  The  electrical safety 
devices,  viz  a  circuit breaker activated by  overspeed,  and  one  activated by 
pushing  an  emergency  button,  were  ineffective since  they  acted  on  the  same 
brake  and  tripping prevented  the  application of  electrical braking. 
While waiting for  the  results  of  the Public  Inquiry,  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health Commission  asked  the  Working  Party on  'Winding  and  guide  ropes'  whose 
competence it extended  to  winding machines,  to  contact  the members  of  the 
board of  inquiry set up  in  the United Kingdom,  in order  to  permit  the  results 
of  this  investigation,  to  be  available  to  the  Community  as  a  whole. 3.1.4. 
3.1.4.1. 
.3.1.4.2. 
3.1.4.3. 
Rock  burst at  the  Sachsen mine,  near Hamm  (Germany)  on  8  August  1973  -
- 9  fatalities  and  8  persons  injured 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  studied this  accident  for  the  first 
time  on  22  January  1974,  although  the Mines  Inspectorate has  not yet 
published  a  final  report. 
The  causes of  and  circumstances  attending  this  accident may  be  summed  up 
as  follows: 
The  accident  occurred  in a  descending  incline being  sunk  in  seam  18. 
This  fairly flat  seam,  with  a  working  thickness  of  5.5.  m.,  was  usually 
worked  in  two  lifts,  the  upper  level with pneumatic  stowing and  the  lower 
with  caving.  The  incline had  been driven  in  the  full  seam  section for 
20  m.  The  descending  incline in the  upper  3  m of  the  seam,  started at  the 
beginning  of  June,  had  reached  a  length of  68  m.  at  the  time  of  the 
accident.  Since  the  seam was  subject  to  rock bursts,  before  the  incline 
was  advanced,  borings  of  20  to  25  m.  long were  made,  one  in the  line of 
advance  and  the  other  two  at an  angle  of  15  degrees  in  the walls  and  towards 
the  lower  seam.  The  results  of  these borings  (excessive  amounts  of  fine 
dust  in relation to  the  volume  drilled and  known  danger  thesholds)  had, 
from  the beginning  of  the  drivage,  required  the drilling of  several relief 
holes  (96  mm.  in diameterY  which  has  yielded  a  total  amount  of  248m3  of coal. 
Other  investigatory probes  had  also  been drilled in the walls  behind  the 
face  of  the  incline. 
The  first 
750  m3  of 
unawares. 
seriously 
roof  break occurred  towards  the middle  of  the  incline ejecting 
coal  and  filling  the  incline over  20  to  50  m.  It took  19  workers 
They  were  hurled  towards  the  roof:  9  died  and  8  were more  or  less 
injured.  The  5  workers  who  were working at  the  face were  rescued. 
3.1.4.4.  An  hour before  the  accident  a  rock burst had  been registered in Cologne  and 
in Bochum  and  had  been  traced  to  the  Sachsen mine,  1.2 km.  from  the position 
of  the  accident.  The  rock burst causing  the  accident  had  also been  registered. 
The  Westphalische  Berggewerkschaftskasse  in Bochum  has  been asked  to  establish 
any  possible  links  between  the  two  events  and  to  decide whether  excess  stress 
can be  transferred  to  adjacent districts. 
3.1.4.5.  The  seam  is  under  100m.  of strata with more  than  50%  of  sandstone,  and  lies 
above  50  m of strata with more  than  75  % of  sandstone.  50  m above  the 
descending incline  there was  the  stopline of  an old working  in  the Ernestine 
Seam. 
3.1.4.6.  The  North-Rhine-Westphalia Inspectorate has  decided  that henceforth: 
3.1.4.6.1.  development  drivages  in seam  18  or similar seams  should  be driven in the 
full  seam  section; 
3.1.4.6.2.  the minimum  number  of workers  should  be  employed  in workings  liable to 
rock bursts; 
3.1.4.6.3.  It should  be  noted  that in this accident  there  had  been  a  resurgence  of  stress 
behind  the  face  of  the  advancing  incline;  in planning holes  for detection 
of stress  account  should be  taken of  this possibility. 
3.2.  An  Outburst of  firedamp  in pit No  25  of Monceau-Fontaine  (Belgium)  on 
7  November  1972  - 6  fatalities 
3.2.1.1.  An  initial report of  this  accident was  submitted  to  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health Commission  on  6  February  1973  and  a  final  report was  submitted  on 
22  June  1973. 
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3.2.1.2. 
3.2.1.3. 
3.2.2. 
3.2.2.1. 
The  causes  of  and  circumstances  attending  this  accident may  be  summed  up 
as  follows: 
The  outburst occurred  in  the  intake  airway of district  'S  Paumes',  face  C, 
at  a  depth of  930  m. 
This  mine  is  classified under Category III for  firedamp  with liability to 
outbursts,  but  the  area  in which  the  accident occurred was  not  considered 
to  be  dangerous  as  no  accident  had  taken place  in  the  course of working 
lower panels  which  has  been extracted since  1961.  This  was  considered  to 
be  especially  true  above  the  face where it had  entered  the  old  'Bourbier' 
concession which  was  only  classed as  category II with no  liability to  outbursts. 
The  seam  dipped  at  140  towards  the  north  and  was  worked  as  a  220  m plough  face 
together with  an  armoured  conveyor  and  cantilevered steel bars with descensional 
ventilation.  The  seam  had  a  normal  thickness  of  1.3 m with  a  fault at  the  top 
of  the  face  where  the  thickness  increased in places  to  2.7  m. 
The  main  roadway  had  been driven  7  m ahead  of  the  face,  with  3  exploratory  and 
relief boreholes,  110  mm  in diameter  and  4  m long,  drilled each  day.  The  daily 
rate of  advance  was  1.5 m.  The  deputy  for  the  district had visited the  bottom 
of  the  face  a  few  minutes  before  the  accident  and  had  not  noticed anything 
unusual. 
The  coal  ejected by  the  outburst engulfed  the  five  workmen  engaged  in driving 
the  intake  roadway  and  one  workman  near  the  road.  Ventilation was  only just 
maintained,  although  the  normal  airflow was  20  m3/sec because  of  the  gassy 
nature of  the  working.  (1.1.  % CH4  in  the  return airflow,  production being 
600  saleable  tons  per day). 
80  tons  of  coal  were  ejected  and  the quantity of  firedamp  released during  the 
first  few  hours  was  estimated at 11,500 m3. 
After  the  accident,  the  length of  the  exploratory  and  relief boreholes  was 
extended  to  15  m,  and  the  roadway  was  extended  further  in front  of  the  face. 
The  seam was  found  to  be  very  irregular as  a  result of  a  fault.  In 
consequence,  the  upper  50  m of  the  face  had  been  abandoned,  and  a  new  road 
had  been started  from  this  point,  preceded by  boreholes  15  m long.  After  an 
advance  of  28  m,  a  new  outburst occurred,  ejecting 80  tons  of  extremely fine 
dust.  The  working was  then  abandoned. 
Following  this  accident,  the  Belgian Mines  Inspectorate  issued  a  Ministerial 
circular containing new  preventive measures.  This  circular gives  information 
on  the mechanics  of  an outburst.  Indices  of  susceptibility are  used  to 
recognise  the  imminance  of  an outburst  and  thus  the  required preventative 
measures. 
The  Mines  Safety  and Health Commission  approves  these measures,  whilst  the 
circular is fully  reproduced  in Annex  X. 
Outburst  of  coal  and  co2  in  the Dauphine  coalfield on  4  May  1971  -
8  fatalities 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  discussed  this  accident for  the  last 
time  on  6  February  1973. 
The  causes  of  and  circumstances  attending  the  accident were  given  in  the  9th 
Report,  p.  21,  and  the  lOth Report,  p.  27.  Conclusions  are  summarised  in 
these  reports.  They  are  also  given  in summary  form  below  as  they  are  not 
applicable  to  other mines  liable  to  outbursts. 3.2.2.2. 
3.2.3. 
3.2.3.1. 
3.2.3.2. 
3.2.3.3. 
The  French Mines  Inspectorate decided  to  retain  the method  of  inducer 
shotfiring to  prevent outbursts,  but it may  only  be  used with  the  approval 
of  the  Senior Mines  Inspector.  The  decision can be  delegated  to  the  Special 
Service  for  outbursts  in  the  Dauphine  coalfield which classifies  each working 
individually.  The  objective criteria 6  and v1  are not  applicable  to  C02; 
consequently,  subjective criteria have  ~o be  applied,  such  as  the quantity 
and quality of  curvings  from drilling.  This  information must  be  given  to  the 
the  Special Service.  The  new  measures  recommended  by  the Mines  Inspectorate 
are  aimed  at  improving  this  information.  If there  is  the slightest doubt, 
the working must  be  classified as  dangerous  by  the  Special  Service  and  inducer 
shotfiring must  be  used. 
Rock  burst at  the Hannover pit at  Bochum-Hordel  (Germany)  on  4  May  1971 
- 6  fatalities 
The  circumstances  attending  this  accident were  given in the  9th Report, 
p.  22. 
A final  exchange  of  views  took  place when  the Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  met  on  22  February  1973. 
The  causes  of  and  circumstances  attending  this  accident may  be  summarised 
as  follows: 
The  rock burst  occurred  on  the  950  m level  in a  continuation of  the  face 
beyond  a  geological  fault  o.f  3.7 min a  seam  1.7 m thick,  with roof  and  floor 
of  sandstone,  dipping at  50  to  55  gons,  worked  by  means  of  an  oblique  face, 
with winning  by  pneumatic  pick.  No  rock bursts  had  occurred previously  in this 
district.  However,  after a  weak  weight  due  to  relaxation  (which  occurred 
10  days  before  the  accident  in  the  region of  a  fault)  several  borings  had 
been made  as  laid down  in Mines  Inspectorate directives  to  locate  the  con-
centrations  of  stress;  the  results of  two  borings  carried out  in  the morning 
of  the  day  the  accident  occurred were  not  interpreted correctly. 
The  rock burst occurred  during  the  afternoon shift;  6  miners  were  killed 
either by  flying  coal  or by  being buried. 
The  following preventative measures  were  adopted  on  the  initiation of  the 
Chief  Inspector of Mines  for  North-Rhine-Westphalia  concerning  the application 
of boreholes  for  detecting stress  concentrations  and  for  relief of pressure. 
These boreholes  had  already been prescribed.  The  undernoted  steps were 
accepted by  the  Steinkohlenbergbauverein  in Essen: 
3.2.3.3.1.  Training  and  instruction for  all officials  involved;  training of  the drilling 
and  injection teams. 
3.2.3.3.2.  Inspection of workings  by  experts  in  the  assessment  of  the  geological  and 
technical  aspects  of winning operations;  the preliminary  calculation of 
stress distribution,  location of  danger  zones  and  points;  development  and 
application of  counter-measures. 
3.2.3.3.3.  Improvement  of drilling machines  for  exploratory  and  relief voreholes. 
3.2.3.3.4.  Continuation of  research into  and  development  of methods  to mark  out  zones 
threatened by  rock bursts,  together with ways  of detecting and  combatting 
the  risks  involved. 
3.2.3.4.  The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  approved  these measures.  On 
22  February  1973  following  the  study  of  these  rock bursts  and  outbursts, 
the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  confirmed its previous  decision  to 
entrust investigation of  these  two  problems  to  the  Working Parties on 
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'Ventilation and  Firedamp'  and  'Roof  control',  the  latter Working  Party 
studying  the mechanical  interactions  between  the  two  phenomena. 
Pending  the  result of  these  studies,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission 
decided  on  22  February  1973  to  send  a  small  delegation  to  the  site of  the 
most  recent occurences  of  the  phenomena  to  note  the  lessons  learned by  these 
coalfields  (see  284). 
X 
X  X SECT ION  IV 
IMPLEMENTATION  OF  PROPOSALS  MADE  TO  GOVERNMENTS  BY 
THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
4.1.  Annex  V gives  the  main  points  of  the  proposals  made  to  governments  by  the 
Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  in pursuance  of Article  1  of its terms  of 
reference,  with  a  view  to  improvement  of  safety  and  health  in  coal  mines.  These 
proposals  are  drawn  up  in  the  form  of  "recommendations",  "directives",  opinions 
and  observations,  depending  on  the matter  involved  and  the possibility of  in-
corporating them  in mining  regulations.  The  opinions  and  observations  take 
account  of matters  in certain new  fields  and  cannot  in general  be  incorporated 
in mining regulations  but,  because  of  their importance,  are  sent  to  governments 
and  interested persons  for  information  so  that  they  may  be  applied  as  far  as 
possible. 
4.2.  In pursuance  of Article  4  of its  terms  of  reference,  governments  are  regularly 
requested  to  inform the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  of  the  measures 
taken  to  comply  with  these  proposals.  The  latest  information  obtained  in  this 
matter refers  to  the  situation  on  1  January  1974  and  again  shows  that  the  pro-
posals  from  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  have  almost  all been  implemen-
ted. 
The  classification of  the  recommendations,  directives,  op~n~ons  and  observations 
has  been  revised  this  year  and  now  depends  on  the nature  of  the  subject matter 
and  not  on  the chronological  order in which  they were  issued. 
For  the  first  time,  these  tables  indicate  the  situation in  the United Kingdom, 
showing  that,  on  the  whole,  problems  have  been  treated  in much  the  same  manner 
in  the  United  Kingdom  as  in  the  former  Community  of  Six.  There  are  however 
some  differences,  which  are  quoted  in  the  report,  and Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  \vorking Parties  are  attempting to  find  joint solutions  for  these. 
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SECTION  V 
JOINT  ACCIDENT  STATISTICS 
5.1.  Annex  I  contains  tables  la)  and  lb),  which  give  absolute  figures  and  frequency 
rates  (per million hours)  for fatalities  and  injuries  for  1973  according  to 
the  13  "technical"  causes  and  4  accident  sites.  Tables  2a)  and  2b),  which  give 
a  similar information  concerning fatalities  and  injuries  in accordance with 
the severity and  locality of  the  injuries.  These  tables  cover  Belgium,  the 
Netherlands,  Italy,  the Federal Republic of  Germany  ~,ri th separate  tables  for 
each  coal  field  (in Germany  and  France).  A summary  has  been made  for  these 
countries  for  tables  la)  and  lb),  but not  for  2a)  and  2b)  as it was  not pos-
sible  for  Belgium  to provide  the necessary details. 
5.2. 
5.2 .1. 
5.2.2. 
5.2.3. 
5. 3. 
For  the United Kingdom,  tables  la)  and  lb),  2a)  and  2b)  have  been  drawn  up  on 
an  experimental basis but  only  for  fatalities  and  "serious  injuries
11
• 
The  results  for  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Community  of  Six can  only  be  partial-
ly  compared with  reservations  for  the  following  reasons 
United Kingdom  injury figures  cannot be  incorporated in their present  form  in 
the  tables  used by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission.  Records  are kept  for 
all accidents  g1v1ng  rise  to more  than  three  days'  incapacity whereas  for  the 
community  of  Six,  the  records  are  for  at  least  4  days  of  incapacity  and  under 
different headings. 
Different criteria are  used  to  define  the  term "serious" accidents  :  in the 
United  Kingdom  it means  those which  result  in  serious  fractures  or  amputations 
and  other  injuries which  might  endanger  life or lead  to permanent  incapacity, 
while  in the  Community  of  Six,  it means  accidents  causing  temporary  incapacity 
of  more  than  56  days.  These  accident  rates  are  not comparable  in their present 
form.  The  study mentioned  in 2.5.2.  will  attempt  to  deal with  this matter. 
Fatal accidents  mean  those  resulting in death within  52  weeks  after the  accident 
in  the  United  Kingdom,  and within  56  calendar  days  in  the  Community  of  Six.  In 
spite  of  this  difference,  rates  for  these  accidents  are  generally  comparable. 
As  in earlier years,  the  tables  in this  chapter  include  a  chronological  compari-
son  of  serious  and  fatal  accidents  since  1968  for  the  Community  of Six.  These 
figures  are  given  in tables  A,  B,  and  C  (collective  accidents)  and D,  which 
summarizes  the  important  factors.  The  lower  section of  the  latter table  gives 
the  corresponding  figures  for  the  United Kingdom  in  1973. 
A summary  of  the  frequency  rates  of all  accidents  in  1973  in the  Community  of 
Six is  also  given with  these  tables  (lb),  2b))  and  tables  1  b)  and  2b)  for  the 
United Kingdom,  but  for  fatalities  and  "serious  injuries"  only. 
5.4.  As  has  been  mentioned,  the  only  comparison which  can  properly be  made  without 
further  investigation is  that  of  fatal  accidents  :  In  1973  there were  74 
fatalities  in  the United Kingdom,  representing  a  rate of  0.241  per million 
hours,  and  137  fatalities  (a rate of 0.413  ~er million hours)  in the  Community 
of  Six.  The  United Kingdom  rate  is  significantly  lower  than  the  Community  one. 
For  the  purposes  of statistical comparison,  it is  advisable  to  deduct  fatali-
ties  resulting  from  collective  accidents  (30  in  the  United Kingdom  and  9  in the 
Community  of Six);  the  rates  are  then  0.111  and  0.385  respectively. 
5.5.  Returning  to  the  chronological analysis  of serious  and  fatal accidents  in  the 
Community  of  Six,  the  same  reservations  apply  as  in earlier years.  The  rates 
cannot  be  compared  as  such  and  a  certain margin  or  confidence  interval should 
be  allowed. Summarising  the  tendencies  which  can  be  observed  from  table D under  these 
conditions,  the  frequency  of fatalities has  risen  from  0.399  to 0.413 per mil-
lion hours,  an  increase of  3.9  %.  If collective accidents  are  disregarded, 
these  rates  are  0.382  and  0.386  respectively,  an  increase  of  1  %,  which  cannot 
be  regarded  as  significant,  since  the  confidence  interval is relatively great 
(±  12  %).  The  frequency  rate  for fatalities  has  levelled off after the  constant 
and  significant reduction  observed since  1957. 
The  frequency  rate for  serious  injuries has  risen  from  15.60 to 16.77,  an  in-
crease of  7  %,  which  is significant  :  after improving  since  1969  and  then  level-
ling off,  the  rate  is  on  the  increase. 
This  increase  is  indicated in tables  A and  F  under  almost  all headings  or 
"technical  causes"  and  particularly headings  I  to  IV  :  Falls  of  ground,  haulage 
and  transport,  movement  of personnel  and  machinery. 
5.6.  A chronological  analysis  of  other  accidents  in  the  Community  of  Six  can  only be 
made  for  a  period of  3  years,  which  is  too  short  a  time  to permit  a  reliable 
interpretation of  the variations. 
Bearing  in mind  these  reservations,  it should be  mentioned,  that  (see  tables 
la)  and  lb)). 
(i)  - the  number  of  casualties  causing incapacity of  21  to  56  days  fell  from 
18,531  to  17,325  and  the  rate per million hours  rose  from  50.17  to·52.26, 
an  increase  of  4.17  %,  which  is  significant  (>1.05  % x  2) 
(ii) - the number  of  casualties  causing incapacity of  4  to  20  days  fell  from 
40,376  to  37,384  and  the  rate per million hours  rose  from  109.31  to 
112.77,  an  increase  of  3.17%  (>0.7%  x  2).  In  this  connection it should 
be  remembered  that  the Working  Party concerned  considers  that  the  fre-
quency  of  these  accidents  also  depends  on  social factors  and  cannot  be 
regarded  as  a  true  reflection of  safety and  accident  prevention  standards. 
5.7.  In  the  same  way  as  last year,  the  distribution of  accidents  in  1973  is  given 
I 
II 
by  categories  or "technical  causes"  in  the  Community  of Six.  A similar examina-
tion is made  for  the  United Kingdom  for  serious  injuries  and  fatalities  (table 
la). 
If we  deduct  the  casualties  arising from  the  3 British collective  accidents  and 
the  one  collective  accident  in  the  Community  of  Six,  the distribution is  as 
follows  for  the  first five headings. 
1973  Community  (Six)  United  Kingdom 
4  to  20  21  to  56  >  56  Fat ali-
days  days  days  Fatalities  Total  Serious  ties  Total 
%  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Falls  of  ground  32.1  26.3  25.6  25.8  29.8  24.8  29.5  25.2 
Haulage  and  transport  5.2  7.3  12.6  29. 1  6.6  38.9  47.7  39.7 
' 
III Falls by  accident  21.2  26.5  23.1  9. 7  22.9  10 .o  2.5  9.0 
victim 
IV  Machinery,  tools  etc.  15.0  13.7  12.0  4. 8  14.4  17.2  4.1  15.4 
v  Falling objects  21.2  22.0  21.6  4. 8  21.4  4.7  1.2  1.0 
Total  I  to  V  94.7  95.8  94.9  74.2  95.1  95.6  85.0  90.3 
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Headings  I  to V account  for  95  % of injuries  and  74  % of fatalities  in  the 
Community  of  Six,  and  95  % and  85  % respectively  in  the United Kingdom.  For 
the  "Six"  these  accidents  may  be  divided  into three  approximately  equal parts  -
falls  of  ground;  haulage  and  transport;  and  falls  by  the  accident  victim, 
represent almost  50  % of  the  total of  serious  injuries  and  fatalities.  The 
reasons  for  these  disparities will be  studied by  the Working  Party  on  Joint 
Accident  Statistics which will  use  the  results  of  the  investigation mentioned 
earlier. 
5.8.  The  analysis  of  tables  2a)  and  2b)  on  the  location  and  nature  of injuries  can-
not be  made  for  the  Community  since it was  not possible  to  summarize  the  data. 
To  sum  up,  it is suggested that accident  frequency  rates  in the  Community  of 
Six have  increased significantly for  injuries  and  levelled off for fatalities 
between  1972  and  1973. 
The  Working  Party on  Joint Accident  Statistics is  to resume  its work  and  will 
attempt  to harmonize  accident  figures  in  the Community  of  Six and  the  United 
Kingdom. 
It should be  indicated in this  connection  that Annex  XII  gives  a  statistical 
comparison  of  serious  accidents  due  to falls  of  ground  in  1969,  1970  and  1971, 
and  an  example  of  the very  detailed way  in which  accidents  figures  are  recorded 
in  the  United Kingdom.  This  document  was  drawn  up  by  the Working  Party on  Roof 
Control. GERMANY  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  4,843  4,779 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  2,550  2,569 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  2,497  2,463 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  o, 767  0,914 
5)  Falling objects  2,537  2, 719 
6)  Explosives  0,015  0,011 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,011  0,016 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  0,004  -
11)  Electricity  0,010  0,014 
12)  Other  causes  0,487  0,522 
TOTAL  13 '7 21  14,007 
BELGIUM  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  5,911  4,294 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  4,132  2, 979 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  1,  3"54  0,998 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  2,804  2,085 
5)  Falling objects  0,414  0,371 
6)  Explosives  0,027  0,007 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  fiiedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,011  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - -
11)  Electricity  0,011  -
12)  Other  causes  0, 260  0,255 
TOTAL  14,924  10,989 
A.  Comparative  Table of numbers  of  persons  incapacitated 
by  underground  accidents  for eight weeks  or  longer 
years  1958-1973  per  '000,000 man-hours 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
4,886  4'  797  4,682  4, 663  4,894  4,732  4,  7 21  4,524 
2,445  2.458  2,501  2,433  2,385  2,411  2,067  1,913 
2,348  2,512  2,608  2,646  2, 744  3,032  2,852  2, 974 
0,920  0,867  1,046  1,213  1,242  1,234  1,244  1,124 
2,738  2,945  3,077  3,038  3,242  3,344  3, 272  3,642 
0,010  0,009  0,008  0,006  0,006  0,005  0,005  0,017 
- 0,002  o, 123  0,010  - 0,014  0,013  -
- - - - - 0,005  - 0,003 
0,003  0,002  - - - - - -
- - - 0,004  - - - -
0,012  0,014  0,006  0,012  0,009  0,002  0,010  0,006 
0,457  0,503  0,488  0,473  0,477  0,354  0,414  0,396 
13,819  14,109  14,539  14,499  14,999  15,133  14,598  14,599 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
4,324  4,071  4,439  4,432  4,417  3' 574  3,568  3,850 
2, 709  2,770  3,331  3,565  3,419  2,866  3,269  2,960 
1,008  1,062  1' 136  1,066  0,961  0,771  0,936  0,903 
2,386  2,097  2,461  2,414  2,310  2,126  2,146  2,265 
0,354  0,301  0,445  0,547  0' 397  0,292  0,349  0,459 
0,032  0,018  - 0,019  0,018  - 0,013  0,056 
- - - - 0,009  0,031  - -
- - - - - - 0,013  -
- - - - - 0,021  - -
- - 0,010  - - - - -
0,016  0,018  0,010  0,009  - 0,010  0,015  -
o, 260  0,301  0,351  0,198  0,268  0,333  0,362  0,278 
11,089  10,638  12,161  12,250  11' 7  99  10,024  10,669  10'  7 71 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
4,618  4, 736  4,321  4,354  4,20  4,30 
1,994  2,195  2,007  1 '7 24  1,81  1, 80 
3,300  3,399  3,370  3,246  3,48  3,98 
1,396  1,291  1,382  1,597  1,38  1,61 
3,773  4,036  4,166  3,313  3,49  3,49 
0,011  0,007  0,008  - - -
0,004  0,004  - 0,012  - -
- - - - - -
0,004  - - - - -
- - - - - -
0,011  0,026  0,012  0,008  0,01  0,005 
0,429  0,402  0,532  0,632  0,96  0,99 
15,540  16,096  15 '7 98  14,886  15,31  16,19 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
3' 676  5,07 5  4, 673  3,989  4,6  4,02 
3,220  3,169  3,018  3, 365  2,8  3,33 
1,122  1,186  1,144  1,496  1,3  1,41 
1,903  2,353  1,801  2,469  1,7  2,58 
0,358  1,244  1,242  1,870  1,5  1,44 
0,049  - - 0,025  0,03  -
- 0,019  - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - 0,025  - -
0,016  0,019  - - - 0,03 
0,228  o, 17 5  0,195  0,324  0,2  0,36 
10' 57 2  13,240  12,097  13' 563  12,13  13,16 ;'( 
FRANCE  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  5,027  4,665 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,980  1,695 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  1,505  1,118 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  0,914  1,022 
5)  Falling  objects  1,890  2,187 
6)  Explosives  0,043  0,051 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,047  0,088 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,004  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - -
11)  Electricity  0,014  -
12)  Other  causes  2,956  2, 7 68 
TOTAL  14,380  13,594 
ITALY  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  1,355  1,378 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,335  0,984 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0,668  0,394 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  1,169  0,984 
5)  Falling objects  1,169  1,698 
6)  Explosives  o, 167  -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  - -
8)  Sudden  outburst  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of  water  - -
11)  Electricity  - -
12)  Other  causes  0,334  0,591 
TOTAL  6,197  6,299 
* Including  Provence  as  from  1970. 
A.  Comparative  Table  of  numbers  of  persons  incapacitated 
by  underground  accidents  for  eight weeks  or  longer 
years  1958-1973  per  '000,000 man-hours 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
4,  744  4,416  4,222  4,177  4,308  3,941  3' 927  3,634 
1,920  2,106  2,196  2,364  2' 27 8  2,153  1,858  1,918 
2,873  2,334  2,458  2,368  2,383  2,087  2,239  2,174 
1,621  2,523  2,991  3,096  3,042  2, 272  2,639  2, 773 
1,893  2,292  2,073  2, 27 8  2,074  1,839  1, 7 85  2,114 
0,031  0,017  0,051  0,009  0,013  0,037  0,010  0,011 
- - 0,004  - - - 0,029  -
- - - - - - - 0,005 
- - - - - - - -
- - - - 0,018  - 0,005  - -
0,004  0,029  0,004  0,014  0,009  0,014  - 0,005 
o, 793  0,362  0,240  0,354  0' 227  0' 174  0,200  0,185 
1968 
4,162 
1,946 
2,815 
3,016 
2,386 
-
-
-
-
0,006 
0,006 
0,233 
13,909  14,079  14,239  14' 660  14,347  12,517  12,692  12,819  14,570 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968 
1,808  - 0,792  0,366  0,893  5, 57 2  6,360  5,580  0,182 
1,205  o, 676  1,847  1,465  1 '7 87  - 0'  707  0,  797  0,812 
1,005  1'  578  1,056  0,732  1, 7  87  - 0,707  1,594  0,812 
o, 603  0,902  1,584  1,465  3,127  7 '164  7 '067  13,552  7,304 
1,808  2,029  2, 37 5  3,296  3' 574  0' 796  - 6,377  6,493 
- 0,225  - 0,366  - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
o, 603  0,451  - - - 1,592  3,360  3,189  0,812 
7,032  5,861  7, 654  7 '690  11,168  15,124  18,201  31,089  17,043 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
4,044  3 '7 61  3,721  3 '79  4,38 
1,556  1,666  1,959  1,89  2,37 
3,226  3,372  3,667  4,51  4, 79 
3,070  3,332  2,373  2,63  2,84 
2,537  2,515  4,566  4,96  5,00 
0,050  0,016  - 0,02  -
- 0,087  - - -
- - - - -
- - - - 0,01 
- 0,032  - 0,01  0,04 
0,014  0,024  0,009  0,01  -
0,291  0,294  0,314  0,43  o, 67 
14'  7 88  15,099  16,609  18,24  20,09 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
3,656  - 5,958  2,20  -
- - 3,404  - -
1,462  - 1,  702  - 3,25 
8,043  6,896  2,553  - -
3,656  - 1,  702  - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- 5' 17 2  0,851  - -
16,817  12,068  16,170  2,20  3,25 NETHERLANDS  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  1,326  1,464 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,511  1,562 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0,324  0,386 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  o, 617  0,402 
5)  Falling objects  0,401  0,515 
6)  Explosives  - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of  water  - -
11)  Electricity  - -
12)  Other  causes  0,262  0,161 
TDrAL  4,441  4,490 
COMMUNITY  (IV)  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of•ground  4,846  4,490 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  2,602  2,347 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  2,003  1,823 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  1,098  1,064 
5)  Falling objects  1,962  2,161 
6)  Explosives  0,023  0,020 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,017  0,030 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,002  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  0,002  -
11)  Electricity  0,010  0,008 
12)  Other  causes  0,985  1,012 
TOTAL  13,551  12,954 
A.  Comparative  Table of  numbers  of  persons  incapacitated 
by  underground  accidents  for eight  weeks  or  longer 
years  1958-1973  per  '000,000 man-hours 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
1,305  1,829  2,238  1,742  2,017  1,923  1,688  2,466 
1,898  1,924  2,590  1,826  1,952  2,808  2,621  1,866 
0,187  0,514  0,580  0,630  0,472  0,774  0, 605  o, 766 
o, 780  0,915  1,015  1,050  1,094  1,282  2,066  0,833 
0,492  0,819  0,642  0, 630  0,923  0,862  0,958  0,866 
- - - - 0,021  - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - 0,021  - 0,021  - - -
0,390  0,210  0,497  0,147  0,129  0,088  0,353  o, 700 
5,051  6,212  7,583  6,025  6,629  7,737  8,291  7,497 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
4, 571  4,434  4,387  4,337  4,509  4,215  4,186  4,060 
2,310  2' 371  2,521  2,520  2,346  2,416  2' 17 3  2,037 
2,185  2,185  2,282  2,261  2,326  2,364  2' 320  2,354 
1,264  1,423  1 '712  1,818  1,848  1 '77 3  1,815  1, 790 
2,105  2,353  2,375  2,406  2,442  2,415  2,362  2' 638 
0,017  0,012  0,018  0,010  0,011  0,013  0,007  0,019 
0,010  0,001  0,071  0,006  0,001  0,011  0,016  -
- - - - - 0,002  0,001  0,003 
0,002  0,001  - - - 0,002  - -
- - 0,001  0,002  0,003  - 0,001  -
0,010  0,018  0,007  0,012  0,008  0,006  0,007  0,005 
0,513  0,428  0,404  0,390  0,364  0,289  0,354  0,337 
12,986  13' 227  13 '7  81  13,7 81  13,861  13' 506  13,242  13 '246 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
2,450  2,737  2,634  2,528  2,06  4,219 
2,407  2,562  2,634  1,820  2,19  2,443 
1,160  1,165  0,905  0,404  1,03  0,888 
1,031  1,689  1,894  3,033  1,81  1,554 
1,590  1,106  0,659  1,213  1,55  0,888 
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
0,301  0,116  0,165  0,202  0,52  0,666 
8,939  9,375  8,891  9,201  9,15  10,659 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
4,261  4,492  4,135  4,109  4,08  4,29 
2,139  2,118  2,016  1,953  1,93  2,11 
2, 795  3,023  3,084  3,117  3,47  3,88 
1,945  1,865  2,011  1, 876  1 '7 5  2,01 
2,858  3,185  3,308  3,506  3,62  3' 63 
0,015  0,019  0,011  0,002  0,008  -
0,002  0,004  0,025  0,007  - -
- - - - - -
0,002  - - - - 0,003 
0,002  - 0,009  0,002  0,003  0,009 
0,010  0,021  0,014  0,007  0,008  0,006 
0,341  0,333  0,434  0,509  o, 73  0,84 
14,370  15, 160  15,047  15,088  15,60  16,77 GERMANY  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  0,268  o, 290 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0'  179  0,169 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0,094  0,097 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  0,010  0,027 
5)  Falling objects  0,065  0,041 
6)  Explosives  0,009  0,003 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,011  0,012 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural  gases  0,005  0,003 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - 0,003 
10)  Inrushes  of water  - 0,003 
11)  Electricity  0,022  0,008 
12)  Other  causes  0,025  0,025 
TOTAL  0,687  o, 680 
BELGIUM  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  0,223  o, 213 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  o, 101  0,124 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0,011  0,027 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  0,005  0,014 
5)  Falling  objects  0,016  -
6)  Explosives  0,011  0,014 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,016  0,014 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - 0,007 
10)  Inrushes  of water  0,011  -
11)  Electricity  0,021  -
12)  Other  causes  0,005  -
TOTAL  0,420  0,413 
B.  Underground  accidents  resulting  in  death within  eight  weeks 
years  1958-1973 
per  '000,000  man-hours 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
o, 263  0,216  0,280  0,260  0,200  0,184  0' 197  o, 206  0,148  0,192 
0,182  0,196  0,149  0' 17 8  0,300  0,191  0,175  0,150  0,126  0,143 
0,070  0,086  0,059  0,089  0,071  0,070  0,094  0,076  0,079  0,056 
0,012  0,027  0,037  0,019  0,028  0,025  0,030  0,020  0,014  0,034 
0,039  0,065  0,072  0,072  0,054  0,058  0,048  0,063  0,051  0,049 
0,003  - 0,004  - 0,002  - - - 0,004  -
- - 0,660  0,002  0,002  0,019  0,056  - 0,061  -
0,002  0,004  0,002  - - 0,002  0,002  0,007  - 0,004 
- 0,002  - 0,006  0,009  0,005  - - - -
0,002  - - 0,004  - - - - - -
0,002  0,005  0,010  0,002  0,004  0,005  - 0,003  0,004  0,004 
0,036  0,049  0,049  0,025  0,017  0,023  0,027  0,017  0,022  0,022 
0,611  0,651  1,344  0' 657  0,587  0,582  0,629  0,542  0,509  0,504 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
0,299  0,266  o, 246  o, 264  0,222  0,239  0,324  o, 264  o, 179  0,214 
0,157  o, 168  o, 142  0,245  0,166  0,166  0' 187  o, 180  o, 114  0,097 
0,008  0,035  0,010  0,057  0,028  0,011  0,025  - 0,033  -
0,016  0,027  0,047  - 0,018  0,052  0,025  0,028  0,065  -
0,008  - 0,010  0,019  0,018  - - - 0,016  -
- - - - - - - - 0,016  -
0,016  - - - - 0,011  - - - -
- - 0,047  - - 0,041  0,013  - - -
- - - - - 0,011  - - - -
- 0,044  0,047  0,019  - - - - - -
0,024  - - 0,009  0,009  0,011  - 0,014  0,033  0,019 
0,008  0,009  0,019  0,028  0,009  - 0,013  0,042  - -
0,536  0,549  0,568  o, 641  0,471  0,542  0'  587  0,528  0,456  0,330 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
0,113  o, 147  o, 10  0,08 
0,128  o, 103  0,16  o, 13 
0,058  0,032  0,06  0,06 
0,031  0,032  0,03  0,02 
0,035  0,047  0,06  0,02 
- - - -
- 0,008  - -
- 0,008  0,004  0,005 
- - - -
0,012  - - -
0,004  - 0,004  0,005 
0,027  0,083  0,04  0,09 
0,408  0,460  0,46  0,420 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
0,268  o, 100  0,08  0,21 
o, 170  0,125  0,18  0,21 
- 0,049  0,03  -
- 0,025  - 0,03 
- - 0,03  -
- - - -
- - - -
- 0,025  0,18  0,06 
- - - -
- - - -
0,024  - - .. 
- - 0,03  0,03 
0,462  0,324  0,53  0,54 FRANCE  ~·,  1958  1959  . 
1)  Falls  of  ground  o, 235  0,192 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0,115  0,085 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0,007  0,018 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  0,018  0,040 
5)  Falling objects  0,025  0,007 
6)  Explosives  - 0,026 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,115  0,121 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,043  0,026 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - -
11)  Electricity  - 0,011 
12)  Other  causes  0,036  0,029 
TOTAL  0,594  0,555 
ITALY  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  o, 167  -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  - 0' 197 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  - -
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  - -
5)  Falling objects  - o, 197 
6)  Explosives  0,501  -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  o, 167  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - -
11)  Electricity  - -
12)  Other  causes  - -
TOTAL  0,835  0,394 
*  Including  Provence as  from  1970. 
B.  Underground  accidents  resulting  in death within eight  weeks 
years  1958-1973 
per  '000,000  man-hours 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
0,186  0,219  o, 167  0,120  o, 127  o, 164  o, 214  0,159  o, 177  o, 149 
0,082  0,122  0,077  0,121  0,141  0,052  0,126  0,088  0,101  0,186 
0,027  0,008  0,043  0,009  0,009  0,042  0,024  0,016  0,025  0,014 
0,016  0,008  0,030  0,009  0,036  0,009  0,015  0,016  0,006  -
0,004  0,017  0,030  0,009  0,018  0,019  0,015  0,011  0,031  0,014 
- - - 0,005  0,005  0,009  0,005  0,005  0,006  -
- - 0,004  - - 0,155  - - 0,038  -
0,019  0,004  - 0,019  0,009  - 0,005  0,027  0,019  0,007 
- - - - - - - - - -
- 0,004  - - - 0,005  - 0,005  - -
0,012  - 0,009  0,024  - - 0,010  - - 0,007 
0,008  - 0,009  0,014  0,014  - 0,005  0,005  - 0,007 
0,354  0,382  0,369  0,330  0,359  0,455  0,419  0,332  0,403  0,384 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
0,201  0,225  - 0,366  - - - - - -
- - - - - - - 0,  797  - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - 0,  797  - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
0,201  0,226  - 0,366  - - - 1,594  - -
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
0,143  o, 117  0,07  0,20 
o, 127  0,108  0,08  0,07 
0,016  0,072  0,01  0,01 
0,032  0,027  - 0,02 
0,016  0,045  - 0,04 
0,108  0,018  - -
o, 127  - - -
- 0,072  - 0,01 
- - 0,01  -
0,016  - 0,01  -
- - - -
- 0,009  0,03  -
0,484  0,468  o, 21  0,37 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
- - 2,20  -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - 2,20  -NETHERLANDS  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  0,262  0,064 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0,077  0,145 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  - -
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  0,015  0,016 
5)  Falling objects  - 0,016 
6)  Explosives  - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - -
11)  Electricity  - -
12)  Other  causes  - -
TOTAL  0,355  0,241 
COMMUNITY  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  0,253  0,242 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  o, 147  o, 141 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0,057  0,063 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  0,011  0,028 
5)  Falling objects  0,045  0,027 
6)  Explosives  0,009  0,010 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,032  0,036 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural  gases  0,016  0,010 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - 0,003 
10)  Inrushes  of water  0,002  0,002 
11)  Electricity  0,016  0,007 
12)  Other  causes  0,023  0,021 
TOTAL  0,610  0,590 
B.  Underground  accidents  resulting  in death within eight  weeks 
years  1958-1973 
per  '000,000 man-hours 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
0,034  0,114  0,062  0,084  0,043  0,044  0,050  o, 100  0'  172  0,058 
0,067  0,095  0,062  0, lOS  o, 17 2  0' 177  0,126  - 0,086  -
- - - - - - - - - 0,058 
- - 0,041  - - 0,022  - 0,067  - o, 117 
- - - - 0,043  - - - 0,043  -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- 0,019  - - - - - - - -
0,017  - - - - - - - - -
0,119  0,229  0,166  o, 189  0,258  0,243  0,17 6  0,167  0,301  0,233 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
0,235  0, 217  0,234  o, 217  o, 17 5  0' 17 7  0,208  0,192  0,160  o, 17 6 
o, 146  o, 168  0,124  0' 167  0,178  0,149  0' 160  0,128  0,115  o, 145 
0,047  0,056  0,045  0,060  0,045  0,051  0,060  0,044  0,054  0,038 
J 
0,012  0,021  0,037  0,013  0,030  0,024  0,023  0,024  0,017  0,023 
0,024  0,041  0,062  0,046  0,037  0,037  0,030  0,036  0,040  0,031 
0,002  - 0,002  0,001  0,002  0,002  0,001  0,002  0,006  -
0,002  - 0,375  0,001  0,001  0,053  0,030  - 0,044  -
0,006  0,003  0,007  0,005  0,002  0,006  0,004  0,012  0,006  0,004 
- 0,001  - 0,003  0,005  0,005  - - - -
0,001  0,006  0,005  0,005  - 0,001  - 0,002  - -
0,007  0,004  0,008  0,008  0,003  0,004  0,003  0,004  0,006  0,006 
0,024  0,029  0,032  0,021  0,014  0,013  0,017  0,015  0,012  0,015 
o, 507  0,546  0,932  0,547  0,492  0,522  0,536  0,457  0,460  0,438 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
0,082  o, 101  - -
0,165  - 0,26  -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0,247  0,101  0,26  -
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
0,135  o, 133  0,092  0'  13 
0,132  0,104  o, 141  0,12 
0,039  0,043  0,043  0,04 
0,027  0,029  0,019  0,02 
0,025  0,041  0,038  0,02 
0,002  0,005  - -
0,037  0,005  - -
- 0,027  0,022  0,012 
- - 0,003  -
0,011  - 0,003  0,003 
0,004  - 0,003  0,003 
0,016  0,053  0,035  0,06 
0,429  0,440  0,399  0,413 CAUSES 
( 1960-1964)  1960  1961 
Germany 
1962  1963 
Belgium 
1964  1960  1961  1962  1963 
C.  Comparative Table  of underground  group  accidents  (see  (1)  below) 
years  1960-1973 
France * 
1964  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1960  1961 
Italy  Netherlands  Coumunity 
1962  1963  1964  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964 
NabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNabNabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNab 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3)  Movement  of personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handing  of  tools  and 
supports 
5)  Falling objects 
6)  Explosives 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires 
10)  Inrushes  of water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other  causes 
TOTAL 
(1965-1969) 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3)  Movement  of personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handing of  tools  and 
supports 
5)  Falling objects 
j  6)  Explosives 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust 
8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases 
1  9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires 
10)  Inrushes  of water 
11)  Electdcity 
12)  Other  causes 
TOTAL 
( 1970-1973) 
10  - 6  - 6  - - 7  1  -
5  14  -
62  33B  -
10  - 3  63  344  - 14  - 6  - 1  - 1  -
1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1965  1966 
NabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNab  Na 
1  -
1  -
21  - 1  - 17  2  - 33  6-----
-I  - - -
- -I-
21  1  - 17  2  - 33  6  -
1970  1971  1972  1973  1970  1971  1972  1973  1970  1971  1972  1973  1970  1971  1972  1973  1970  1971 
10  18 
14 
62  338  -
10  1  - 6  65  356  -
1967  1968  1969  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
NabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNab 
- 6 
- 5 
41  3  11  21  - - 17 
4  41  11  21  - 17  - 11 
1972  1973  1970  1971  1972  1973 
~abNab NabNab  NabNab  NabNabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNabNab  NabNab  NabNab  NabNab 
1)  Falls  of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3)  Movement  of personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handing of  tools  and 
supports 
5)  Falling objects 
6)  Explosives 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires 
10)  Inrushes  of water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other  causes 
12  - 2  -
TOTAL  2  - 12  - - - ~  -
(1)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of type  (a). 
(N)  Number  of  group  accidents 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume work  below  ground for at  least eight weeks • 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(*)  Including Provence  as  from  1970. 
- 12 
11  16  - 111E 
6  - 8 
- 6  11  16  1  - 111!  - 20  -47 
D.  RECAPITULATION:  COMMUNITY  OVERALL 
Seriou•  in-1 
Serious  in-
Fatal- Serious 
Ext rae- Under- Million  juries  (4)  1  Fatal- ities  injuries 
ground  Fa  tal- (disable- ities  juries  (  4)  Year  tion  man-
ities  ment  for  per  per m. 
(1)  o.m.s.  hours  per  per m.  m.  man- man-
(kg.)  worked  8 weeks  m.  tons  tons  hours  or over  hours 
1958  252  278  1  634  1  260  770  17  074  3,052  67,68  0,610  13,551 
1959  240  602  1  788  1  122  622  14  539  2,585  60,43  0,590  12,950 
1960  239  967  1  958  1  037  526  13  459  2,192  56,09  0,507  12.986 
1961  235  848  2  100  962  527  12  720  2,235  53,93  0,548  13,227 
1962  233  233  2  229  901  840  (3)  12  418  3,602  (3)  53,24  0,932  (3)  13,781 
541  (4)  2,320  ( 4)  0,600  (4) 
1963  229  769  2  331  849  465  11  686  2,024  50,86  0,547  13.761 
1964  235  007  2  395  841  411  11  726  1,749  49,89  0,493  13,860 
1965  224  249  2  461  784  410  10  595  1,828  47,25  0,522  13,506 
1966  210  189  2  611  698  374  9  247  1, 779  43,99  0,536  13.242 
1967  189  484  2  824  587  269  7  781  1,420  41,06  0,457  13.246 
1968  181  016  3  065  522  240  7  501  1,326  41,44  0,460  14,370 
1969  176  749  3  265  476  209  7  222  1,181  40,82  0,438  15,160 
1970  170  355  3  442  438  188  6  591  1,104  38,69  0,429  15,047 
1971  164  910  3  514  414  182  6  249  1,104  37,89  0,440  15,088 
1972  151  809  3  659  369  147  5  763  1,033  26,34  0,399  15,60 
1973  139  700  3  755  332  137  5  560  0,981  39,80  0,413  16,77 
( 1)  Net  extr>action,  slur>r>y  and  dust. 
(2)  Incl.  Luisenthal explosion. 
(3)  Excl.  Luisenthal explosion. 
(4)  Casualties  wer>e  unable  to r>esume  wor>k  for>  at  least eight weeks. GRAPHS 
OF FATAL AND SERIOUS CASUALTIES 
IN COMMUNITY COALMINES 1) 
KEY 
to Roman figures in Graphs 
I  Falls of ground 
II  Haulage and transport 
Ill  Movement of personnel 
IV  Machinery, handling of tools and supports 
V  Falling objects 
VI  Explosives 
VII  Explosions of firedamp or coal dust 
VIII  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, suffocation by natural gases 
IX  Fires and uderground combustion 
X  Inrushes of water 
XI  Electricity 
XII  Other causes 
(1) Casualties were unable to resume work for at least eight weeks Per '000.000 man-hours 
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1) CASUAL  TIES WERE UNABLE TO RESUME WORK BELOW GROUND 
FOR AT LEAST EIGHT WEEKS  73  74 '  ANNEXES LIST  OF  ANNEXES 
1.  Common  statistical summary  of  underground  accidents  at mines  in  1973 
(Annex  I) 
2.  Terms  of  reference  and  rules  of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
(Annex  II) 
3.  Terms  of  reference of  the  various  Working Parties of  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health Commission 
(Annex  III) 
4.  Composition of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  the  Restricted Committee 
and  the  Working Parties 
(Annex  IV) 
5.  Implementation of  Recommendation  up  to  1  January  1974  of  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  (Annex  VIII) 
6.  Information Report  on  'Dust binding by  means  of  salt pastes,  powders  and  flakes' 
(Annex  VI) 
7.  Information Report  on  'Water  trough  barriers  for  protection against  underground 
explosions  of coal-dust 
(Annex  VII) 
8.  Report  on  triggered barriers  and  recommendations  for  their use  underground 
(Annex  VIII) 
9.  Report  and  conclusions  on  Haulage  powered  by  iinear motors 
(Annex  IX) 
10.  Circular  181  of  the  Belgian Ministry of Economic  Affairs  relating  to  the 
prevention of  outbursts  of Firedamp 
(Annex  X) 
11.  Guide  lines  concerning  the Design  and  Use  of  Coal  Getting  and  Heading Machines, 
relating  to  the  reduction of  airborne  dust 
(Annex  XI) 
12.  Notes  concerning  the  statistical comparison of  serious  and  fatal  accidents  due 
to  falls  of  ground  in  the  bituminous  coal  mining  industry  of  the  European 
Communities  and  Great  Britain 
(Annex  XII) 
13.  Notes  on  operating statistics  in  the  coal  mining  industry  of  the European 
Community  countries  as  established  for  1972 
(Annex  XIII) 
14.  Bibliography  of  the work  of  the  Safety  and  Health Commission 
(Annex  XIV) 
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X  X COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  ~1INES  IN  1973 
ANNEX  I MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Conmon  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~of  incapacity 
CAUSES  OF  ACCIDENTS-------------
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
I I.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
COAL-FIElD  :  Land  North/Rhine Westphalie 
Production  faces 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(J) 
3  395  1  771 
>56 
days 
(J) 
529 
48  40  1  35 
I 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
10 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
5  705  2  00~ 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)  56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
813  248  3  068 
125  40l  377  263  20  1  061 
Shafts  and  staple-pits 
4  to 
20 
days 
(J) 
12 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
12 
so  64 
>s6 
days 
(J) 
30 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
28 
148 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
26 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  189  307  217 
Other  places 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
:>s6 
days 
(J} 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
37 
11 
4  to 
20 
days 
(J) 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(J) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
5  434  2  604  16  8  83 
503  486  330  26  1  34 
Table  la 
56 
1W 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
a)  Continuous  Transport  116  340  76  141 
~--~--~~---+----t--~--~--+---~--1--~---+--~--~--~--~--~--~--r---r-~--~---r---r--~--~--r---l 
31:  2:5~ 
94  159  172  111  22  40  32  44 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport  26  261  187  15  721  46  61  29  140  331  327  219  21  89 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL  938  629  148  1  716  3  43  2  064  555  6  064  230  199  56  489  132  66  12  210  4  7381  2  958  771  12  i  8  47 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
___  2~~----~  __  5_3~ 1--_5_7~_2_8_o+-_8_7~---4---9_3_8~_3_64-__  2o-4-----r----r--6-l-+  __  l_4 _____  3  __  i ____  +----r--l-8-+--6-4_7r 1 1  __  3_2_3T-_9_8~----r~
1 _t_o_7~--~----~--~ 
b)  in  the  course  of other activities  911  I  6091  142 [  1  1  663 i  2  86~  1  784  468  5  126  194  179  52  428  118  63  I  11  192  I  4  091!  2  635  673  10  7  40 
IV,  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
I  !  I 
l  114  I  717  I  207  2  041  663!  365  91  1  119  26  14  40  38  12  50  1  841 11  108 
59 
277 
I 
I  I 
49  i  33  143  32  30  21  83  I  92  I  83 
157  44 
I 
4781  228  48  747 
!  ! 
43  1  8o9!  4o6  26  13  39  35  i 
I 
I 
298  1 
c)  Supports  778  511  130  1  420  16  107  22  289  !  152  i,  94o I  619 
3  25C 
231 
1  307 
1  712 
1  3151  2  oo2[  l_o_t_2~-3-5o~~--4-3--3-66~--l-1_5+--5-5-4--22--~--~~l-92--~-86--~ 1 !  __  2_9-+----r----r-1-24--~3--9-86~~-2--1_4o-r-7-o_24-----r-6-8-3~3----4----+--__, 
I  -I  -1  -!  - j  I 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS  1  783  1  044  321 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
I--VI_I_.-IG_N_IT-IO_N_S_OR--EX-P-LO-SI-0-NS-------r---+--~----r---+----r--+-----r----~--~--~---+---4----+---+--~----~--4 1---4---4----r---~,  ---+---+--~~--~----r---r---l 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST  I  - I  - I  -I  - I 
VI II  .  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS'  DE -OXYGENATION.  1,  1  I  ! 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
:y~A~ASES  (C02 ,  CH4,  CO,  H2S),  I 
a)  Outbursts  of  Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural  Gases 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
111  69  27 
7  389  4  272  1  267  23 
210 
I 
l 
I 
~ 
281  163  81  13 
12  951  8  793  4  797  588  49 
538  33  21 
15  ~27  466  366  121 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by  pit staff and errpLoyees  of oontraotor  firms  who  beLong  to  a  miners' sociaL  insu:ranoe  s&!eme. 
63 
961 
(2)  Accidents  invoLving more  than  five  caBuaZties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unahLe  to reswne work  underground  for at  l.eaBt  eight weeks). 
( 3)  Cal.ender  daus. 
- i  - I 
26  35  451  260  119  16  846 
312  131  28  471  6  960  9  566  3  004  80  29  61C 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Comnon  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
1!.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous Transport 
II I. FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other  activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDA..'1P  AND  COAL  DUST 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and Poisoning 
bv  natural Gases 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII,  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency  rates) 
COUNTRY  :  Germany  YEAR  :  1973 
COAL-FIElD  :  Land  North/Rhine Westphalie  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  189  307  217 
Production faces 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and  staple-pits  Other  places 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
2 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>s6 
days 
(3} 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)  56 
days 
(3) 
17,93  9,36  2,79  0,05  30,13  10,57  4,29  1,31  0,03  16,20  0,06  0,06  0,02  0,14  0,14  0,04  0,02 
0,25  0,21  0,18  0,01  0,65  2,12  1,99  1,39  0,11  5,61  0,26  0,34  0,16  0,02  o, 781  0,02  0,03  0,01 
0,12  0,21  0,17  0,50  0,76  0,61  0,40  0,03  1,80  0,02  0,02  0,01  0,05  0,02  0,01 
0,14  0,02  0,01  0,17  1,36  1,38  0,99  0,08  3,81  0,24  0,32  0,15  0,02  0, 73:  0,01  0,03 
4,95  3,32  0,78  0,01  I  9,06  18,H  10,90  2,93  0,04  32,03  1,21  1,05  0,30  0,02  2,58  0,70  0,35  0,06 
0,14  I  0,11  i  0,03  0,28  3,0  1,48  0,46  0,01  4, 96  0,19  0,11  0,02  0,01  0,33  0,07  0,02  0,01 
4,81  3,221  0,75  0,01  8,79  15,1  9,42  '  2,47  0,03  27,07  1,02  0,95  0,27  0,02  2,26  0,62  0,33  0,06 
5,88  3,79  1,09  0,02  10,78  3,5d  1,93  0,48  5,91  0,14  0,07  0,21  0,20  0,06 
0,31  0,26  0,17  0,01  0,75  0,1~  0,16  0,111  - 0,44  - 0,01  0,02 
1,46  0,83  0,23  2,52  2,4~  1,20  0,25  3, 94  0,14  0,07  0,21  0,18  0,04 
4,11  2,70  0,69  0,01  7,51  0,8~  0,57  0,12  1,54  - 0,01  o,o1l  o,o1 
9,42  5,51  1,70  0,02  16,65  10,5~  5,35  1,05  0,01  17,79  0,61  0,29  0,12  1,02!  0,45  0,15  0,05 
I 
0,01  0,01 
I  -
I 
0,0  0,01  0,01  0,03  -
0,0  0,01  0,01  0,03  -
0,0  0,01  -
0,01  0,01  0,02  o,o  0,01  0,04  - 0,01  0,01  0,02 
0,59  0,36  0,14  0,02  1,11  1,4  0,86  0,43  0,07  2,84  0,17  0,11  0,05  0,33  0,14  0,04  0,01 
39,03  22,57  6,69  0,12  68,41  46,4  25,34  8,39  0,26  80,44  2,46  1,93  0,64  O,Oii  5,07  1,65  0,69  0,1' 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
0,20  28,70  13,76  4,14  0,08  46,68 
0,06  2,66  2,57  1,74  0,14  7,11 
0,03  0,91  0,84  0,59  0,03  2,37 
0,04  1,75  1,73  1,16  0,11  4,75 
1,11  25,03  15,63  4,07  0,06  44,79 
0,10  3,42  1,71  0,52  0,01  5,66 
1,01  21,61  13,92  3,56  0,05  39,14 
0,26  9,  72  5,85  1,57  0,02  17,16 
o,o3  o,49  o,44  o,2q  o,o1  1,23 
0,22  4,27  2,14  0,4~  - 6,90 
0,01  4,97  3,27  0,8C  0,01  9,05 
0,65  21,06  11,30  3,  7  0,03  36,10 
!  -
I  - 0,01j  - 0,01 
0,01  0,01  0,01  0,03 
0,01  0,01  0,01  0,03 
0,01  0,01 
0,02  0,03  0,04  0,01  0,08 
0,19  2,38  1,37  0,6  0,08  4,46 
2,49  89,58  50,53  15,8  0,42  56,40 
(1)  NunU:Jer  of hours  worked by  pit staff and errptoyees  of aontraator  firms  who  beLong  to a  miners 1  soaiaZ  insuranae  s<>he'MB. 
~~~  ~~t:a:;s  J::,';,Zving more  than  five  aasuatties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unabLe  to resume  work  underground  for at  Zeast  eight weeks). 
Table  lb 
56 
?W 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
0,05  0,05 
0,05  0,05 
H I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in  coal mines 
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Table  2a 
YEAR  :  1973 
COAL-FIELD:  Land  North/Rhine Westphalie  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  189  307  217 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxations,  Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and  Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  with  or without  twists  and  and inter- and muscular  of electricity  and  of  those not  TOTAL 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY  abrasions  and  radiation 
enucleations  dis location  sprains  nal injury  suffocation  specified  (2) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
4  to  21  to 
>  56  >  5o  >  56  >  56  20  56 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  days  days 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  (5)  (5) 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
'  IX  ~x  IX  I.  He ad  and neck  - - 1  63  33  263  3  - 29  22  3  154  52  6  2  536  l  - 14  - - - 2  228  586  141 
II. Eyes  1  - 3  ~  V(  r>< XV( X 
l  - 4  33  - 579  6  - 55  ~  V( ~ 
- - 2  536  66  41 
i 
III.  Trunk  - - - 98  7  350  2  - 44  2  4  23  46  5  1  573  - -
't>< [X  t>< 
- - l  1  150  686  148 
I 
I 
IV.  Upper  limbs 
1  1  169  287  18  - I  115 X  X  XI 
70  - 2  791  I  3  - 24 X  V( X 
1  - 3  2  282  677  262  (excluding the  hands)  - -
(3) 
285 [>( ~"' 
- 7  778  V.  Hands  72  - 188  716  - 3  114  30  ~  3  I  - 26 ,x  [>( IX 
- - - 5  763  4  551  1  077 
[>(  ~'"  IX  t>< t>< 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding feet)  (4)  3  - 3  268  2  364  80  - 439  3  078  I  3  - 23  - - 2  2  087  1  257  563 
! 
[X  txJ)<j  '~  [X  /;>< 
VII.  Feet  12  - 19  484  - 1  200  37  - 794  118  - 2  318  1  - - - 1  2  262  l  425  652 
!  ·IX  [X X 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  - 1  2  67  13  111  2  - 20  8  2  i  25  43  l  930  - - - - l  649  311  120 
IX.  Not  specified  X  X  X  t>< [>( t>< X  lX X  [>( [>( IX  IX  [X X 
- - - - 1  10  - 2  3  3  7  -
,  I 
I 
TOTAL  89  1  217  1  865  55  5  689  172  - 1  726  33  206 
I 
827  12  21  503  17  - 166  - l  10  1  2  13  16  960  9  566  3  004 
(1)  Nwnber  of houre  worked by  pit staff and empLoyees  of aontraator firms  who  belong to a miner's  sooial insuranae  soheme. 
( 2}  inaluding aomp lioations. 
( 3)  The  shouLdere  and the wrists a:re  inaluded under  "upper  Limbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankLes  are  inoLuded under  "Lower  Limbs". 
(5}  Calender  days. 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
42  2  997 
- 643 
16  2  000 
H 
- 3  221 
- 11  391 
2  3  909 
-r-----
- 4  339 
l7  1  097 
3  13 
80  29  610 • 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in  coal  mines  (Frequency  rates) 
COUNTRY :  Germany 
COAL-FIELD  :  Land  North/Rhine Westphalie 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxations,  Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  with or without  twists  and  and  inter- and  muscular  of electricity 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY  abrasions  and  radiation 
enuc l€:ations  dis location  sprains  nal injury 
l  2  3  4  5  6 
>  , 5 I  Fatal I  Fatal  Fatal  Fatal  Fatal  Fatal  >  56  >  56  >  56  >  56  >  56 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  da~s 
1 
acci-1 total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
r5;  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5}  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and  neck 
I 
- - 0,01  0,33  0,171  1, 39  0,02  - 0,15  0,12  0,02  0,81  0,27  0,03  13,40  O,Ol  - 0,07 
I 
~  V( X  X  ~'·" 
I  II. Eyes  0,01  0,02  - 0,02  0,17  - 3,06  0,031  -
1  0,29 
I  ~----''-------' 
--~~~ 
I  o  05 
I  I  I 
III.  Trunk  - - !  - 0,52  0,04  1,85  0,01  - 0,23  0,01  0,02  0,12  0,24  0,03  8,31  -
I 
- I  ' 
I 
! 
I 
i  V( X  X 
! 
I 
I 
IV.  Upper  limbs 
'·" I 
I 
(excluding  the  hands)  - I  0,01  0,89  - 1,52  0,10  - 0,61  0,37  - 14,74  0,02  0,13 
(3 I 
I 
I 
I 
I  1\/  \  / 
~< 
V.  Hands  'x''  0,38  - 0,99  3 '78 
I  - 16,45  0,16  -++\ /\ 
1,35  - 41,09  0,02  - 0,14 
I  I 
'·" 1-
I 
'·"  X 
1\/ 
I 
VI.  Lower  limbs  I 
I 
I'·" 1/x  '·" 
I  I 
(excluding  feet)  I  (4 J  0,02  '1  1,42  I  1,92  0,42  v  \ 
1,10  - 16,26  - 0,12 
! 
I 
! 
I  IX  >< 
1\  / 
! 
I 
VII.  Feet  o,o6  1  - 0,10  2,56  - 6,34  0,20  - 4,19  ~/><\ 
0,62  - 12,24  0,011  - 0,04 
I 
I 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  - 0,01  0,01  0,35  0,07  0,59  0,01  - I  0,11  0,04  0,01  0,13  0,23  O,Ol  4,91  - 0,04 
I 
I 
i 
IX.  Not  specified  X  ~  X  ~lXX  1X
1X  ~IX  X  ~<  ~  ~  ~>( 
- - -
TOTAL  0,47  0,01  l,  15  9,85  0,29  30,05  0,91  - 9,12  0,17  0,05  1,09  4,37  0,06  114,01  0,09  - 0,88 
I  I 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by pit staff and  emp~oyees of aont:raator  fi-rms  who  be~ong to a  miner's soaiat insuranae  SC!heme. 
(2}  induding C!OmpZiaations. 
(3)  The  shoulders  and the wrists  are  inC!~uded under  "upper  limbs". 
(4)  The  hips and the  anHes  are  inC!~uded under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  CaLender  days. 
Table  2b 
YEAR  :1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  189  307  217 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not  TOTAL 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7  8  9 
Fatal  Fatal 
4  to  21  to 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  >  56  20  56 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  days  acci- total 
days 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  (5)  (5)  dents 
~!X 
I 
I  i 
I 
"·"I 
- - - 11,77  3,10  0,74  0,22 
~>~ 
! 
I 
- I  - 0,01  2,83  0,35 
I 
0,22  - 3,40 i 
I 
XX X 
i 
! 
I  I 
I 
0,01  1  6,07 
I 
I 
-
1-
I 
3,62  0,78  0,08  10,55 
I  !  I  i 
I 
I  w 
I  I  I 
•  I 
1,381  17,011  0,01  - o,,o2  12,05  3,58  -
I 
I  I 
I 
H 
~~~ 
I 
I 
il  I 
124,04  i  5,69  60,171  - I - - 30,44  -
I  l 
XJM 
I  I  I 
I 
I '·" "·" I··" I '·" 
i 
- '  - 0,011  20,641 
i 
V(~X  txJ 
I 
i 
I  I 
i 
- - 0,01  111,95 
I  7,53  !  3,44  - 22 '92 
~  XV< 
: 
! 
0,091  - - 0,01  3,43  1,64  0,63  5, 79 
I 
- O,Ol  0,05  - 0,01 
I 
0,02  0,02  o,04  I  - 0,02  0,08 
- 0,01  0,05  0,01  0,01  0,07  89,58  50,53  15,87  0,4  156,40 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
COMMISSION 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  Table  la 
Coi!IDOII  Statistics  on  victims 
(absolute  figures)  of accidents  underground in coal mines 
COUNTRY  :  Germsny  YEAR  :  1973 
COAL-FIEU>  :  Saar  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  20  157  680 
Headings  excluding  Total of  Group 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT  Production  faces  shafts  and staple-pits  Shafts  and  staple-pits  Other  places  accidents  underground  accidents  (2) 
~ 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  1W 
acci- total 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents  c 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3}  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
I,  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS  304  200  80  586  121  77  37  235  430  279  118  829 
I I.  TRANSPORT,  TarAL  76  61  16  153  89  95  29  214  15  174  162  48  385 
a)  Continuous  Transport  75  61  16  152  87  93  28  .l09  15  m;  160  47  379 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport  3  i  61 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
39  20  13  72  135  103  48  286  14  180  129  63  372  TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine  12  20  58  52  23  133  73  59  29  161 
b)  in  the  course  of other  activities  27  16  52  77  51  25  153 
I  - 1071  70  34  211 
I 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
I 
I  1861 
I 
TOTAL  73  45  15  133  109  57  23  190 
i  - 104  1  39  3311 
a)  Machines  124  102 
r 
172  I 
i 
I 
i  H  67  42  15  56  23  182  100  39  313  i 
i 
! 
- I 
'-.J  b)  Tools  12  !  14 
I 
c)  Supports  2 i 
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS  103  64  22  189  47  43  97 
I 
I 
1521  108  30  1  290 
I 
I  I  ! 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES  I  - -
I  I 
VII,  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST  -I 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
TarAL 
a)  Outbursts of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
bv natural Gases 
IX,  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XI I.  arHER  CAUSES  176  114  47  338  122  98  39  261  10  16  301  222  89  615 
TOTAL  771  504  193  1471  623  473  184  1  284  23  26  10  60  1  423  1  004  388  2  823 
(1)  Number  of houi'S  worked by  pit staff and errptoyeea  of aontraator  firmB  who  be tong to  a  miners 1  aoaiat  insuranae s&zeMe. 
(2)  Aaaidents involving more  than  five  aasuatties  (i.e.  !Jho  either died or !Jere  unable  to resume  IJork  undsrground for at  Zeast eight IJeeks). 
( 3)  CaZendsr  daus. MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
CollllllOtl  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground in coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
COAL-FIEUl :  Saar 
Production  faces 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
Shafts  and  staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
15,08  9,92  3,97  0,10  29,07  6,00  3,82  1,84  11,66  0,20  0,10  0,30  0,05 
YEAR:  1973 
MAN-HOUilS  WORKED  (1)  20  157  680 
Other  places 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
0,05  0,10  21,33  13,84  5,86  0,10  41,13 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL  3,  77  3,03  o, 79  7,59  4,42  4,71  1,44  0,05  10,62  0,35  0,25  0,15  0,741  0,10  0,05  0,15  8,63  8,04  2,38  0,05  19,10 
a)  Continuous Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
3,72  3,03  0,79 
0,05 
1,93  0,99  0,65 
0,59  0,20  0,20 
7,54  4,32  4,61  1,39  0,05  10,37  0,35  0,25  0,15 
0,05  0,10  0,10  0,05  0,25 
3,57  6,70  5,11  2,38  14,19  0,30  0,30  0,10 
0,99  2,88  2,58  1,14  1  6,60  0,15  0,15  0,10 
b)  in  the  course  of other activities  1,34  0,79  0,45  2,58  3,82  2,53  1,24  7,59  0,15  0,15 
IV .  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
bv  natural Gases 
IX.  BEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
3,62  2,23  0,74  6,60  5,41  2,83  1,14  0,05  9,42  0,10  0,10  0,05  0,05 
3,32  2,08  0,74  6,15  5,06  2, 78  1,14  0,05  9,03  0,05  0,10  0,05  0,05 
0,20  0,05  0,25  0,35  0,05  0,40  0,05 
0,10  o, 10  0,20 
5,11  3,17  1,09  9,38  2,33  2,13  0,35  4,81  0,05  0,05  0,05 
- I 
0,05  0,05 
8,73  5,66  2,33  0,05  16,77  6,05  4,86  1,93  0,10  12,95  0,15  0,50  0,15 
38,t5  25,00  9,57  0,15  72,97  30,91  23,46  9,13  0,20  63,70  1,14  1,29  0,50  0,05 
(1)  Nwri:ler  of hours  !Jorked by  pit staff and errpZoyees  of contractor fil'f71B  who  be tong  to a 17Tiners'  soaiaZ  insurance  s<Jhe,.,.,, 
o, 74  \  0,10  0,05 
0,69 
0,40 
0,30 
0,30  o, 10 
0,25  0,10 
0,05 
0,15  0,05 
0,79 
2,98  0,30  0,05  0,05 
(2)  A""idents invoZving ,.,re  than  five  easuatties  (i.e,  who  either died or were  Wlllbte  to reswne  work  undsrground for at  Zeast  eight weeks). 
(3)  CaZendsr  daye, 
0,15  8,48  7,94  2,33  0,05  18,80 
o, 15  0,10  0,05  0,30 
8, 93  6,40  3,12  18,45 
3,62  2,93  1,44.  7,99 
5,31  3,47  1,68  10,46 
0,10  9,23  5,16  1,93  0,10  16,42 
0,10  8,53  4,96  1,93  0,10  15,53 
0,6C  0,10  0,69 
O,lC  0,10  0,20 
0,05  7,54  5,36  1,49  14,39 
0,05  o,os 
14,9  11,0  4,42  0,15  30,51 
0,40  70,5  49,8  19,25  0,40  140,05 
Table lb 
56 
1W 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victilll8 
of  accidents  underground in coal mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleations 
1 
Fatal I  >  so 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  days  acci- \ total 
(5)  dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and neck  - - -
II. Eyes  1  - 1 
III.  Trunk  3  1  13 
IV.  Upper  limbs  9  - 14 
(excluding the  hands) 
(3) 
V.  Hands  3  - 11 
VI.  Lower  limbs  1  1 
(excluding feet)  (4) 
VII.  Feet  1  - 3 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  l  - l 
IX.  Not  specified  X  X  X 
TOTAL  19  1  44 
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
COAL-FIELD  :  Saar 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
2  2  6  1  - 5 
[>< ~  ~  ~  IX  ~ 
1  - 9  1  3  9 
- - 9  - - 1 
, 
30  - 100  1  - 9 
20  - 24  7  - 26 
12  - 38  - - 24 
3  1  5  - - 2 
X  V( ~  X  t>< [>< 
68  3  191  10  3  76 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful  effects 
and  inter- and muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury 
4  5  6 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
2  1  17  18  - 338  - - -
- - 1  7  - 146  1  - 2 
- - - 7  - 131  - - -
~  X  X 
23  - 240  - I  - 1 
V( X  X 
91  - 810  1  - 3 
V( V< X 
51  - 342  - - -
V(  V< X 
65  - 317  - - -
l  - 1  24  - 154  - - 1 
~  V( X  V< V( X 
- - -
3  1  19  286  - 2  478  2  - 7 
(1)  Nwri>er  of hours  worked by  pit staff and empLoyees  of eontractor firms  who  beLong  to a  miner's sociaL insurance  scheme. 
( 2)  inc  Lwii.ng  comp Zications. 
(3)  The  shouLders  and  the wrists are incLuded under  "upper  Zirri:is". 
(4)  The  hips and the  ankles  are incLuded under  "Lower  Zimbs". 
(5)  CaLender  dizy_s. 
Table  2a 
YEAR:  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  20  157  680 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of those not  TOTAL 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7  8  9 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
4  to  21  to 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  20  56 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
days 
(5)  dents 
(5)  (5) 
~  X  ~ 
- - 1  260  81  23  3  367 
[>< IX  ~ 
- - 3  109  35  9  T  153 
V( V( X 
- - - 90  56  12  4  162 
X  ~  ~ 
I 
- - 1  174  60  32  - 266 
X  t\~X 
- - - 387  420  126  - 933 
X  V( X 
- - 3  167  150  79  - 396 
X  V( X 
- - - 158  146  78  - 382 
X  V( X 
- - - 78  56  29  1  164 
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - 8  l  423  l  004  388  8  2  823 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in coal  mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enuc leations 
l 
>  55  I  Fat~l 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  days  acct- total 
( 5)  dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and neck  - - -
II. Eyes  0,05  - 0,05 
III. Trunk  0,15  0,05  0,64 
IV,  Upper  limbs 
(excluding the  hands)  0,45  - 0,69 
(3) 
V.  Hands  0,15  - 0,55 
VI.  Lower  limbs  0,05  - 0,05 
(excluding feet)  (4) 
VII.  Feet  0,05  - 0,15 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  0,05  - 0,05 
IX.  Not  specified  t>( X  X 
TOTAL  0,94  0,05  2,18 
COUNTRY  :  Gennany 
COAL-FIELD  :  Saar 
Fractures  Luxations t 
with  or without  twists  and 
dislocation  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
0,10  0,10  o,3o 1  0,05  - 0,25 
XV( X  [>( ~  IX 
I 
I 
0,05  - 0,45  0,05  0,15  0,451 
I 
I  - - 0,45  - - 0,05 
i 
I  I 
I 
I  I 
1,49  - 4,961  0,05  -
I  0,45 
I 
I 
0,99  - 1,19  0,35  - 1,29 
I 
0,60  - 1,89  - -
'  1,19 
0,15  0,05  0,25  - - 0,10 
X  X  X  X  XX 
3,37  0,15  9,48  0,50  0,15  3,77 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency  rates) 
Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  inter- and  muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury 
4  5  6 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
0,10  0,05  0,84  0,89  - 16,77  - -
I 
-
I 
I  - - 0,05  0,35  - 7,24  0,05  - I  0,10 
- - - 0,35  - 6,50  - - -
X  ~  X 
1,14  - 11,91  - - 0,05 
X  X  X 
4,51  - 40,18  0,05  - 0,15 
/ 
X  ~x X 
I 
I 
I 
2,53  - 16,97  - - -
X  X  X 
3,22  - 15,73  - - -
0,05  - 0,05  1,19  - 7,64  - - 0,05 
IX X  IX X  X  X 
- -
0,15  0,05  0,94  14,19  - 122,93  0,10  - 0,35 
(1)  Nwnber  of hou.rs  worked by pit staff and  emp~oyees of contraetor fil'ITIB  who  be~ong to a  miner's  soeia~ insurance  seheme. 
(2)  induding compUeations. 
(3)  The  shou~ders and the wrists are  ineZuded under  "upper  Urnbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ank~es are included under  "Lower  Limbs". 
(5)  Ca~nder daYs. 
Table  2b 
YEAR:  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORJ<ED  (1)  20  157  680 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of those not  TOTAL 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7  8  9 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
4  to  21  to 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  20  56 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  days  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  (5)  (5)  dents 
IX  IX  IX 
1, 
1,14 
I  "·"I 
- !  - 0,05  12,90  '  4,02  0,15 
XIX' X 
I 
I 
I 
7,591  - - I  0,15  5,41  1,74  0,44  -
I 
I 
X  x~x 
8,J 
I 
- - - 4,46:  2,78  i  0,60  0,20 
I  I 
X  X  X 
I 
I 
- - 0,05  i  8,63  2,98  1, 59  - 13,20 
H 
Xvt\ 
6,251 
I 
- - - 19,20 20,83  - 46,281 
I 
i  I 
I 
X  0t>< 
'·"  I 
- - o, 15  8,28  7,44  - 19,64 
1 
X'  X[>( 
! 
7,841 
I  - - - 7,24  3,87  - I  18,  95[ 
I 
IX X  X 
- - - 3,87  2,78  1,44  0,05  8,14 
I 
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - 0,40  70,59 49,81  19,25  0,40  140,05 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
CoiiiiiOil  Statio  tics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
CA 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
Ill.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  whi 1e  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VI II.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (COz,  CH4,  CO,  HzS) , 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural Gases 
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
3  699 
124 
97 
27 
977 
39 
938 
1  187 
126 
281 
780 
1  886 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
287 
8  160 
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
COAL-FIElD  :  Total 
Production  faces 
1 
21  to  Fatal 
56  >56  acci-
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
1  971  609  12 
101  51  2 
101  48  -
- 3  2 
649  161  1 
24  10  -
625  151  1 
762  222  3 
91  48  2 
158  44  -
513  130  1 
1  108  343  3 
1  - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
1  - 1 
183  74  4 
4  776  1  460  26 
4  to 
total  20 
days 
(3) 
6  291  2  122 
278  4901 
246  230 
32  260 
1  788  3  573 
73  628 
1  715  2  945 
2  174  772 
267  134 
483  478 
1  424  160 
3  340  2  049 
1  -
- -
- 1 
- -
- 1 
- 1 
- -
2 
548  40 
14  422  ~  41 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits 
2  3 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
56  )  56  acci- total  20  56  .>s6  acci- total  20 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
890  285  6  3  303  16  14  4  - 34  27 
472  292  21  1  275  57  69  33  4  163  6 
209  104  6  549  11  8  4  - 23  5 
263  188  15  726  46  61  29  4  140  1 
2  167  603  i  7  6  35C  236  205  58  4  503  132 
I 
332  110  i  1  1  071  39  23  6  1  69  14 
I 
1  835  493  1  6  5  279  197  182  52  3  434  118 
422  114  !  1  1  309  28  16  1  1  46  40 
86  44 i  1  265  1  2  1  1  5  3 
I 
I 
229  48  - 755  27  13  - - 40  35 
107  22  - 28S  - 1  - - 1  2 
1  055  357  2  3  463  116  56  23  -
I 
195  87 
- - - - - - - - - -
I 
- I  - - - - - - - - -
I 
I 
1  - 1  - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
1  - 1  - - - - - -
I  - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - I  - -
2  1  - 8  - 1  - - i  1  -
?61  120  15  799  36  31  12  - 79  26 
5  270  1  772  53  16  511  489  392  131  9  1  021  318 
(JJ  Nwri>er  of hours  worked by pit staff and errpZoyees  of aontractor firms  who  beZong to a  mi-ners' soeiaZ insurance •'*"""'· 
{2)  Ac:c:idents  invoZving more  than  five  oosuaZties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unabZe  to resume  work  undsrground for at  Zeast  eight weeks). 
(3)  CaZendsr  days. 
YE'AR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  209  464  897 
Total of  Group 
Other  places  accidents  underground  accidents  (2) 
4  5  6 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
56  )56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  m· 
acci- total 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
8  4  - 39  5  864  2  883  902  18  9  667  - 9  9 
6  2  - 14  677  648  378  27  1  730 
1  2  - 8  343  319  158  6  826 
5  - - 6  334  329  220  21  904 
66  12  - 210  4  918  3  087  834  12  8  851 
3  1  - 18  720  382  127  2  1  231 
63  11  - 192  4  198  2  705  707  10  7  620 
12  - - 52  2  027  1  212  337  5  3  581 
4  - - 7  26~  183  93  4  544 
H 
8  - - I  43  821  408  92  - 1  321 
- - - 2  94  621  152  1  1  716 
29  9  - 125  4  138  2  248  732  5  7  123 
- - - - - 1  - - 1 
I 
I  - - - - - - - - -
I 
- - - - 1  - 1  3 
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - 1  - 1 
- - - - - - - 1 
- - - - - - - - -
4  - - 4  5  8  1  1  u 
7  2  - 35  752  482  208  19  1  46 
132  29  - 479  18  383  10  57  3  392  88  32  43  - 9  9 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of accidents  underground in coal mines 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates) 
YEAR  :  1973  COUNTRY  :  Germany 
COAL-FIEill  :  Total  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  209  464  897 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDA.'IP  AND  COAL  DUST 
Production  faces 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits  Other  places 
17,66  9,41  2,91  0,06  30,03  10,13  4,25  1,36  0,03  15,77  0,07  0,06 
0,59  0,48  0,24  0,01  1,33  2,34  2,25  1,39  0,10  6,08  0,27  0,33 
0,46  0,48  o, 23  1,17  1,10  1,00  0,49  0,03  2,62  0,05  0,04 
0,13  I 0,01  o,o1  o,ls  1,24  1,25  o,9o  o,o7  3,46  0,22  o,29 
4,66  3,10  0, 77  o,oo  8,54  17,05  10,34  2,88  0,03  30,31  1,12  0,98 
0,18  0,12  0,05  0,35  3,00  1,58  0,52  0,00'  5'  11  0,19  0,11 
4,48  !  2,98  0,  72  I  0,00  8,19  :14,05 
I 
8 '76  2,35  0,03  25,20  0,94  0,87 
i 
5,67  3,64 i 1,06  o,ol  10,38  3,68  2,01  0,54  0,00'  6,25  0,13  0,07 
0,60  0,43  0, 23  0,01  1,27  0,64  0,41  0,21  o,oo  1,26  o,oo  0,01 
1,34  o, 75  0,21  2,30  2,28  1,09  0,23  3,60  0,13  0,06 
3,  72  2,45  0,62  o,oo~  6,80  o, 76  0,51  0,10  1,38  0,005 
9,00  5,29  1,64  0,01  15,94  9, 78  5,04  1,70  0,01  16,53  0,55  0,27 
0,005  - 0,005 
0,02  0,16  0,13  0,04  0,02 
0,16  0,02  0,78  0,03  0,03  0,01 
0,02  o,11  o,o2  o,oos  o,o1 
0'  14  0,02  0,67  0,005  0,02 
0,28  0,02  2  40  0  63  0  31  0  06  i  -
0,03  0,00  0,33  0,07  i  0,01  0,005 
0,25  o,o1  2,07  0,56  0,30  0,05 
0,005  o,oo  0,221  0,19  0,06 
0,005  0,00  0,02  0,01  0,02 
o 19  I 
'  I 
0,17  '  0,04 
o,oo5  0,01  1 
I  o,42  I  o,14  0,04 
! 
0,931  0,11 
I  I  -
I 
I 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
0,19  27,99  13,76  4,30  0,08  46,14 
0,07  3,23  3,09  1,80  0,13  8,26 
0,04  1,64  1,52  0,75  0,03  3,94 
0,03  1,59  1,57  1,05  0,10  4,32 
1  00  23.4 
I 
0,08  3,44[  1,82  o,61  o,o1  5,88 
0,92  20,04  12,91  3,37  0,05  36,37 
0,25  9. 67  5,78'  1,61  0,02  17,09 
0,03  1  1,26  0,87  0,44  0,02  2,60 
0,21  1  3,92  1,95  0,44  6,30 
I 
o,o1  1  4,49  2,961  0,731  0,005  8,19 
0,60  19,75  10,73  3,49  0,02  34,00 
o,oos[  !  - '  o,oosi 
i  -
I 
I  VI II.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE -OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
TOTAL  0,005  0,005  0,005  0,02 
i  - i  - 10,005  0,005  0,005  0,01 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural Gases 
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XI I.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
0,005  -
1,37  0,87  0,35 
38,95  22,80  6,97 
1
o,oos  o,oos  0,005  0,02 
0,005  0,005 
0,005  0,01  0,02  0,01  0,005  0,04  0,005 
0,02  2,62  1,92  1,24  0,57  0,07  3,81  0,17  0,15 
0,12  68,84  44,94  25,15  8,46  0,25  78,81  2,33  1,87 
(1)  NU!TiJer  of hours  worked by pit staff and errpLoyees  of aont:roator  firms  who  beLong to a  miners 1  soaiaZ  insu:ranae  sd-zel"'e. 
- i  -
! 
0,005  0,02 
0,06  0,38  0,12  0,03  0,01 
0,62  0,04  4,87  1,52  0,63  0,14 
(2)  Aaaidents  invoZving more  than  five  aasuaUies  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unabLe  to resume  work  underground  for at  /.east  eight weeks). 
(3)  Cal.ender  daua. 
I  - - I 
I  o,oo5l  o,oos  o,oos  o,-ol 
0,005  0,005 
! 
- I 
0,02  0,02  0,04  0,005  0,005  0,07 
0,16  3,59  2,30  0,99  0,09  6,97 
2,29  87,75  50,45  16,19  0,420  154,81 
Table  lb 
Group 
accidents  I 
(2J  I 
0,043  0,043 
I 
_i 
I 
I 
0,043  0,043 
H I 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Table  2a 
YEAR  :  1973  COUNTRY  :  Germany 
COAL-FIELD  ·  Total  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1}  209  464  897 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxationst  Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and  Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  with  or without  twists  and  and  inter- and  muscular  of electricity  and  of  those  not  TOTAL 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY  abrasions  and  radiation 
enucleations  dis location  sprains  nal injury  suffocation  specified  (2} 
l  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
>  So  I Fatal I  Fatal  Fatal  ,  "  I, ..  ~,  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
4  to  21  to 
>  56  >  56  >  56 
total j  ~a~~ 
20  56 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  days 
1  acci  -~ total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  ace~- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- acci- total  days  acci- total 
days  days  days 
(5}  1  dents  (5}  dents  (5)  dents  (5}  dents  (5}  dents  (5)  dents  I  (5}  dents  (5}  dents  (5)  (5)  (5) 
i  I 
i 
~  ~ 
I 
I  LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
i 
i 
I 
1  I 
I 
2  87J 
I 
i 
I 
i  I.  Head  and neck  - - l  65  35  269  4  - I  34  24 
J 
4  171  70  6  l  - 14  :  - - 1  2  488  667  164 
j 
i 
l>< X  Mxl><JX. 
i 
I 
I 
~X  D< 
I 
I 
I  I 
I  I 
50  i 
I 
7251 
I 
I 
I  II.  Eyes  2  - 4  1  I  - 5  40  - 7  - 57  - - 5  645  101 
i 
I  !  i 
I 
I 
I 
I  ,l>< IX  ~~ 
I 
I 
I  I 
I  I 
3  1  13  99  7 
I 
359  3  3  53  2  4  23  53  5  1  704  - - -
I 
- I  1  I  1  24o  742 
160  I  III.  Trunk  I  ! 
I 
I  I 
!  I 
I 
-1---
I  fJX X 
I  ~  X  )<J 
I  I  I 
IV,  Upper  limbs  I 
I 
3  0311 
I 
12  456  2941  (excluding  the  hands)  10  - 15  169  -
I 
296  18  - 116  93  - 3  - 25  l  - 4  737 
(3)  I 
l  I  I  i 
I 
! 
I  ,X X  X 
I 
!  X  [x1X 
I 
I 
1199 
I 
6  150 14 971 
I 
V.  Hands  75  - 746  I  - 3  214  31  - 294  347  - 8  588  4  I  - 29  - - - l  203  i 
I 
I  i 
I 
I  I  I 
I 
X  X  X 
I 
I  ,[>( ~ 
I 
I  VI.  Lower  limbs  I 
(excluding  feet)  (4)  4  - 4  288  2  388  87  -
i  465  260  - 3  4201  3  - - - 5  2  254  l  407  6421 
I  I  I  i 
I 
I 
[X1X X 
I 
t>< M>< 
i 
I 
VII.  Feet  13  - 22  496  - l  238  37  - I  818  183  - 2  635  1 
I  - - 1  2  420  1  571  730 
I 
! 
I 
i 
l><~ X 
I  i 
I 
3671  VIII.  Multiple  locations  1  1  3  70  14  116  2 
I  -
I 
22  9  2  26  67  l  l  084  - - 9  - - l  727  '  149 
~  X  [>< t>< IX X  X  ~  l>< X  IX  ~  ix  IX 
~x~l 
i 
I 
IX.  Not  specified  - - - - 1  10  - !  2  3  3  7  -
V\ 
I 
TOTAL  108  2  261  1  933  58  5  880  182  3  1  802  36  I" 
225  1  113  12  24  061  19  - 173  - l  10  l  2  21  18  383  10 570  3  392 
(1}  Nwnber  of hours  worked by  pit staff and empLoyees  of contractor firms  who  belong to a  miner's  sociaL insurance  scheme, 
(2}  including corrrp lioations. 
(3)  The  shoulders  and  the wrists are  inoLw:iEd  under  "upper  Urnbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankles  are  inoZuded under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Calender  days. 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
45  3  364 
-
I 
796  I 
I 
20  2  162 
I  H 
- I  3  487 
- 12  324 
2  4  305 
- 4  721 
18  1  261 
3  13 
88  32  433 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on victi• 
of accidents  underground in coal mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleations 
1 
Fatal  >  55 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. Head  and neck  - - 0,005 
COUNTRY :  Germany 
COAL-FIELD  :  Total 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
0,31  0,17  1,28  0,02  - 0,16 
II. Eyes  0,01  - 0,02 ~  ~  X  X  X  ~ 
III. Trunk  o,ol  0,005  0,06  0,47  0,03  1,71  0,01  0,01  0,25 
IV.  Upper  limbs 
(excluding the h-;nds)  0,05  - 0,07  0,81  - 1,41  0,08  - 0,55 
(3) 
V.  Hands  0,36  - 0,95  3,56  - 15,34  0,15  - 1,40 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding feet)  (4)  0,02  - 0,02  1,37  0,01  1,85  0,41  - 2,22 
VII.  Feet  0,06  - 0,11  2,37  - 5,91  0,18  - 3,90 
VIII.  Multip  1e  locations  0,005  0,005  0,01  0,33  0,07  0,55  0,01  - 0,10 
IX.  Not  specified  [>( X  X  X  X  X  X  X  ~ 
TOTAL  0,52  0,01  1,25  9,23  0,28  28,07  0,87  0,01  8,60 
DETAILED  BREAKD!Ml  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency rates) 
Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  inter- and muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury 
4  5  6 
Fatal  Fatal  Fatal  >  56  >  56  >  56 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
0,11  0,02  0,82  0,33  0,03  13,72  0,005  - 0,07 
0,005  - 0,02  0,19  - 3,46  0,03  - 0,27 
YEAR:  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORI(ED  (1) :  209 464  897 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of those not 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7  8 
Fatal  Fatal 
4  to 
>  56  >  56  20 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5} 
X  X  ~ 
- - 0,005  11,87 
X  [>( X 
- - 0,02  3,08 
0,01  0,02  0,11  0,25  0,02  8,13  - - o.~'X  ~  X 
- - 0,005  5,92 
X  X  ~ 
0,44  - 14,47  0,01  - 0,12 X  X  X 
0,0051  - 0,02  11,72 
X  ~  ~ 
1,66  - 40,99  0,02  - 0,14 X  X  X 
- - - 29,36 
X  ~  ~  X  ~  X 
I 
I 
1,24  - 16,32  0,01  - 0,11  - - 0,02  10,76 
X  ~  [X  X  ~  X 
I 
0,87  - 12,58  0,005  - 0,03  - - 0,005  11,5~ 
0,04  0,01  0,12  0,32  0,005  5,17  - - 0,04 X  X  X 
- - 0,005  3,47 
~  X  X  'X  [>( X 
- - - - 0,00  0,05  - 0,01  0,01  0,01 
0,17  0,05  1,07  5,31  0,06  114,85  0,09  - 0,83  - 0,00  0,05  0,005  o,o  0,10  87,75 
(1}  Number  of houre  ~Varked by pit staff and empLoyees  of eontraetor firms  who  beLong  to a miner's  soeiaL insurance  scheme. 
(2)  incLuding compLications. 
(3)  The  shoulders  and the wrists are inetuded under  "upper  Urrbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and  the ankLea  are included under  "Lower  Limbs". 
(5}  Calender days. 
Table  2b 
TOTAL 
9 
21  to 
>  56  Fatal 
56 
days  days  acci- total 
(5)  (5)  dents 
3,18  0,78  0,215  16,06 
0,48  0,24  - 3,80 
3,54  o,  76  0,095  10,32 
H 
3,52  1,40  - 16,64 
23,73  5,74  - 58,83 
6,  72  3,06  0,010  20,55 
7,50  3,48  - 22,53 
1,75  0,71  0,086  6,02 
0,03  - 0,014  0,06 
50,45  16,19  0,420  154,81 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Co1111110t1  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground in  coa  1  mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~f  incapacity 
CAUSES  OF  ACCIDENTS------------
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX,  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
4  to 
20 
day• 
(3) 
COUNTRY  :  Belgium 
COAL-FIElD  :  Total 
Production  faces 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
2  523  420  98 
243  89  26 
240  88  26 
263  77  21 
140  40  14 
123  37 
1  018  251  57 
122  3o  11 
304  52 
592  169  39 
394  88  15 
133  10 
4  584  935  221 
total 
3  056 
360 
356 
361 
194 
167 
1  327 
163 
363 
801 
497 
147 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  33  350  760 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits 
2 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)  56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
964  99  29  094 
263  61  24  351 
40  12  57 
223  49  19  294 
356  64  11  431 
172  31  6  I  209 
184  33  222 
525  86  21  632 
77  14  94 
161  17  184 
287  55  12  354 
486  79  15  580 
- I 
- I 
I 
- I 
85  94 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
36 
50 
50 
52 
14 
38 
26 
15 
66 
18 
Shafts  and staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
15 
15 
4 
12 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
38 
73 
73 
60 
19 
41 
30 
11 
16 
80 
20 
Other  places 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
180  28 
289  99 
44  10 
245  89 
299  49 
128  28 
171  21 
269  33 
69  10 
100  11 
100  12 
394  66 
103  21 
)56 
days 
(3} 
53 
45 
12 
17 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
215  3  713 
443  844 
62  323 
381  521 
360  970 
160  454 
200  516 
310  1  838 
82  270 
114  574 
114  994 
477  1  336 
131  339 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(3) 
550  134 
265  111 
111  39 
154  72 
195  47 
102  26 
93  21 
374  86 
55  17 
82  16 
237  53 
239  48 
40  12 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4404 
7  I 1  227 
475 
752 
1  212 
582 
630 
2  299 
342 
672 
1  285 
1  623 
392 
5  748  2  683  397  102  7  ~ 189  248  40  13  301  1  577  299  104  1  943  9  047  1  667  439  18  11  171 
(1)  Number  of hours  worked by  pit staff and errpLoyees  of controotor firms  who  beLong  to a  miners' sodaL  insurance scheme. 
~;~  ~~t;;:;s  j;':,Lving more  than  five  casualties  (i.e,  who  either died or were  unabLe  to resume  work  undsrground for at  Least  eight weeks). 
Table la 
56  ms 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Co11111on  Statistics on  victims 
of accidents  underground in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~f  incapacity 
C~-OF~~ 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY  :  Belgium 
COAL-FIElD  :  Total 
(frequency rates) 
Production  faces 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)  56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
75,95  12,59  2,94  0,15  91,63  28,90  2,97  0,87  0,06  32,80  1,08  0,06 
>56 
days 
(3) 
7,29  2,67  0,78  0,06  10,79  7,89  1,83  0,72  0,09  10,52  1,50  0,45  0,24 
7,20  2,64  i  0, 78  0,06  10,67  1,20  0,36  0,15  1,  71  -
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  33  350  760 
Other places 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
::>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
1,14  5,40  0,84  0,21  - 6,45  111,33  16,49  4,02  0,21  132,05 
2,19  8,67  2,97  1,59  0,06  13,28  25,31  7,95  3,33  0,21  36,79 
1,32  0,30  0,24  - 1,86  9,68  3,33  1,77  0,06  14,24 
Table  lb 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
56  Fatal 
acci-
dents  1W 
total 
~--b-)_D_i_s_co_n_t_in_u_ou_s_T_r_an_s_p_o_rt-------4--o_,_o9~_o_,_o3~----~---_J  __  o_,l_2-+6_,_69-+-l-,_47~-o-,_s_7+-0-,_o_9~8-,_8_2~-l-,5-0~-o-,4-5~-o-,2-4-+----+---2-,l-94--7-,3-54--2-,6-7~-l-,3-54-0--,-o6-+-ll_,_4_24-l_s_,_62+-4-,_6_2+--2,_1_6~-o,_l_5+-2-2_,s_s~--~----~--~ 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
19,92  1,56  0,15  0,09 
~--~---+----~---+---~~~-----+---~---+--~ 
7,89  2,31  0,63  10,82  0,67  1,92  0,33 
4,20  1,20  0,42  5,82  5,16  0,93  0,18  6,27  0,42  0,09  0,06 
6,66  1,14  0,06  0,03 
1,80  8,97  1,47  0,36  - 10,79  29,0~  5,85  1,41  36,34 
0,57  3,84 i  0,84  0,12  - 17,45 
1,23  5,13  0,63  0,24  - 0,01  15,41  2,79  0,63  18,89  b)  in  the  course  of other activities  3,69  1,111  0,21  5,01  5,52  0,99  0,15 
IV.  MACHINES'  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS  I  ---ll---t---+--+-----+--+--+---+--+--+--+---+--+----+--------+-----+----;1--+---+----+-----+---l---: 
TOTAL  30,52  7,53  1,71  0,03  39,79  5,74  2,58  0,63  18,95  0,78  0,12  0,90  8,07  0,99  0,24  - 9,30  I  55,1  11,21  2,58  0,03  68,93 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDA."'!P  AND  COAL  DUST 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU~ 
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH 4,  CO,  HzS), 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural  Gases 
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
3,66 
I 
9,121 
17,75 
I 
I 
I 
3,99 
0,90  0,33 
1,56  0,21 
5,07  1,17 
2,64  0,45 
0,30  o, 12 
137,45  28,04  6,63 
4,89  2,31 
10,88  4,83 
0,03  24,02  8,61 
14,90  4,57 
I 
II  -
0,12 
4,41  2,55 
0,24  172,35  0,45 
4,18  0,09  2,82  0,06  0,03 
0,51  0,18  5,52  0,27  0,06 
1,65  0,36  10,62  0,45  0,03 
2,37  0,45  17,39  1,98  0,36 
0,03  0,06  0,09  -
0,03  0,06  0,09  -
0,12  -
0,21  0,06  2,82  0,54  0,06 
11,90  3,06  0,21  95,62  7,44  1,20 
(1)  Nwribero  of houre  woroked  by pit staff and errployees of aont:raatoro  fii'mS  who  belong to  a  rrrine:rs'  soaial  insu:rance  sc~el"!e. 
0,06 
0,36 
0,09  2,07:  0,30  0,09  -
0,33  3,00  'I  0,091  - 0,33 ' 
I 
0,48  3,001  0,36  0,061  -
i 
2,40  11,8lr  1,98  0,511  -
i 
I  -
i 
I  -
! 
I 
I  i 
I  0,03 
I  -
0)09:  0,06  0,03  -
0,60  3,09  0,63  0,18  0,03 
1  2,46  80,51  1,65  0,51 
3,42  1,  17 ,2~  2,46  I  o,48 
3,42  29,8q  7,111  1,59 
114,30 i 40,0  7,17
1
!  1,44 
I  ! 
!  - I  - I  -
I 
0,03 
I  -
0,18 
3,93 
I  I  ! 
I 
I 
!  I 
l  0,031 
i 
1 
o,o3  1 
I 
I 
-
I
'  0,03 
o,o~  0,061  0,03 
10,16  1,20 i  0,36 
9,03  46,09  8, 97  3,12  0,09  58,26  271,2  49,98113,16 
(2)  Accidents involving mo:re  than  five  casualties  (i.e.  who  eithe:r died o:r  we:re  wtahle  to :reswne  worok  wtderoq:rowtd  '"?:r  at  wast eioht weeks). 
(3)  cawnde:r  da  s.  •  • 
10,25 
20,15 
0,03  38,531 
48,66 
I  -
0,06  0,09 
0,06  0,09 
o,o 
0,1 
O,lE 
0,03  11,75 
0, 54  334,95 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in  coal  mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleations 
l 
I 
>  56  Fatal] 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  days  :~~~~ i total 
(5) 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and  neck  - - -
II. Eyes  - - -
I 
--
I 
III.  Trunk  - - -
I 
IV.  Upper  limbs  - - -
(excluding  the  hands) 
(3) 
V.  Hands  15  - 15 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding feet)  (4)  2  - 2 
VII.  Feet  5  - 5 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  - - -
IX.  Not  spec1fied  [>( X  ~ 
TOTAL  22  - 22 
COUNTRY  :  Belgium 
COAL-FIELD  :  Total 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  I  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  I acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5!  dents 
9  7  16  - - -
~NX 
I  !  WV< 
I  [ 
I 
I 
I  I 
I  18  3 
I 
21  2  - 2  I 
I 
I 
I 
22  2  2  22  - I  -
I 
I 
I  I 
I 
I 
I 
i  86  -
I 
86  4  - 4 
I 
I 
I 
53  - 53 I  9  9 
55  - 55  3  - 3 
l  2  3  - - -
~  X  t>< t>< X  X 
244  12  256  20  - 20 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful  effects 
and  inter- and  muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury 
4  5  6 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- t.otal  days  acci- total 
(5!  dents  (5)  dents  (5!  dents 
i 
I 
3  - 3  9  - 9  -
I 
- -
I 
I  I 
1  - l  3  - 3  - I  - I 
I  I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
i  2  2  4  17  - 17  .  - -
I 
X  X  ~ 
22  - 22 
I 
1  -I 
1 
X  X  V( 
I 
! 
51  1  1  51  -
i 
i 
-
I 
I 
X  X  V( 
I 
: 
!  61  - 61  I  - -
: 
X  X  V< 
I 
13  - 13  I  - - -
I 
I 
I 
1  1  1  - - - 1  - -
X  X  V( A  ~  X 
- -
7  2  9  177  - 177  2  - 2 
I 
(1)  Number  of hours  worked by pit staff and  e~toyees of contractor firms  who  belong to a  rmner  s  soc'!-aL  1-nswance  scneme. 
(2!  including  ao~Uaations. 
(3)  The  shoulders  and  the  w-rists  are  included under  "upper  Umbs "· 
(4!  The  hips  and the  ankles  a:re  inatuded under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Calender  days. 
Table  2a 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  33  350  760 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not  TOTAL 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7  8  9 
4  to  21  to 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
total I  d!~s 
56  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
days 
(5)  dents  (5)  (5) 
!X  lXlX 
I  I 
! 
29  i  1 
!  - 1  22  7 
i 
I 
~  IX  ~ 
I  I 
i 
I  1  - l  5  ~  5 
I 
:X  M>< 
I 
47  5  52 I 
8  - 8 
~  KX 
I 
1 
I 
- l  48  - 48 
I  I 
! 
i 
H 
I~  txJXI 
!  I 
7  - 7  164  - 164  I 
I 
X  t><X 
I 
13  - 13  138  - 138 
~  A  X 
2  - 2  78  - 78 
~  ~  ~ 
1  i  1  2  4  3  7 
I 
I  - 3  3  - - - - 3  3 
I 
- 3  3  34  1  35  506  18  524 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
ColiDDOn  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in  coal  mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleations 
1 
Fatal  >  55 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  acci- total  days 
(5}  dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. Head  and neck  - - -
COUNTRY  ;  Belgium 
COAL-FIELD;  Total 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dislocation  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5}  dents  (5)  dents 
I 
0,27  0,21  0,48  - - -
II. Eyes  - - - ~  V( ~  ~  V(~ 
III.  Trunk  - - - 0,54  0,09  0,63  0,06  - 0,06 
IV.  Upper  limbs 
0,66  0,66  0,06  0,06  (excluding the  hands)  - - - - I  -
(3) 
i  I 
i 
I 
V.  Hands  0,45  I  0,12  - 0,45  2,58  - 2,58  0,12  -
i 
I  I, 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding  feet)  (4)  0,06  - 0,06  1,59  - 1,59  0,27  - 0,27 
VII.  Feet  0,15  - 0,15  1,65  - 1,65  0,09  - 0,09 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  - - - 0,03  0,06  0,09 
i 
- - ! 
IX.  Not  specified  V( V( [>( X  [X ~  ~  [X ~ 
TOIAL  0,66  - 0,66  7,32  0,36  7,68  0,60  - 0,60 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency  rates) 
YEAR  ;  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  ;  33  350  760 
Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and  Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
contusions  harmful effects 
and inter- and  muscular  of electricity  and  of those not 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury  suffocation  specified  (2) 
4  5  6  7  8 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
4  to 
>  56  20 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  acci- total  days  acci- total  days 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5}  dents  (5)  dents 
days 
(5) 
0,09  - 0,09  0,27  - 0,27  -
1-
- ~  IX  IX 0,03  - 0,03 
I  [X ~ 
I  I  i 
I 
1-
I 
0,03  - 0,03  0,09  - 0,09  I  - - 0,03  - 0,03 
M><  [>( 
I 
0,06  0,06  0,12  0,51  - 0,51  - - - 0,24  - I  0,24 
i  I 
~  V( X 
!  M>([><J 
I  I  I  I 
0,66  - 0,66  I  0,03 
I 
I  0,03  :  ;  I  0,03  I -
0,03 
I  -
~  IX )( 
I  IX X  lA'·" 
'·" I '·" 
1,53  - 0,03  - 0,21  -
[X [X [X  I  [>( IX [X 
I  i 
1,83  - 1,83  -
i 
- - 0,39  - 0,39 
[X [X  D<  X  IX  [>\ 
I 
0,39  - 0,39  - - - 0,06  - 0,06 
I  X  IX  t>< 
! 
0,03  - 0,03  0,03  - 0,03  - - - 0,03  0,03  0,06 
[>< [X  V< IX  [>< [>(-
- - - - - - - -
0,21  0,06  0,27  5,31  - 5,31  0,06  0,06  0,06  - - - 1,02  0,03  1,05 
(1)  Number  of houre  worked  by  pit staff and errrpZoyees  of aontraator firms  who  beZong  to a  rrriner's  soaiaZ insuranae  saheme. 
(2)  inaZuding corrrpZiaations. 
(3)  The  shouZders  and  the wrists are  incZuded under  "upper  Zilli>s". 
(4)  The  hips  and the ankZes  are  inaZuded under  "Lower  Limbs". 
(5)  CaZender  days. 
Table  2b 
TOTAL 
9 
21  to 
>  56  Fatal 
56 
days  acci- total 
days 
(5)  dents 
(5) 
0,66  0,21  0,87 
0,15  - 0,15 
I 
1,41  0,15  1,56 
I 
I 
H 
1,44  - 1,44 
I 
I 
4,92  4,92 
I  -
I 
4,14  - 4,14 
2,34  - 2,34 
0,12  0,09  0,21 
- 0,09  0,09 
15,17  0,54  15,71 l 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
c 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of  other activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAHP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH 4,  CO,  H2S), 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
. by  natural Gases 
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XI I.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
924 
27 
13 
14 
I 
163 
i 
133 
30 
i  534 
I 
35  I 
I 
183  1 
316 
757 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
131 
2  540 
COUNTRY:  France 
COAL-FIElD:  Nord 
Production  faces 
1 
21  to  Fatal 
56  >56  acci-
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
364  116  9 
I 
14 
I 
6  0 
9  2  0 
I  5  4  0 
! 
62  27 
I  0 
i 
48 
I  22  0 
14  1  5  0 
175  48  0 
I 
9  I  12  0 
52  7 
I 
0 
111  32  0 
305  97  I  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
1  0  0 
0  0  0 
16  8  0 
937  302  9 
total 
1413 
47 
24  I 
23 
: 
252 
203 
i 
49 
757  I 
56 
242 
I 
459 
I 
1  159 
I  2 
I 
0 
I  0  i 
I 
I 
I 
0 
I 
i  0 1 
0 
I 
3 
0 
155 
3  788 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits  Shafts  and  staple-pits 
2  3 
4  to  121  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  .>56  acci- total  20 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
I 
I 
393  119  38  2  552  0  3  0  0  3  194 
I 
I 
401  28  20  0  88  12 
i  l3  6  2  33  130 
91 
i 
6  !  3  0  18  0  0  0  0  0  27 
! 
31  22  17  0  I  70  12  13  6  2  I  33  103 
I 
! 
i 
I 
2441 
I 
111  51  0  I  406  15  18  4  0  37  401 
I  l83j  85  !  42  0 
I  310  10  13  2  0  25  330 
I 
I 
61  26  9  0  96  5  5  2  0  12  71, 
2241  73  I  I 
I 
i 
: 
25 
I  0 
i  322  9  1  1  0  11  241 i 
I 
!  I 
16 I 
! 
28  19 
I  8  I  0  55  0  0  0  0  0 
! 
101  23  I 
! 
4 
I 
0 
I 
128  4  I  0  0  5  101  i 
31!  I 
I 
95  13  0  139  5  0  1  0 
!  6  124 
I 
159  1 
I 
! 
I 
5121  377  39  0  575  32  10  4  0 
I 
46  I 
I 
0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0 
i 
0  0  0' 
I  I 
i  I 
0  0  0  0  0  0 
I 
0  0 
I  0 
I 
0  I  o  I 
I 
t 
I 
!  I  i  l  ol  2  0  i 
1  3  0  I  0  0  0  0  0 
a!  I  1 
I 
I 
I 
0  0  0  0  0 
i 
0  0  0  I  0  Q. 
i  I  I 
I  !  i 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
ol 
I  0  I  2  0  i  1  3  0  0  0  0  0 
I 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
I 
0  0  '  1  0  1  1  0  0  0 
i  1  0 
oj  1  0  0  1  0  0  I 
I 
I 
0  0  I  0  2 
1031 
i 
I  ! 
32  8  0  143  15  5  5  0  25  119 
l  381  526  182  3  12  092  84  I  50  20  2  156  1  599 
(1)  Nwriber  of hours  worked by pit staff and errpLoyees  of aontraator firms  who  beLong to a  miners'  somaL  insuranae  saheme. 
(2)  Aaaidents  invoLving more  than  fi·Je  aasuaUies  (i.e.  who  either died or were  ~mabLe to reswne work  ~mdergro~md for at  'Least  eight weeks). 
(3)  Cal.ender  daw. 
Table  la 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORI<ED  (1):  45  764  056 
Total of  Group  l 
Other  places  accidents  underground  accidents  (2)  I 
I 
4  5  6  I 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
56  >56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  ms  acci- total 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  ,_ 
57  19  l  271  l  511  543  173  12  2  239  0  0  0 
83  !  49  l  263  209  138  81  I 
3  431  0  0  0 
I 
9  6  0  42  49  I  24  11  0  84  0  0  0 
! 
74 
1  43  l  221  160  114  70  3  347  0  0  0 
192  79  0  672  823  383  161  0  it  367  i  0  I  0  0 
137  66  0  533  656  283  132  0  l  071  I  0  0  0 
1 
55  l3  0  I  139  167  100  29  0  296  0  0  0 
I  I  I 
I  i  ! 
102  24  0  367  I  1  oo8  1  351  98  0  l  457  0  0  I  0 
! 
791  21  8  0  45 
I  52  '  25  0  156  0  0  0 
H 
28  5  0  I  134  3891  104  1  16  0  509  0  0  0 
I 
i  I  I 
53  11 
I  0  188 
i 
540 !  195  '  57  0  792 
I  0  0  0 
I 
i  !  I  I  I 
[2  592  i  228  72 
I 
0  I  812  l  678  I  702  I  212  i  0  0  0  0 
I  I 
j 
! 
21 
I 
3  I  0  0  0  0  1  I  0  0  0  0  0 
i  _l 
I 
I 
I 
0 
i  0  0  0  O!  0  a  I  0  0  0  0 
i  0 
I 
I 
0  ! 
I 
I 
I 
i 
21 
I 
I 
i 
0  I  0 
!  0  a;  0  I  1  3  0  0  0 
I 
oi  0  0  0  0  Ol  0  0  0  0  0 
i  0 
I 
I 
21 
I 
i 
oj 
I 
0  0  I  0  0  0  1  3  0  ~!  I 
oj  0  ! 
I 
I 
0  :  0  0  0 
t 
0  0  0  0  0  0 
I 
0  1  0  l  3  1  2  I  I 
0  6  0  0  0 
0  0  0  2  2  1  0  0  I  3  i  0  0  0 
30  9  a  I  158  368  83  30  0 
I 
4811  0  0  0 
692  253  2  2  546  5  604  2  205  757  16  8  582  0  0  0 
I MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Colmllon  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
c 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
I I. TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
II I.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other  activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI,  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural Gases 
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAtJSES 
TOTAL 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
20,19 
0,59 
0,28 
0,31 
3,56 
2,91 
0,66 
11,67 
0, 76 
4,00 
6,90 
16,54 
0,04 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,oo 
0,00 
0,04 
0,00 
2,86 
55,50 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIElD  :  Nord 
Production  faces 
1 
21  to  Fatal 
56  >56  acci-
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
7,95  2,53  i  0,20 
i  0,31  0,13 
: 
0,00 
0,20  0,04  0,00 
I 
o, 11  0,09  I  0,00 
1,35  0,59  0,00 
1,05  0,48  0,00 
0,31  0,11  o,oo 
3,82  1,05  0,00 
I 
0,26 i  0,20  o,oo 
1,141  0,15  0,00 
2,4310,70  0,00 
I 
6,66  2,12  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  o,oo  o,oo 
o,oo  o,oo  0,00 
0,02  0,00  0,00 
o,oo  0,00  o,oo 
0,35  0,17  0,00 
20,47  6,60  0,20 
4  to 
total  20 
days 
(3) 
30,88  8,59i 
1,03 
! 
0,871 
0,52  0,20 
0,50  0,68 
I 
5,51  5,33 
4,44  4,00 
1,07  1,33 
16,54  I  4,89: 
1,22  0,61j 
5,29  2)21: 
I 
10,03  2,os: 
25,33  8,24' 
j 
i 
0,04  O,OOj 
! 
0,00  0,00 
o,ooi  0,00 
! 
I 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,07  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
3,39  2,25 
82,77  30,18 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits 
2  3 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
56  )56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (J)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
I 
2,60  o,83  1  o,04  12,06  0,00  I  0,07  0,00  0,00  0,07  4,24 
I  I 
I 
0,61  0,44  0,00  1,92  0,26  I  0,28  0,13  0,04  0,72  2,84 
0,13  0,07  o,oo  0,39  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,59 
0,48  0,37  o,oo  1,53  0,26  I  o,2s  0,13  0,04  0,72  2,25 
I 
0,33  i  0,39  2,43  l,  ll  o,oo  8,87  0,09  0,00  0,81  8, 76 
i 
1,86  0,92  0,00  6,771 0,22 
I  0,28  0,04  0,00  0,55  7,21 
I 
0,57 I  0,20  o,oo  2,10  0,11 
i  0,11  0,04  o,oo  0,26  1,55 I 
I 
I 
5,271  1,60  0,55  0,00  7,041 0,20  0,02  0,02  0,00  0,24 
0,42! 
!  0,17  0,00  1,2o I  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,35 
I 
0,09  i  o.oo  I 
I  I 
2,21!  0,50  2,80 i 0,09  0,02  0,00  0,00  0,11 
I  : 
I 
i 
0,68:  0,28  0,00  3,04 i 0,11  0,00  0,02  0,00  0,13  2,11 1 
I 
3,47 i 
'  !  i 
11,191  o,ss  1  o,oo  j  12,56 
1  o,1o  0,22  0,09  0,00  1,01 
I  : 
I 
o.oo 1  0,02  0,00  0,00 
I  0,02' 0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
I 
o,ool  o,oo  0,00 
I 
0,00  0,00 
i 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
I 
I  I  I 
0,04  o,oo  : 0,02  o,o1  : o-,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
I 
I 
i  I 
0,001  0,00! 0,00 
I  0,00 : 0,00 
I 
0,00  0,00  0,00  f  0,00  o,oo 
I 
I 
o,o1  1  o,oo 
I 
0,04  o,oo  0,02  o,oo  o,oo  o,oo  i  0,00  0,00 
I 
i  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 i o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00: 
i  I  : 
0,00  0,02  0,00  0,02  0,02 
I  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,02  0,00 
I 
I 
0,02  0,00 '0,00  I  0,02  0,00  0,00  0,00  000  0,00  0,04 
0,70  0,17  0,00  3,12  0,33  0,11  0,11  o,oo  0,55  2,60 
11,49  3,98  0,07  45,71  1,84  1,09  0,44  0,041  3,41  34,94 
(1)  Nwrber  of houre  Ulorked  by pit staff and  e~~ployees of contractor  firms  U!ho  belong to a  miners 1  social  insu:t'ClJ'Ice  s&zeme. 
(2)  Aaaidents involving more  than  five  aasuaZties  (i.e.  who  either died or Wel'e  unable  to resume  Ulork  underground for at  U.ast  eight weeks). 
( 3)  CaU.nder  daus. 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  45  764  056 
Total of 
Other  places  accidents  underground 
4  5 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal 
56  :>56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
1,25  0,42  0,02  5,92  33,0:1  11,87  3,78  0,26  48,92 
1,81  1,07  0,02  5,75  4,57  3,02  1,77  0,07  9,42 
0,20  0,13  0,00  0,92  1,07  0,52  0,24  0,00  1,84 
1,62  0,94  0,02  4,83  3,5(  2,49  1,53  0,07  7,58 
4,20  1,  73  0,00  14,68  17,9  8,37  3,52  o,oo  29,87 
2,99  1,44  0,00  11,65  14,3  6,18  2,88  o,oo  23,40 
1,20  0,28  0,00  3,041  3,6  2,19  0,63  0,00  6,47 
2,23  0,52  0,00  8,02  22,0  7,67  2,14  0,00  31,84 
0,46  0,17  o,oo  1  0,98  1,7  1,14  0,55  0,00  3,41 
0,61  0,11  0,00  2,93  8,5(  2,27  0,35  o,oo  11,12 
I 
1,161 0,24  I  0,00  4,11  11,8(  4,26J  1,25  o,oo  17,31 
4,98! 1,57  I  0,00  17,74  36,6  15,341  4,63  o,oo  56,64 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00!  0,04  0,02  0,00  0,00  0,07 
0,00  0,00  o,oo  I  0,00  O,OC  0,00  o,oo  0,00  o,oo 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,ool  0,04  0,00  0,02  0,07 
o,oo  0,00  :  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,()( 
o,oo  0,00  0,00  o,ool  0,00  0,04  0,00  0,02  0,07 
o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,()( 
0,00  0,02  0,00  0,02  0,07  0,02  0,04  0,00  O,l 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,04  0,04  0,02  o,oc  0,00  o,o 
0,66  0,20  0,00  3,45  8,04  1,81  0,66  0,00  10,5 
15,12  5,53  0,04  55,63 122,45  48,18  16,54  0,35  187,5 
Table  lb 
Group 
accidents 
6 
56  Fatal 
?W 
acci-
dents 
0,00  o,oo 
o,oo  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  o,oo 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
o,oo  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
(2) 
total 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,oo  I 
0,00 
o,oo 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,oo 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
N 
c MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleations 
1 
>  56 I  Fat~ll 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  days  I  acc1- total 
r5;  , dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. Head  and neck  0  1  1 
II. Eyes  1  0  1 
III.  Trunk  0  0  0 
IV.  Upper  limbs 
(excluding the hands)  0  I  0  0 
(3) 
V.  Hands  27  0  27 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding feet)  (4)  2  0  2 
VII.  Feet  3  0  3 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  0  0  0 
IX.  Not  specified  ~  ~  [X 
TOTAL  33  1  34 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIELD  :  Nord 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
15  3  18  0  0  0 
[X  V<t>< NXiX 
I 
! 
33  1  34  16  0 
I 
16 
I 
:  I 
50  0  I  50  3 
I 
0  3 
i 
i 
I 
I 
I  128  0  128  2  0  2 
I 
I 
I  T 
87  0  87  33  0 
I 
33 
46  0  46  0  0  0 
2  1  3  0  0  0 
[X  V( [>( [X ~  [X 
361  5  366  54  0  54 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Concussion  Open wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  inter- and  muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal  injury 
4  5  6 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
2 
I 
0  2  14  0  14  0  0  0 
I  i  !  i 
2  0  2  14 
0  I 
14  0  0  !  0 
! 
! 
6  2  8  17  0  !  17  0  0  0 
i 
: 
N>( X 
I  34  0  34  0  0  0 
! 
i 
I 
NX X 
I 
I 
80  0 
I 
80  0  0  0 
l 
N>(  ~  I,  104  1  0  0  0 
i 
l>< [>( [X 
12  0  I  12  0  0  0 
I 
I  12  I 
0  0  0  0  i 
12  0  0  0 
l 
I 
~  V( X  V( [X 
0  0  0 
10  2  12  287  1  288  0  0  0 
(1)  Number  of houre  worked by  pit staff and employees  of contractor  firms  who  belong to a miner's social insurance  scheme. 
(2)  including compZiaations. 
(3)  The  shoutdere  and  the wrists  are  inctuded under  "upper  Zirri>s ". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankles  are  included under  "Lower  tirri>s". 
(5)  Calender days. 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  ( 1) 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7  8 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
~:X  ~x  2  0  2 
~  ,X  t>< 
0  0  0 
I 
1  1  0  0  0 
~~xt>< 
0  0  0 
i 
V< X  t>< 
I 
I 
1  0  1 
V(  t><  V< 
2  0  2 
~  MX 
0  0  0 
I  1  1  7  4  11 
0  1  1  0  0  0 
0  3  3  12  4  16 
Table  2a 
45  764  056 
TOTAL 
9 
4  to  21  to 
>  56  Fatal 
20  56 
days  days  days  acci- total 
(5)  (5)  (5)  dents 
416  61  33  4  514 
490  23  17  0  530 
714  348  72  4  1  138  ! 
706  159  87  0  952 
I 
I 
I 
N 
i  I 
1  829  960  238  0  3  0271 
l 
1  490 I  884  377  228  1 
+-----
427  I  217  61  0  705 
136  57  21  6  220 
2  3  0  1  6 
5  604  2  205  757  16  8  582 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
CoUD!IOn  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enuc leations 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIELD  :  Nord 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
Fatal 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency  rates) 
Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  inter- and  muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury 
5  6 
Fatal 
Table  2b 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  45  764  056 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not  TOTAL 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7 
Fatal 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
>  55  I  Fat~l 
days  ace~- total 
(5)  dents 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
acci- total 
dents 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
acc.i- total 
dents 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
acci- total 
dents 
0,09  0,72 
I 
11,231 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  He ad  and neck 
! 
11,581 
24,871 
L---Ir.  ____  Eyes------t--o,o2  +----'  o,oo---r--1  '·----+"  X--------'f-----X---t---11\~~1*1  ----'f-1  --------+1~,  0,04----t---!  o-------t-,ool_o,04--t-o,--T-31  o_,oo  t----0,3----t---+-----+oo  i_o,oo-t-!  '·'-------+--'  K~~-----¥---[><J-----Irl_o,oo-L-i  o,oo-t---1  0-------t,oo  1_10,7-+-----1  o.-----r~  i_0,37+---o,o-t-o  I  ------t 
1 
1 
I  I  I  I  I  r  0,37  0,00  ,I  0,00 I  0,00  i'  0,00  0,02  0,02  .1
1 
0,00  1
1 
0,00  I  o,oo 
1
115,6017,60  I  I 
I 
I 
20,80 I 
1  ~:'  ,::~·  um,  '·"  o,oo  o,oo  '·"  1 '·" I  '·~ f(:  i '·"~~>  '·"  o,oo  I  ;  i  VvM  I  :  I  I  I '·"  i  o,M 
I  ;:;"'""'"' '"' "'"'''  0,00  0,00  o,oo  ),M  o,oo  >,M  I '·" i  o,oo i '·" v  \/'\!\  '·"  0,00  I  '·"  ! 0,00  i  0,00 i 0,00 NV\!  0,00 I  0,00 I  0,00 I  "·"! '·" I '·"I 0,00  ! 
I  I  I  I  I  I  i\/!\ :\/li  I  i  i  I  !\/;V\11  r--1  I  I  I  !  I  I 
;  ,  ""'·  '·"  o.oo 
1 
'·"  '·"'  o.oo 
1 
'·"' 
1 
'·"' 
1 
o.oo 
1 
'·"' ~/~, v  \J .. , 
1 
o.oo  '·" 
1 
'·"'  ,  o.oo 
1 
o.oo  [1\J;\v~ '·": o.oo  , '·" 
1 "·'r·" 
1 
,.,
1 
o.oo 
1 
"·" 
f-----v-r.  L-owe-r  limb-s  ----+-I[,  ------+--t---!:  --t----t----1  I  i  ;  :\V~~~\\/!  I  [  I  1\11\/~  I  I  I  :  I'  :  I  i 
(excluding  feet)  (4)  0,04 
1
0,00  0,04  1,90 '0,00  11,90  i  0,721 0,00 I 0,72  ~~~~/  ~  2,2710,02  2,29  0,00  ~  0,00 I  0,00 ~  0,041 0,00  i  0,04,19,3218,24  4,981  0,021  32,561 
VII.  Feet 
IX.  Not  specified 
i  ·  I 
M~  '·" '·"  '·"  '·" o,n  ,,oo  '·"  o,oo  '·"  '·" I '·"'  j  '·" I '·"  o,o,  '·" I  o,oo 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by  pit staff and  emp~oyee8 of contractor firms  who  beZong  to a  miner's  sociaZ insurance  scheme. 
(2)  inoluding complications. 
(3)  The  shoulders  and the wrists aN  inc~uded 101der  "upper  Urrbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ank~es are  inaZuded 101der  "Lower  lirrbs". 
(5)  Calender days. 
o.oo  o.oo I  ,  ... 
0,00  0,02  0,13 
0,07  0,07  0,26  0,09  0,35  122,45 48,18  16,54  0,35  187,53 
H 
N 
N MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIELD  :  Lorraine 
Production  faces 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits 
2 
(absolute  figures) 
Shafts  and staple-pits 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  20  952  000 
Other  places 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
Table  la 
Group  I 
accid:nts  (2)  J 
I 
4  to  Jzt  to 
20  56 
days  days 
(J)  (3) 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal  J 
c  d:s  d~:  ~:  ::~  ~t~  ~~  :~;  ~u1 d:s  d:s  ~:  ::_!_;~~-t_a_l~d_!_~~-d_:_s~~~-~-:~=-~-~-:~~-t_a_l~d-=-s~_d_:_s~-d-~-~~·-=-=-~--~to_t_a_l~d-~_J_·~:_:_:_!;~,~t~ 
~------------~:::::.f-(_J_!_f-(J_!_f-(-3)_(___-+--+---+--~(::.:J!_f-_  _j_ __  ,_(_3_J -f-(_3)_+-_(_JJ_+--- (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3}  .. 
I  I  'I  175  I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS  454  320  112  4  890  97  61  I  11  o  0  0  0  19  5  2  0  26  570  386  131  I  4  1  o91  0  0 
105  31  45 
I 
15  1  11  I  1 
I 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL  44  16  4  I 
: 
10  6 
12  a)  Continuous  Transport  24  67 
I 
6 l  0  14  0  0  : 
o  I 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport  u  I  21  38  10  I  17  10  6  0  ! 
t9  I 
I 
o  I 
19  I 
49 
40 
46 
I 
37  I 
32 
28 
I 
0  I 
o  I 
127 
22 
10s  I 
107  112  62  282 
43  38  22  103 
64  74  40  79  0  J 
~---------i------i--
11-+-----+---+-1  ------'----i------+---J---+-+----i--,-~  I  I  I  I 
I 
I  III. FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM,  I  I  I  I  l  I  i  I  I 
TOTAL  r--4_95 __  3_71~1  __  64-+_o_~_9_3o_ri'  _9_7-T
1
--~2~3~~0--~l=82~~-~l~3-+~l4~+-~2~--~o~~~2~9~l~2~9~64-~2~4~3-r~6~5~~o~~6=~,~--9=o=l+-~69=0,_~l=54~~o~~l~7=45~_~o-+i_~~-r'-~~~ 
555  119  1  409  0  a)  while  moV1ng  about  the  mine  406  :  291  49  I  0  746  I  83  59  l  17  0  1159  9  12  2  0  23  237  !  193  51  I  0  I  481  735! 
b)  in  the  course  of other acti  vi ties --89r:r--l5---,-l  ~0--+--1-84--'- 1  -1-4--+---3--j!--6-+l-o---+- ~~  ~23~+--4-+---2~+---0--+---0-+--6---59--ji~-50-t- 1 
~14--j~--0--+ 
1
1_1_2_3  -"!--1-6-6+!  _1_3_5+-3-5-j--0-+-3-36-+-0-.;----0~~~  --0~ 
0  0 
IV.  MACHINE 5,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
1  215  I  114  I  35  o  364  I  57  32  !  __  1_4--'-~~l--+-i  _l_~-~--2-+-_o_+-~o~---o-+--2--+--4--+li  ___  l~8rj----t4  __  o__,.1~_6_3-+--_3_1_5-+- :  __  16_4-f~~-53-r_l_+-_s_33~  __  o  __  +l' ~o  ____  o_. 
41  I  28  I  8  I  0  I  77  I  9  I  10  I  8  _1  1  28  0  I  0  0  ;  0  I  0  [  5  I  l  I  2  :  0  8  i  55  i  39  18  1  1131  0  :  0  0  a)  Machines 
b)  Tools  "' I " I '1  I~"  ~-~--4~--2o~_ri  ~6~1~o----7-o·-~j_-~J2---t
1
---~-o- __  ~~~~~~o~~~---:_·~~-~---_-_-2:+-J  _____  3_~_-l___!----1~6~:~~~2~~~~-o~~~~~5~4~~~2-:__,-l-+  ~~~~-l·-1-~7~-~~~-3-5~:~1  ~-o_-_-_-t+-1 1
.~~3-9_3~:~  ~~o~~-:~  ~~o~~~~~o~-. 
.  I  I  I  I'  I  I  I  '  ! 
c)  Supports  I  15  5  0  0  20  4  2  0  0  1  6  0  0  0  0  1  0  I  0  1  0  i  0  l  19  )  8  ;  0  !  0  271  0  0  [  0  I 
~v-_-F_A_u_s_~_m_J_E_cr_s _______  +_2_o_s+-1-7-3+-4-9+-o~~::_4~3~o 4 1_3_7~-3-1-~1-1~-o--~-7-9~--14 1 __  4
4 
__  2  ___  o_-t!l~~7~~-1-o_l~-7-4_+-il_~_i  1  2u  wl  ~~  nl  1  ~J  o  o  j  o  i 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES  l  !  1  0  1,  0  2  I  l  I  0  0  I  0  I  l  0  0  0  0  I  0  I  0  I  0  I  0  I  0  0  21  1  I  0  !  0  3  I  0  0  I  0  : 
l~------------------------~--+---~r---+·--~~----+----+---~--~---L--~-~-4----~--~---r~  ------------~--~.  ---,---~--~----+---~---r---r'---4----J~~---~ 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS  i  I  II  i  I  I  I  !  !  I  I  I 
~--o_F_n_RE_D_A':_~  __  AN_D_c_oA_L~Dl_'s_r ___  +-~-o  -+---o_1'--~o-l'-o~--ll~~o--+,  __  o-l  __  o_,___o---'!~o--+l  ___  o----1·~-o--+--o--+~---o  +---o  __ 
1  ~-o--lj  ___  o -+---o-+-'  ~-o  __  i!---_o__.l~_o-+----o-+---o~i  __  o-+~o--+-~o-+l_o_+--_o_+-1  __  o_  i 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS'  DE-OXYGENATION'  I  !  I'  I  i  I  I  I  II,  !  I  I  '  I  1
1 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU- I  I  I  !  I  i  0  I  I  0  I  I 
RAL  GAsEs  <co2.  CH4,  co,  H2Sl,  o  o  o  o  o  o  o 
1 
o  j  o  o  I  o  i  o  o  o  o  1  o  o  1  o 
1  o  o  1  o  ,  o  o  o  o  o 
1
1 
TOTAL  I  I  I 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas  o  o  0  0  0  0  0  0  !  0  0  0  !  0  0  0  0  1  0  ~  0  i  0  l  0  0  0  0  I  0  0  0  0  0  I 
--o--
1 
0  0  0  i  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  I  0  0  0  0  I  0  I  0  I  0  I  0  0  :  0  i  0  0  0  0  0  0  I  b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural Gases 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
I  XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
0  0  0  i  0  o  I 
i  I  I  I  I 
oj  oj  o  o  o1  o;  ol 
o  I  0  ! 
i 
o  I o  o  I  o  I 
I 
I 
0  0 l  0  o! 
o  I  134  21  9  0  164  72  8  0  I  0  80  4  l  0  5  77  14  94  287  44  12 
I 
!  1: 
~-------------------~-~--~---+---r--r--!-----t----·~1  __  ~--I--~--
400  142  1  126  2  529  l  679  510  7 
0  0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
343  0 
4  725  0 
0 
0 
0  TOTAL  l  551  l  045  285  4  2  885  365  209  76  2  165l  30  2~  7  J  0  I  62  583  I 
(1)  Nwnber  of houre  worked by  pit staff and enpLoyees  of aont:roctor  firms  who  beLong  to a  rrriners'  sociaL  insurance scheme.  -'-~--j__~- __  ___c ___  _L_  _  ___c __  ~j__~---'-----j__----'--~'-----'---L---'----'----~ 
(2)  Accidents  invotving moro  than  five  casuaLties  (i.e.  UJho  either died or wero  unabLe  to resume  work  underground  for at  least eight UJeeks). 
( 3)  Calender  daus. 
H 
N 
w MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
CA 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOI'AL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOI'AL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other  activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VI I I.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE -OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES 
TOI'AL 
(C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural Gases 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
Xl.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OI'HER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21,67 
2,10 
1,48 
0,62 
23,63 
19,38 
4,25 
10,26 
1,96 
7,59 
0,72 
9,93 
0,05 
o,oo 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,oo 
o,oo 
6,40 
74,03 
COUNTRY. :  France 
COAL-FIElD  :  Lorraine 
Production  faces 
1 
21  to  Fatal 
56  >56  acci-
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
15,27  5,35  0,19 
2,15  0,76  o,oo 
1,15  0,57  o,oo 
1,00  0,19  o,oo 
17,71  3,05  0,00 
13,89  2,34  0,00 
3,82  0,72  0,00 
5,44  1,67  o,oo 
1,34  0,38  0,00 
3,87  1,29  o,oo 
0,24  0,00  0,00 
8,26  2,34  0,00 
0,05  0,00  0,00 
0,00  o,oo  0,00  I 
o,oo  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  o,oo 
0,00  o,oo  0,00 
0,00  o,oo  o,oo 
0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  o,oo  0,00 
1,00  0,43  0,00 
49,88  13,60  0,19 
4  to 
total  20 
days 
(3) 
42,48  4,63 
5,01  0,19 
3,20  0,14 
1,81  0,05 
44,39  4,63 
35,61  3,96 
8,78  0,67 
17,37  2,72 
3,68  0,43 
12,74  2,10 
0,95  0,19 
20,52  1,771 
0,10  0,05 
I 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  o,oo 
o,oo  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
7,83  3,44 
37,70  17,42 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits 
2  3 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
2,91  0,81  o,oo  8,35  o,oo  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,91 
0,72  0,53  0,05  1,48  0,48  0,29  0,14  0,00  0,91  2,34 
0,24  0,29  o,oo  0,67  o,oo  o,oo  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,43 
0,48  0,24  0,05  0,81  0,48  0,29  0,14  o,oo  0,91  1,  91 
2,96  1,10  o,oo  8,69  0,62  0,67  0,10  0,00  1,38  14,13 
2,82  0,81  0,00  7,59  0,43  0,57  0,10  0,00  1,10  11,31 
0,14  0,29  0,00  1,10  0,19  0,10  0,00  0,00  0,29  2,82 
1,53  l  0,67  0,05  4,96  o,lo  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,10  1,96 
0,48  0,38  0,05  1,34  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,24 
0,95  0,29  o,oo  3,34  0,10  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,10  1,72 
0,10  I o,oo  o,oo  0,29  0,00  0,00  0,00  I  0,00  0,00  o,oo 
1,48  0,53  0,00  3,77  0,05  0,19  0,10  1 o.oo  0,33  4,82 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,05  o,oo  0,00 
I 
o,oo  I o,oo  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,00  o,oo  I  o,oo  0,00  0,00 
I 
I 
i  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo  o,oo  I o,oo  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,00 
I 
0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo 
o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo 
I 
0,00  i  o,oo  o,oo  0,00  0,00  O,OQ  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,38  o,oo  0,00  3,82  0,19  0,05  0,00  0,00  0,24  3,68 
9,98  3,63  0,10  31,12  1,43  1,19  0,33  0,00  2,96  27,83 
(1)  Nuni:Jer  of houra  worked by pit stafi and errpLoyees  of contractor  fi.rn~B who  beLong to  a  rrrinera'  sociaL  insurance  s'.!herrs. 
(2)  Aaaidsnts invoZving more  than  five  aaeuaUies  (i.e.  who  eithezo died or were  WlabLe  to resume  work  WldsrgroW'Id  for at  least eight weeks}. 
(3)  Cal.endsr  days. 
Table  lb 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  20  952  000 
Total of  Group 
Other places  accidents  underground  accidents  (2) 
4  5  6 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
56  :>s6  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  ?W 
acci- total 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3}  (3)  (3) 
0,24  0,10  0,00  1,24  27,21  18,42  6,25  0,19  52,07  0,00  0,00  0,00 
2,20  1,53  0,00  6,06  5,11  5,35  2,96  0,05  13,46  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,43  0,19  0,00  1,05  2,05  1,81  1,05  0,00  4,92  0,00  0,00  0,00 
1,77  1,34  0,00  5,01  3,05  3,53  1,91  0,05  3,77  0,00  0,00  0,00 
I 
11,60  3,10  0,00  28,83  43,00  32,93  7,35  0,00  83,29  0,00  o,oo  0,00 
9,21  2,43  0,00  22,96  35,08  26,49  5,68  0,00  67,25  0,00  0,00  0,00 
2,39  0,67  0,00  5,87  7,92  6,44  1,67  o,oo  16,04  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,86  0,19  o,oo  3,01  15,03  7,83  2,53  0,05  25,44  0,00  0,00  0,00 
o,os  0,10  0,00  0,38  2,63  1,86  0,86  0,05  5,39  o,oo 
H 
0,00  0,00 
0,76  0,10  1  o,oo  2,58  ,11,50  5,58 i  1,67  0,00  18,76  0,00  0,00  o,oo 
I 
'0,05  o,oo  1  o,oo  0,05  0,91  0,38  0,00  0,00  1,29  0,00  0,00  0,00 
I 
3,53  1,72  1  0,05  10,12  16,56  13,46 
! 
4,68  0,05  34,75  0,00  0,00  0,00 
I 0,00  I 0,00  0,00 
0,00 t"" 
0,05  0,00  0,00  0,14  0,00  0,00  0,00 
1  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
I 
I 0,00  I 0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00 
0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,00  o,oo  1  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
o,oo  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00  o,oo  o,oo  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00  o,oo  0,00 
0,67  0,14  0,00  4,49  13,70  2,10  0,57  0,00  16,37  0,00  0,00  0,00 
19,09  6,78  0,05  53,74  20,70  80,14  24,34  0,33  225,52  0,00  o,oo  0,00 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on victims 
of  accidents  underground in coal mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleation& 
l 
Fatal  >  s.; 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. Head  and neck  0  0  0 
II. Eyes  0  0  0 
III,  Trunk  0  0  0 
IV.  Upper  limbs 
0  1  1  (excluding the  hands) 
(3) 
V.  Hands  10  0  10 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding feet)  (4)  0  0  0 
VII.  Feet  0  0  0 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  0  0  0 
IX.  Not  specified 
t>< t>< t>< 
TOTAL  10  1  11 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIELD  •  Lorraine 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
7  2  9  0  0  0 
tx; ~  ~  ~  ~  ~ 
16  0  16  11  0  11 
15  0  15  4  0  4 
99  0  99 
!  5  0  5 
I 
46  1  47  I 
25  0  25 
37  0  37  2  0  2 
10  2  12  2  0  2 
t>< t>< [>< t>< IX  [X 
230  5  235  49  0  49 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  inter- and muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury 
4  5  6 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acc:i- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
4 
I 
0  4  19  1  20  0  0  0 
! 
I 
: 
0  I  0  0  6  0  6  0  0  0 
i 
i 
0  0  0  8  0  8  0  0  0 
i 
I 
~  vt< 
15  0  15  1 
I 
0  1 
I 
X  [xJX 
i  I 
51  0  51  0 
I 
0  0 
X  ~ 
I 
I 
52  0  52 
I 
0  0  0 
IX ~ 
14  0  14  0  0  0 
i 
i 
0  0  I  0  23  0  23  0  0  0 
I 
t>< IX  [X  ~  IX  t>< 
0  0  0 
I 
4  0  4  188  1  189  1  0  1 
(1)  Nwri>er  of houre  IJOrked  by  pit staff and errpl.oyees  of eontraetor firms  who  betong to a  miner's  soc1-at  1-nsurance  scneme. 
(2)  incZuding eorrpZieations. 
(3)  The  shoutders and  the wrists are  ineZudsd under  "upper  Urrbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and  the  anktes are inetudsd under  "Lower  Zimbs". 
(5)  CaZender  days, 
Poisoning 
and 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  ( 1) 
Multiple  injuries 
of  those not 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7  8 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
20  952 000 
4  to 
20 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days 
(5}  dents  (5)  dents  (5) 
~  IX  ~ 
10  0  10  296 
t>< IX  ~ 
1  0  1  302 
~  ~x  ~ 
4  0  4  356 
[>( X  ~ 
3  0  3  353 
~  X  ~I 6  0  6  536 
~  X  ~ 
3  0  3  400 
[>< IX  [X 
0  0  0  180 
~  ~  [>< 
0  0  0  85 
0  0  0  1  0  1  21 
0  0  0  28  0  28  2  529 
Table  2a 
TOTAL 
9 
21  to 
>  56  56 
days  days  (5)  (5) 
133  40 
23  7 
337  39 
165  38 
510  171 
304  126 
105  53 
89  35 
13  1 
1  679  510 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
3 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
7 
total 
472 
332 
732 
557 
1  217 
831 
338 
211 
35 
4  725 
!  N 
U1 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in  coal  mines 
NATIJRE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  He ad  and neck 
II. Eyes 
III.  Trunk 
IV.  Upper  limbs 
(excluding the  hands) 
(3) 
V.  Hands 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding  feet)  (4) 
VII.  Feet 
VIII. Multiple  locations 
>  55 
days 
(5) 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,48 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
o,oo  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00 
o,os  0,05 
0,00  0,48 
0,00  i  o,oo  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  o,oo 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIELD  :  Lorraine 
rractures  Lux at  ions, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
0,33 
0,76 
0,72 
4,73 
2,20 
1,77 
0,48 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0,10 
0,00 
total 
0,43 
0, 76 
0,00  o, 72 
0,00  4, 73 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
0,00 
0,53 
0,19 
1  0,24 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0,00 
o,oo 
0,00 
o,oo 
I  I'  I  o,os  2,24  1  1,19  o,oo 
I  i 
'·" I 
j 
0,10 I 0,00  1 
i 
0,00 
0,10  0,57  I 0,10  I  0,00 I 
total 
o,oo 
0,53 
0,10 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency  rates) 
Table  2b 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  20  952  000 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal injury 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
I 
o, 191 0,00 
I 
o,oo:  0,00 
I 
l 
0,00 I 0,00 
! 
total 
0,19 
0,00 
0,00 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and muscular 
abrasions 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
0,91 
0,29 
Fatal I 
, acci- total 
'•"" i 
0,05  I o. 95 
I 
o,oo  0,29 
0,38  0,00  1 
o, 72  o,oo 
lr 
0,72 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Multiple  injuries 
of  those not 
specified  (2) 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
total 
0,00  0,00  o.oo IX:X'X o...  o.oo  o ... 
o,oo  I 
I 
I  0,00  1 
i 
I 
I 0,05! 
o,oo 
0,00 
o.oo !>W<V< o.,: o.oo  o., 
0,00 
TOTAL 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
14,13  6,35 
14,41  1,10 
16,99  16,08 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
1,91 I 0,14 
I  0,33  o,oo 
1,86  0,00 
1,81  0,05 
i  I  ! 
1
2,43  I  0,00  i  0,29125,58 24,34  2,43  0,00  8,1610,00:  o.oo  o.oo ~XN  o.,  o.oo 
0,00  0,00 
2,48 
0,67 
o,oo  12,48 
i 
I 
0,00  !  0,67 
o.oo  1  '·'"  o.oo  1,10 
I 
: 0,00 
0,00 
I 
I 
o,oo  o,oo ~  0,'-'  0,00  0,'-'  19,09  14,51  1  6,01  I  o,os 
0,00  o.oo >W<IX o.oo  • o.oo .  o.oo  8, 591  5,01  2,53  0,00 
0,00  4,06  4,25  1,67  0,10 
total 
26,58 
58,09 
39,66 
IX.  Not  specified  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,05  0,00  0,05  1,00  0,62  0,05  0,00  1,67 
I 
TOTAL  0,48  0,05  0,53  10,98  0,24  11,22  2,34  0,00  2,34  0,19
1 
0,00 I 0,19  .  8,97  0,05  9,02 
I 
(1)  NunU>er  of hours  worked by  pit staff and errrptoyees  of aontraator firms  who  betong to a  miner's soaiat insw>anae  scheme. 
(2)  induding aorrrpZiaations. 
(3)  The  shouLders  and  the wrists are included under  "upper  U100s". 
(4)  The  hips and the anktes  are inatuded under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Catender  da;;s. 
0,05  0,00  0,05  0,00  0,00  0,00  1,34  0,00  1,34  120,70 80,14  24,34  0,33  225,52 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground in coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
c 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  whi 1e  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other  activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V .  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  OUST 
VI II.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE -OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural Gases 
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
X  I I.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
78 
19 
15 
4 
38 
27 
11 
110 
13 
37 
60 
85 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
26 
357 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIElD  :  Centre-Midi 
Production  faces 
1 
21  to  Fatal  4  to 
56  >56  acci- total  20 
days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3} 
82  31  1  192  38 
18  17  1  55  s  I 
14  12  1  42  0 
4  5  0  13  5 
27  14  0  79  19 
20  8  0  55  12 
7  6  0  24  7 
97  36  0  243  32 
11  6  0  30  1 
33  7  0  77  15 
53  23  0  136  16 
101  23  2  211  47 
0  0  0  1  0 
I 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  1 
10  4  0  40  15 
335  125  4  821  157 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits 
2  3 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3}  (3)  (3}  (3)  (3)  (3) 
39  19  0 
i 
96  0  0  0  0  0  26 
I 
1  4  0  10  2  2  2  0  6  56 
i 
0  2  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  14 
1  2  i  0  8  2  2  2  0  6  I  42 
I 
I  I 
27  8  i  0  54  5  2  2  0  9  160 
18  6  0  36  3  0  1  0  4  102 
9  2  0  18  2  2  1  0  5  i  58 
I 
37 
I  10 
i 
1 
i  80  5  1  2  0  8  104 
I 
I  o  I  3  0  0  6  1  0  0  1  10 
i 
16  5 
I 
0 
I 
36  3  0  1  0  4  59 
I 
j 
18  3  I  1  38  1  1  1  0  3  35 
39  12  0  98  8  4  2  0  14  !  172 
0  0  0  1 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0 
I 
0  0  0  0  0  I  0  0 
i  l 
I 
I 
0  !  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  !  0  1 
: 
! 
0  I  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1 
o  I  0  1 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  I  0  0 
2  1  1  4  0  0  0  0  0  I  0 
0  0  0  1  1  0  0  o  I  1  0 
4  0  0  19  0  1  0  0  1  45 
149  54  2  362  21  10  8  0  39  564 
(1)  Nwrt>er  of houra  worked by  pit staff and errpLoyeea  of aontractor  fi1'1118  who  beLong  to a  rrriners'  sociaL  insurance s<Yieme. 
(2}  Aceidenta  invoLving more  than five  easuaLties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unabLe  to reawne  work  underground for at wast eight weeks). 
( 3}  Caknder days. 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN -HOURS  WORKED  ( 1) 
Other  places 
4 
21  to  Fatal 
56  )56  acci- total 
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
27  12  0  65 
61  32  1  150 
30  9  0  53 
31  23  1  97 
146  61  1  368 
86  35  1  224 
60  26  0  144 
I  106  38  0  248 
I 
10  3  I  0  23 
I 
45  24 
I  0  !  128 
51  11  0  97 
169  71  0  412 
I 
0  i  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0 
: 
I 
0  0  0  I  1 
0  0  0  0 
0  0  I 
I  0  1 
0  1  0  1 
0  0  0  0 
2  0  0  2 
23  10  0  78 
534  225  2  1  325 
--
16  852  389 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
5 
4  to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  ).56  acci- total 
days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
142  148  62  1  353 
82  82  55  2  221 
29  44  23  1  97 
53  38  32  1  124 
222  202  85  1  510 
144  124  50  1  319 
78  78  35  0  191 
251  241  86  1  579 
25  24:  11  0  60 
114  941  37  0  245 
112  1231  38  1  2741 
i 
312  3131  108  2  735 
1  o'  0  0  1 
I 
0  0  0  0  0 
1  0  0  0  1 
0  0  0  0  0 
1  0  0  0  1 
0  0  1  0  1 
0  2  1  1  4 
2  2  0  0  4 
86  38  14  0  138 
1  099  1  028  412  8  2  547 
-
Table  la 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
6 
56  Fatal 
1W 
acci- total 
dents 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  i  0 
I 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
I 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
i 
I 
I 
! 
! 
I 
: 
H 
N 
-......! I 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Co1111110n  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
::::s::::_  c 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course of other activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  HzS), 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX,  HEATING$  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII,  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
4,63 
1,13 
0,89 
0,24 
2,25 
1,60 
0,65 
6,53 
0,77 
2,20 
I  3,56 
5,04 
0,06 
0,00 
o,oo 
0,00 
0,00 
I 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
1,54 
21,18 
I 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIElD:  Centre-Midi 
Production faces 
1 
21  to  Fatal 
56  >56  acci- total 
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
4,87  1,84  0,06  11,39 
1,07  1,01  0,06  3,26 
0,83  0,71  0,06  2,49 
0,24  0,30  o,oo  0,77 
1,60  0,83  0,00  4,69 
1,19  0,47  o,oo  3,26 
0,42  0,36  0,00  1,42 
5, 76  2,14  0,00  14,42 
0,65  0,36  0,00  1,78 
1,96  0,42  0,00  4,57 
3,14  1,36  0,00  8,07 
5,99  1,36  0,12  12,52 
o,oo  o,oo  0,00  0,06 
0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00 
o,oo  o,oo  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  o,oo  o,oo 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,59  0,24  o,oo  '  2,37 
19,88  7,42  0,24  48,72 
I 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits 
2  3 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3}  (3)  (3)  (3) 
2,25  2,31  1,13  0,00  5,70  0,00  o,oo  o,oo  0,00  0,00  1,54 
I 
I  13,32  0,30  i  0,06  0,24  0,00  0,59  0,12  0,12  0,12  o,oo  0,36 
i 
o,oo  0,00  0,12  0,00  0,12  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  :  0,83 
i 
I  I 
0,30  0,06  0,12  I o,oo  0,47  0,12  0,12  0,12  I o,oo  0,36  !  2,49 
1,13  1,60  0,47  0,00  3,20  0,30  0,12  0,12  o,oo  I  0,53  9,49 
0,71  1  1,07  0,36  o,oo  2,14  0,18  0,00  0,06  0,00  0,24  /6,05 
0,42  1  o. 53  0,12  0,00  1,07  0,12  0,12  0,06  0,00  0,30  3,44 
1,90  2,20  0,59  0,06  4,75  0,30  0,06  0,12  0,00  0,47  6,17 
0,06  0,18  0,00  o,oo  I  0,36  0,06  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,06  I o,s9 
0,89  0,95  0,30  . 0,00  2,14  0,18  o,oo  0,06  0,00  0,24  3,50 
o,9s  I  1,07  0,18  0,06  :  2,25  0,06  0,06  0,06  0,00  0,18  2,08 
I  I  i 
2,79  I  2,31 
1
o.n  I 0,00  5,82  0,47  0,24  o,12  I o,oo  0,83  10,21 
i 
o,oo  :  o,oo  lo,oo 
I 
o,oo  ,I  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo  o,oo 
I 
o,oo  1  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  ; 0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00 
I  I 
I 
I 
i 
I 0,00 I o,oo 
i 
0,00  o,oo  1  0,00  0,00  o,oo  o,oo  1  o,oo  0,00  0,06 
o.oo  1  o.oo  0,00  o,oo 
I  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00 
I 
0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,06 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,12  0,06  0,06  0,24  0,00  0,00  0,00  ,  I  o,oo  0,00  0,00 
0,06  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,06  0,06  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,06  0,00 
0,89  0,24  o,oo  0,00  1,13  0,00  0,06  0,00  o,oo  0,06  2,67 
9,32  8,84  3,20  0,12  21,48  1,25  0,59  0,47  0,00  2,31  33,47 
(1)  Number  of hours  worked by  pit staff and errployees  of oontmator fi1'17!8  who  belong to a  miners 1  soaial  insuranae  s'!heme. 
(2)  Aaaidents involving m::>re  than  five  aasuaUies  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unable  to resume  work  W!derground  for at  least eight weeks). 
(3)  Calender  days, 
Table  lb 
YEAR:  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  .  16  852  389 
Total of  Group 
Other  places  accidents  underground  accidents 
4  5  6 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
56  }56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  ?W 
acci-
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(3)  (3}  (3)  (3)  (3) 
1,60  0,71  o,oo  3,86  8,43  8,78  3,68  0,06  20,95 o,oo  o,oo 
3,62  1,90  0,06  8,90  4,87  4,87  3,26  0,12  13,11  0,00  0,00 
1,78  0,53  0,00  3,14  1,72  2,61  1,36  0,06  5,76 ,0,00  0,00 
1,84  1,36  0,06  5,76  3,14  2,25  1,90  0,06  7,36 o,oo  o,oo 
8,66  3  62  0  06  21  84  13  17  11  99  504  0  06  30 26  000  OM 
5,10  2,08  0,06  13,29  8,54  7,36  2,97  0,06  18,93 0,00  0,00 
3,56  1,54  0,00  8,54  4,63  4,63  2,08  0,00  11,33 0,00  0,00 
!  6,29  2,25  0,00  14,72  14,89  14,30  5,10  0,06  34,36 o,oo  o,oo 
0,59  0,18  0,00  1,36  1,48  1,42  0,65  0,00  3,56 0,00  0,00 
2,67  1,42  o,oo  7,60  6, 76  5,58  2,20  0,00  14,54 o,oo  o,oo 
3,03  0,65 I  0,00  5,76  6,65  7,30 i 2,25  0,06  16,26 0,00  0,00 
10,03  4,21  o,oo  124,45  18,51  18,57  6,41  0,12  4J,61 0,00  0,00 
o,oo I 0,00  0,00  0,00  0,06  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,06 o,oo  0,00 
0,00  0,00 I  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo 0,00  0,00 
I 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,06  0,06  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,06 0,00  0,00 
I 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo 0,00  0,00 
o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,06  0,06  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,06 0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,06  0,00  0,06  0,00  0,00  0,06  0,00  o;o6 0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,12  0,06  0,06  0,24  o~oo  0,00 
0,12!  0,00  0,00  0,12  0,12  0,12  o,oo  0,00  0,24 0,00  0,00 
1,36  0,59  0,00  4,63  5,10  2,25  0,83  0,00  e.19 0,00  0,00 
31,69  13,35  0,12  78,62  65,21  61,00  4,45  0,47  151,14 0,00  o,oo 
(2) 
total 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0~  IV} 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,oo 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,oo 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
H 
N 
00 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enuc leations 
l 
>  5o  I  Fat:o-1 I 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  days  acn- total 
(5)  dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. Head  and  neck  0  0  0 
II, Eyes  0  0  0 
III.  Trunk  0  0  0 
IV.  Upper  limbs 
(excluding th; hands)  2  0  1 
(3) 
'l.  Hands  6  0  5 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding feet)  (4)  0  0  0 
I 
VII.  Feet  0  0  0 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  0  0  0 
IX.  Not  specified  t>< tx: lX 
TOTAL  8  0  6 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIELD  :  Centre-Midi 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or  without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
I 
3  1  4  1  0  0 
~  X  [>< [>< tx: [X 
I 
13  0  8  50  0 
I 
50 
16  0  11  4 
I 
0  I 
4 
I  1 
I 
I  73  0  66  I  4  0 
I 
3 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I  I 
23  0  19  16  0  14 
24  0  19  1  0  1 
6  1  3  2  0  2 
[X  [>< [X lX  [X  [X 
158  2  130  78  0  74 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Concussion  Open wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful  effects 
and  inter- and muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury 
4  5  6 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56 
acci- total  acci- total  acci- total  days  days  days 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
• 
1  0  1  6  0  6  0  0  0 
i  I 
! 
I 
0  0  0  2  0  2  0  0  0 
l 
3  0 
!  1  18  0  11  0 
I 
0  0 
I 
X  IX X 
I 
10  0  9 
I 
0 
I 
0  0 
XV<D< 
I 
! 
32  0  29  0  I  0  0 
I 
X  tx1X 
I 
I 
50  0  43  0  0  0 
tx  V(  [>< 
I 
I 
11  1  10  1 
I 
0  1 
I 
1 
I 
0  1  12  0  8  0  0 
I 
0 
I 
[X ~  X  [X  [>< 
0  1  l 
5  0 
I 
3  141  1  118  1  1  2 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours worked by  pit staff and emptoyees  of contractor  firms  who  betong to a  miner's sociaZ insurance  scheme. 
( 2)  inc  Zuding  camp Zications. 
(3)  The  shoutders  and the wrists are inctuded under  "upper  limbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the anktes  are inctuded under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Cal-ender  days. 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  16  852  389 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7  8 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
4  to 
>  56  20 
acci- total  acci- total  days  days  days 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5) 
~  ~ 
~I 
0  0  0  86 
X  ~  X 
I 
1  0  I  1  115 
X  IX X 
3  0  3  172 
X  X  X 
I 
3  0  3  110 
I 
X  X  X 
I 
1  0 
I 
1  246 
X  X  X 
2  0  2  218 
[X IX  [>< 
0  0  0  90 
lXIX lX 
9  2  10  56 
1  0  1  1  2  3  6 
1  0  1  20  4  23  l  099 
Table 2a 
TOTAL 
9 
21  to 
>  56  56 
days  days 
(5)  (5) 
35  11 
15  3 
216  86 
I 
70  36 
315  115 
I 
I 
195  91 
105  37 
68  31 
~  2 
1  028  412 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
3 
3 
8 
total 
133 
133 
474 
216 
I 
6761 
504 
233 
158 
20 
2  547 
H 
N 
1..0 I 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
CollllllDtl  Statistics on victi  .. 
of  accidents  underground in coal mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enuc  lt!ations 
1 
>  55  Fatal 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. Head  and neck  0,00  0,00  0,00 
II. Eyes  0,00  0,00  0,00 
III. Trunk  0,00  0,00  0,00 
IV.  Upper  limbs  0,12  0,00  0,06 
(excluding  the  hands) 
(3) 
V.  Hands  0,36  o,oo  0,30 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding feet)  (4)  o,oo  0,00  0,00 
VII.  Feet  0,00  0,00  0,00 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  0,00  0,00  0,00 
IX.  Not  specified  X  X  X 
TOTAL  0,47  0,00  0,36 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIELD  :  Centre-Midi 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
0,18  0,06  0,24  0,06  o,oo  0,00 
~  ~  X  ~  MX 
i 
I 
0,77  0,00  0,47  2,97  0,00' 2, 97 
0,95  0,00  0,65  0,24  0,00  0,24 
!  i 
4,33  0,00  3,92  0,24  i  o.oo  I  o. 18 
I 
I  I 
o,oo I 0,83  1,36  0,00  1,13  0,95 
i 
I 
1,42  0,00  1,13  0,06  0,00  0,06 
0,36  0,06  0,18  0,12  0,00  0,12 
X  X  X  t>< l>< X 
9,38  0,12  7. 71  4,63  0,00  4,39 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency rates) 
Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  inter- and muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury 
4  5  6 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acc!i- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
I  ~ 
I 
I  0,06  0,00  0,06  0,36  0,00  0,36  o.oo  o.oo  1  o.oo 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,12  0,00  0,12  o,oo  o,oo  o,oo 
I 
I 
0,18  0,00  0,06  1,07  o,oo  I  0,65  0,00  1  0,00  0,00 
I 
I 
i 
X  X  X 
0,59  o,oo  1 '·" 
0,00  0,00  0,00 
I 
X  X  X 
I 
I  o.oo: 
I  1,90  o,oo  I  1,72  o,oo  o,oo 
~ 
I  i 
lXV(  t>< 
I 
I 
2,97  o,oo  I  2,55  0,00  o,oo  0,00 
IX X  IX 
0,65  0,06  0,59  0,06  0,00  0,06 
0,06  0,00  0,06  0,71  0,00  0,47  o,oo  0,00  0,00 
~  X  X  IX ~  X 
0,00  0,06  0,06 
0,30  0,00  0,18  8,37  0,06  7,00  0,06  0,06  0,12 
(1)  Nwri>er  of hoUI'B  worked by pit staff and e"{)l.oyees  of contractor firms  who  beLong  to a  miner's  sociaL insurance  scheme. 
(2)  incLuding corrpUcations. 
(3)  The  shouLders  and the wrists are  incLuded under  "upper  Urri>s". 
(4)  The  hips and  the  ankLes  are  incLuded under  "Lower  Limbs". 
(5)  CaZend2r  aaYs. 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  16  852  389 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7  8 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal  4  to 
>  56  20 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
days 
(5) 
IX  IX  IX 
0,00  0,00  o,oo  5,10 
X  ~X 
i 
0,06  0,00  0,06  6,82 
X  [X X 
I 
0,18  0,00  0,18110,21 
X  X  X 
0,18  0,00  '·"I 
6,53 
I 
I 
X  X  XI 
0,06  0,00  0,06114,60 
[>< X  t>< 
0,12  0,00  0,12  12,94 
[X  IX  t>< 
I 
0,00  o.oo  1  0,00  5,34 
t>(  t>< V( 
0,53  0,12  0,59  3,32 
0,06  0,00  0,06  0,06  0,12  0,18  0,36 
0,06  0,00  0,06  1,19  0,24  1,36  65,21 
Table  2b 
TOTAL 
9 
21  to 
>  56  Fatal 
56 
days  acci-
days 
(5)  dents 
(5) 
2,08  0,65  0,06 
0,89  0,18  0,00 
12,82  5,10  0,00 
4,15  2,14  0,00 
18,69  6,821 0,00 
11,57  5,40  0,00 
6,23  2,20  0,06 
I 
4,04  1,84  0,18 
0,53  0,12  0,18 
61,00  24,45  0,47 
~·- --
total 
7,89 
7,89 
I 
I 
28,13 
12,82 
40,11 i 
I 
I 
29,91 
13,83 
9,38 
1,19 
151,14 
H 
w 
0 I 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Co1111110l1  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in coal mines 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
YEAR:  1973  COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIElD:  Total  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1) •  83  568  445 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT  Production  faces 
Headings  excluding  Total of 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits  Other  places  accidents  underground 
1  2  3  4  5 
~ 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  )  56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  :>56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci_- total 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  c  (J)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  {3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS  1  456  766  259  14  2  495  528  219  74  2  82.3  0  3  0  0  3  239  89  33  1  362  2  223  1  077  366  17  3  683 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL  90  77  39  1  207  49  44  35  1  12.9  24  21  11  2  58  235  190  113  2  540  398  332  198  6  934 
I 
a)  Continuous  Transport  59  47  I  26  1  133  12 I  11  I  11  I 
0  34  0  0  0  0  0  '>50  48  19  0  117  121  106  56  1  284 
I 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport  31  30  13  0  74  37  33  24 
I 
1  95  24  21  11  2  58  185  I  142  94  2  423  277  226  142  5  550 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM,  I 
4001  TOTAL  696  460  105 
I 
0  l  261  360  200  82  0  642  33  34  8  0  75  857  581  205  1  l  644  1  946  1  275  1  3  622 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine  566  359  I  79  0  1  004  278!  162  65 
I 
0  505  22  25  5  0  52  669  416  152  1  1  238  1  535  962  301  l  2  799 
-----,---'--
b)  in  the  course  of other  activities  I  82'  !  4111  130  101  26  0  257  38  17 
i 
0  137  11  9  3  0  23  188  165  53  0  406  313  99  0  823 
I  I 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
3131  1421  I  TOTAL  859  386  119  0  1364  49  2  506  16  2  3  0  21  386  226  66  0  678  1  574  756  237  2  2  569 
I  i 
a)  Machines  891  51  23  0  163  38  i  32 
! 
16  I  1  89  1  0  0  0  1  311 
32  13  i  0  76  159  1151  54  1  329 
I 
I  I  I 
1661  59  I 
1 
I 
T 
315!  b)  Tools  379  41  0  586  160  15  0  234  9  1  1  0  11  196  89  31 
I 
0  316  744 
I 
88  0  1  147 
1151 
I  ml  22  1 
! 
326:  c)  Supports  391  169  55  0  615  51  16  1  183  6  1  2  0  9  lOS  0  286  671  95  1  1  093 
i  I 
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS  1  050  579  169  2  1  800  461  229  62  0  752  41  18  8  0  67  7851  471  179  I  l 
I 
1  436  2  337  1  2971  418  3  4  055 
! 
I  VI.  EXPLOSIVES  4  1  0  0  5  1  1  0  0  2.  0  0  0  0  I  0  ol  o!  0  0  i  0  5  2  0  0  I  7 
i 
I  I 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS  I 
I  I  I  I 
I  0  I 
I 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
I  ol  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
! 
! 
I  I 
I 
I  ~ ,i  ,I 
I  SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU- I 
I 
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S),  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  I  0  1  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  2  0  1 
41  TOTAL  -~ 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  I 
0  I  0  I  0  I  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  01 
i  I 
! 
1 I 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  1  3  0  0  0  o  I  0  0  0  0  l  1  2[  0  1  4 
by  natural Gases 
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  I  0  i  of  0  1  0  l  0  c  l  0  t 
I  I 
X.  INRUSHES  2  l  0  0  3  0  2  2  1  5  1  0  0  0 
I 
1  I  0  0  1  0  1  3  ' 
3  1  lC 
I 
XI.  ELECTRICITY  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  2  1  0 
I 
I 
0  0  1  2'  2  0  0  4  4  0  0  7 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  291  47  21  0  359  190  44  8  0  242  19  7  5  0  31  241  67  22  0  330  741  16  56  0  962 
TOTAL  4  448  2  317  712  17  7  494  1  903  884  312  7  3  106  135  85  35  2  257  2  746  1  626  620  5  4  997  9  232  4  91  1  679  31  15  851i 
(1)  NUIIUJer  of houre  bJOrked  by  pit staff and errpLoyees  of contraator fimJB  blho  beLong  to a  miners' soaiaL  insuranae  sc*eme. 
~;~  ~~t:;s  j;;';.Zving more  than  five  aasua.Lties  (i.e.  blho  either died or blere  unabLe  to resume  blork  W1dsrground  for at  least eight bleeks). 
Table  la 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
6 
56  Fatal 
1W 
acci- total 
dents 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
I 
0  0  0  I 
I 
0  0  0 
i 
0  0  0  ! 
I 
0  0  0 
0  0 
I 
0 
0  0  i  0 
i  0  0  0 
I  0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
I 
I 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Coumon  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground in coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
CA 
I •  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
II I.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (COz,  CH4,  CO,  HzS), 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
loy_ natural Gases 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
x.  INRUSHES 
XI,  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAU3ES 
TOTAL 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
17,42 
1,08 
0,71 
0,37 
8,33 
6,77 
1,56 
10,28 
1,06 
4,54 
4,68 
12,56 
0,05 
0,00 
I 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,02 
0,00 
3,48 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIELD  :  Total 
Production  faces 
1 
21  to  Fatal 
56  >56  acci-
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
9,17  3,10  0,17 
0,92  0,47  0,01 
0,56  0,31  0,01 
0,36  0,16  0,00 
5,50  1,26  0,00 
4,30  0,95  0,00 
1,21  0,31  0,00 
4,62  1,42  0,00 
0,61  0,28  0,00 
1,99  0,49  0,00 
2,02  0,66  0,00 
6,93  2,02  0,02 
0,01  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  o,oo 
o,oo  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  o,oo  0,00 
0,01  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,56  0,25  0,00 
I 
I 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits 
2  3 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >5&  acci- total  20 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3}  (3)  (3) 
I 
29,86  6,32  2,62  0,89  0,02  9,85  0,00  0,04  0,00  o,oo  0,04  2,86 
2,48  0,59  0,53  0,42  o,o1j_  1,54  0,29  0,25  0,13  0,02  0,69  2,81 
I 
1,59  0,14  0,13  0,13  o,oo  1  0,41  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,60 
0,89  0,44  0,39  1  o,29  0,01 i  1,14  0,29 
I 
0,25  0,13  0,02  0,69  I  2,21 
I 
15,09  4,31  2,39  0,98  I  0,00  7,68  0,39  0,41  0,10  0,00  0,90  10,26 
I 
12,01  3,33  1,94 
I 
0,78  0,00!  6,04  0,26  0,30  0,06  0,00  0,62  8,01 
3,08  '  0,98  0,45  1  0,20  1  o.oo  1,64  0,13  0,11  0,04  o,oo  0,28  2,25  I 
I 
I  I  I 
16,32  3,75[  1,70  '0,59  o,o2  1  6,05  0,19  0,02  0,04  0,00  0,25  4,62 
1,95  0,45  0,38  1  0,19  0,01  I  1,06  0,01  0,00  0,00  . 0,00  0,01  0,37 
'·" I ']  '·" I'·" 
o.oo  1  !  2,80  0,11  0,01  0,01  0,00  0,13  2,35 
7,36  1,38  0,61 l  0,19 
! 
I  0,01 :  2,19  0,07  0,01  0,02  o,oo  0,11  1,90 
I 
0,10  I,  0,00  21,54  I 5,52:  2,74  o,74  0,00  9,00  0,49  0,22  0,80  9,39 
0,011  I  0,00  I  o,oo  I 
I 
0,06  0,01  0,02  0,00  0,00  0,00  !  0,00  0,00 
i 
0,00 
o,ool 
I 
I 
o.oo  1 
! 
0,00!  0,00  0,00  I  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo  1  o,oo  0,00 
o,ool 
I  I 
i  I 
0,00 l  0,00 
I  I 
0,00  0,02  o,oo  I  0,01  0,04  0,00  0,00  0,00  I  0,01 
! 
0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  I o,oo  0,00  o,oo 1 
0,00  I 0,00  0,02  0,00  0,01  0,04  0,00  0,00  !  ! 
0,00  I 0,00 I 0,00  0,01 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00·  0,00  0,00  0,00  I  I  0,00  '  0,00  i  0,00  0,00 
0,04  0,00  0,02  0,02  0,01  0,06  0,01  0,00  0,00 
1  0,00  0,01  0,00 
0,00  0,01  0,01  0,00  o,oo  0,02  0,01  0,00 
!  i 
0,00  !  0,00  1  0,01  0,02 
4,30  2,27  0,53  0,10  0,00  2,90  0,23  0,08  0,06  0,00  0,37  2,88 
I 53,23  27,73  8,52  0,20  89,67  22,77  10,58  3,73  0,08  37,17  1,62  1,02  0,42  0,02  3,08  32,86 
(1)  Nuni:Jer  of hours  worked by pit staff and e17pZoyees  of oontru~tor firms  who  beZong to  a  miners--,-8;;;£(lC:r;;;;urance- s""eme. 
(2)  Ac~idents invoZving more  than five  ~aBuaZties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unabZe  to resume  work  underground for at  Zeast  eight O)eeks). 
(3)  CaZender  days, 
Table  1b 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  83  568  445 
Total of  Group 
Other places  accidents  underground  accidents 
4  5  6 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
56  )  56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  1W 
acci-
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
1,06  0,39  0,01  4,33  26,60  12,89  4,38  0,20  44,07  0,00  0,00 
2,27  1,35  0,02  6,46  4,76  3,97  2,37  0,07  11,18 0,00  0,00 
0,57  0,23  0,00  1,40  1,45!  1,27  0,67  0,01  3,40 0,00  0,00 
1,70  1,12  0,02  5,06  3,31  2,70  1,70  0,06  6,58 0,00  o,oo 
I 
6,95  2,45  o,o1  19,67  23,29  15,26  4,79  0,01  43,34 0,00  0,00 
4,98  1,82  0,01  14,81  18,37  11,51  3,60  0,01  33,49 0,00  0,00 
1, 97  0,63  0,00  4,86  4,92 
I 
3, 75  1,18  0,00  9,85  0,00  0,00 
2,70  0,79  0,00  8,11  'I  18,83  9,05  2,84  0,02  30,74 o,oo  0,00 
! 
0,38  o, 16  1  o,oo  0,91  1,  9C  1,381  0,65  0,01  3,94 o,oo  0,00 
I 
I  I  I 
1,06  0,37  0,00  3, 78  I  8,9C  3,77!  1,05  0,00  13, 73' 0,00  0,00 
I  I 
1,26  0,26  '0,00  3,42  1  8,03]  3,90  1,14  0,01  13,08 0,00  o,oo 
I  j  5,64  2,14  0,01  ,17,18  27,97  15,52  5,00  0,04  48,52  0,00  0,00 
1  I 
I 
o,oo I  0,06  0,00  o,oo  I  o,oo  0,021  0,00  o,oo  0,08 o,oo  0,00 
I 
I  I 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,ocl  o,oo  0,00  0,00  0,00 0,00  o,oo 
I 
I 
! 
0,021  o,oo  1  o.oo 
I 
0,01  1  o,o5' o,oo  0,00  0,0  0,00  0,01  0,00 
I 
0,00  !  0,09 
I 
0,00  o,oo  I  o,oo  0,, 0,00  0,00  0,00 0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,01  o,o~  0,021  0,00  0,01  0,05 o,oo  0,00 
0,00  0,01  I 0,00  0,01  0,~  0,00  0,01  0,00  0,01  0,00  0,00 
i 
0,00  0,01  0,00  0,01  0,1  0,04  0,04  0,01  0,12  0,00  o,oo 
! 
0,02  0,00  0,00  0,05  o,o  O,Oii  o,oo  0,00  0,08 o,oo  0,00 
0,80  0,26  0,00  3,95  8,8  1,9  0,67  o,oo  11,51  0,00  o,oo 
19,46  7,42  0,06  59,80  110,4  58,7f  20,09  0,37  189,7  0,00  0,00 
(2) 
total 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,oo 
0,00 
I 
w 
N I 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Cotm110n  Statistics on victims 
of  accidents  underground in  coal  mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleations 
l 
>  s,;  Fatal] 
PERIOD  OF  IN CAPACITY  'acci-~ total  days 
(5)  dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and  neck  0  l  l 
II. Eyes  1  0  1 
III.  Trunk  0  0  0 
IV.  Upper  limbs  2  1  2 
(excluding the  hands) 
(3) 
V.  Hands  43  0  42 
VI.  Lower  limbs  2  0  2 
(excluding feet)  (4) 
VII.  Feet 
I 
3  0  3 
VIII.  Multiple  locations 
I 
0  0  0 
IX.  Not  specified  ~  ~  [X 
TOTAL  51  2  51 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIELD  :  Total 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or  without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
25  6  31  l  0  0 
t>< t>< ~~xJX  ,X 
: 
62  1  58  77  0  77 
81  0  76  11  0  11 
I 
300  0  293  ll  0  110 
i 
T 
I 
156  l  153  74  0  172 
107  0  102  3  0  3 
18  4  18  4  0  4 
V( [X ~  [X ~  [X 
749  12  731  181  0  177 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  inter- and muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal  injury 
4  5  6 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5}  dents  (5)  dents 
I 
I 
7  0  7  39  l  40  0  0  0 
2  0 
I 
2  22  0  22  0  0  0 
I 
I 
I 
9  2  9  43  0  36  0  0  0 
I 
)<~IJ>< 
59  0  58  1  i 
0  l 
t>< 11>< 
163  0  160  0  0  0 
I 
X  XX 
206  l  200  0  I  0  0 
I  I 
I 
[X  [XlX 
37  1  36  1  0  1 
1  0  I  l  47  0  43  0  0  0 
! 
l< ~  [X [X [X 
0  l  1 
• 
19  2  19  616  3  595  2  •  l  3 
(1)  Nund:!er  of hours  worked by  pit staff and e77f?Zoyees  of contractor firms  who  beZong  to  a  miner's  soc1-aZ  insurance  scheme. 
(2)  inaZuding ao77f?Zications. 
(J)  The  shouLders  and  the wrists aN incZuded under  "upper  Zimbs ". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankZes  are inaluded under  "Lower  Zimbs". 
( 5)  CaZender  da.~s. 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  83  568  445 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those  not 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7  8 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
4  to 
>  56 
acci- total I  acci- total  20 
days  days 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
days 
(5} 
IX  IX  ~ 
12  I , 
12  798 
[>< X  ~ 
2  0 
I 
2  907  I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
0  i  1  l  7  0  I  7  l  242 
~  X  ~ 
6  0  6  1  169 
t>< X  ~! 
8  0  8  2  611 
V(  t>< ~ 
7  0  7  1  502 
[X [X [X 
0  0  0  697 
I 
I 
0  l  l  16  6  21  277 
1  l  2  2  2  4  29 
l  3  4  60  8  67  9  232 
Table  2a 
TOTAL 
9 
21  to 
>  56  56 
days  days 
(5)  (5) 
229  84 
61  27 
901  197 
394  161  I 
I 
I 
I 
1  785  524  i 
876  445 
427  151 
214  87 
25  3 
4  912  1  6"19 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
8 
0 
4 
l 
0 
2 
1 
ll 
4 
31 
total 
l  119 
995 
2  344 
1  725 
4  920 
2  825 
1  276 
589 
61 
15  854 
w 
w I 
I, 
1 
i 
l 
I 
I 
I 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  undergronnd  in  coal  mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucltiations 
1 
>  55  I  Fat~l 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  total  days  ace>-
r5;  dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and  neck  0,00  0,01  0,01 
II. Eyes  o,ol  o,oo  0,01 
I 
I 
1  o.oo  III,  Trunk  o,oo  1  o,oo 
IV,  Upper  limbs 
(excluding the  hands)  0,02  0,01  0,02 
(3) 
V.  Hands  0,51  0,00  0,50 
VI.  Lower  limbs  I 
(excluding feet)  (4)  o,o1  , o,oo  0,02 
VII.  Feet  0,04  0,00  0,04 
I 
I 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  0,00  o,oo  0,00 
IX.  Not  specified  X  X  X 
TOTAL  0,61  0,02  0,61 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIELD  :  Total 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5}  dents  (5}  dents 
I 
0,30  0,07  0,37  0,01  0,00  0,00 
~  [)< t>< lt< X 
I 
I 
0,74  0,011  0,69  0,92  o,oo  0,92 
I 
I 
I 
0,97  0,00  o,91  1  0,13  o,oo  0,13 
i 
: 
! 
I  0,00  I  0,12 
I 
3,59  0,00  3,51  0,13 
I  I 
I 
'·" : 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1,87  0,01  0,89  ojoo  !  0,86 
1,28  ! 
I 
o,oo  1,221  0,04  0,00  0,04 
I 
0,22  0,05  0,22  0,05  0,00  0,05 
X  X  t>< lX X  [>( 
8,96  0,14  8,75  2,17  0,00  2,12 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency  rates) 
Concussion  Open  wonnds 
I 
Burns  and 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  inter- and  muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury 
4  5  6 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56 
acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5}  dents 
I 
I 
0,08  0,00  0,08  0,47  0,01  0,48  0,00  0,00  0,00 
I 
I 
I 
0,02  0,00  0,02  0,26  0,00  0,26  I  0,00  0,00  0,00 
I 
o, 11  0,02  0,11  0,51  0,00  0,43 
I  0,00 1  0,00  0,00 
! 
YEAR:  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  83  568  445 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of those not 
suffocation  specified  (2} 
7  8 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
4  to 
>  56  20  acci- total  acci- total  days  days  days 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5) 
1XNX
1
'·" 
I  I o,oo  0,14  9,55 
X  txt\ 
0,02  0,00  0,02  10,85 
I 
I 
I 
I 
o,oo  0,01  0,01  0,08  0,00  o,os  14,86 
I  I 
X  IX X 
I  '·"X X  XI'·" 
I  I 
I  ! 
0,71  0,00  0,69 
I 
0,01  I  o,oo  0,00  0,07  !  13,99 
I  I 
X  X  X 
I 
I  MX 
131,24  1,95  0,00  1,91  0,00 I o.oo  0,00  o,lo  o,oo  0,10 
i 
X  X  X 
I  [>( txt\ 
! 
j  o,oo  'I  2,47  0,01  2,39  o,oo 1  o,oo  o,oo  0,08  0,08  17 '97 
i 
X  X  I~< 
I  [X txt< 
0,44  0,01  0,43  I  0,01:  0,00  0,01  0,00  0,00  o,oo  8,34 
0,01  0,00  0,01  0,56  0,00  0,51  0,00  0,00  o,oo  0,00  0,01  0,01  0,19  0,07  0,2!1  3,31 
X  X  X  IX X  X 
0,00  0,01  0,01  o,o1  0,01  0,02  0,02  0,02  0,05  0,35 
0,23  0,02  0,23  7,37  0,04  7'  12  0,02  0,01  0,04  0,01  0,04  0,05  0,72  0,10  0,80  110,47 
(1)  N~er of hoU1'8  worked by  pit staff and errp'Loyees  Jf contractor fi1'm8  who  betong to a miner's  sociaZ inBU1'ance  scheme, 
(2)  inc Zuding  corrp Zications. 
(3)  The  shouZders  and  the wrists are  incZuded under  "UPper  Zimbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and  the  ankZes  are  included under  "Lower  Limbs". 
(5)  CaZender  days. 
Table  2b 
TOTAL 
9 
21  to 
>  56  Fatal 
56 
days  acci- total 
days 
(5)  (5)  dents 
I 
I 
2,74  1,01  0,10  13,39 
0,73  0,32  o,oo  1  11,91 
10,78  2,361  0,05  28,05, 
I 
i 
1,931  0,01  20,64 I  4,71 
i 
H 
I 
I 
21,36  6,271  0,00  58,87 
I 
10,48  5,32  0,02  33,80 
i 
5,11  1,81  0,01  15,27 
2,56  1,04  0,13  7,05 
0,30  0,04  0,05  0,73 
58,78  20,09  0,37  189,11 I 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Conmon  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  ~mdergro~md in coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
c 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  wh1le  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of  other  act1vities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VI II,  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE -OXYGE~ATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (COz,  CH4,  CO,  HzS), 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural  Gases 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
COUNTRY  :  It  a 1 y 
COAL-FIELD  ·  Sulcis 
Production  faces 
l 
4  to 
, ..  0  I 
Fatal 
20  56  >56  acci- total 
days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I  i  I 
i  I 
i 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
-
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and  staple-pits 
2  3 
4  to  121  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
20  I  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (,7,)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (J)  (3) 
I  i 
1  - l  - - l 
i 
3 
I 
l  - -
I 
- 1  1 
- I  -
I  - i  - - -
I  I 
!  I 
I 
1  - - I  - l  1 
1 
I 
I 
I  9  3  2  - 14  I  6 
I 
5  2  1 
!  - 8  1 
I 
I 
I  4  1  l  - 6 
I 
5 
I 
I 
5  4  -
I  - 9  5  I  I 
-
I 
1 
:  - - 1  -
I 
I  I 
4  2 
I  6  I  2  - -
I 
1  l  - - 2 
I 
3 
4  3  - -
I  - 3 
I 
I 
J 
I  I 
I 
I 
I  I 
i 
I  I 
I 
i 
li 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
! 
7  I  1  - - 8  4 
26  8  2 
I 
- 36 
I  I 
23 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by pit staj'f and employees of oont:roator  firms  who  belong to  a  nriners 1  soaial  insUPCtnae  s<Jhene. 
(2)  Aaaidents  involving more  than  five  casuaLties  (i, e.  who  either died or were  unable  to resume  work  underground for at  Zeast  eight weeks!. 
( 3)  CaZender  days. 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  ·  616  253 
Total of 
Other  places  accidents  underground 
4  5 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal 
56  >56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (J)  (J) 
I 
6  I  2  - - 5  4  2 
i  - -
I 
- - - 1  i  2  -
I 
- - z  I 
- - - - I  - - - - - l  I 
I  1  I  i  2  I  - - - 2  - - -
I  i 
4  - - i  10  15  7  2  I 
~  I  24 
i 
2  - - 3  6  4  l  - 11 
I 
2  - -
I 
7  9  3  l  - 13 
I 
I 
4  - - 9  10  8  - - I  18  I  I 
I  l  - I  -
I 
1  - 2  - - 2 
i  j  +  I 
I 
I  1  - - 3 
! 
6  3  - - 9 
I 
! 
5  I  2  - - 4  3  - - 7 
I 
I  - - 4  7  - !  -
I  - 7  -
I 
i 
I  I 
I 
i 
I 
I  I 
I 
I  I  j 
I  I 
I  I 
I 
I 
I  I  I  I 
i 
I 
I  I  ! 
i 
I 
I  I  I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  I 
i 
i 
I 
I 
1  - 5  11  2  - - 13 
I 
11  - - 34  49  19  2  - 70 
Table  la 
Group 
accidents 
6 
56  Fatal 
1W 
acci-
dents 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- I  -
- I  -
- l  -
- i 
I  -
- -
I 
- -
- -
I 
i 
I 
I 
- -
- -
(2) 
total 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
I 
w 
\...11 I 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
s 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOIAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOIAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine  I 
I 
b)  I 
in  the  course  of other  activities' 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST  I 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
TOIAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural  Gases 
IX,  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES  I 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XI I.  OIHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
I 
I 
COUNTRY  :  Italy 
COAL-FIElD  :  Sulcis 
Production  faces 
l 
21  to  Fatal 
56  >56  acci-
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
I  I 
! 
i 
I 
4  to 
total  20 
days 
(3) 
2 
2  I 
I 
2  I 
I 
I 
14 
8 
6 
I 
I 
8  I 
I  I 
I 
7! 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
5 
I  I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
! 
I 
i 
11 
42 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits 
2  3 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
56  )  56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (J) 
2  5 
I  2 
i 
1 
I  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2  I  l  I 
5  4  I  23 
I  I  10 
I 
I 
I 
2  3  2  13 
l 
I  1 
i  2  2  10 
I 
8 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
!  6  14 
' 
8 
I 
I 
I 
I  1  1 
:  I 
I 
I 
3  10  I  3 
I  I 
2 
I  !  3  :  5 
I  I 
i 
I  -
!  i 
5  7 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  I 
I 
I  i  I 
I  li  I 
!  I 
I  I 
i  I 
I 
! 
I  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  ! 
2  13  ! 
i  I 
6 
13  4  59  37 
(1)  NwrU:iel'  of houl'B  wol'ked by pit staff and errployees of controatol'  fil'fTIB  who  belong to  a  minel's'  soc:iaZ  insu..-.oanae  s<:heroe. 
(2)  Aaaidents involving more  than  five  casualties  (i.e,  who  eithel' died Ol'  were  unable  to !'eswne  Wol'k  under>!J'f'Ound  fol'  <~t  '/..east  eight weeks). 
( 3)  Ca7..endel'  dalis. 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  616  253 
Other places 
4 
21  to  Fatal  4  to 
56  )56  acci- total  20 
days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
3  I  8  7 
l  3 
l  3 
6  16  24 
3  5  10 
3  ll  14 
7  15  16 
2 
I  2  -
I 
2  5 
I 
10 
I 
I  3 
I 
8  I  6 
I  -
• 
7  12 
I 
I 
I  I  I 
I 
I  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
!  ! 
i  I 
I 
I 
I 
I  i 
2  8  17 
18  55  79 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
5 
21  to  Fatal 
56  )56  acci- total 
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
3  10 
3 
3 
11  4  39 
6  2  18 
5  2  21 
13  29 
I 
3  3 
I 
5 
I 
15 
5  I  :  11 
- I  12 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
4  21 
31  4  114 
Table  lb 
Group 
accidents 
6 
56  Fatal 
1W 
acci-
dents 
I 
i 
(2) 
total 
--
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
H 
w 
0" I 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in  coal  mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enuc lea ti  ens 
l 
COUNTRY  :  Italy 
COAL-FIELD  :  Sulcis 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or  without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  Fatal 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  inter- and  muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury 
4  5  6 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
YEAR  :  197 3 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  616  253 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7  8 
Fatal  Fatal 
4  to 
I  >  56  >  56  >  So  I  Fat~l I  >  56 I  Fatal  20 
PERIOD  OF  IN CAPACITY  days  I  acc1- , total  days  I acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total I  days  acci- total I  days  acci- total 
days 
(5)  , dents I  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  I  (5)  dents  (5) 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I 
! 
I 
I  NXIX  I 
3  I. Head  and neck 
l 
I 
I 
I  X  ~·  I 
I 
I  I  ~  )<J  I 
II.  Eyes  I 
I 
5 
I 
I  I  i  i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I  ~  i 
III.  Trunk  I 
I 
I  I 
2 
I  j  I  I  I 
i  I  I 
~  X 
II 
I 
I  ~  >V1 
i 
IV.  Upper  limbs 
I  I 
I  8 
(excluding  the  hands)  i  I 
I 
I 
I  I 
I 
I 
(3) 
i  I  I  I 
I  I 
I 
I  I  ~  X 
I 
i  Mxt<1 
I  I 
V.  Hands 
I  I 
15 
I 
I  I  I 
I 
! 
I  V( X  X 
i 
i 
I  ~ 
I 
' 
I 
I  I  I 
I 
VI.  Lower  limbs  I  12  (excluding  feet)  (4)  1  I  I  I 
VII.  Feet  1  V( ~  X 
I  X  ~  X 
4 
VIII.  Multiple  locations 
I  I 
I  X  ~  X 
IX.  Not  specified  ~  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  IX  ~\ X 
I 
TOTAL  2 
I 
49 
(1)  Nwriber  of hours  worked by  pit staff and  e~~oyees of aontraator firms  who  beLong  to a  miner's  soaiaL  insUI'anae  sal!eme. 
(2)  ina~uding ao~Ziaations. 
(3)  The  shou~ders and  the wrists  are  incLuded under  "upper  Hrri>s". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankLes  are  ina~uded under  "Lower  Limbs". 
(5)  Calender  days. 
Table  2a 
TOTAL 
9 
21  to 
>  56  Fatal 
56 
days  days  acci- total 
(5)  (5)  dents 
- - - 3 
I 
1  - - 6 
I 
I  3 
j 
- - 5 
l  I 
I - ~-~-i 
1  I 
I 
- I  - "  I  7 
J  I 
H 
I 
I 
4  1  - 17 
3  1  - 8 
I 
19  2  - 70 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in  coal  mines 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. Head  and  neck 
II.  Eyes 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding feet)  (4) 
VII,  Feet 
VIII.  Multiple  locations 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
COUNTRY  :  Italy 
COAL-FIELD:  Sulcis 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
>  55  I Fat~l  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  ace>- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5}  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency rates) 
Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful  effects 
and  inter- and muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury 
5  6 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
I 
I 
(1}  Nwnber  of hours  worked by pit staff and empLoyees of contractor firms  who  beLong  to a  miner's sociaL insurance  scheme. 
(2)  incLuding complications. 
(3)  The  shouLders  and  the wrists  are  incLuded under  "upper  Zirrbs", 
(4}  The  hips  and the  ankles  are included under  "Lower  lirrbs". 
(5}  Calender days. 
Table  2b 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  616  253 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not  TOTAL 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
4  to  21  to 
>  56  Fat~l  20  56  >  56 
total  days  ace>- total  days  days  days 
(5)  dents  (5)  (5 )  (5) 
79  31 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
- 114 
H  ... 
w 
CXl MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
COMMISSION  OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  Table  la 
Co11111on  Statistics  on  victims 
(absolute  figures)  of accidents  ~.mdergro~.md in  coal mines 
COUNTRY  Netherlands  YEAR  :  1973 
COAL-FIELD  :  South-Limbourg  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  4  503  376 
Headings  excluding 
I 
Total of  Group 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT  Production  faces  shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits  Other  places  accidents  underground  accidents  (2) 
~ 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  121  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
20  56  >56  acci- total  20  '  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  ). 56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  1W 
acci- total 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents  c  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
I 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS  161  36  16 
I  - 213  ll  19  25  35  197  51  19  267 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL  ll  17  25  14  47  38  18  11  67 
a)  Continuous  Transport  10  16  - I  - 19 
1  32  31  12  50 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
I 
1  I  15  17 
I 
II  I. FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL  19  1 
' 
- 22  56  21  3 
I 
80  77  24  105 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine  I  3 
I 
23  I  31  26  34 
I 
b)  in  the  course  of other  activities 
I  I  i  16  19  I  33  14  49  51  17  3  ~  7l 
I  i  i  I 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
I 
I  TOTAL  128  2l  155  6  1  10  43  50  177  31  215 
i  I 
I 
I 
i  H 
a)  Machines  3 
!  -
I  -
i  I 
i 
I 
I  1  38 
I 
I 
w 
b)  Tools  21  26  32 
5+11 
7l  1..0 
I 
I  /w  c)  Supports  104  16  125  113  I  19  I  138 
I 
4  ! 
i  I 
I  v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS  43  53  I 
56  ll  68  lOS 
!  20  I  129  -
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
- l 
i 
I  VI.  EXPLOSIVES  -
i 
- - -
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
j  - I 
i  - I 
! 
I 
I 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST  - I  - -
I  - - - i  I 
VII I.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE -OXYGENATION, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
- I 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU- I 
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S),  i 
I  TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
- i 
I 
De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
I 
! 
b) 
by  natural Gases 
IX •  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
I 
X.  INRUSHES  I 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  19  21  53  10  66  79  13  95 
TOTAL  381  72  28  481  28  13  43  258  71  17  346  673  157  48  878 
(1)  Number  of hours  worked by  pit staj"f and ellf?loyees  of oontractor  firms  who  belong to a  miners 1  social insurance scheme. 
(2)  Acr;,idents  involving more  than  five  casualties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unable  to resume  work  underground  for at  least eight weeks). 
(3)  Calender  dmis. MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COOIISSION 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  ANO  PERIOO  OF  INCAPACITY  Table  lb 
Co111110n  Statistics on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II,  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
COUNTRY  :  Netherlands 
COAL-FIElll  :  South-Limbourg 
(frequency rates) 
Production faces 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits 
2 
35,750  7,994  3,553  47,297  2,443  1,554  0,222  - 4,219  -
2,443  0,888  0,444  3,775 0,222  - 0,222  0,222  - 0,222 
2,221  0,888  0,444  3,553 0,222  - 0,222  0,222  -
0,222  - 0,222  0,22 
YEAR:  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  4  503  376 
Other places 
5,551  1,776  0,444 
0,444  5,551  3,109  1,776 
0,222  4,219  1,776  1,110 
0,222  1,332  1,332  0,666 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
56 
total  ?W 
7,772 43,744  11,325 4,219  59,288  -
10,437  8,438  3,997  2,443  14,878  -
7,106  6,88~  2,665  1,554  11,103  -
3,331  1,55~  1,332 0,888  3,775  -
23,315  -
Group 
accidents  (2) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
III.  ~~~~ AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM,  4,219  0,444  0,222  4,885 0,444  0,222  - 0,666  - 12,435  4,663  0,666  17,764  17 ,09!  5,329  0,888 
r----r--_,----r---~----r-~----~---r---+----i----+----r----r---+----+--~r---~--~---+----~--+----+---+----+---4----+---+--~ 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine  0,666  -
b)  in  the  course  of ether activities  3,553  0,444  0,222 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU~ 
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
bv natural Gases 
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
X,  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XI I.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
28,423  4,663  1,332 
0,666  0,222  -
4,663  0,888  0,222 
23,093  3,553  1,110 
9,548  1,554  0,666 
4,219  0,444 
84,603  15,988  6,211 
- I 
0,666 
4,219 0,444  0,2221  -
34,418  1,332  0,666  0,222,  -
0,888 
5,773  1,3321  0,222  -
27,756- 0,444  0,22 
11,769  0,8881  0,444  -
I 
I  -
I 
I 
4,66  0,88 
106,§01  6,21  2,887  0,441 
5,107  1,554  0,222 
0,666  - 7,3281  3,109  0,444 
2,221  - 9,548  1,554  -
I  -
I  0,444  -
1,554  - 7,106  1,332  -
0,666  - 1,999  0,222  -
1,332  0,444  - I  - I  0,444  12,4351  2,443  0,222 
I  - !  -
0,888  0,66(  0,222  0,888  11,769  2,221  0,66E 
9,548  1,33<  0,222  0,222  1,776 57,290 15,765  3,77' 
(1)  Nwrber  of hours  worked by pit staff and e11pZoyees  of oont:roctor firms  who  beZang  to a  miners' sociaZ  insurance  -:heme. 
g~ ~~t~;s  j;;;~~Zving more  than five  casuaZties  (i.e,  who  either died or were  lQ!abZe  to reswne  work  undsrground for at  Zeast  eight weeks). 
6,884  5,77  1,554 0,222  7,550  -
10,881  11,32  3,775  0,666  15,766  -
11,103  39,30 I  6,8~ 1,554  47,741  -
0,444  1,11C  0,22  1,332  -
8,438113,10  2,44~ 0,222  15,766  T 
2,221  25,09  4,215  1,332  30,643  -
115,100 23,31  4,44  0,888  28,84 
14,651  17,542  2,887  0,666  21,09 
76,83  49f43  34,862  10,659  94,961  -MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on victims 
of  accidents  underground in  coal  mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleations 
l 
>  s.;  I  Fatal I 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  days  ' acci  -~ total 
( 5)  dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  He ad  and neck  - - -
II. Eyes  - - -
III.  Trunk  - - -
IV.  Upper  limbs 
(excluding the  ha-;,ds)  - - -
(:5} 
V.  Hands  2 
I 
- 2 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding feet)  (4}  - - -
VII.  Feet  - - -
VIII.  Multiple  locations  - - -
IX.  Not  specified  X  X  X 
TOTAL  2  - 2 
COUNTRY  :  Netherlands 
COAL-FIELD  :  South-Limbourg 
Fractures  Luxations • 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
2  3 
>  56 I  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  I acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5}  dents  (5)  dents 
1  - 1  - - -
X  X  X  XX X 
i 
3  - 3  - -
I 
-
I 
I 
i  - 2  - 2  1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I  i 
I 
6  I - 6  - - -
I  l 
I 
I 
I 
t 
I 
I 
I 
6  - 6  1  I  - 1 
5  - 5  - - -
- - - - - -
X  t>< X  X  V( X 
23  - 23  2  - 2 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful effects 
and  inter- and muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
nal injury 
4  5  6 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
--
- -
I 
- 1  - 1  - - -
I 
I 
I  I  I 
- - I  - 1  - 1  - -
I 
-
I 
I 
I 
I 
i  I  I  - - - - - - - - -
I 
i 
~X 
! 
1  - 1  -
I 
- -
I 
~X 
!  I 
4  - 4  -
I  - -
i 
~ 
I 
I  I  I 
3  - 3 
i  - - -
t>< >W< 
- - - - - -
I 
I 
- - I  - 2  - 2  - - -
X  >W< X  X  X 
- - -
- -
I 
- 12  - 12  - - -
(1}  Nwnber  of hours  worked  by  pit staff and  errrpl-oyees  of "ontro"tor firma  who  belong  to a  mi.ner 's  so"iaZ insur=e s"heme. 
(2}  in"tuding "orrrpti"ations. 
(3)  The  shouZd£rs  and  the wrists are  in"Zud£d  und£r  "upper  Urrbs ". 
(4)  The  hips  and  the  anktes  are  i""tud£d und£r  "Lower  Limbs". 
(5}  Catend£r  days. 
Table  2a 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  4  503  376 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not  TOTAL 
suffocation  specified  (2} 
7  8  9 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
4  to  21  to 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  20  56 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  days  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5}  dents  (5}  (5}  (5)  dents 
IX X  :x - - - 56  7  2  - 65 
X  X  [>< 
- - - 57  4  1  - 62 
J 
M><  [><J 
I 
-
I 
- - 23  6  3  - 32 
I  I 
N><N 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1  - 1  70  9  5 
I  - 84 
L 
I 
H 
M><  IXJ  I 
I 
I 
5  - 5  I 275 
71  17 
I 
- 363 
~  t>< X 
I  i  -~ 
1  - 1  99  22  ll  I 
X  t>< X 
2  - 2  72  32  7  - lll 
!X  t>< X 
- - - 21  6  2  - 29 
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - 9  - 9  673  157  48  - 878 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground in  coal  mines 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enuc Ieations 
COUNTRY  :  Netherlands 
COAL-FIELD  :  South-Limbourg 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal injury 
(Frequency  rates) 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and  muscular 
abrasions 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
Table  2b 
YEAR:  1973 
!WI-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  4  503  376 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of those not  TOTAL 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
>  55 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
' acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(r' 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5} 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
,  56 
days 
(5)  I 
4  to  21  to 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
acci-, total  days  acci- total  days  acd- total  days  acci- total  20  56  days  acd- total 
dents /  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  d~~;  d~~~  (5)  dents 
~--LO-C-AT_I_OO  __  O_F_T_HE  __  I_N_~-R-Y--~----~--~----~--~----~---+----~--~----+----t----t---~----~--~----~~----4---~~----4 ~~--~~~----~~--~--~~  ----}---~----~~-~~~}----+-----~ 
L  '"'  ~• ""'"  - _  - o,m  - o,m  1- - - - - - o,m  - r""'  - - -~~  _  - - "·"' '·"'  o,w.  - "·"' 
II. Eyes 
III.  Trunk  0,666  I  - - - - - - 1- - 1- I -~  -
IV •  Upper  limbs 
(excluding the  hands) 
(3) 
0,444  0,444  0,222 
V.  Hands  0,444  - 0,444  1,332  1,332 
I 
I- ~~<X  o.~  - I'·"' 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding feet)  (4) 
VII.  Feet 
VIII.  Multiple  locations 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL 
1,332 
1,110 
0,444  - 0,444  5,107 
! 
1,332  0,222 
1,110  ~lXIX-
0,444  -
5,107  0,444  - 0,444  - 2,665  -
(1)  Number  of hoU1'8  UJorked  by pit staff and e"f'l-oyees  of contractor firms  UJho  beZong  to a  miner's  soaiaZ insurance  scheme. 
(2)  inaZuding corrpUcations. 
(3)  The  shouZdsrs  and  the UJrists  are  incZudsd undsr  "upper  Ziros". 
(4)  The  hips and the anktes are inctudsd undsr  "LoUJer  Umbs". 
(5)  CaZendsr  dauB. 
0,444 
2,665 
- 1- IXM'·"' 
I 
- I  -
IXl><l\-
1,  998  -
12,657 0,888 I ,.J- 13.767 
[5,107  1,332  0,666  • 
0,222  ,,.," ,  .... I '·"' -
1 
18,6531 
I 
1,110  61,065 5,766 
21,984  4,885  ,,.,,1 -
I 
I 
0,444  24,6481 
4,663  1,332  0,444  - 6,440 
1,  998  149,44  ~4'  862  10,659  - 194,964 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in  coal mines 
COUNTRY  :  COMIJNITY 
COAL-FIElD 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Table  la 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN -HOURS  WORKED  ( 1)  331  503  731 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT  Production  faces 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits 
2 
Shafts  and  staple-pits  Other  places 
4 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
Group 
accidents  I 
(2)  I 
I .  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to  Fatal 
56  >56  acci-
days  days  dents 
(J}  (3) 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to I  Fatal 
56  )  56  acci- total 
days  1 days  dents 
(J)  i (3) 
7  849  3  193  982  31  12  055  i 3  62611  215  389  10  5  240 
577]  351  468  118  271 
i 
862  8041  25  1  7  57 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3} 
52 
132 
21  to  Fatal 
56  >56  acci-
days  days  dents 
( 3)  (J) 
19  4  i 
I 
105  53 
total 
75 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
474 
21  to  Fatal 
56  :>56  acci- total 
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to  Fatal 
56  )56  acci- total 
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
135  46  1  656  12  001  4  563  1  421'  42  8  027 
296  556  309  176  4  1 1  045  l  959  1  263  698  40  3  960 
56 
1W 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
I  -
I 
4o6 I  240 i  102  3  751  283  6  641  12  8  4  - 24  118  I  67  34  - I  219  8181  548  260  9  1  635  - i  - ! 
total 
9  ! 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport  62  311  16  2  111  5211  345  231  19  1  116  120  97  49  6  I  272  438  :  242  142  4  I  826  1  141  7151  4381  31  2  325  - I  - I 
~-~--~--~---r---r-----~~---~-r--+--+--~~--~~r--r--r--lr--rl  ~~-~:--r--r--~~ 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other activities 
1  955  1  188  i  2881  1  3  432  4  3ooj  2  435  698  7  7  440  321  244  69  4  638  1  350  721  232  1  2  304  1  7  926'  4  588jl  287  13  :u  814 
748'  423 i  103  _  1  274  ,1  0831  527  182  l  l  793  75  51  13  1  140  835  :  456  158  1  1  11  450  1  2  741
1 
1  457:  456  3  ,4 6571  _  _ 
1 
12011  765
1 
1851  1  215813 21111  908!  516 
1 
6  5  647  246  193  56  3  498  515'  265 
1  74  I  - 85415 1851  3  131'  831  10·  91571  - - j  -
1 
r--------------------------r----r---~---r--~----~--~--~----r---+----i----+----r----r--~----+-------~r---,---~---+--~----~--~--~--~----~--~----
1  '  I  :  :  '  I  !  i  I  !  !  I  IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
3  19211 420 i  404  4 i  5  020  i  1  621[  657 i  185  i  3  2  466  70  22  4  1  97  743  i  282  I  74  !  - 1  099  i  5  626~  2  3811  667  8  18  6821  - I  - !  .  -
3401  1731  82  2:  5971  2491  133i  65:  2  449  4  3  1  l  9  103!  47:  16  -I  1681  698:  356!  1641  5  11  223!  - I  -
9851  380  93  - 1  458  I  809  308 I  69  I  - l  186  45  16  1  - 62  365 I  115  II  34  ·- !  514  ,I  2  2041  819  1971  - 3  220  - - - 1-----'----+---+---+1 --j ----+---i  ----;- !  ::kR~ 
I  --t----t--+--+---1-----l-----+----+--,  _
1 
______ --+  i!  ---i----+---+---+-~--+~ 
r---+---t- ~-- t----2-t-2--965  563  21·6-+----------ill  51  !  I  I 
1 
___  c_J_s_u_PP_o_r_ts  __________________  +-_1_8_67~--8-67~~  --2-29~---l----4--,~--~--~---14---83-1~---2-l+----3+----2~----r---26-r!-2_7_3~:  __  1_2_o+--2-4~ 1 ----,-!---4-l7-~l-2  __  7_24+i--1_2_06-+--3-0-6~~--3-+I-4--239  - - 1  -
r- I  I  I  I  I'  !  I 
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS  3  373  1  782  530 I  5  5  690  : 3  003  1  3651  434  2  4  804  645  153  46  - 84411  326  ii  577  206  I  1  !  2  110  7  923:  3  804  1  202 i  8  112  937  - I  - I  -
~------------------+---r--+--~--+----~~--~--~-+--~---r--+---+--~--r-~-----+-~~--~--~~--~~------+---~-+1--~i--~'---
VI.  EXPLOSIVEs  4  !  2  -I  -I  6  :  1  1  I  - I  - 2  - - - - I  -l  -I  -i  - I  - I  - !  ~  3  - - I  8:  I 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS  I  _/,  - I  -I  - i!  -1
1
1  - !  !  ~il  Ji'  - I' 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST  - I  - i  - - - i  - - - - - I  - i  -:  - - - i 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION,f-----~~---t---+--+--±b'  !  '  __  -_L~~.~  ---11----+---t---+---t---:-1--+---l--+----+~--;-~1  ___  .._~ ____  ~~  --,---+-----~---t~---+---~---1 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATu- _  _  1 
1 
1 
21 
·  _  _  _ 
11 
_ 
1
1 
~ai-'A~ASES(co2,cH4,co,H2Sl,  - - - - 4  9  - 1  2  3  1,  I- 1!  41  4  loj 
a)  Outbursts  of  Gas  _  _  _  1  _  I  2  3  _  1  _  2  II  31  j  - I  - !  .,  1  - 2  31  - - I  - I 
-+----~---+--+--~---+---+--+---+'---~--r---+---+l--+---7--~--r--+--~---+---r---l 
I  - i  1 I  - - - I  1  l  3:  2  7  - - I  b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural Gases 
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  730  242  99  4  1  075  689  313 
I 
10  2  I  5 
106  130  I 
I 
15  1  147  143  46  19  - ! 
I 
208  1  427 
TOTAL  17  573  8  100  2  421  51  ~8 145  14056  6  572  2  190  67  2  885  3  313  875  269  18  4  475  14  882  2  139 
(1)  Number  of hours  worked by  pit staff and errpLoyeea  of aontl'O.ator  firms  who  be tong to a  miners' soaiat insuranae  saherne. 
(2)  Aaaidents invotving more  than  five  aasuaUies  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unabLe  to resume  work  underground for at  Zeast  eight weeks). 
( 3)  Catender  dg.y_a. 
- I  2  ~ 
- !  14 
14  12  28 
33  1  567  1  9221  702  279 
I 
20  2  9231  -
770  8  7  799  37  384  17  325  5  560  137  0  406 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
CoDI!lon  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
COUNTRY  :  COMIJNITY 
COAL-FIEID 
Production  faces 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency  rates) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
2 
)56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
Shafts  and staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>5& 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  331  503  731 
Other  places 
4 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)  56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS  23,68  9,63  2,96  0,09  36,36  10,94  3,66  1,17  0,03  15,81  0,16  0,06  0,01  0,23  1,43  0,41  0,14  0,003  1,98  36,20  13,76  4,29  0,13  54,38 
II. TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
1,41  0,82  0,36  0,01  2,60 
1,23  0,72  0,31  0,009  2,27 
0,18  0,09  0,05  0,006  0,33 
5,90  3,58  0,87  0,003  10,35 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine  2,26  11,28  0,31  - 3,84 
b)  in  the  course of other activities  3,64  2,30  0,56  0,003  6,51 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  9,63  4,28  1,22 
2,43  1,74  1,o6  I o,o8  5,30  0,40  0,32  0,16 
I 0,85  o.  70  0,36  : 0,02  :  1, 93  0,04  0,02  0,01 
1,57[  1,04 
1
o,7o  [ o,o6  :  3,37  0,36  0,29  0,15 
I  I 
12,971  7,35  2,11  1  o,o2  22,44  0,97  0,74  0,21 
3,27,1,59  0,55  0,003  5,41  0,23  0,15  0,04 
9,70  5,76  1,56  0,02  17,03  0,74  0,58  0,17 
0,21  0,07  0,01 
0,02  0,89  1,68  0,93  o,53  o,o1  3,15  5,91  3,81  2,11  0,12  11,95 
0,07  0,36  0,20  0,10  - 0,66  2,47  1,65  0, 78  0,03  4,93 
0,02  0,82  1,32  0,73  0,43  0,01  2,49  3,44  2,16  1,33  0,09  7,02 
0,01  1,93  4,07  2,18  0,70  0,003  6,95  23,91  13,84  3,88  0,04  41,67' 
0,003  0,42  2,52  1,38  0,48  10,003  4,37  8,27  4,40  1,38  0,009  14,05 
I 
0,009  1,50  1,55  0,80  0,22  - 2,58  15,64  9,44  2,50  0,03  27,62 
I 
2,24  i 0,85  26,1G  116,97  7,18  2,01  0,02  3,32  0,29  0,22  - 0,003 
Table  lb 
56 
1W 
Group 
accidents 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
(2) 
total 
0,03  0,03 
I 
0,01  115,14  4,89  1,98  0,56  0,0091  7,44 
~---+---+---+---+--~-------+,--~--4~--~---+---+---4---+---+---+---4---+--~--~--~--~--+---~--+---+---~--1 
1,03  0,52  0,25  0,006  1,80  0,7  0,40  0,20  0,00611,35  0,01  0,009 0,003  0,003  0,03  0,31  0,14  0,05  1- 0,51  2,101  1,07  i  0,49  0,015  3,69  a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
I VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VI I I.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE -OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
TUTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
2,97  1,15  0,28  - 4,40 
1  2,44  0,93  r  0,21 
1 
_ 
1
3.58  0,14  0,05  0,003 
i o,oo3i  2,51  o,o6 
'  : 
0,65  i 0,15  0,009  0,006  1,  7C  o,oo6  8,94  2,61  0,69  5,63 
10,18  5,38  1,60  0,01  17,16  9,01 
i 
4,1211,31  0,006  14,49  1,95  0,46  0,14 
0,01  0,006  - 0,02  o,oo  0,003  - - 0,006  -
1- - i  -
I 
!  -
T  I  I 
0,0031  0,01  i- I 
I 
0,01  i  0,03  i  - 0,003  -
- 0,003  - 0,006  0,009  - 0,003  -
0,00'  0,009  - 0,006  0,02  -
I - 0,00  - 0,003  -
0,006  0,003  - 0,009  0,0  0,006  0,006  0,003  0,03  O,Ol'  -
0,003  - 0,003  0,006  0,02  0,009 0,003  - 0,03  0,003  0,003  -
1  2,2o  o,73  o,3o  o,o1  3,24  2,0!  0, 94  0,39  0,04  3,46  0,43  0,14  0,06 
53,01  24,43  7,30  0,15  84,90  42,4(  19,83  6,61  0,20  69,03  10,00  2,64  0,81 
0,19  1,10  0,35  0,10  - 11,55  6,65  2,47  :  0,59  -
0,08  0,82  0,36  0,07  - 1,26  8,22  3,64  0,92  0,009 
2,55  !  4,00  1,74  I  0,62  ; 0,003  6,37  I 23,90 11,48  3,63  0,02 
I  - I  -
I  -
I 
1  0,006 
!  0,0061 
0,009  0,003 i  -
0,009  -
I 
1-
- I  - 0,003  -
0,003  0,003  -
!  0,0151  - 0,003  -
0,006  0,015  0,024  0,003  -
0,0151  0,009  ~  -
- 1-
I 
: 0,003  0,006  0,012  - 0,012 
- - 0,003 i  - 0,006 
0,003  0,006  0,009  - 0,006 
0,006  0,003  0,003  o,oo  -
0,003  0,02  0,009  0,00'  0,003 
0,04  0,04  0,04  0,006 0,003 
0,63  1,29  0,32  O,lo  0,003  1,71  5,80  2,12  0,84  0,06 
9,7 
1,28 
39,0~ 
I 
0,0 
0,0 
0,00' 
0,0 
0,00' 
0,01 
o,oa 
8,82 
0,05  13,50  14,73  6,45  2,32  0,02  23,53  12,77  52,26  16,77  0,413  182,22 
(1)  NU!Wer  of hou1'8  worked by pit staff and errpZoyees  of oontroator fi1'1118  who  bel-eng  to a  miners 1  soaiaZ  insurance  sd-zeTt>e. 
~;~  ~~t~;s  j;;;;':_Zving more  than  five  casualties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unable  to resume  work  undsr~und for at  '/.east  eight weeks). 
0,03  0,03 I 
I 
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Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
s 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
IV,  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
TOTAL 
IX,  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
COUNTRY  :  United  Kingdom 
COAL-FIElD 
Production  faces 
1 
Fatal  Serious  Total 
16  92  108 
1  35  36 
1  14  15 
2  37  39 
- 6  6 
- 12  12 
1  13  14 
- 2  2 
- - -
- - -
- - -
7  - 7 
- - -
- 2  2 
28  213  241 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits 
2  3 
Fatal  Serious  Total  Fatal  Serious  Total  Fatal 
- 24  24  - - - 2 
.1  4  5  20  15  35  17 
- 4  4  1  l  2  -
1  6  7  - - - -
I 
- 2  2  - ;  - - -
- - - - I  - - -
I 
- - -
i  - I  - - -
I  - - -
i 
- - - -
I  I  !  !  - I  - i  - I  - - -
I 
I  i 
I 
I  - 1  1 
!  - - - -
- - - -
! 
- - -
- - - - - - 1 
- - - - 1  - - 2 
- 1  1  - i  - - 1 
I 
t  42  44  21  16  37  23 
(1)  Nwriier  of houre  worked by  pit staff and errpZoyees  of cont:ractor  firnlB  who  beZong  to a  rrrine:rs  1  sociaZ  insurance  scheme. 
(2)  Accidents invoZving more  than  five  casuaUies  (i.e,  who  either died o:r  were  unabZe  to :reswne  wo:rk  underground fo:r  at  Zeast  eight OJeeks). 
( 3)  CaZe>1d2r  daL s 
YEAR  :  1973 
HAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1) 
Other  places 
4 
Serious  Total 
6  8 
142  159 
30  30 
I 
8  8 
13  13 
- -
I 
10  10 
1  1 
- -
I 
- -
I  - -
- 1 
3  5 
6  7 
219  242 
Table  la 
306  158  588 
Total of  Group  I  accidents  underground  accidents  (2) 
s  6 
Fatal  Serious  Total 
18  122  140  5  +  4 
39  196  235  18  +  11 
I  I  2  49  51 
3  51  54 
- 21  21 
- 12  12 
1  23  24 
- 3  !  3 
I 
- - i  -
I  ! 
I 
!  I  -
I 
1  1  I 
- - -
8  - 8  7  +  0 
2  3  5 
1  9  10 
74  490  564 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
COUNTRY  :  United  Kingdom 
COAL-FIELD 
Product ion  faces 
Fatal  Serious  Total 
0,052  0. 301  0.353 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits 
2 
Fatal  Serious  Total 
0.078  0.078 
(frequency  rates) 
Shafts  and staple-pits 
Fatal  Serious  Total  Fatal 
0.007 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  ( 1)  306  158  588 
Other places 
Serious  Total  Fatal 
0.019  0.029  0.059 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
Serious  Total 
0.398  0,457 
Table  lb 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
5  +  4 
1 _I_r_._T~  ___  sP_o_RT_,  __  Tm  __  A_L ____________  ~~-o-._o_o3  __  +-__  o_.1_14  __  -t  __  o_._1_17  ___  ~  __  o_.oo  __  3 __  r-_o_.o_l_3 __  t-_o_.o_l_6 __  t-_o_._o6_5  __  t-_o_._o4_9  __  1-__  o_.l_l_4 __  t-__  o._o_56  __  T  ___  o._4_64  __  +
1
---o-.5_2_o __  ~
1
1 
__  o_.l_2_7 __  ~  __  o._6_4o  __  ,_  __  o._7_6_7~----l-8  __  + __  1_1 ____ 
1 
1- III.  ~~~~~AND MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM,  0.003  I  0.046  0.049  - I  0.013  I  0.013  I  0.003  0.003  i  0.006  - 0.098  0.098  0.006  I  0.160  0.166 
I 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines  o.oo,  I  o.;,o  o.m  I  o.oo,  I  o.O>o  I o_,,  I  - I  - I  - !  o "'  I  o_,,  I  o.o>o  • 
~--------~~~  --o-.0~2-o--+--o.-o-,o-~  -----~  ~'  _J_-~-.o_o_7  ___  j_
7\l----_---1----_--- -~~---~-----~~~  ---~----~~--o-.-04-2--+•---o-.o-4-2--~~  --------T~---o.-o-6-9~---o.-o-69--J~'------------~ 
~v-.  -:-:-L:-:-p-::-r-::-J-E-cr_s _____________  -t---o-~-oo-3--~+~  --:-:-:-::----+--:-:  :-::  1 ~  ~  ~-----+-~ -~~----~---+---~-----+  ~- --~--T----It-----o-~  o-3-3--+-~---o  --.  o-3-3 ___, ___  o --.  o-o-,  +~:  :~  :  :::  ~ 
b)  Tools 
0.166  0.176 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
VI I.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
VI II.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE -OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
TmAL 
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
0.007 
I 
I 
i 
r  _  _ 
1 
_  _  0. 003  1  o. 003  i  _  1  0. 010  0.010 
I  I  - i 
I 
I  l 
I  0.003  I  o. 003  I  I 
0.093  o.oo3  1 
!  - -!-I- I- I-i-I 
X.  INRUSHES  I  -------+-~  __  - ____  -+-)  --------+------~  ----+-- o.oo3 __  i  ___  -~  __  o.oo3  ~~-~~------j'---o  __  .o_z_6---l[r---7--+  ___  o ____  __, 
XI.  ELECTRICITY  - - -1- I  - - - II  - I  0.007  i  0.0]0  I  0.017  I  0,007  I 
0.023  0.023 
1-----------------------------+--------+---------+--------+-------~------~'  ------+-------~-------r-------+----
0.003  1  - _  _  0.003  i  0.020  ;  0.023  XII.  mHER  CAUSES  0.007  0,007 
0.017  0.010 
0.030  1  - 0. 003  0,003  0,035 
TOTAL  0.091  0.696  0. 784  0,006  0.137  0.143  0.068  0.052  0,120  0.076  o. 7'15  0. 791  0,241  1. 600  1.841 
(1)  Number  of hours  worked by pit staff and employees  of aontraator firms  who  belong to a  miners'  soaiaZ insurance  s&lene. 
{2)  Aaaidents involving more  than  five  aasuatties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unable  to resume  work  underground for at  l-east  eight "-'ee~s). 
(J)  CaZender~~~,s~·---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal mines 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
YEAR:  1973  COUNTRY  :  United Kingdom 
COAL-FIELD  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  306  158  588 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxations, 
and  with  or  without  twists  and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleations  dis location  sprains 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal injury 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and  muscular 
abrasions 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those  not 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
I  I 
Fatal rerioui  Total i  Fatal 
!  I  I  J 
Total  I Fatal ,Serious Total ] Fatal  ~eriuus Total  Fatal ~erioui Total  eriouE 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. Head  and neck 
II. Eyes 
III.  Trunk 
IV.  Upper  limbs  -
(excluding  the  hands)  I  -
(3) 
V.  Hands  I -
I 
VI.  Lower  limbs  I 
(excluding  feet)  (4)  -
I 
VII.  Feet 
I 
14  29  43 
_  1  _  I _ I _ 
i 
I 
I  -
i 
I  -
I 
9  86  I  95  _
1
,!  _  I  _ 
.  I 
I 
- 206 
I 
15 
I 
206  ~ 
15 
- I  -
I 
-1-1-~-
-1-'-1~-
I 
I  -
I 
-i- -1-[>(/t\ 
'3 
- I  - - V(txt>< 
HH. '"'  "'  ,, '"'"''""'  I - - - "  "  "  - - - - ' - I  - I  ' 
~~~[X~[Xt><IX[X~IXIX 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  22  22  35  444  479 
(1)  Nwnber  of hou!'B  worked by  pit staff o:nd  employees of aontraator fi1'm8  who  belcmg  to a  miner's  soaiat insUJ>anae  saheme, 
(2)  induding aompliaaticms. 
(3)  The  shoulders  and  the wrists  are inatwied under  "upper  limbs". 
(4)  The  hips  o:nd  the  ankles  are  inatw:l£d under  "Lower  Limbs". 
(5)  Calender  days. 
- I  - I. 
I  I 
- I  -
26 
33  42 
Fatal 
14 
13 
37 
10 
74 
Table  2a 
TOTAL 
Serious  Total 
31  45 
95  108 
H 
96  96 
216  216 
18  18 
20  57 
11 
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Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleations 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  Fatal  eriou  Total 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. Head  and  neck 
COUNTRY  :  United  Kingdom 
COAL-FIELD 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
Fatal ~eriou 
i 
Total 
1  I 
Fatal  Serious Total 
I  . 
0.0461 0.094 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal  injury 
(Frequency rates) 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and  muscular 
abrasions 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
YEAR  :  1973 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  306  158  588 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
Fatal  Seriou!  Total 
I  1 
Fatal Serious  Total I Fatal ~eriouj Total  ,  Fatal ~erioud Total  Fatal  Fatal ~eriouj Total 
i  I 
! 
0.046 
0.041 
Table  2b 
TOTAL 
Serious  Total 
0.100  0.146 
0.023  0.023 
0.310  0.351 
0.313  0.313 
0.020  0.020 
~~~ __  v_r._1 _<~-:-~-u!-~-n~-s-fe-et_)_(_4_J~----+-o-.o-23~o-.o-2-3+-----ro-.6-7-3~!  -o-.-67~3-----~--~~-----T~--~~--~~~~-:--~+---~ro-.o-l-o~l-o-.-o1~,~-----r---~---~~~--*~--~~~--T---~~-----r----+-------~--o-.7-o-6-+--o-.7-o-6~ 
I  ~  -~-~-~iv1,\/  !\/_  -~~,,:  _'_iv1VI  f\1_ 
I  VII.  Feet  - 0.010  0.010  - :0.0491  0.049  1/\J/\~~  - - ~~/\ 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  0.039  0.049  0.0881 
I  i  /Vf\lf\1  - I - , - - - '·"'"  - I o.oo•  - o.o>o I o.o>o!/\ll\1!\ '·"'  o.oo,  '-"'' 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  0.072  0.072  0.114  1.450  1.564  o.ooj o.ol6l,  o.ol9  o.003  o.ol6
1 
I  !  I 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by  pit staff and e~Loyees of contractor fi:rms  who  beZong  to a  miner's  sociaZ insurance  scheme. 
(2)  inctuding  co~  Zications. 
(3)  The  shouLders  and the wrists  are  incLuded under  "upper  ZirrU:Ja". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankles  are  inaZuded under  "Lower  Umbs". 
(5)  CaZender  days. 
0.007  0.007  0.007  0.003  0.010  0.020  0.020 
0.059  0.059 
0.120  0.066  0.186 
0.003  0.037 
1.841 
H DECISION  (1) 
OF  9 JULY,  1957 
CONCERNING  THE  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  AND  RULES 
OF  PROCEDURE  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 
ANNEX  II 
(1)  See  '~ournal officiel de  la Communaute  europeenne  du  charbon  et de  l'acier" no.  28  of 
the  31st August  1957. II,  3 
COUNCIL  OF  t1INISTERS 
DECISION 
of  9  July  1957 
concerning  the  terms  of  reference  and  rules 
of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
Having  taken note  of  the Recommendations  adopted  by  the  Conference 
on  Safety  in Coalmines  and  of  the  proposals  submitted  by  the  High  Author-
ity in connection with  the Conference's  final  Report, which  afford  a  working 
basis  for  the  improvement  of  safety in coalmines,  and 
having  regard  to  their Decisions  at  the  Council's  36th and  42nd  sessions 
on  September  6,  1956  and  on  May  9  and  10,  1957,  setting up  the Mines  Safety 
Commission, 
THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS  OF  THE  MEMBER  STATES  MEETING 
AT  THE  SPECIAL  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS, 
- hereby  lay  down  that  the  terms  of  reference  of  the  aforesaid Commission 
shall  be  as  follows: 
1.  The  Commission  shall  follow  developments  regarding  safety  in coalmines,  including 
those  regarding  the  safety regulations  instituted by  the  public authorities,  and 
assemble  the  necessary  information concerning progress  and  practical results ob-
tained,  more  especially  in the matter  of  accident  prevention. 
To  secure  the  necessary  information,  the  Commission  shall  apply  to  the  Governments 
concerned. 
The  Commission  shall evaluate  the  information in its possession and  submit  to  the 
Governments  proposals  for  the  improvement  of  safety in coalmines. 
2.  The  Commission  shall help  the  High Authority  to  work  out  a  method  of  compiling 
intercomparable  accident statistics. 
3.  The  Commission  shall ensure  the  prompt  forwarding  to  the quarters directly concerned 
(including  in particular mines  inspectorates  and  employers'  and  workers'  associa-
tions)  of  relevant  information assembled  by  it. 
4.  The  Commission  shall ascertain,  by  regular contact with  the Governments,  what  action 
is being  taken  to  implement  the  proposals  of  the  Conference  on  Safety in Coalmines, 
.and  such proposals  as  it may  itself draw up. 
5.  The  Commission  shall propose  such  study  and  research  as  it deems most indicated for 
the  improvement  of  safety, with notes  as  to  the way  in which  these  can best be ef-
fected. 
6.  The  Commission  shall facilitate  the  exchange  of  information and  experience  among 
persons  responsible  for  safety matters,  and  propose  appropriate measures  for  this 
purpose  (e.g.  organization of  study  sessions,  establishment  of  documentation ser-
vices). 
7.  The  Corr~ission shall propose  appropriate measures  for  ensuring  the  necessary liaison 
among  the  rescue  services  of  the  Community  countries. II,  4 
8.  The  Commission  shall submit  annually  to  the Council  of Ministers  and  the  High Author-
ity a  Report  on  its activities and  on developments  regarding  safety in coalmines  in 
the different member  States.  In this  connection,  it shall  in particular  examine  the 
statistics compiled  on  accidents  and  incidents  in coalmines. 
- The  Representatives  of  the Governments  further  lay  down  that  the  rules 
of  procedure  of  the  Commission  shall be  those  set forth  in  the Annex  to 
the  present Decision. 
- The  Representatives  of  the  Governments  trust  that  the  High  Authority will 
arrange  for  the  Commission  to  start work  at  the  earliest possible moment. 
This  Decision was  adopted  by  the  Council  at its forty-fourth  session, 
on  July  9,  1957. 
For  the  Council, 
J.  REY 
President. II,  5 
RULES  OF  PROCEDURE 
of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
CHAIRMAN 
APtiaZe  1 
The  Chairman  of  the Mines  Safety Commission  shall be  a  Member  of  the  High 
Authority  of  the  European Coal  and  Steel Community. 
APtiaZe  2 
ANNEX 
The  Chairman  shall conduct  the  work  of  the  Commission  in accordance with  these 
Rules  of  Procedure. 
MEMBERS 
APtiaZe  3  (1) 
The  Commission  shall consist  of  36  members  appointed  by  the  Governments;  each 
country  shall  have  four  members,  of whom  two  shall be  representatives  of  that country's 
Governments.  one  of  the  employers  and  one  of  the workers. 
Each  Government  shall  send  in writing  to  the Chairman a  nominal  roll of  the 
members  appointed  by it. It shall notify  the  Chairman of  all changes  in this. 
Each  Government  may  appoint  for  any particular meeting  of  the  Commission  one  or 
two  advisers,  whose  names  it shall  send  to  the Chairman. 
I~L.O~  PARTICIPATION 
APtiaZe  4 
Representatives  of  the  International Labour  Organization shall be  invited  to 
attend  the  proceedings  of  the Commission  in a  consultative  capacity. 
ORGANIZATION 
(a)  Restricted Committee 
APtiaZe  5 
A Restricted Committee  shall be  set up,  to  consist of  Governments  representa-
tives  on  the  Commission. II,  6 
Article  6 
The  Chairman  of  the Commission  shall act  as  Chairman  of  the  Restricted  Committee. 
Article  ? 
The  function of  the Restricted  Committee  shall be  to  ensure  permanent  liaison 
among  the  Governments  of  the member  States  and  between  them  and  the Commission,  more  espe-
cially for  the  purpose of  exchanging  relevant  information.  The  Restricted  Committee  shall  see 
to  the preparation of  the Commission's  activities. 
Article 8  (1) 
The  Restricted Committee  shall be  convened  by  the Chairman. 
The  Chairman  shall be  required  to  convene  it when  asked  to  do  so  by  the  represent-
atives of five  or  more  Governments. 
(b)  Working  Parties 
Article 9 
The  Commission  of  the Restricted  Committee  may  set up  Working  Parties  of  experts 
to  consider  specific  technical matters. 
Article 10 
The  Working  Parties  shall decide  their own  modus  operandi. 
Article  11 
The  Restricted  Committee  shall be  given reports  by  the  Working  Parties  on  the 
results  of  their proceedings,  which it shall  submit  to  the Commission with  the  comments 
of  its members. 
In  the  event  of  differences  of  opinion within  the  Working  Parties,  the  views 
expressed  shall be  given,  together with  the  names  of  those  expressing  them. 
SECRETARIAT 
Article  12  ( 1) 
The  High  Authority shall be  responsible  for  the  secretarial arrangements  in 
connection with  the work  of  the Commission,  the  Restricted Committee  and  the  Working 
Parties. 
These  arrangements  shall be  underthe  charge  of  a  High Authority  staff member 
appointed  to  act as  Secretary. 
All documents  shall be  in  the  six official  languages  of  the  Community. II,  7 
WORKING  PROCEDURE 
ArtiaZe  13 
The  Chairman  shall fix the  agenda  and  the dates  of  meetings after consultation 
with  the members  of  the Restricted Committee. 
ArtiaZe  14  (1) 
The  Chairman shall allow to  speak  any  member  of  the  Commission or  representative 
of  the  International Labour  Organization  asking  to  do  so. 
The  Chairman may  allow advisers  to  speak. 
ArtiaZe  15 
The  members  of  the  High Authority  shall have  the right  to  attend meetings  of  the 
Commission  and  of  the Restricted Committee,  and  to  speak  there. 
The  Chairman may  bring with him  advisers,  whom  he  may  allow  to  speak. 
ArtiaZe  16 
Where  the  Commission  or  the Restricted Committee  deems  it desirable  to obtain 
information concerning  the various  aspects  of  safety in coalmines,  it shall request  this 
from  the  Governments  of  the member  States. 
ArtiaZe  17  (1) 
24  members  shall constitute a  quorum.  Conclusions  shall be  adopted  by  major-
ity of  the members  present. 
Proposals  by  the  Commission  under  1,3 of  its terms  of reference  shall,  however, 
require  a  vote  in favour  by  two-thirds  of  the members  present,  and  by  not  less  than nineteen 
members  in all. 
Any  dissenting oplnlons  shall be  brought  to  the attention of  the  Governments 
should  the members  expressing  them  so  request. 
(1)  Amended  having regard to decision of the  CounaiZ  of the European  Communities  of 1  Jan-
uary  1973  (OffiaiaZ  Journal of the European  Communities  L2  of 1  January  1973). II,  8 
THE  COUNCIL 
DECISION  (1) 
of March  11,  1965 
of  the Representatives  of  the  Governments 
of  the  Member  States  assembled  in  the  Special 
Council  of Ministers  to modify  the  decision 
of July  9,  1957 
concerning  the  terms  of  reference  and  rules 
of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS  OF  THE  MEMBER  STATES  ASSEMBLED 
IN  THE  SPECIAL  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS  -
having  regard  to  the decision of  July  9,  1957  regarding  the  terms  of 
reference  and  rules  of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission,  and 
having  regard  to  the  High Authority's  proposal  of  January  7,  1964, 
and 
seeing  that  this decision in no  way  affects Article  1  18  of  the  Treaty 
setting up  the  European  Economic  Commununity, 
DECIDE: 
Article 1 
The  terms  of  reference of  the Mines  Safety Commission  laid  down  by  the decision 
of July  9,  1957  are replaced  by  the  provisions  in the annex. 
Article 2 
The  prov~s~ons of Article  17  of  the rules  of  procedure  annexed  to  the Decision 
of  July  9,  1957  are replaced  by  the  following provisions: 
"Should  the  Mines  Safety Commission  or  the Restricted Committee  consider it 
desirable  to  receive  information regarding  the  various  fields  for  which it is 
responsible,  it shall  apply  to  the  Governments  of  the  member  States." 
This  decision was  adopted  by  the  Council  at its one-hundredth  session,  on 
March  11,  1965. 
For  the Council 
M.  MAURICE-BOKANOWSKI 
President 
(1)  See  "Journal officiel de  la  Communaute  europeenne  du  charbon  et de  l'acier" no.  46 
of 22nd  March  1965. II,  9 
ANNEX 
TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  FOR  THE  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 
1.  The  Commission  shall follow  developments  regarding  safety and  measures  to  avoid  at work-
ing-points  conditions which  represent  a  danger  to  health  in coalmines,  including  to  this 
end  the  safety regulations instituted by  the public authorities and  assemble  the  necessary 
information concerning  progress  and  practical results obtained. 
To  secure  the necessary  information,  the  Commission  shall  apply  to  the  Governments  con-
cerned. 
The  Commission  shall evaluate  the  information  in its possession and  submit  to  the  Govern-
ments  proposals  for  the  improvement  of  safety  and  health conditions  in coalmines. 
2.  The  Commission  shall help  the  High  Authority  to work  out  a  method  of  compiling  inter-
comparable  statistics on  accidents  and  damage  to  health attributable  to  vocational 
activities in coalmines. 
3.  The  Commission  shall  ensure  the  prompt  forwarding  to  the  quarters directly concerned 
(including  in particular mines  inspectorates  and  employers'  and  workers'  associations) 
of  relevant  information assembled  by  it. 
4.  The  Commission  shall ascertain,  by  regular  contact with  the  Governments,  what  action 
is being  taken  to  implement  the  proposals  of  the  Conference  on  Safety  in Coalmines, 
and  such proposals  as  it may  itself draw  up. 
5.  The  Commission  shall propose  such  study  and  research as  it deems  most  indicated  for 
the  improvement  of  safety,  and  of  healthy working  conditions  in coalmines,  with notes 
as  to  the way  in which  these  can be  effected. 
6.  The  Commission  shall facilitate  the  exchange  of  information and  experience  among  per-
sons  responsible for  safety matters  and  the maintenance  of  healthy working  conditions, 
and  propose  appropriate measures  for  this purpose  (e.g.  organization of  study  sessions, 
establishment  of  d9cumentation  services). 
7.  The  Commission  shall propose  appropriate measures  for  ensuring  the necessary  liaison 
among  the  rescue  services  of  the  Community  countries. 
8.  The  Commission  shall submit  annually  to  the Council  of Ministers  and  the  High Autority 
a  Report  on  its activities and  on  developments  regarding  safety and  protection of  health 
in coalmines  in the different member  States.  In  this  connection,  it shall  in particular 
examine  the statistics compiled  in  these fields. TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  OF  THE  VARIOUS  WORKING  PARTIES 
OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COtV1ISSION 
(as  at  31.12.1973) 
ANNEX  III III,  3 
I  - Working  Party  on Electrification - Chairman  Mr  Stassen 
Terms  of reference 
1.  Comparing  adopted  safety  and  accident  prevention provisions  relating  to: 
(a)  electric shock, 
(b)  fire hazard, 
(c)  explosion hazard. 
2.  Ascertaining  the  present position  in Community  countries with  regard  to  safety 
regulations  on  underground  electrical networks  of  low  and  medium voltage  (up 
to  1  100  V)  and  feeder  cables  for  movable  equipment,  with  due  regard  to  the 
specifications  for  the  said  cables. 
3.  Reporting  on  steps  to  be  taken when  work  has  to  be  carried  out  on  electrical 
equipment  under  voltage. 
4.  Studying  the  construction of  high-tension  cables  (of  up  to  6  000  V)  used  under-
ground,  and  protective  equipment. 
5.  Study  of  the  problem of  stray currents. 
6.  Periodic  reports  on  oil-powered  contactors  used  in  gassy  environments. 
7.  To  follow  the  development  of  techniques  designed  to  eliminate entirely  the 
production of  sparks  on  electrical  contact  lines  (battery motors  excluded)  and 
in particular  to  take  note  of  the  new  technique  of  traction by  linear motors. 
8.  Investigation of  the  use  of  remote-control  circuits in automated mining 
operations. 
9.  The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  instructs  the  Working  Party  on 
Electricity: 
l(i)  to  take  due  note  of  the  results  of  the  work  of  the  CENELEC  Committee  of 
Experts  entrusted with  harmonizing  the  rules  covering  the  design of 
electrical  equipment  for  use  in explosive  atmosphere; 
(ii)  to  examine  the  draft directive of  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities  dealing with  the  co-ordination  in Member  States  of  legislation 
on  electrical  equipment  to  be  used  in explosive  atmosphere; 
2  to  propose,  if appropriate,  modifications  to  the  above  documents  to  make  them 
applicable  to  coal  mines  in countries  of  the  European  Community; 
3  to  suggest  the  means  by  which  harmonization of  the  certification procedures 
and  reciprocal  acceptance  of  the  test methods  and  test certificates could 
be  achieved; 
4  to  compare  the  rules  covering  installation and  use  of underground electrical 
equipment  now  current  in each  to  the  Community  countries,  particularly  in 
respect  of  the  dangers  of  firedamp  ignition;  to  ensure  that  the  rules  are 
uniform or  to  examine  the  equivalence of  certain rules,  so  that  such  equipment 
can be  used without modification  in all  the  Community  countries. III,  4 
II  - Working  Party  on  Rescue  Arrangements,  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion-
Chairman  Mr  Coenders 
A.  General  terms  of  reference 
(Art.  7  of  the  Terms  of Reference  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission) 
Exchange  of  experience  between  the  Community  countries  and  the  United  Kingdom 
on: 
1.  Rescue  operations  and  action against  spontaneous  combustion,  beatings  and 
fires  on  the  occasion of  accidents  or  other  events  underground  requiring  the 
assistance  of  rescue  teams,  from which  useful  lessons  have  been  learned: 
2.  Organization of  rescue  operations  underground  and  the presentation of  reports 
every  two  years; 
3.  The  prevention of  spontaneous  combustion,  beatings  and  fire outbreaks  under-
ground,  the  fighting  and  control  of  spontaneous  combustion,  beatings  and 
fires,  and  reopening  sealed-off workings. 
B.  Special  terms  of  reference 
1.  Comparison  of practical  arrangements  of  rescue  operations  existing in  the 
Community  countries  and  the  United  Kingdom  and  possibly  the  drafting of  a 
standard plan  of procedure  for  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
2.  Exchange  of  experience  and  practical knowledge  in  the  following  fields: 
(a)  methods  and  apparatus  for  the  early detection of  combustion,  beatings 
and pit fires, 
(b)  CO  self-rescuers, 
(c)  Oxygen  deficiency warning  devices, 
(d)  Fires  in long plant, 
(e)  Sealing off  abandoned  workings, 
(f)  Specifications  and  testing conditions  for  fire-resistant  fluids  for 
mechanical  power  transmission. 
3.  Condensed  comparative  survey  of  new  regulations  and  guidelines  promulgated 
by  the  mining  authorities of member  countries  and  the  United  Kingdom  on 
rescue  arrangements,  first  aid  and  fire fighting  and  prevention. 
C.  Analysis  of results  (partial or overall)  of  research projects at present  in 
progress  so  as  to: 
1.  Improve  borehole  rescue  techniques, 
2.  Define  the  standards  to which  flameproof  clothing should  conform. 
D.  Studies  to be  completed  by  the  Group  of Experts  on  Budryk's  theory  on  the 
following  subjects: 
1.  Extent  of  instability of diagonal  ventilation  roadways, 
2.  Effects  of  a  fire  on  workings  with  descensional  ventilation, 
3.  Resources  to  be  applied  to  combat  the  danger  of  explosion during  firefighting. 
III  - Working  Party on  Winding  Ropes  and  Shaft Guides:  Chairman  Mr  Martens 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Follow-up  of progress  made  in  the  testing of winding  ropes  by  means  of appropri-III,  5 
ate  instruments  in order  to  obtain  information  concerning its application  ~n 
the  mines  of  the  Community  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
2.  Testing of  couplings  for  circular  and  flattened winding ropes. 
3.  Arrangements  for  the  installation and  inspection of  capels. 
4.  Testing of  guides  for winding  cages  in drafts  and  guide  mechanisms  for  cable 
haulage  in  roadways. 
5.  Maintenance  required  to  ensure  safe operation of windipg  ropes  and  balance  ropes. 
6.  Use  of  studies  on  the  dynamic  behaviour  of  shaft  and  roadway  ropes. 
7.  Exchange  of  views  on  the  properties operating conditions  and  strength of  winding 
ropes  of particular interest. 
8.  Discussion  on  accidents  involving winding  and  hauling ropes  and  their  cbuplings, 
which  could  provide  new  information. 
IV  - Working  Party  on  Mining  Accident  Statistics:  .Chairman  Mr  Koch 
Terms  of  reference 
In order  to  enable  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  to  draw  conclusions  on 
accident  prevention,  the  frequency  of  underground  accidents  in  the  Community  coal 
m~nes should be  examined,  with  the  following  objectives: 
1.  To  decide  on  suitable mathematical  statistical  systems, 
2.  To  evaluate,  with  their aid,  chronological  differences  in frequency  together 
with  differences  from  country  to  country  or  coalfield  to  coalfield. 
V  - Working Party  on  Combustible Dusts:  Chairman  Mr  Delacote 
Terms  of  reference 
Taking  into  account  the  mechanism of  dust  combustion  and  of  flame  propagation  and 
the  various  factors  which  may  influence  this,  including  the  fact  that  methane  ~s 
frequently  involved  in  this  phenomenon,  the  working  party is  instructed  to  carry 
out  a  study  of precautions  against'dust  combustion,  in particular: 
(a)  dust neutralization  (dust  control  in situ,  stone dusting,  spraying,  dust 
fixation  by  means  of  spreading salts  and  coagulating pastes,  etc.),  this  study 
to  include  the  comparative  analysis  of  the  regulations  and  instructions  applied 
in  the  Community  countries  and  the  United  Kingdom,  along with  the  methods  of 
application  of  the  different processes, 
(d)  dust barriers pf various  types  to  halt dust  explosions,  mixed  dust-methane 
explosions  and  pure  methane  explosions. 
The  working party  may  make  any  suggestions  for  research work  considered  necessary 
to  advance  the  knowledge  of  the  phenomena  studied  and  to  promote  safety  in  these 
fields. 
VI  - Working Party  on  Health  in Coal  Mines:  Chairman  Mr  Wilson 
Studying,  from  the  standpoint  of  technical  prevention  and  industrial medicine,  the 
prevention of  environmental  risks  to  the  health of workers  in  coal  mines. III,  6 
1.  General  directives  concerning dust  control  methods  where  coal  cutting and  getting 
and  roadway  drivage  machinery  is  used. 
2.  Dust  measurement  (methods,  frequency,  measuring points,  conclusions  to  be  drawn 
etc.)  and  where  necessary  establishing  a  scale  of  comparison  of  the  various 
methods  employed. 
3.  Establishment  of  dustiness  thresholds.  Definition of  categories  of  permissible 
dustiness.  Steps  to  be  taken  when  faced  with various  categories  of  dustiness. 
4.  Medical  problems: 
(a)  Among  the  medical  problems  involved  1n  the  control  of  ambient  health hazards 
to  coal  mine  workers,  priority must  be  given  to  the  study  of  the  following 
factors: 
climate,  noise,  vibration,  lighting,  gas,  etc. 
(b)  The  Secretariat  is  to  be  instructed: 
(i)  to  set  up  a  medical  consultative  committee, 
(ii)  comparison  of  the  provisions  in  force  in  the  various  countries 
concerning  the  organization of  company  medical  services:  selection 
and  training of  doctors,  relations  between  medical  services  and 
technical  departments  and  a  list of  the  tasks  and  functions  of  indust-
rial medicine, 
(iii)  a  draft  scheme  to  standardize  pre-recruitment medical  examinations, 
periodic  checks  and  checks  in  special  instances, 
(iv)  a  draft  scheme  for  a  minimum degree  of  standardization  in  the  detection 
of  disorders  and  in  the  radiological  supervision  of workers  as  regards 
pneumoconiosis  prevention, 
(v)  a  draft  scheme  for  standards  and  criteria in workings  in which  miners 
already suffering  from  a  deterioration  in pulmonary  function  do  not 
run  the  risk of  this  deterioration progressing  further. 
VII  - Working  Party  on  Effects  of  Working  Time  on  Safety at  Work,  especially  1n Diffi-
cult or Unhealthy  Conditions:  Chairman  Mr  Vander  Hooft 
Terms  of  reference  (suspended): 
Number  of  hours  worked  in wet  working points.  Determining  in what  cases  a  working 
points  is  to  be  considered wet  and  the  precautions  to  be  taken. 
VIII- Working  Party  on  Psychological  and  Sociological  Factors  affecting Safety: 
Chairman Mr  Schnase 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Community  safety  campaigns. 
2.  Recommendation  on  the  employment  of  foreign  and  young  workers. 
3.  Practical  measures  for  the  prevention  of accidents,  taking  into  account 
psychological  and  sociological  factors. 
IX  - Working  Party  on Ventilation  and  Mine  Gas  - Chairman  Mr  Knuttel 
The  Working  Party  on  Ventilation  and  Mine  Gas  will  examine  general  problems  of 
ventilation,  particularly where  prevention of  firedamp  explosions  is  concerned  and 
other  means  or  measures  should  be  applied  in order  to  suppress  or  control  firedamp. ,III, 7 
In addition  to  the  study of  firedamp  explosions  occurring in the  Community  and  the 
United  Kingdom,  attention will  also  be  devoted  to  usable  results of  research  in 
the  field of  firedamp  outbursts,  in particular where  maximum  permissible  levels 
in ventilation air of  firedamp  and  other poisonous  gases  are  concerned,  and  the 
advance  estimation of  firedamp  emission before  a  working is  started. 
Attention will  also  be  devoted  to  appropriate  speeds  for  the  flow  of ventilation 
air,  measures  to  be  taken  in  the  event  of  deceleration of  the  flow  of air,  measures 
for  the  stabilization of ventilation  and  the  means  and  procedures  for  monitoring 
ventilation. 
Priority will  be  given  to  examination of  the  procedures  for  a  possible raising, 
either  local  or general,  of  the  maximum  permissible  firedamp  level  in ventilation 
air  streams  from  1  to  1.50 or  2%,  and  measures  to be  applied in this  event  to 
ensure  at  least equivalent  safety. 
X  - Working  Party  on  'Mechanization'  - Chairman  Mr  Medaets 
Taking  into  consideration  current  techniques  in winning  and  roadway  driving,  linings 
and  roadway  conveyors,  the  working party is  instructed  to  study particular ways 
of  preventing accidents  connected with mechanization. 
In particular,  it is  to: 
(a)  compile  a  schedule  for  machinery  manufacturers  of  the  minimum  work  safety 
requirements  for  mechanical  protection of machines  and  equipment; 
(b)  study  safety provisions  such  as:  visual  and  acoustic  signalling,  operating 
controls  and  in particular  the  ability  to  stop  machines  from  any  point  on  the 
face  or  roadway,  taking  account  of modern  means  of  telecommunication  and  remote 
control,  electrical protection of  motors  in  the  event of  overloading or  jamming 
of  equipment,  lighting,  etc. 
XI  - Working Party  on  'Roof  controls'  - Chairman  Mr  Carver 
The  Working Party is  instructed  to  examine,  by  exchanging  experience  and  evaluating 
the  results of  research,  whether it is possible  to  draw  up  measures  or practical 
directives  for  the  prevention of  falls of  ground,  taking  into  account  the  indi-
vidual  features  of  coal  measures  and  workings. 
1.  In particular:  In  the  interest of better roof  control,  particularly within  the 
context of working  schedules,  it will  study 
(a)  general measures  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  avoiding falls  of  ground, 
in  the  light of  the  type  of  measure  and  conditions  of working,  e.g.  sequence 
of working  the  seams,  features  of  the  working  areas  (length,  speed  of 
advance,  etc.),  type  and  characteristics of  the  lining; 
(b)  specific measures  to  deal with  individual  difficulties which  may  or  may  not 
foreseeably  arise  in  the  long  term,  such  as  disturbance  zones,  protective 
banks,  working of  a  face  at right-angles  to  the  end  of  an  old  seam,  etc. 
(c)  specific measures  to  be  taken when  starting off  a  face  in order  to  prevent 
abrupt  subsidence  of  the  roof. 
2.  It will  also  compare  mining regulations  on  linings  and  draw  up  minimum  roof 
control  requirements,  taking  into account  the  characteristics  of  the  various 
faces  (overall  seam  thickness,  dip,  dead  rock  ...  ). COMPOSITION  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY 
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A - MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Government  Representatives 
Ministerialrat  W.  SCHNASE,  Referat  III A 1,  Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft  und  Finanzen, 
5300  Bonn 
Dipl.-Ing.  A.  COENDERS,  Prasident  des  Landesoberbergamts  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4600  Dortmund, 
Goebenstrasse  25-27 
Employers'  Representative 
Bergrat  a.D.  H.  ERNST,  Geschaftsfuhrer  des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  4300  Essen, 
Frillendorfer  Strasse  351 
Workers'  Representative 
E.  STEBEL,  Leiter des  Sachgebiets Arbeitsschutz,  IG  Bergbau  und  Energie,  4630  Bochum, 
Alte Hattingerstrasse  19 
Technical Advisers 
H.  BERG,  Ministerialrat,  Ministerium fur  Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand  und  Verkehr  des  Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  Dusseldorf,  Haroldstrasse  4 
Berghauptmann  K.  HUBNER,  Leiter des  Oberbergamts  fur  das  Saarland  und  das  Land  Rheinland-
Pfalz,  6600  Saarbrucken,  Am  Staden  17 
BELGIUM 
Government  Representatives 
J.  MEDAE~S,  directeur  general  des  mines,  ministere des  affaires  economiques,  rue Montoyer, 
3  - B 1040  Bruxelles 
J.  STASSEN,  directeur divisionnaire  des  mines,  ministere des  affaires  economiques, 
rue  Montoyer,  3  - B  1040  Bruxelles 
Employers'  Representative 
A.  HAUSMAN,  directeur  du  Centre  de  coordination de  sauvetage  du  bassin de  Campine, 
555,  Kempische  Steenweg,  Kiewit-Hasselt 
Workers'  Representative 
J.  OLYSLAEGERS,  secretaire national  de  la Centrale  syndicale des  travailleurs  des  m~nes 
de  Belgique,  FGTB,  Koolmijnlaan  1,  Houthalen 
Technical  Adviser 
E.  VANDENDRIESSCHE,  secretaire general  de  la Centrale des  francs-mineurs,  26-32 
avenue  d'Auderghem,  Bruxelles  4 IV,  6 
FRANCE 
Government  Representatives 
L.  KOCR,  ingenieur  en  chef  des  mines,  direction des  mines,  ministere  de  l'industrie  du 
commerce  et de  l'artisanat,  99,  rue  de  Grenelle,  75-Paris  7e 
M.  YOLIN,  ingenieur  des mines,  arrondissement mineralogique  de  Douai, 
941,  rue  Ch.-Bourseul  - 59-Douai 
Employers'  Representative 
F.  POT,  directeur  general  des  services  techniques  des  Charbonnages  de  France, 
9,  avenue  Percier,  75-Paris  Be 
Workers'  Representative 
L.  CHAUVEAU,  federation nationale  des  syndicats  chretiens  des  mineurs,  8,  rue  de  Navarre, 
75-Paris  Se 
Technical  Adviser 
St.  NOWAK,  4,  rue  Charcot,  62-Lens 
Government  Representatives 
Dott.  A.  VENTURELLA,  console d'Italia ad  Esch/Alzette,  Lussemburgo 
Prof.  Dott.  Ing.  A.  GALATI,  ministero dell'industria e  commercio,  Direzione  generale delle 
rniniere,  Serv.  sicurezza rnineraria,  via Veneto  33  -00100  Roma 
Employers'  Representative 
Prof.  M.  CARTA,  Istituto arte mineraria della facolta d'ingegneria,  piazza d'Armi, 
Cagliari  (Sardegna) 
Workers'  Representative 
Dott.  G.  CRAVIOTTO,  segretario generale della Federestrattive, via  Isonzo  42,  Roma 
Technical  Advisers 
Comm.  Dott.  R.  PURPURA,  direttore generale del ministero del  lavoro  e  riposo, 
via Aiaccio  14  - 00198  Rorna 
Dott.  C.  MICHELAZZI,  ispettore generale del  ministero  del  lavoro  e  della previdenza  sociale, 
via Flavia 6,  Roma 
LUXEMBOURG 
Government  Representative 
A.  SCHUSTER,  ingenieur-directeur du  travail et des  mines,  inspection du  travail et des 
mines,  19,  avenue  Gaston-Diderich,  Luxembourg 
Employers'  Representative 
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ANNEX  V v'  3 
The  recommendations,  assessments,  principles  and  reports  prepared  by  the Mines 
Safety  and Health Commission  since  the  beginning  of  its activities  and  distributed  to  the 
Governments  and  other interested bodies  for  further action or for  information,  are 
published  every  other year  in its annual  report. 
They  have  been classified chronologically by  subject. 
The  situation with  regard  to  implementation of  the  above-mentioned  recommendations 
and  proposals  is  indicated,  with  explanatory notes,  in  the  following  tables. 
The  following  symbols  are  used  in  the  tables: 
C  national  regulations which  are  already  in accordance with  the  recommendations 
C'  recommendations  which  have  not  been  embodied  in regulations,  but which  have  been 
implemented  de  facto 
NRC  recommendations  for which  new  regulations  implementing  them  have  been  issued 
NRP  recommendations  for which  new  regulations  implementing  them are being  drawn  up 
E  the preparation of  new  regulations  is being  studied 
?  there  is uncertainty  regarding  the  steps  to  be  taken 
A  the  national  authorities  have  decided  not  to  bring  their regulations  into  line 
with  the  recommendations. v'  5 
A  - RESCUE 
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Nether- United 
Recmmnendations, assessments  and  principles 
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I  - Recommendation  regarding  the  consulting of  I 
l 
foreign  experts  in  the  case  of  rescue  opera-
tions  connected with major mining  accidents 
In  certain serious  mining  accidents  advice 
requested  by  the  leaders  of  the  rescue  opera-
tion from qualified foreign  experts  in mine-
rescue matters. 
The  heads  of l1ine  Rescue  Stations  are  provided 
for  this  purpose with  a  plan containing  the  I 
most  important  addresses  and  information needed  C'  1)  C'  1)  C'  1)  C'  1)  C'  c'  1)  ? 
This  plan  should be  constantly kept  up-to-date  C'  1)  C'  1)  C'  1)  C'  C'  C'  1)  ? 
1)  The  main  First-Aid  stations are in  touch with the main Rescue  stations in the  Community  countries. v'  6 
B  - FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  CONBUSTION 
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1974  1974  1974 
I  - Recommendations  regarding  equipment  for  shafts 
in connection with  the  prevention of fires 
(First ReEort  of  the  Safety Commission,  E·  11 
(German  text) 
1.  Steps  to  Erevent  any  accumulation of  grease 
and  coaldust  (First Report  of  the Mines 
Safety  Commission,  P·  15  (German  text)  and 
Report  of  the  Conference,  p.  54,  No.  2, 
para. c.) 
- Skip-winding  installations  should  as  far 
Al)  as  possible be  sited only  in upcast  shafts;  c'  A 
- Equipment  in new  shafts  should  be  of 
aerodynamic  form;  C'  C'  E 
- all suitable steps  should be  taken  to 
avoid  in every  case  any  accumulation of dust 
to  ensure  that  any  such  accumulation  is 
removed  c  c  c 
2.  Preferred siting of methane-drainage  lines 
in upcast  shafts  (First Report  of  the Mines 
Safety  Commission,  P·  16  (German  text)  and 
Report  of  the  Conference,  p.  54,  No.  3,  Par.  d) 
- This  recommendation of  the  Conference 
applies  particularly  to  pressure  lines  c  c  c 
3.  Siting electric cables,  compressed-air 
mains  and  gas-drainage  pipes  (First Report 
of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission,  p.  16 
(German  text)  and  Report  of  the  Conference, 
p.  54,  No.  3,  par.  e) 
- electric cables  and  leads,  compressed-air 
drains  and  gas-drainage  pipes  should  not 
be  sited in  the  haulage  compartment  :  I  c  c  c 
- electric cables  should  not  all be  sited 
in  the  same  shaft  c  c  c 
II - Guiding principles  for  fighting mine  fires  by 
sending  down  water  (Second  Report  of  the  Mines 
Safety  Commission,  p.  26)  supplemented  5.2.1973 
(lOth  Report  of  the MSCH,  annex  VI) 
l.  Installation 
a)  At  the  top  of  every  shaft  reaching  to  the 
surface  there  must  be  a  device  which  can 
send  down  at  least  so  li  tres  of water  per 
minute  and  per  square metre  of  shaft cross-
section  c  c  C' 
b)  This  device  must  be  installed in such  a 
way  that  the  supply  of water  can at  no  time 
be  seriously affected  by  drawing-off  or 
flowing-away  of water  at other !'oints  c  c  C' 
c)  The  water  pipes  and  the  spray  jets must 
be  set  in such  a  way  that  they  are protected 
from  frost  c  c  C' 
d)  The  damming  device or devices  must  be  set 
outside  the  shaft-top building  in such  a 
way  that  they  can be  operated at any  time. 
They  must  be  marked  by  means  of  an  C' 
instruction plate.  c  c 
1)  ALL  skip-winding equipment  stiLL in use is instaLLed in downcast  shafts; 
21  No  methane-drainage  Lines in service; 
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e)  At  each  filling station of  everey main  shaft 
a  fire point should  be  provided  such  as 
spaying  ramps,  hoses,  or  equivalent  -
apparatus  c  c  c  E  c  A 1)  A 
f)  This  apparatus  should be  operated either  from 
A 1)  the  fi  11 ing station or  the  shaft outlet  c  c  yes  E  E  A 
g)  A devise  should be  installed at  each  level  to I  restrict  the air  flow  in  the  galleries  coming 
from  the air intake  shaft,  if it should be 
I  necessary,  when  the air flow  is  reversed 
A 2)  A 1)  accidentally or on  purpose  c  E  E  E  A 
(This  device  should  not  necessarly  be  ins-
talled close  to  the  shaft;  the  most  important 
point  is  that it should  be  up-wind  of  the 
first bifurcation from  the  filling station. 
Nevertheless,  since  each mine  is  different, 
the  effects  of  using  this  device  should  be 
evaluated beforehand  by  the  use  of  a  simulator 
or  some  equivalent method). 
2.  Fires  in  down-cast  shafts 
a)  Immediate  measures 
- it is  essential  to  indicate  in  the  fire-
fighting plan  the  maximum  amount  of water 
which  can be  sent  down  each  of  the  downcast 
I  shafts,  without  creating additional  dangers 
for  the workers  by  its effects  on  the 
A 3)  A 4)  I  A  3)  ventilation.  A  E  E  c  I 
I  I 
I  - the  damming  device 1vhich  can be  operated at 
I  this  stage must  not  release more  than  this 
! 
i 
l 
A  5) 
I 
A 4)  I 
I  3)  prescribed quantity of water.  I  A  E  I  E  c  A 
I 
- until  the  leader of  the  rescue  operations 
has  issued his  instructions  and  as  long  as 
there has  been  no  reversal  of  ventilation, 
water  may  be  sent  down  only  by  opening  the 
A  5)  A  4)  I  A  3)  damming  device  prescribed  for  this  purpose.  A  E  E  c 
b)  - Measures  to  be  taken on  the  instructions  of 
the  leader of  rescue  operations 
- the  leader of  the  rescue operations  must 
therefore  decide 
- taking  into account all  the  circumstances 
- either  to  send  down  an  increased 
quantity of water  - or  must  he  give orders 
that  reversal  of  the ventilation be  brought 
A  4)  A  4)  4)  about  or  encouraged.  A  E  E  c  A  6) 
- to  facilitate  the  reversal  of  the venti-
lation in  the  burning  downcast  shaft,  once 
this  has  been  opened  and  the  main  fan 
stopped,  water  can be  sent  down  the  up-
A 6)  cast shaft.  c  C'  C'  E  E  c 
- if reversal  of  the ventilation has  already 
occurred  - either as  a  result of  the 
upward  current produced  by  the  heat  of  the 
fire or deliberately - downcast  shafts  I 
should be  treated  as  though  they  were  I 
up cast shafts.  c  C'  I  C'  A 6)  E  E  c 
1)  The  furnishings  of shafts are  incombustible. 
2)  Fireproof doors  to restrict the  airflow are  required in all mines in the intakes close  to the  shaft. 
a)  There  are  doubts  as  to  the  practicability of the Recommendation;  minimum  water quantities are  laid down. 
4)  Not  suitable for  inclusion in regulations; 
5)  There  are  doubts  as  to  the practicability of the Recommendation; 
6)  Not  suitable  for inclusion in regulations;  must be  decided separately in each  case; RecOIIIllendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission 
- if the  calculated water quantity  appears 
to  be  too  small  to  extinguish  the  fire 
immediately,  or  to  hinder  its spread, 
additional  precautions  must  be  worked  out 
and  laid  down  in  the  fire-fighting plan  : 
- simultaneous  supply  of water  down  all 
downcast  shafts, 
- partial  shutting-off of  the  burning 
shaft at surface  level, 
- shut  underground  fire-doors,  etc. 
3.  Fires  in upcast  shafts  I 
- in upcast  shafts,  water  may  be  sent  down 
only  on  the  instructions  of  the  leader 
the  rescue  operation 
v'  8 
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I 
fire  to  continue  to  be  extracted whilst  1  j 
the  water  is  falling.  j  C  C  E  E  :  E  C 
r-------r-----~~------r-----~~------r-----~~----~ 
reI  !  I 
A  2) 
Note. 
III  -
A  commentary  and  examples  (with diagrams), 
garding  the  calculation of  the  effect of 
falling water  on  the  ventilation are  given 
the  Second  Report of  the  Mines  Safety 
Commission  pp.  29-50. 
'j  : 
inl  i 
Recommendations  for  the  sealing-off  by  dams 
of  mine  fires  and  underground  combustion 
(Second  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety Commission 
~ 
Introductory  remark 
I 
The  following  Recommendations  are  not  binding 
They  are  not  intended  to  give  Inspectorates  I 
"ready-made"  regul:Jtions;  on  the  contrary,  it 
remains  for  the  competent  authorities  to  ' 
decide  how  these  Recommendations  are  to  be 
applied  as  regulations,  circulars or service 
instructions. 
These  Recommendations  refer only  to  the 
actual  fighting  of  the  fire or  combustion; 
they  do  not  refer  to  the  measures  to  be  taken 
as  a  matter  of  priority  to  rescue  men  follow-
ing  the  outbreak. 
A  - When  a  mine  fire  has  broken out or under-
ground  combustion  developed,  it is  indis-
pensable  to  take  the  necessary  prepara-
tory  steps  for  any  later sealing-off  by 
darns  which  may  be  necessary while  the 
direct  firefighting operations  are still 
going  on  c  c  c'  C'  c  I 
I 
c 
- In  the  event  of  sealing-off  by  darn 
becoming  necessary,  as  a  general  rule  the 
first  stoppings  to  be  erected must  be 
advance  darns.  c  c  c'  C'  C'  i  c 
These  advance  darns  are  in  fact  the  real 
subject of  the  present Recommendations. 
B - Structure  and  erection of  the  advance 
darns 
l. If  there  is  no  risk of  explosion  ::!)  : 
a)  to  make  the  advance  dams  tremselves 
as  air-tight  as  possible  and  to 
create  the  closest possible  seal 
between  the  darn  and  the  surrounding 
walls;  c  c 
7)  Not  suitable  for inclusion in regulations; 
,S)  There  are  doubts  a:s  to  the vracticabilitu of the  Re,;,_ommenic71,ic'll; 
il)  For  the  a:;;x;s;;ment  of the risk,  ;;e;e  c•lz,1pfc'l'  A  - JI 'I:,  p .•  '>2 
I 
I 
C'  c'  c'  c 
C' 
C' v,  9 
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b)  there is  nothing  against  shutting 
off first of all  the  intake air.  c  c  C'  C'  E  c 
2.  If there  is  a  risk of  explosion  : 
a)  to  have  at all  times  the most  precise 
information possible regarding  the 
degree  of  explosion risks  in the  fire 
zone;  c  c  C'  c'  E  c 
it may  be  necessary  to  provide  the 
men  constructing  the  advance  darns  with 
fireproof  clothing;  c  c  E  C'  C'  c 
b)  to  ensure  that  the  advance  darns  are 
as  air-tight as  possible;  to  ensure 
that  they  are  strong  enough  to  resist 
an  explosion;  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c 
c)  to  ensure  that  for  the  entire period 
during which  the  stopping  is being 
erected,  there  is  sufficient ventil-
ation of  the  fire  zone  to  counter as 
far  as  absolutely possible  the  forma-
tion of  an  explosive  gas  mixture;  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c 
d)  to  ensure  that all suitable measures 
are  taken  to  reduce  as  far  as  possible 
the  effects of any  explosion which  may 
occur;  (dust barriers,  stone-dusting 
or water  trough barriers);  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c 
e)  to  the  greatest possible extent,  the 
darns  on  the  intake  and  return sides 
should  be  sealed simultaneously;  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c 
only  the  number  of workers  and  members 
of  the  staff strictly necessary  for 
this  work  should  stay behind;  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c 
as  soon  as  the  dams  have  been sealed, 
the  danger  area must  be  completely 
evacuated.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c 
c - The  final  dams  must  be  durable,  built of 
brick or concrete under  the  protection 
offered by  the  advance  dams.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c 
Note  :  Additional  details  to  the  foregoing  -- Recommendations 
IV  -
are  given in a  Commentary 
(Second  Report  of  the Mines  Safety Commis-
sion,  pp.  53/  58) 
General  guidelines  for  the  oEening-up  of  sealed-
off fire  areas  (Doc.  1304/3/64 
l.  GENERAL  2) 
Special  reasons  for  opening-up  a  district 
sealed-off after a  fire  : 
- recovery  of bodies 
- salvage  of material 
- recovery  of  roadways  and workings 
- reduction of  the  sealed-off area 
- inspection of  the district,  and,  if 
necessary, 
- direct  fire-fighting. 
1)  Not  necessary. 
2)  The  opening-up of fire  areas is carried out on  the responsibility of the  manager~ who  prepares  a 
reopening plan - taking into account  the  scale and  type of fire  and  the  ventilation situation in 
the  fire  area  - in collaboration with the Main  Rescue  Station.  The  action plans of the Main 
Rescue  Stations  very  largely embody  the  guidelines  laid doum  in Doc.  1304/3/64. 
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A Rec011111endations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the Kines  Safety and  Health Conmission 
The  following  hazards  can arise  from  reopen-
ing  a  sealed-off district  : 
- release of  CO,  foul  air and  hot  damp  air, 
- explosion of  firedamp  or fire  gas,  where 
the  fire  is  not yet  extinguished, 
- recrudescence  of  the  fire,  which  need  not 
necessarily occur  immediately,  but  even 
after  some  time  has  elapsed. 
Recrudescense  of  the  fire  can occur  only  when 
fresh  air reaches  the  seat of  the  fire,  so 
that with all operations  involved  in re-
opening  a  fire area it is of prime  importance 
to  inspect  the  individual air currents 
constantly. 
All  places  suspected of  having been seats  of 
fire or heatings  must  be  ascertained with 
the  utmost  speed 
2.  BASIC  RULES 
2.1  Sealed-off districts  may  be  reopened only 
after  the  competent  authorities  have  been 
notified or have  given  their permission. 
2.2  Before  opening  commences,  gas  samples  must 
be  taken  from  the  fire area,  at  each  stopping 
and  from all sampling pipes. 
2.3  The  gas  samples  are  analysed  and  the  results 
assessed  from  the  point  of  view  of  explosion 
risk in  the  sealed-off  area  and  the  state of 
the  seat of  the  fire. 
2.4  The  cooling-off  time  of  the  seat of  the  fire 
must  be  taken  into  account. 
2.5  If possible,  the  sealed-off district should 
be  inspected before  any  air is  circulated or 
any  operations  are started. 
2.6  Before  opening  commences,  a  plan should  be 
drawn  up  jointly with  the Main  Rescue  Centre. 
2.7  This  plan must  cover  the  following  points  : 
- the  method, 
- nature,  scope  and  order  of  operations, 
- direction and  superv1s1on, 
- checking of  the ventilation system and  of 
the  composition of  the  air, 
- communications, 
- preparation of material, 
- evacuation,  prohibition of access to  and 
remanning  of  endangered workings, 
- deployment  of  the  Rescue  Team, 
- connection  and  disconnection of  electrical 
equipment  and  cutting-off  the  supply  of 
electricity in both  equipment  and  part of 
network  concerned, 
- opening  and  closing of  the  compressed air, 
water  and  methane-drainage pipeline valves, 
- re-sealing of  the  fire  area  in emergency. 
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2.8  The  method  to  be  adopted  for  reopening 
sealed-off districts  depends  on  the  presence 
or otherwise  of 
- non  explosive  gaseous  mixtures  which  remain 
non-explosive  on dilution with  air, 
- non-explosive  gaseous  mixtures  whicP  may 
become  explosive  on  dilution with air,  or 
- explosive  gaseous  mixtures. 
Fire areas  may  be  opened  at one  point or at 
several points.  In  the  latter case,  a 
continuous  direct circulation of air is 
automatically  established  and  the  fire  area 
is  permeated with  fresh air.  An  examination 
should  be  made  of  the  effects  of  the  opening 
of  the  area  on  the  ventilation system of  the 
pit as  a  whole  and within  the  fire  area. 
2.9  A  sealed-off district may  be  reopened  by 
- breaching  one  or more  stoppings  (with or 
without  the  use  of  an air-lock),  or 
- cutting a  new  entry  into  the  fire-area. 
Before  opening  a  sealed-off area,  provision 
should  be  made  for  immediate  reclosure if 
necessary. 
2.10  Stoppings  may  be  opened  only  on  the  instruc-
tions  of  the  manager  underground  and  under 
the  constant  supervision of personnel  ap-
pointed by  him. 
2.11  Workings,  into which  the  opening  of  a  stop-
ping may  release  toxic  gases  or  foul  air, 
or where  there  is  a  risk of  explosion,  must 
be  evacuated  and  put  out  of bounds  to  per-
sonnel  before  opening. 
c 
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2.12  Since  conditions  in  the  district,  the  state 
of  the  seat of  the  fire  and  the  risk of  gas 
explosion may  change  during  the  opening 
operation  the  composition of  the  fire  gases 
or  fumes  must  be  checked at regular  intervals.~  ___  c  ____ r-___  c  ____ +-___  c  ____ 1-___  c  ____ 1-___  c  __  ' __ -r  ____  c_' __ -+  ____  c_' __ -; 
2.13  The  kind  and  number  of  samples  and  the  points 
at which  they  are  to  be  taken  should be  fixed 
in  advance. 
2.14  In doing  so,  the  possibility of  gas  accumula-
tions  forming  should  be  allowed  for.  (In 
general,  the  formation  of  gas  layers  is 
fostered  by  low  air velocities  and  differ-
ences  in  temperature). 
2.15  Where  a  stopping  is  opened  in  the  knowledge 
that  a  fire is  not yet extinguished,  or where 
the  fire  is  revived  as  a  result,  the  area  in 
question must  be  resealed at once,  if the 
composition of  the  fire  gases  or  fumes 
changes  in  such  a  way  that  an  explosion 
hazard might  arise. 
2.16  With  non-explosive  gas  mixtures  in  the  fire 
area,  this  is  necessary  only  if extinguishing 
operations  seem  unlikely  to  succeed. 
2.17  It is  the  responsibility  of  the  Rescue  Team 
to  open  and  inspect fire  areas,  even after 
they  have  been ventilated. 
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1)  Reopening of an  area where  a  known  fire  exists is not normally  considered. 
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2)  Opening of sealed off areas is prohibited while  there is knOl.Jn  to be  an  explos1~ve  m1~xture behind 
the  stoppings. 
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C'  A'L 
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C'  C' Reconnendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the Mines  Safety and  Health Cormnissio-. 
2.18  On  the  intake  side,  breaching of  stoppings 
need  not  be  carried out  by  the  Rescue  Team 
provided  that  no  gas  hazard  is  to  be 
reckoned with. 
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2.19  When  deploying  the  Rescue  Team,  allowance 
should be  made  for  the  adverse  climatic 
conditions which  are  likely  to  obtain at 
any  point where  they  may  be  employed.  c  c  C'  c  c'  __ -+  ___ c  ____  ~---c~·--~ 
V - OPENING-UP  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS  CONTAINING 
NON-EXPLOSIVE  GAS  MIXTURES 
l. Opening-up  one  side  only 
A sealed-off district containing non-ex-
plosive  gas  mixtures  may  be  opened  on  one 
side  even if the  fire  is not  yet 
extinguished. 
It must  first be  established whether  the 
remaining  stoppings  and  seals  are sufficiently 
air-tight  and  that  there  is  no  risk of 
releasing fire  gases,  in particular carbon 
monoxide  in other parts  of  the working, 
which  may  be  connected with  the  fire area. 
If  the  stopping  to  be  opened  is  on  the  return 
side,  special attention should be  paid  to 
the  release  of  CO  or of  other  toxic  or 
dangerous  gases  or  foul  air. 
The  decision as  to  whether  to  carry out 
operations  in  the  fire  area without  venti-
lation air or with auxiliary ventilation 
depends  on  the  purpose  of  the  reopenins  of 
the  area,  the  expected duration of  the Rescue 
Team's  operations  and  the  possible hazards 
involved.  Auxiliary ventilation is 
especially  desirable  for  extended  operations 
within  the  fire  area. 
a)  Working without ventilation air, 
especially behind  an airlock,  has  the 
advantage  of  eliminating  the  risk of 
reviving  the  fire.  When  carrying out 
extinguishing operations without ventil-
ation air and  under  unfavourable  air 
conditions,  it is advisable first  to  set 
up  water  sprinklers  or nozzles  and  to  put 
these  into operation only  after  the 
Rescue  Team  has  left  the  fire area. 
b)  If auxiliary ventilation is  used,  it 
should  preferably be  by  suction. 
It is  advisable  to  isolate  the  fire  area 
ventilated by  an  auxiliary  fan  from  the 
non-ventilated section by  means  of  an 
auxiliary  stopping if the  seat of  the 
fire  is  situated in  the  non-ventilated 
section. 
2.  Opening  on  two  sides  to  establish  a  circu-
lation of air round  the  sealed-off area 
A  sealed-off area  containing non-explosive 
gas  mixtures  may  be  ventilated  only  if it is 
likely  that  the  fire  is extinct. 
A 1) 
A 1) 
A 1) 
A 1) 
A  1) 
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c  c  I  C'  C' 
c  c  I  c  C' 
c  c'  C'  c  I 
A  2)  C'  c'  3) 
c  c  I  C I  C' 
c  C'  C'  C' 
1)  It is forbidden  to start opening  sealed off areas~ either from  one  point or from  two  places~ 
while  there is known  to be  an  explosive mixture behind the  stoppings. 
2)  Experience  hitherto has  shown  that blowing auxiliary ventilation is preferable,  to  ensure  that no 
explosive gases  are  sucked in by  the auxiliary  fan. 
3)  The  use of blowing auxiliary ventilation is preferred. 
4)  Not  suitable for inclusion in regulations;  the  use of forcing  or auxiliary  fans  would depend  on 
individual circumstances. 
c'  c  I 
c  I  C' 
C' 
C I  A  4) 
C I 
c  I  C I Recommendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the Mines  Safety  an,!  Health Commissi<n 
While ventilation is being established,  a 
Rescue  Team wearing breathing apparatus 
may  enter  the  fire  area  to  examine  conditions 
within it and  to  extinguish  any  fires. 
VI  - REOPENING  OF  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS  CONTAINING 
GAS  MIXTURES  WHICH  MAY  BECOME  EXPLOSIVE  ON 
DILUTION  WITH  AIR 
1.  Opening  on  one  side  only 
1.1  A sealed-off area  containing  gas  mixtures 
which  may  become  explosive  on  dilution with 
air may  be  opened  on  one  side only,  even if 
the  fire  is not  yet  extinguished. 
It is,  however,  essential  to  install  a  tight 
airlock  in  front  of  che  stopping  to  be 
opened,  so  as  to  ensure  an effective air 
seal. 
1.2 It must  first be  checked whether  the  remain-
ing  stoppings  and  seals  are  sufficiently 
air-tight  and  that  there  is  no  risk of 
releasing fire  gases,  in particular  carbon 
monoxide,  into  other parts  of  the  workings 
which  may  be  connected with  the  fire area. 
1.3 If  the  stopping  to  be  opened  is  on  the  return 
side,  particular attention must  be  paid  to 
the  possibility of  releasing CO,  CH4  or 
foul  air. 
1.4 All  operations  must  be  carried out without 
ventilation air. 
1.5  There  must  be  continuous  sampling  and 
evaluation of  the  results  of  analysis  to 
check whether  the  gas  mixture  remains  non-
explosive. 
1.6 For  extinguishing operations,  see  section 
III .I. 
If  the  size of  the  sealed-off area  is  to  be 
reduced,  a  new  explosion-proof  stopping must 
be  erected.  In order  to be  able  to  erect 
this  stopping  under  tolerable climatic 
conditions  and  possibly without wearing 
breathing apparatus,  auxiliary ventilation 
may  have  to  be  provided. 
1.7  For  this  purpose,  an auxiliary stopping 
must  first be  erected  and  sealed  in an 
unventilated  atmosphere.  (Before 
constructing  the  main  stopping,  it should 
be  considered whether  to  erect  several 
successive auxiliary stoppings,  according 
to  the  possible hazards) . 
1.8  The  section of  roadway  thus  recovered must 
then be  ventilated by  an auxiliary  fan  so  as 
to  create suitable air conditions  for  the 
erection of  the  main  stopping. 
1.9  When  starting up  the  auxiliary ventilation, 
it must  be  remembered  that  the  gas  mixture 
becomes  explosive  on dilution with air.  It 
is  therefore essential  to  ensure  that  there 
is  no  source of  ignition in  the workings  to 
be ventilated. 
1.10  In addition,  it is  essential  to  make  certain 
that  the  fan  used  cannot  cause  any  risk of 
ignition. 
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l.ll Before  starting up  the  auxiliary venti-
lation,  all workings  likely  to  be  exposed 
to  the  hazards  of  fire  gases  or  explosions 
must  first be  evacuated  and  access  thereto 
prohibited.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  A 
1.12 Electrical  equiplllent  must  be  cut off  1) 
from  the  power  supply.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  A 
1. 13  In addition,  the ventilation must,  as  far 
as  possible,  be  regulated  so  that  no 
explosive  gas  mixtures  can be  released over 
long  distances.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c'  A 
1.14  For  this  purpose,  the quantity of air 
circulated should,  if necessary,  be 
increased.  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  A 
2)  Opening  on  two  sides  to  establish a 
circulation of  'lir  through  the  fire  area 
2.1  This  method  of opening  automatically 
results  in  the  formation  of  a  through 
air-current in the  open district,  but 
not  necessarily  in other parts of  the 
district.  The  method  can be  used  only 
if  there are  no  remaining  signs  of  fire 
in  the  district.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.2  In addition,  a  period  long  enough  for  I 
the  seat of  the  fire  to  cool  off must 
have  elapsed since  the  estimated  time  I 
of extinction.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.3  If possible,  the  Rescue  Team  should  carry 
out  an  inspection  in an unventilated 
atmosphere.  A  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.4  Failing  this,  the  results of  the  snuffle 
pipe  tests  should  be  used  to  determine  the 
condition of  the  seat of  the  fire.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.5  Furthermore,  it should be  considered  in 
such  cases  whether  the  method  described  in 
section IV .1  might  not  be  preferable  NRP  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.6  In each  case,  it is  essential  to  check 
the  likelihood of  a  recrudescence  of 
the  fire  during ventilation,  by  means 
of  fire  gas  samples.  c  c  c'  ..  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.7  This  applies  particularly  in  the  case  of 
a  much-branched district.  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.8  Before ventilating  the  fire area,  all 
workings  exposed  to  the  hazards  of 
fire  gases  or explosions  of  fire  gases 
or  fire-damp  when  the  stopping  is 
opened  must  be  evacuated.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.9  All  electrical installations  in these 
workings  must  be  cut off from  the  power 
supply.  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.10  On  safety grounds,  it is  advisable  to 
open  the  return stopping first.  NRP  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.11  After  the  Rescue  Team  has  withdrawn  to 
less  dangerous  zones,  the  intake  stopping 
should  be  opened.  NRP  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.12  When  ventilating  the  fire area,  the 
quantity of air and  the  content of 
inflammable  gases  in  the  air-current 
circulating  through  the  fire areas,  and 
in  the  current into  which  it sub seq-
uently  flows,  should  be  checked ..  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1)  Special attention is drawn  to  the  fact  that the  fan  must  be  switched off. Recommendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission 
2.13  The  two  air-currents  should  be  mutually 
adjusted  in such  a  manner  as  to  ensure 
that  no  explosive mixture  of  gases  is 
present over  long distances  after  their 
junction. 
2.14  Access  to  the  fire area  is prohibited 
until it has  been ventilated. 
VII- OPENING  OF  FIRE  AREAS  CONTAINING  EXPLOSIVE  GAS 
MIXTURES 
Sealed-off districts may  not  be  reopened,  either 
on  one  side or  on  two  sides,  if the  presence  of 
explosive  gas  mixtures  behind  the  stoppings  is 
established. 
VIII-OPENING  OF  FLOODED  FIRE  AREAS 
The  composition of .the air in fire areas  flooded 
to  extinguish  the  fire must  be  checked  after 
draining. 
In workings  with solid coal,  allowance  must  be 
made  for  the  increased hazard of  spontaneous 
ignition after drainage. 
Where  fire areas  have  been  isolated by  local 
flooding  instead of  by  stoppings,  the  rules 
mentioned  in section  I  to  V should  be  observed, 
insofar as  applicable,  when  opening  a  district. 
IX  - REMANNING  OF  FIRE  AREAS 
After ventilating a  fire area,  workings  may  not 
be  manned  until  a  Rescue  Team  has  established 
that all workings  are  free  of  noxious  gases. 
If  the  fire  area  is merely  being  reduced  in size, 
workings  free  of noxious  gases  may  be  manned 
only  when  the  remainder  of  the  fire area has 
been sealed-off by  permanent stoppings. 
X - GUIDELINES  FOR  THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  ADVANCE  FIRE 
STOPPINGS  FROM  PLASTER  (doc.  4928/63/2) 
In all  cases where  it is possible  and  advan-
tageous,  the erection of  plaster stoppings  to 
seal off fires  and heatings  is  recommended. 
Is  this process  applied  in practice as  laid  down 
in  the  guidelines  contained  in  the  report? 
Is  the application of  this process prescribed 
by  regulations? 
Is  this process  applied  in practice  in a  manner 
differing  from  the  principles  laid down 
Is  the  application of  this modified process 
prescribed by  regulations? 
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1)  The  construction of advance  stoppings against will be  the subject of new  regulations when  the 
fire-fighting directives are revised. 
2)  The  choice of means  is,  however,  left to  the mine-manager. 
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XI  - USE  FOR  FOAMED  URETHANE 
Opinion  on  the  use  underground  of  foamed 
urethane  in coal  mines  (7th  Report  of  the Mines 
Safety  and  Health Commission,  annex  VI) 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  consid-
ers  it desirable  that  the  producers  of  the 
foamed  urethane plastic  should  further  develop 
the  compound  at present available  in  such  a  way 
that,  while  retaining unchanged  the  positive 
properties which  it now  has,  it satisfies  the 
requirement  set out  in  the Commission's  opinion. 
Are  there  any  regulations  governing  the  use 
underground  of  foamed  urethane  ? 
XII  - PLASTER  STOPPINGS 
Opinion  on  the  construction of plaster stoppings 
using  the  hydromechanical  process  (doc.  3481/ 
3/69);  instructions  for  construction 
(8th Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission,  annex  V) 
Is  this  recently  developed  process  in use  ? 
Is  its use  governed  by  any  regulation  ? 
XIII- FOURTH  REPORT  ON  SPECIFICATIONS  AND  TESTING 
CONDITIONS  RELATING  TO  FIRE-RESISTANT  FLUIDS 
USED  FOR  POWER  TRANSMISSION 
Part II - Specifications  and  test  conditions 
(pp.  19  onwards) 
l. Fire-resistant fluids  for  hydraulic power 
transmission  and  hydraulic  control,  before 
being  used  in mine  workings,  must  be  given 
a  certificate of  approval. 
This  certificate must  indicate  that  the 
product  has  been subjected  to  the  following 
tests: 
a)  Laboratory  tests  (articles  3  - 7) 
aa)  to  determine  criteria of  flammability 
(article 3,  p.22) 
bb)  to  determine  health criteria (art-
icle  4,  p.  23) 
cc)  to  determine  technical  criteria 
(article 5,  p.  23) 
b)  Long-term  tests  during  normal  operations 
(article 8,  p.  27) 
2.  These  tests  are  carried  out  under  an 
authorised  body. 
3.  Authorisation for  use  underground  should  be 
dependent  on presentation of  the  certific-
ate mentioned  in 1.  above. 
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1}  The  use  underground of liquid plastic products requires  the  approval of the  Oberbergamt.  Approval 
has  so  far  only been granted for its use in rock consolidation.  Its use for coating surfaces is 
not permitted. 
2)  For use  only after prior study. 
2) 
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3!  Directives for the  construction of stoppings of 21.4.71  - 18.13.1 II- 1. 
4;  In  the  Charbcnnages  de  France  register,  the Mines  SJ.fety  Corronission  Recorronendations  have  been  taken into account. 
5!  The  question of drawing up  a  new  regulation is being  examined by  the  competent authority. v'  17 
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Article  9  - Withdrawal  of  approval 
At  the  request  of  the  authorised body,  the 
I 
permitting authority  may  withdraw  the  approval 
for  the  fluid  to  be  used  in mine  workings.  c  c  C'  C'E  E  c'  c 
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C.  ELECTRIFICATION 
Recommendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Conmission 
I  RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  ELIMINATION  OF  OIL 
FROM  UNDERGROUND  ELECTRICAL  EQUIPMENT  (1st 
REPORT  OF  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION,  p.  7 
(German  text) 
la)  Resistances  installed underground  should  not 
contain  any  combustible oil.  (Exceptions  are 
allowed  for  the  starting-up resistances of 
large motors  driving water  pumps). 
b)  Condensers  and  transformers  installed 
underground  must  not  cont~n either  com-
bustible oil or dielectric  substances  which 
can  give  off noxious  gases. 
- Otherwise  effective measures  should be 
taken  against  the  dangers  to  workers 
caused  by  the  use  of  these  devices. 
c)  ~itches~nd re~~Y§,  used  underground  and 
operating  on  voltages  below  1,100  V,  must 
not  contain  any  flammable  oils. 
d)  Protection of workers  against  dangers 
involved  in  the  use  of  switches  and  relays, 
which  work  on voltages  above  1,100 V and 
contain  flammable oil. 
2.  Recommendation  to begin detailed  investiga-
tion  into  the  degree  of  increased safety 
which  can be  achieved,  when  prescribing an 
explosion-proof  housing  for  normally 
spark-producing  components  only,  and  a 
design of  the  "increased safety"  type  for 
all  other  equipment. 
3.  Is  the  policy  followed  of  reducing  the  use 
of oil  in  cut-off  devices  by  reason of  the 
potential  dangers  of  explosion and  fire  ? 
4.  Are  new  purchases  restricted  to  apparatus 
using  no  oil or,  if this  is not  possible, 
only  small  quantities  of oil  ? 
II  RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  SHOTFIRING  LEADS 
(2nd  Report  of Hines  Safety Commission,  p.lO) 
1.  Recommendations  for all  shotfiring  leads 
- Every  conductor must  be  provided with at 
least  one  good-quality  insulation. 
- All  connections  must  be  properly  insulated. 
- Every  shotfiring  lead must  have  the 
appropriate  degree  of  flexibility 
- The  conductors  must  be  of  such  cross-
sectional  area  that  they  do  not  occasion 
an  excPssive voltage drop. 
- The  shotfiring  leads  must  be  made  up  and 
laid  so  that  the  risk of  any  fault  current, 
resulting  from  contact with metal  objects, 
is  reduced. 
- Before  any  shotfiring operation in 
particular workings  and  before  the  simul-
taneous  firing of  a  fairly  large  number 
of  shots,  the  ohmic  resistance of  the 
circuit must  be  measured. 
1)  In  haz,y_rdous  zones  only. 
2)  Cannot  be  laid doum  in inspectorate regulations. 
3)  Not  appli~able. 
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4)  Approval  regulations have  been issued for equipment in the  "increased safety" category,  but  the  type of 
protection is ?eft to  the individuel  firms. 
5 1  A  Bl'itish  Standard  for  "increased safety" apparatus  has  been published. 
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a)  Temporar;y:  shotfiring leads 
- Careful  inspection before  each firing.  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
- Regular  and  thorough  testing  by  an  expert 
either at  the  surface or  in an  underground 
workshop.  C'  c  c  c  C'  C' 
A  thorough  checking must  consist of  at least  : 
- a  careful  inspection of  the  lead over its 
whole  length;  C'  c  c  c  c  C'+E 
- measurement  of  the  insulation between  the 
two  conductors,  if the  lead consists of  a 
c  2)  cable  or  rubber-covered  lead;  c  c  c  c  C' 
- measurement  of  the  ohmic  resistance of 
the  lead!  C'  c  c  c  c  c 
b)  Permanent  shotfiring leads 
- Regular  and  thorough  checks  by  an  expert.  c  c  c  c  C'  -
2) 
Written record of  - every  thorough  check, 
A 3)  2) 
with  the  date.  c  c  c  C'  -
2.  Further  recommendations  for  permanent  and 
I 
temporary  shotfiring leads  used  in  gassy 
mines  ---
- The  shotfiring  leads  must  fulfil  conditions 
which  ensure  sufficient safety with 
regard  to  : 
a)  mechanical  strength  and  in particular 
tensile,  bending  and  abrasion strength;  c  c  c  c'  NRP  C+C' 
b)  electrical  insulation;  c  c  c  C'  NRP  C+C' 
c)  impermeability  (to moisture)  of  the  C'+ 
insulation  and  the  sheathing.  c  c  c  C'  NRP  NRP 
Recommendation  that  checking standards 
which  correspond  to  the  conditions  be  laid 
down.  c  c  c  2)  NRP  E 
3.  Supplementary  recommendations  for  permanent 
shotfiring  leads  used  in  gassy  pits 
- Permanent  leads  should  be  so  arranged 
that,  as  far  as  possible,  damage  during 
firing of  the  shots  or  from  other  causes 
2) 
is  avoided.  c'  c  c  C'  C'  -
- If the  shotfiring  lead  consists  of  two 
separate  conductors,  these  should  be 
arranged  sufficiently far  apart 
and  in  such  a  way  that  inspection is 
2) 
possible.  C'  c  c  C'  c'  c 
- In  shafts  and  dipping  roads,  the  leads  must 
have  an  adequate  mechanical  strength.  C'  c  c  c  c  C' 
1)  5afety is ensuPed  by  pPopeP  insulation;  leads  must not  be  used if thePe  is any  visual evidence of 
damage;  to  the  insulation. 
2)  Not  applicable. 
3)  Seems  unneccessaPy  and 1vould  incPease  administPative woPk. 
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III  RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  THE  PROTECTION  OF 
UNDERGROUND  DISTRIBUTION  NETWORKS  AGAINST  THE 
DANGER  OF  CAUSlNG  ELECTRIC  SHOCKS  (2nd  Report 
of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission,  p.l3) 
I.  The  following  recommendations  refer only  to 
the  MT  networks  defined  below;  Medium 
Tension  (MT)  :  the  normal  voltage  range  for 
working  equipment  used  underground with 
three-phase  A.C.  (between  380  and  1,100 V). 
These  networks  should  fulfil all  the  recom-
mendations  set out  below. 
These  recommendations  refer neither  to  the 
HT  networks,  nor  to voltages which  are  lower 
than  the  medium-tension  range  and  are  used 
for particular purposes  (lighting,  drilling 
apparatus,  telephone  installations,  etc.) 
for  which  some  easing of  the  restrictions 
may  be  allowed.  Overhead  wire  networks 
with bare  trolley wires  are  also  excluded. 
II Protection against  the  risk of  electric 
shocks 
A  - First order precautions 
(Protection against  direct  contact with 
a  live phase) 
l.  Every  chance  contact with  a  live phase 
should  be  avoided  as  far  as  possible 
by  laying  the  conductor  out of  the 
workmen's  reach,  by  interposing 
effective barriers,  by  sheathing  the 
phase  or  by  insulating it. 
2.  The  cables  and  leads  used  in medium-
tension underground  networks  should 
be  mechanically protected either by 
means  of  a  metal  armouring  connected 
to  the  pilot  lead,  or  by  a  flexible 
envelope  of  the best possible  design. 
- Leads  without metal  armouring  must 
be  electrically protected by  sepa-
rate or  common  protective screens, 
which  trip safety  devices  in  the 
event of  a  fault. 
3.  Only  trained men  should  be  allowed  to 
open  the  housings  of  accessible  live 
parts  (medium-tension voltage  range) 
and  this  only  under  conditions  which 
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4.  The  repair  and  maintenance  of  the 
electrical  equipment  should  be 
entrusted only  to  trained personnel 
B - Second  order precautions 
(Equipotential  connection  between 
conductive parts of  the  installation) 
l. All  underground  networks  must  be 
provided with an equipotential 
connection  between  the  conductive 
(not  live  in normal  operation) 
components  of  the  installation and 
the  other metal  elements  connected 
thereto,  such  that its conductance 
is  sufficient  to  prevent  the  occur-
rence,  between  any  two  points  acces-
sible  to  a  workman  simultaneously, 
of  a  voltage  higher  than  the  weak 
voltage. 
2.  This  equipotential  connection  (pro-
tective  lead)  must  ensure  electric 
connection between  the  conductive 
c 
c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c  c  c 
c  c  NRP  c Recommendations, assessments  an•d  principles 
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elements  of  the  installation over  the whole 
length of  the  network.  It must  be  main-
tained  in satisfactory condition  and  must 
be  inspected  as  often as  is  necessary  to 
ensure  this. 
3.  The  above-mentioned  equipotential 
connection  (protective  lead)  must  be 
earthed  to  at  least one  point  of  the 
network  via an earth connection of  the 
lowest  possible resistance. 
4.  This  earth connection must  be  combined with 
the  star-point earth connection,  if a  star-
point  is  employed. 
C  - Third  order precautions 
(Reduction of  fault  duration) 
1.  Any  fault  current must  be  considered 
dangerous  in underground  medium-tension 
networks  if, when  the  fault  current  flows 
through  the  protective  lead  and  connected 
conductive  components  of  the  installation 
of  earth,  there  is  produced  between  any 
two  points  accessible  to  a  workman  simul-
taneously  a  voltage  exceeding  the  level  of 
a  weak  voltage,  regardless  of whether it 
occurs  between parts  of  the  installation or 
between  such  parts  and  earth. 
2.  If  the  star-point of  a  network  is  earthed 
via  a  weak  impedance  or without  any 
impedance,  so  that  the  presumed  fault 
current  is  not  restricted  to  a  low value, 
then  the  network  must  be  provided with 
safety  devices  which  can at  any  time  auto-
matically isolate  the  damaged  section of 
the  network  from  the  current source  (or 
render it completely  dead)  before  the  fault 
flowing  through  the  protective  components 
of  the  installation or  earth reach  a 
dangerous  value 
- Since  the  complete  or partial cutting-
off of  a  line voltage  can  have  serious 
effects  on  the  current  supply  to  import-
ant  equipment,  appropriate  preventive 
measures  should be  taken. 
- Only  when  the  line has  been  repaired or 
the  fault  eliminated,  or at  the direction 
of  a  specialist who  has  taken all necess-
ary precautions,  may  that  section of  the 
network  be  brought  under  voltage  again. 
3.  If the  star-point of  a  network  is  insulated 
or earthed via  some  impedance,  which 
restricts  fault  currents  to  a  low  value, 
the  network must  be  fitted with supervising 
devices  which  are  always  in a  state of 
readiness  and  which  are  capable  : 
a)- either of  checking  the  insulation of 
the  various parts of  the  network  and 
of  indicating  any  damage  they  may  have 
suffered or 
- of  automatically  cutting off  the 
damaged  section of  the  network  from 
its source of  current  (or  rendering  the 
entire  network  dead). 
- If  no  automatic  cut-off  device  is in-
stalled,  the  responsibility  for  cutting 
off  should be entrusted  to  an  expert 
who  can  intervene  as  soon  as  the warn-
ing signal  of  the  supervisory  system is 
tripped or if the  fault  assumes  major 
dimensions. 
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- If cutting-off has  been  necessitated by 
one  of  the  two  cases  cited above,  the 
restoration of  current may  be  accepted 
only  after repair of  the  line or 
elimination of  the  fault,  or only  at  the 
direction of  an  expert official,  who 
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has  taken all necessary precautions.  ~--c  ____ ,_  ___  c  ____ +-___  c  ____  +-_N_R_P  __  ~----c_'  __ -i  __  --c ____ t-__  c  ____  ~ 
- If no  automatic  cut-off device  is 
installed,  the  rubber-covered  leads  of 
mobile  machines  should be fitted with 
an  automatic  device which  renders  them 
dead  as  soon  as  there occurs  a  fault 
current which  is  caused by  damage  to 
the  external  armour  or  by  damage  to  the 
insulation of  an  individual  phase, 
b)  - or of  automatically  cutting off  the 
the  damaged  section of  the  network  from 
its source of  current  (or  rendering  the 
entire  network  dead)  as  soon  as  a 
double  faul~ occurs  leading  to  a  danger-
ous  fault  current  in  the  protective 
lead  and  connedted parts  of  the 
installation. 
- In  this  instance,  the  current may  be 
switched  on  again only  after  the  line 
has  been  repaired or  the  fault  elimi-
nated. 
N.B.  The  comments  on  this  Recommendation  are 
given  in  the  Second  Report  of  the  Mines 
Safety Commission,  pp.  15/22. 
IV  - RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  THE  PROTECTION  OF 
UNDERGROUND  ELECTRICAL  NETWORKS  AGAINST  FIRE 
AND  FIREDAMP-EXPLOSION  RISKS  (Doc.  1156/61/4) 
1.  Recommendations  regarding  the  protection of 
underground  electrical  networks  against 
fire  risk  -----
A - First order precautions  - avoidance  of 
fire  risk 
1)  Avoidance  of excessive heating of 
cables  in normal  use  by  providing 
adequate  conductivity.  Avoidance  of 
unforeseen  local  heatings  by  the  use 
of suitable designs  and  by  proper 
supervision. 
2)  Reduce  the possibility of  faults  and 
short-circuits occurring bet\Jeen 
conductors,  or between  conductors  and 
earth,  by  adequate  insulation or 
proper  spacing of  the  conductors. 
B - Second-order precautions  - protection 
against  the  effects of  a  heating or  a 
fault 
1)  Use  of heat-stable  insulations. 
2)  Use  of protective  sheathing  for  equip-
c 
1) 
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ment  and  for  cables,  made  of  flame- C+  C+ 
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2) 
c 
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resistent and  non-propagating material ~--c  ____ ~  ___  c  ____ +-__  c  ___  -+_N_R_P  __  ~~--c_'  __ ~  __  N_R_P  ____  ~  __  c_' __ _, 
- Use  of oil  as  a  non-conductor only 
if no  fire risk for  the  workers  is 
involved. 
3)  Accumulations  of  flammable  or  combus-
tible materials  and  pipelines  for 
combustible  gases  should be  sited 
well  away  from electrical  equipment. 
1)  Not  applicable. 
2)  Not  suitable  for inclusion in regulations. 
c  c  c 
c  c  c 
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NRP 
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c  - Third-order 12recautions  - measures 
re~ardin~ the  network 
1)  Automatic  protection of  networks  I  C+ 
against  abnormal  overloads.  c  c  c  c  c  NRP 
2)  Automatic protection of  networks 
against short-circuit;  these  protec-
tive devices  must  be  capable of 
handling  the  maximum  short-circuit 
I  C+ 
current at their point of installation  c  c  c  NRP  c  NRP 
Selecting  and  regulating of  these 
devices  in relation to  the  minimum 
short-circuit current which  can occur  C+ 
at  the  end  of  the  section  they protect  c  c  c  NRP  C'  NRP 
3)  Steps  to  give  effective protection 
against  low-current faults,  which 
I  might  get past  the  above-named  protec-
tive  devices  and  cause  dangerous  I  C'+ 
1)  l 
heatings.  c  c  c  c  C'  i  NRP 
2.  Recommendations  for  the protection of  under-
ground  electrical  networks  a~ainst firedam12-
explosion risks 
A.  First-order Erecautions  - 12revention of 
I  accumulations cf firedamp 
I 
I)  The  firedamp  content at  the  site of 
the  electrical apparatus  must  be  kept 
within  the  limits prescribed  by  the 
Inspectorate.  c  c  c  c  c  c 
2)  The  ventilation situation must  be 
checked before  any  new  ins tall  a tion or  C'+  extension of electrical  equipment.  c  c  c  c  c' 
NRP 
3)  There  must  be  a  thorough  investigation 
of  the possible  consequences  of  any 
alterations  in working  method,  of 
ventilation or  gas  omission,  which 
might  cause  problems  in the  vicinity 
of electrical  equipment.  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
B.  Second-order 12recautions  - protection 
against  ignition 
l)  In  gassy workings  :  use  of  electrical 
equipment which  is permitted  by  the 
Inspectorate only  under  its own  C+ 
specified conditions.  c  c  c  c  c  NRP 
2)  The  electrical  equipment  must  be 
installed,  used,  supervised  and  main-
tained  in such  a  way  as  to  keep  it  C+ 
flameproof.  c  c  c  c  c  NRP 
All  cables  must  be  of  adequate  C+ 
mechanical  strength.  c  c  c  c  c  NRP 
All  cables  must  be  installed and 
maintained without  damage.  c  c  c  c  c  c 
c.  Third-order 12recautions  - cut  tin~ off  the 
circuit 
1)  Networks  must  be  designed  and  installed 
in such  a  way  that  any  fault  current 
which  may  arise between phase  and  earth 
is  reduced  to  a  low  value or quickly 
C+  cut off.  c  c  c  c  c 
NRP 
1)  Was  earned out in liJorkings  7iJhere  there is a  Pisk of firedamp. 
2)  In such mines llJhere  CR4  is a  hazard~ all apparatus must be  designed to prevent open  sparking and 
must be  so  certified. 
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2)  A  protective relay,  preferable automa-
tic,  must  be  provided  against  between- C'+ 
phase  faults  and  earth faults.  c  c  c  c  c  NRP 
3)  Precautions  must  be  taken  to  avoid 
accidents  when  faults  are  being  sought  CC'+ 
or dealt with.  c  c  c  c  c  NRP 
4)  Protection must  be  given  to  leads with-
out  metallic sheathing,  and  to  those 
which  supply movable  machines,  by  means 
of  individual  or  collective screens 
which  bring  a  protective  device  into  C'+ 
operation if a  fault  occurs.  c  c  c  c  c  NRP 
5)  If the  firedamp  content rises  above  the 
I 
prescribed  limit,  all  the  sections of 
I  the  network  involved must  be  cut off.  c  c  c  c  c  c 
Issuing  instructions  to  maintain  in  I 
operation certain machines  which  I 
provide ventilation.  c  c  c  c  c  I C+C  I 
Restarting  only  when  the  firedamp 
I 
content  has  fallen below  the  permis-
I 
sible value,  and  only  on  the  orders  I  C+ 
of  a  trained person.  c  c  c  c  c  I  NRP 
Supplementary  precautions  for pits  liable  I 
to 
sudden outbursts  of  gas  I 
I 
1.  Risk  of  damage  by  particles  projected  by 
c;n  outburst of  gas 
- The  threatened  zones  in which  projection  NRP 
can occur  should  not  be  electrified.  A  c  c  c 
1)  c  2) 
A 
- The  electrical  equipment  and  cables 
should  be  protected against  heavy  blows.  A  c  c  c  c 
2)  c 
- The  electrical  equipment  should  be  I 
designed  to  give  adequate  robustness.  A  c  c  c  c  2)  I  c 
2.  The  risk of  firedamp  concentrations 
- Increased ventilation  C'  C'  C'  c  c 
2)  c 
- Use  of  remote-indicating methano-meters 
or ventilation-fault detectors  which  can 
cut off  the  threatened  section of  the  C+ 
network.  C'  C'  c 
I 
c  c 
2) 
NRP 
I 
1)  The  use of electricity is forbidden in pits liable  to sudden outbursts of gas~  excepting for  lighting 
and  shot-firing.  Exceptions  can~  however~  be  approved by  the  senior mining engineers  :  when  using 
armoured  cables~  telephone installations and methanometers  in intake airways-provided that no  damage 
is likely to occur as  a  result of a  gas  outburst - and also in main  return airways. 
2)  No  pits liable  to  sudden outbursts of gas.  However~ in pits or parts of mines which  are  considered 
to be  liable  to  sudden  outbursts of gas~  the use  of electricity~  excepting for  lighting purposes 
and portable  lamps~  must be  authorized by  a  senior mining  engineer~  subject  to  the  observance of all 
other  measures~ precautions or restrictions which might be  included in the authorization such as for 
example  the  above-mentioned recommendations. 
3)  Introduced recently in some  individual mines which  are  not necessarily  subject  to  outbursts~ but 
have  high quantities of firedamp. 
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C' 
c 
c 
C' 
E 
3) Reconunendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Conunission 
- Relaxation shoe-firing only after all 
equipment  has  been  switched off. 
3.  - Supplementary  electrical precautions 
a)  Preferable  use  of  a  starpoint earthed 
via  a  strong  impedance,  e.g.  by  means  of 
an  insulation detector. 
b)  Quickest  possible  automatic  protection 
of  the  network  against all  insulation 
faults,  even if formed  by  resistances 
between phase  and  earth. 
V - CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATION  CONCERNING  THE  USE 
OF  EXPLOSION-PROOF ELECTRICAL  APPARATUS  FOR  NOMINAL 
VOLTAGES  ABOVE  1100  VOLTS  (lOth Report  MSHC, 
annex  VIII, June  197:Jl_ 
In  respect of  the  circuit-breakers,  it will  be 
observed  that  the  conclusions  contained  in  the 
Report  of  1964  (see  third  report of  The  Mines 
Safety  and  Healrh  Commission,  annex  VIII,  pages 
391-404)  are  now  out-of-date,  since  considerable 
efforts  have  been made  in all  the  Member  States 
to  eliminate  or  reduce  the quantities  of  oil  used. 
Different  types  of oil-less apoaratus  can  be  I 
found  (using  sulphur hexafluoride,  air or water) 
and  all have  given  satisfaction and  their utiliz-
ation has  made  considerable  advances. 
During  the  reporting period,  the  design of circuit 
breakers  of  the  "increased safety"  category with 
additional  protection of  the  contacts  has  been 
accepted  in different Member  States,  and  the  new 
purchases  of  circuit-breakers  containing  a  large 
quantity of oil  have  been either restricted or 
forbidden. 
In  the  contactors  without oil,  considerable 
progress  has  been  achieved,  particularly as  a 
result of  the  introduction of vacuum-break 
contactors. 
In  these  circumstances,  the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  C01nmiss ion considers  it necessary  to 
recommend  to  the  Member  States  to  continue  their 
policy  of  reducing  the  use  of oil in cut-off 
devices  by  reason  of  the  potential  dangers  of 
explosion  and  fire  resulting  from  the  presence 
of  an  appreciable quantity of oil  in  such  devices. 
Consequently,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Com-
mission recommends that  new  purchases  be  restricted 
to  apparatus  using  no  oil or,  if this  is  not 
possible,  only  small  quantities  of  oil. 
1)  Is  the  policy  followed  of  reducing  the  use  of 
oil  in  cut-off  devices  by  reason of  the 
potential dangers  of  explosion  and  fire  ? 
2)  Are  new  purchases  restricted  to  apparatus 
using  no  oil  or,  if this  is  not  possible, 
only  small  quantities of oil  ? 
v'  25 
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1)  No  pits liable  to  sudden  outbw•sts of gas.  However~  in pits  OP  parts of mine.c;  which  ore  conm:dr::rerJ  to  b.:: 
liable  to  sudden  outbuPsts cf ;NS~  the  use of electricity~  excepting  for  Zi']hting  purposes  ond pm•tahle  lamvs~ 
must  be  author1·zed by  a  sem·or m1·ning  eng·in"er~  eubject  to  the  obsC1'Vance  of aU other  measurr's~  prceaut1:on.3 
or restrictions 1,lh1:ch  might  b.;  included  in  the  authorization  such us  fol'  c;;;ample  the  u.bovc-menU.oned 
l'ccommenda tions. Reconanendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the Mines  Safety and  Health Conanission 
VI  - CABLES  SUPPLYING  MOBILE  MACHINES  AND  THEIR 
ELECTRICAL  PROTECTION 
Recommendations  arising out of  the  "Report 
adopted  by  the  Mines  Safety and Health  Commis-
sion on  20  June  1969  on  the  characteristics  and 
electrical protection of  cables  supplying mobile 
machines  (coal  cutters,  loading machines,  etc.) 
used  underground  in coal  mines  in  the various 
Community  countries"  1) 
(8th Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Corn-
mission,  Annex  IX) 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  recommends 
that electrical  equipment  supplying  current  to 
mobile  machines  should meet  the  following  minimum 
requirements  : 
A.  Power  should  automatically  be  cut  off  cables 
supplying mobile machines  in  the  following 
cases  : 
a)  phase  to  phase  faults 
b)  faults  between phase  and  earth 
c)  faults  between phase  and  polarised  screen 
d)  faults  between  conductor or polarised 
screen and  earth 
e)  breaking  of  the monitoring circuit 
B.  The  electrical  installations  defined  above 
should  be  designed  in such  a  way  that  any 
fault  arising  in  the  cable  cannot  result  in 
unintentional  starting of machines  connected 
to  the  supply. 
C.  CI  or  CB  insulation monitors  and  BS  safety 
blocks  not  automatically monitored  should 
incorporate  a  device  which monitors  their 
operation  and  integrity.  They  should also 
have  a  fault-indicating  device. 
D.  The  BS  safety block  should be  arranged  so 
that  the  supply  cable  cannot  become  live again 
after power  has  been  cut off  due  to  a  fault. 
E.  The  monitoring circuit should  not  give  rise 
to  any  risk of  igniting  firedamp. 
F.  The  earth  conductors  should be  symmetrically 
arranged. 
G.  Finally,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commis-
sion  recommends  that  : 
1.  The  power  to  a  cable  supplying  a  mobile 
machine  should be  cut off when  the  first 
fault  between phase  and  screen  (polarised 
screen or earth conductor)  appears  and, 
v'  26 
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1)  &e  7th Repcrt of the  Mines  Eafety  and  Health  Commission,  Annex  V. 
2)  There  is no  pol2rised screen. 
3)  There  are  precautions additional  to BS. 
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4)  Yes,  but on  condition  that this measure is extended to  the  whole  network  which is practically impossible. 
5)  Before  the  screems. 
6)  Before  the  additional  mass  conductors. 
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2.  In  view  of  the  present  state of  the  art it 
suggests  the  use  of  cables  provided with 
I 
screens  (polarised  screens  or  earth 
conductors)  of  one  of  the  types  described  I 
in annex  V,  page  13  of  the  7th Report  of 
I  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  C'+ 
I 
except  types  A2,  B2,  D2.  c  c  c  NRP  E  I  yes  C' 
3.  These  cables  should be  used  in conjunction  ! 
with  the  following  devices  : 
- protection by  means  of  current intensity 
appropriate  to  the  length  and  cross- C'+  I 
section of  the  cables,  c  c  c  NRP  E  yes  ? 
- a  permanent  insulation monitor  (CI  or  C'+  ! 
CB),  c  c  c  NRP  E  I  yes  C' 
I 
- a  safety block  incorporated  in  the  gate- C'+  I  I 
I 
end  box.  c  c  c  NRP  E  i  yes 
I 
c 
I 
I  I  !  I v'  28 
D.  WINDING  ROPES  AND  SHAFT  GUIDES 
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Nether- United 
lands  Kingdom 
Recommendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  1.1.  1.1.  l.l.  1.1.  l.l.  1.1.  1.1. 
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I  - REPORT  ON  THE  ELECTRO  MAGNETIC  EXAMINATION  OF 
WINDING  ROPE  (doc.  nr.  8470/64/2). 
Steps  taken  to  develop  electro-magnetic  testing  C' 1)  Cl  c I  2)  cl2)  3)  Cl  c I  2) 
methods  and  results obtained.  2) 
I 
II- REPORT  ON  THE  USE  OF  ACCELEROMETERS  TO  TEST 
WINDING  INSTALLATIONS  doc.  3725/l/61,  p.  9 
(German  text). 
Tests  with  accelerometers  should  be  continued 
on  a  large scale.  c I  Cl  - - E  cl  Cl 
Use  of  accelerometers  should  be  extended.  C  1E 4)  E  - - E  Cl  Cl 
·~·~-~ 
1)  Electromagnetic monitoring is required in the  special  case of cables consisting of flat  wi1•es  in 
multiple  layers. 
2)  Trials  to improve  electro-magnetic testing methods  are  underway. 
3)  Electromagnetic  examination of cables is not compulsory. 
4)  The  formulation  of rules regulating acceleration measurements  in cartain  cases  i.e;  being examined. v'  29 
E.  VENTILATION  AND  HINE  GAS 
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Nether- United 
Recommendations, assessments  and  principles 
lands  Kingdom 
by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1974  1974  1974  1974  1974  1974  1974 
I  - PRACTICAL  CONCLUSIONS  ON  THE  APPLICATION  OF  THE 
THEORY  OF  STABILISATION  OF  VENTILATION  (sixth 
report  of  the  mines  safety  and  health  commission  -
Annex  Ill) 
1.  SuEervision of ventilation 
The  supervision of  ventilation in a  mrnrng 
system requires  an overall  view,  and  should 
therefore be  entrusted  to  a  single man  special-
ly  appointed,  having at his  disposal  all  the  1)  A 2)  necessary  means  for  carrying out his  task.  C'  c  C'  c  c  c 
2.  Fundamental  factors  in ventilation 
Apart  from  a  regular  inspection and  analysis  of 
ventilation conditions  in mines,  ventilation  I 
officials  require  to  have  data  on  I 
- the  actual  characteristics of  the  main  and 
3) 
I  auxiliary ventilation fans,  c  c  C'  c'  C'  c  C' 
- the  order  of  magnitude  of  the  aerodynamic  ef- I 
feet  of natural  ventilation in  summer  and  C+ 
winter,  NRP  c  C'  C'  C'  c  C' 
- the potentials  of  the  intersections  (at  least  4)  the  main  ones).  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c  C' 
3.  Additional  representations  of ventilation 
systems 
I 
In order  to  obtain  a  precise picture of  the  i 
overall  structure of ventilation  systems  and  to 
reveal  possible  instabilities, it would  be 
advisable  when  necessary  to  have,  in addition 
to  the  regulation diagrams,  representations  of 
other  types,  such as,  for  example  : 
a)  a  representation of  the  whole  of  the  mine 
workings  in perspective  (isometric or  any  ,5) 
other equivalent  system),  c  c  E  C'  C'  c  c 
b)  a  diagram without  any  topographical  inform- 6)  4)  I  ation.  C'  c'  c'  C'  C'  c  c 
I 
4.  Characteristics  of ventilation 
The  representations mentioned  in conclusion 
No.  3  should  make  available all  the  data 
necessary  for  the  understanding of analysis  of 
ventilation,  particularly  : 
a)  at  the  measuring  points 
- the air quantities  c  c  C'  c  c  c  c 
- the  direction of  the  airflow  c  c  C'  c  c  c  c 
- the  methane  content  c  c  C'  c  c  c  c 
the  c  c  C'  7)  c  c  A 
?)  - temperatures 
- the  pressures  (at least at  the  principal  7) 
intersections)  c  c  E  C'  E  c  A 
1)  In every  colliery with over  500  workers  the  engineer responsible is also assisted by  a  supervisor who  ensures 
application of the  ventilation measures.  In  each  coalfield an  engineer  has  been specially entrusted with 
studying  the  application of the  ventilation stabilisation theory  adopted by  the  Mines  safety and  health commission. 
2)  It is a  statutory duty of the  undermanager  or~  in some  cases~  the manager  of a  mine  to verify the  sufficiency of 
the  ventilation. 
3)  Applies  to recent  ventilators~  but not  to old ones. 
4)  These  are  being carried out. 
5)  Applicable to  some  coalfields~  but not all. 
6)  Carried out by  means  of network plans in ventilation calculations made  by  electronic computers. 
7)  Not  s~stematicallu recorded. V,  30 
F.  HECHANISATION 
Recommendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the Mines  Safety and  Health Commission 
I  - RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  LOCOMOTIVE  EQUIPMENT 
(First Report  of  the  Safety  Commission,  p.20  -
German  text - April  1959) 
1.  New  locomotives  must  be  equipped with  fixed, 
rigid cabins  which at all  times  give  the  driver 
a  clear view  along  the  roadway,  ahead  and 
behind,  without  any  need  for  him  to  put his 
head  out of  the  cabin.  (Fixed  cabins  are 
understood  to  cover  those  forming  a  part of 
the  structure or which  can be  removed  only 
laboriously with  special  tools). 
2.  The  locomotives  in service must  be  modified 
to  meet  this  requirement, 
- locomotiveswhich  cannot  be modified  should 
gradually  be  withdrawn  from  service,  within 
a  period  to  be  fixed  by  the  responsible 
inspectorate,  or 
- only  be  used  in  roadways  which  are wide 
and  high  enough  to  eliminate  accident  risk 
3.  For particular  types  of  locomotive,  or  in 
certain circumstances,  the  responsible  Inspect-
orate  can  grant exceptions  from  the  above 
regulations,  provided  that  safety  regulations 
of  equal  stringency are  laid down 
RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  THE  NEUTRALISATION  OF 
DIESEL-ENGINE  EXHAUST  FUMES  (First Report  of  the 
Safety Commission,  p.  23  - German  text -April 
1959) 
- General  use  of better starters 
- Intensified  research  into  improving  combustion 
by  the  use  of  catalysts 
- Draw  attention  to  the  existence of  this  process 
- Continuation of  the  research  into  an  automatic 
transmission  system,  which  would  make  it pos-
sible  to  give Diesel  engines  a  constant  rpm. 
Subsequent  resumption of  trials with  the 
Houdry  carbon monoxide  purification process. 
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1)  In  the  case of main-road  locomotives~ with  the exception of "a  clear view  behind"~  which is 
difficult technically. 
2)  No  application made  to gateroad  locomotives~  because  the risk of accident is increased. 
3)  For  trolley  locomotives. 
4)  For  other than  trolley  locomotives. 
5)  Not  applicable. 
6)  The  problem of the  low  CO  content of Diesel  engine  exhaust  fumes  is solved by  blocking the 
injection pump  at a  pumping  capacity at which  the  CO  content shows  a  marked rise. 
7)  Not  suitable  for inclusion in regulations. 
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1974 
c 
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A 
A 
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6) 
Nether-
lands 
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G - HEALTH  IN  COAL  MINES  AND  MEDICAL 
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Nether- United 
Reconunendations, assessments  and  principles 
lands  Kingdom 
by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1974  1974  1974  1974  1974  1974  1974 
I  - DUST  CONTROL 
RECOMMENDATION  EMBODYING  DIRECTIVES  OF  SUPPRES-
SING  DUST  CONCENTRATIONS  IN  UNDERGROUND  WORKINGS 
(8th  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety and  Health Com-
mission,  Annex  VI) 
With  due  regard  to  the  basic principles  set out 
and,  in particular,  to  the  need  for  the differ-
ent  dust  control  processes  to  be  combined  to 
suit locally prevailing conditions,  the  dust 
control methods  should be  applied  in accordance 
with  the directives of  the  recommendation,  namely  : 
A.  FACES  ---
1)  Coal  winning 
1.1.  - Seam  injection  c  c  C'  c  E  C'  C' 
- Is  any  attention paid  to  the  degree 
I 
of  efficiency of  the  different pro-
cesses  suggested  ?  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  yes  NRP 
1.2  Spraying  c  c  C'  c  c  C'  C' 
I 
2)  Stowing  I 
I  I 
I 
a)  In  general  : 
I 
2.1.  Prior sprinkling of  the  soil  C'  c  ?  c  I  c  C'  C' 
2. 2.  Prior  sprinkling of  the  site  to  be 
stowed  C'  c  ?  c  C'  C'  C' 
b)  When  hydraulic  stowing  is  employed  :  i 
I 
2. 3.  Specific  consumption of ventilated 
air maintained at  the  lowest possible 
level  C'  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  ? 
2.4.  Use  of soil of  fine mechanical  compo-
s1t1on  and  sufficiently humid  to 
prevent  subsequent  fissuring during 
transport  and  forced  ventilation  C'  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  ? 
2.5  Prevention of air stagnation in  the 
stowage  zone  when  tipping  the  goaf  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  ? 
3)  Caving 
3.1  Seam  injection  c  c  C'  c  E  C'  C' 
3.2 Spraying  c  c  ?  c  C'  C'  C' 
B.  SHAFTS  AND  ROADWAYS 
4)  Drilling of mine  chambers 
(shot  1-..:>les) 
4.1.  Wet  drilling,  dry  dust  extraction  c  c  C'  c  C'+C  C'  NRP 
5)  Shotfiring 
5 .1.  Use  of wet  tamps  or gelatine pastes, 
supplemented  by  previous  sprinkling 
of  the  floor  and  sides  of  the  roadways 
and  the dirt resulting  from  previous 
shots. 
l  c 1)  c  C'  c  c  C'  C' 
5.2.  Use  of water screen where wet  tamps 
cannot  be  used  c 1)  c  E  c  E  C'  C' 
1)  Only  wet  tamps  are  used. v,  32 
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6)  Loading of  excavated material 
6 .1.  Abundant  and  systematic  sprinkling of 
excavated material  C'  c  C'  c  c  C'  c' 
7)  Machine  drivers 
7 .1.  Suitable distribution of  the dust 
extraction  and  ventilation flow  rates 
I  so  as  to  keep  the  dust  against  the 
drivage  front at  the  maximum  distance 
away  from  the  machine  operators  c'  C'  E  c'  c'  - C' 
7. 2.  Purification of  the  dusty air before 
it is diluted in  the  general venti-
lation system  C'  C'  E  - c'  - C' 
8)  Various  rock working  operations 
8 .1.  Use  of  wet mechanical  picks  C'  A  C'  - i  C'  C'  C' 
9)  Various  material  handling operations  I 
9 .1.  Arrangements  for withdrawal,  transfer, 
tipping  and  loading  (e.g.  determining 
I  the  minimum  height  of fall,  ensuring 
that materials  are  completely  tipped  I  out at  loading  and  unloading  points)  C'  c  E  c  c  C'  C' 
9. 2.  Use  of additional  products  ensuring or  I 
maintaining surface wetting  c'  A  E  - c  A 1)  C' 
II - ORGANISATION  OF  SERVICES 
RECOMMENDATION  ON  THE  ORGANISATION  OF  SPECIAL  I 
I 
SERVICES  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  THE  INSPECTION  OF  DUST 
CONDITIONS  IN  UNDERGROUND  WORKINGS  (8th Report 
of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission, 
Annex  VII) 
The  Commission  recommends  the  following  methods 
of operating  : 
1.  The  management  of  each pit shall  appoint  from 
among  its staff a  person who  shall be  respon-
sible for  dust  control  and  is  not directly 
concerned with  production and  output.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  NRP 
2.  The  said  person,  and  any  assistants,  shall be 
responsible  for  dust  control  operations,  any 
improvements  required,  and  dust  sampling.  c  c  C'  c'  C'  C'  NRP 
3.  Dust  is  to  be  sampled  in all working places. 
The  frequency  and  location of  sampling or 
measurement will  depend  on  the  hazards  to 
which  the  men  are  exposed.  The  results  of 
measurements  are  to  be  recorded  in accordance 
with  the  standards  laid  down  in  the  various 
countries  and  made  available  to  the  appro-
priate administrations  and  the  mine's  medica] 
department.  c  c  c  C'  c  c'  NRP 
4.  A department belonging  to  the  company  or 
coalfield shall  assemble  the  results  of 
measurements,  be  responsible  for  training 
persons  in charge  of  dust  control operations 
in each mine,  and  work  out  and  co-ordinate 
instructions  for  use  by  the latter.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  NRP 
1)  spraying is  sufficient~  the  use of additives is not necessary. Recorrunendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Heal.:h  Corrunission 
5.  The  special  services  belonging  to  the 
company  or  coalfield shall  keep  in  touch 
with  the  relevant  technical  and  medical 
departments  so  as  to  take  any  precautions 
needed  for  reducing  inadmissible  dust  con-
centrations  or moving  staff following  the 
results obtained  during  the  periodical 
medical  examinations. 
III - RECOMMENDATIONS  ON  THE  FIXING  OF  CLIMATIC 
LIMITS  (The  unabridged  text  is  reproduced  in 
doc.  3034/ 4/62) 
l.l 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
The  basis  is  the  American  effective  tem-
perature  (
0  eff basic scale). 
Air velocities  above  3  metres/sec  should 
be  considered  as  only  3  metres/sec  in 
determining  the American  effective 
temperature. 
The  temperature  data  must  be  given  so  as 
to  make  possible  a  comparison  on  the 
basis  indicated under  1.1. 
The  climatic  limits  determined  shall  be 
maximum  values. 
More  favourable  climatic values  for  the 
workers  shall  remain unchanged. 
v'  33 
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1974 
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c 
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c 
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Saar 
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c 
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c 
c 
I  c  I 
Belgium 
1.1. 
1974 
no 
C' 
C' 
C' 
France 
1.1. 
1974 
C' 
E  1) 
Italy 
1.1. 
1974 
C' 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
I  I 
i  c  I  - - NRP  I 
Nether-
lands 
1.1. 
1974 
C' 
c 
c 
c 
c 
3) 
United 
Kingdom 
1.1. 
1974 
NRP 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
'1.  l  I  'I 
There will  be  further  investigation intol  I'  1' 
the  effectiveness  and  accuracy  of  the  1  I  _ 3) 
1 
various  climatic  indices.  ~-------~---------+---------~~---------4---N_R_P  ____  ~-------t---c  ____ _, 
2. 
2.2 
Determination of  a  maximum  climatic 
value 
Work  on  location is  forbidden  in working 
places  where  the  temperature  exceeds  32° 
eff A  (basic  scale),  excepting  the  cases 
named  in 2.3  and  2.4. 
2.3  An  exception  can be  made  to  the  ban  on 
working  on  location in  temperatures 
above  32°  eff A  (basic  scale)  if the 
competent authority has  given permission 
and  the workers  in question have  been 
medically  examined. 
In  this  case  the  following  conditions 
must  also  be  fulfilled  : 
2.3.1  The  responsible authority  can  only  issue 
permission for  a  fixed  period  and  for 
given working  operations. 
2.3.2  The  work  must  be  carried out  under 
medical  supervision. 
Guidelines  must  be  worked  out,  in colla-
boration with medical  experts,  covering 
the  medical  examination  envisaged  under 
2. 3. 
2.3.3  Work  must  not  continue  uninterrupted 
for  more  than  one  hour.  A  ~uitable break 
must  then be  arranged  in a  better 
1 climate'. 
c 
c  5) 
c 
c 
c 
c 
I 
c  E  4)  NRP  c  c 
c  A  NRP  c  c 
c  NRP  c  c 
c  6)  NRP  c  c 
NRP  c  c 
c  NRP  c  E 
~-----------------------------------------------------~·--------~~.-----L--------~-------J  ________  _L  ________  L_  _______  ~ 
1 I  CUmcctic  valu<?s  Gilly  have  to  he  detcrmint"d  in  r:ertain  very  exc-eptional  cases. 
:3)  3_, 5  mc--.t-res/s2C:. 
3!  Not  upp Zz:c·ob Ze. 
--1!  Jv,Jrkilzg  points  zJlz,'re  tlw  tf'mperature  reaches  28°  C are  considered as  particularly  hot  (without  this 
being  an  absolute;  maximum  value). 
5)  For mine  re,c;eue  personnel. 
6)  Medica.l  supervision obligatory. v,  34 
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The  duration of  uninterrupted working  time,  as 
well  as  the  duration and  frequency  of  the 
breaks  and  the  climatic  range  in which  this 
break  is spent,  as  also all other necessary 
provisions  are  to  be  laid down  in writing by 
the  competent authority  together with  the  1) 
responsible  doctor before  the  work  begins.  c  c  - - NRP  c  E 
2.3.4 Acclimatised  persons  must  be  chosen.  Persons 
over  40  years  of  age  should  not  be  put  to 
2) 
this work.  c  c  - - NRP  c  E 
Persons  under  21  and  over  45  years  of  age  3) 
must  not  be  put  to  this work.  c  c  - - NRP  c  E 
2.4  An  exception  can  also  be  made  to  the  ban  on 
working  on  location in  temperatures  above 
I 
320 eff A (basic  scale)  if danger  threatens 
or  in  special  circumstances  calling for  c 4)  immediate  action.  c  c  I  C'  NRP  c  E 
In  such  case,  however  : 
I 
2.4.1  The  competent  authority  and  the  responsible 
I  doctor must  be  immediately  informed.  c  c  C'  - NRP  c  E 
2.4.2  This  work  must  be  performed  as  I 
I  I  soon  as  pos- I 
sible under  the  conditions  listed in  2.3 .1  I  I  I 
l  to  2. 3.4.  c  c  C'  C'  NRP  c  E 
3.  Climatic  range  between  32° eff A  and  28°eff  I 
A  (basic  scale)  I 
3.1.1  Only  persons  shown  by  medical  examination  to 
be  suitable  can be  employed  in  this  climatic 
range.  A  C'  - c  NRP  C'  E 
The  medical  examination must  pay  particular 
attention  to  the  heart  and  to  blood circu-
lation.  A  C'  - c  NRP  C'  E 
Persons  continually  employed  in  this  climatic 
range  must  be  examined  medically at least once 
a  year.  A  - - c  NRP  C'  E 
In addition,  the  following  provisions  apply  : 
3.1. 2  As  soon  as  a  working-point  reaches  a  tempera-
ture  above  28°eff A  (basic  scale)  the  compe- 5) 
tent  authority  must  be  informed  in writing.  A  c  - - NRP  c  E 
3.1.  3  The  length  of  stay  in the  climatic range  bet- 6) 
ween  300  and  32°eff A  (basic  scale)  is  re- A  c  - - NRP  c  E 
stricted  to  5  hours,  and  in  the  range  between 
280  and  30°  eff A  (basic  scale)  to  6  hours.  c  c  C'  - NRP  c  E 
3 .1.4 For work  in  a  climatic  range  between  28°  and 
32°  eff A  (basic  scale)  a  method  of payment 
corresponding  to  these  conditions  must  be 
7)  A 7)  applied  to  eliminat~ any  overloading.  A?)  A  - c  NRP  C' 
3 .1. 5  The  provisions  quoted  in  3 .1. 3  and  2.1.4  apply 
to  all persons  who,  during one  shift,  have  to 
work  more  than half  the  time  of  that shift in 
one  of  the  climatic  ranges  mentioned  above.  A  c  - - NRP  C'  E 
---
1)  Laid down  generally in the mine  rescue  plans. 
2)  Only  required for rescue work. 
3)  No  provision made  for excluding persons  below  21  years of age  from  exceptional  hot work. 
4)  ...  ban  on  work  on  location in  excessivelH_hig~ temperatures  ... 
5)  If 300eff A  (basic  scale)  isre-ache-dor-exceeded~  the Mines  Inspectorate must be  informed. 
6)  Six  hours. 
7)  Must  be  arranged by  tariff~  outside the intervention of the Mines  Inspectorate. v,  35 
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IV  - RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  MEDICAL  EXAMINATION 
(Second  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety Commission, 
P·  79) 
1.  Pre-Entry  Medical  Examinations 
- All  applicants  for  employment  at collieries 
should  undergo  a  pre-entry medical  examina-
tion.  c  c  c  c  c 
- This  must  establish  that  the  applicant 
shows  no  symptoms  rendering  him unfit  for 
such  employment.  c  c  c  c  c 
The  pre-entry medical  examination must 
include  : 
- a  general  examination 
- such  special  examination  as  may  be  deemed 
necessary  for  the  purpose.  c  c  c  c  c 
- The  examinations  effected must  include,  as 
regards  the  chest,  a  radiograph or  radio-
photograph  of  format  not  smaller  than  70  X  I 
70  mm.  c  I  c  I  c  c  c 
- The  latter to  be  supplemented  if need  be  by  I 
a  standard-format  (1  :  1)  radiophotograph.  c  I  c  c  c  C' 
- The  nature  of  these  examinations  and  c  1 
I  c  c  c  C' 
- the practical details,  together with  c  I  c  i  c  c  C' 
- the criteria on which  the  doctor  should base 
his  findings,  c  c  c  c  C' 
- should  be  defined by  medical  experts.  c  c  c  c  C' 
- In  the  case  of  recruitment  for  work,  whether 
below or above  ground,  where  the  worker will 
be  exposed  to  a  dust hazard,  the  examination  I 
must  show  a  normal  pulmonary  image.  c  c  c  C'  C' 
- The  concept  of  normal  pulmonary  image  rnus t 
be  defined  by  medical  experts.  c  c  c  C'  C' 
- These  are  to  be  regarded  as  minimum  medical 
recommendations. 
- The  points  concerning  the  number  and  type  of 
examinations  to  be  carried out, 
- the  effecting of  radiological  examinations 
- the  definition of  the  normal  pulmonary  image 
- are  subject  to  review  in  each  country 
- whenever  this  is  felt  to  be  appropriate  in 
the  light of progress  in medical  and  radio-
logical  knowledge 
- working  conditions,  and 
- preventive measures. 
1)  Statutory  regulations  require all persons  under  l8  years  of age  to undergo  such an  examination. 
In practice extensive medical facilities  are  available  to all miners  free  of charge  and  at any 
time. 
Nether- United 
lands  Kingdom 
1.1.  1.1. 
1974  1974 
c  c ,]) 
c  c 
I 
c  c 
c  c' 
I 
c  C' 
c  C' 
c  C' 
c  C' 
c  C' 
c  C' 
c  C' v'  36 
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2.  Special  Examinations 
a)  The  object of special  medical  examinam-
inations  should  be  to  establish - taking 
into  account,  according  to  circumstances, 
the  opinions  of 
- the  training 
- vocational-guidance  and  applied 
psychology  c  c  NRP  C'  E  C'  C' 
- and  other services  concerned  a  worker's 
fitness  for  certain specific occu-
pations.  c  c  NRP  c  c  c  C' 
b)  Such  examinations  are  essential  in  the 
case  of  jobs 
- which,  either in  themselves  or owing 
to  the  conditions  under which  they  are 
performed,  involve  a  special  hazard  to 
the worker  himself or  to  others  as 
regards  health and/or safety.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C' 
- which  involve  special  health or safety 
requirements, 
!  - or which  demand  particular physical 
aptitutes  or characterological 
qualities.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C' 
c)  No  attempt  has  been  made  here  to  list in 
full  the  cases  in which  special  examin-
I 
ations  are  necessary,  this  being left  to 
the  competent  authorities  in  each 
country. 
Examples  include  : 
- winding  enginemen,  c 
- staple pit  enginemen,  NRP 
- motormen  (drivers  of  locomotives, 
mobile  haulers  and  surface vehicles),  NRP 
- workers  assigned  to  hot workings,  NRP 
- all  those  employed  on  cage  handling.  NRP 
3.  Routine  examinations  during  emEloyment 
a)  Periodic health  checks 
- The  object here  is  to  establish whether 
the  subject  is still fit for  duty,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- to  detect  any  symptoms  of  occupational 
disease at  the  earliest possible  stage,  c  c  c  c  C'  c  c 
- where  appropriate  to  help  supervise  the 
subject's health  generally.  c  c  c  c  C'  c  c 
- All  personnel  should  undergo  such 
check-ups  at  intervals.  c  c  c  c  c  c  A 
.J) 
- The  interval  is  fixed  at  two  years.  c  c  c  c 
1)  c 
2)  c  c 
4) 
- The  interval  is  reduced  for  workers 
under  21.  c  c  c  c 3)  c  NRP  - 4) 
1)  The  interval is one  year; 
2)  Article 648  of Inspectorate Regulations provides  for  an  interval of one  year. 
3)  For  workers  under  lB  years. 
4)  Compulsory  for persons  under  lB  years of age  at annual  intervals;  other miners  can  consult their local 
doctors  or an  industrial medical officer. v'  37 
N.R./Wph.  Saar 
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1974  1974 
- The  interval  should be  considered  as  a  1)  maximum  figure.  c  -
This  interval  can also  be  reduced  : 
- if  the  state of health of  a  worker 
indicates  that  such  a  reduction is 
desirable;  c  c 
- in relation  to  the  type  of  work 
performed;  c  c 
t---
- because  of  the  nature  of  the  place at 
which  the work  is  being  done.  c  c 
b)  Medical  examinations  on  specific _occasions 
l.  In  the  case of  reassignment 
- Workers  whom  it is  proposed  to 
assign  to  jobs  involving hazards  not 
previously  taken  into  account  for 
the  man  concerned  should  be  re-
examined.  c  c 
2.  Medical  examination  following  absence 
from  work 
- Where  a  man's  return  to  work  after 
an  illness or accident  involves  risk 
to  the  safety of himself  or others, 
he  may  be  subjected  to  a  special 
examination,  c  c  I 
- the  type  and  extent of which  should 
be  fixed  in  each  case  according  to 
I 
the  circumstances.  c  c  I 
1)  Not  applicab7~. 
2)  Compulsory  for persons  under  l8  years of age  at annual  intervals; 
oth,:;r  miners  can  consult their local  docto'rs  or an  industrial 
medical officer. 
Belgium  France  Italy  Nether- United 
lands  Kingdom 
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c  c  c  c  - 2) 
c  c  E  c  c' 
c  c  E  I  c  C' 
c  c  E  c  C' 
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c  c  E  c  C' 
I 
I  c  I  c  E  C'  C' 
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c  C'  E  C'  C' v'  38 
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Recormnendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Conmtission 
I  - RECOMMENDATIONS  ON  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  AND  SOCIOLO-
GICAL  FACTORS  AFFECTING  SAFETY  (3rd  report of  the 
Mines  Safety Commission,  p.  425) 
1.  Measures  which will make  it possible  for 
workmen  to  recognise  dangers  and  to  carry 
out  their work  in  such  a  way  that  these 
dangers  are  avoided. 
1.1  Recognising dangers 
1.1.1 Before  starting work  in a  district,  a 
section of  a  working or  a  workingpoint  and 
before  any  planned major  change  in  the 
manpower  deployment or  in working  conditions 
it is  important  to  check all  the  safety pre-
cautions  to  meet  any  dangers  to  be  encount-
ered. 
1.1.2 During  the  work,  regular  reports  on  the 
following points must  be  prepared  on  the 
basis  of  the  safety  conditions  which  have 
to  be  observed  under  continuous  super-
vision  : 
a)  changes  in operating conditions 
b)  accidents  or  incidents 
c)  dangerous  situations  encountered  during 
work 
The  data brought  together  in  these  reports 
should be  systematically assessed with  a 
view  to  improving  or adapting  the  safety 
precautions  in force. 
1.1.3 After  the  work  has  been  finished,  the  data 
assembled  on  the basis  of  daily experience 
should be  used  to  prepare  a  report of 
experie-nce  which  should  at least  inclulle 
information 
regarding  the  winning  methods  used, 
the  dangers  which  have  arisen and  the 
precautions  taken  to  deal with  them, 
together with  any  accidents,  incidents  and 
dangerous  situations which  have  occurred 
during  the working  operations. 
1.2  Making  known  the  dangers  to  all concerned 
1.2.1  Before starting work  in a  district,  a 
section of  a  working  or  a  workingpoint or 
in  the  event of  a  major  change  in  the 
operating conditions,  it is  advisable  to 
arrange  a  discussion between  representatives 
of  the  management,  supervisory staff and 
members  of  the  safety services  as well  as 
the workers  concerned or  their representa-
tives,  in order  : 
- to  inform each  individual with  regard  to 
the work  envisaged 
- to  study  in detail  the work  to  be  carried 
out. 
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1)  No  report is drawn  up,  verbal  or written instructions given  to  the personnel  concerned. 
2)  As  regards  the pattern of work  and not actual operations as mentioned in the  text. 
3)  Such  situations are  discussed at management  or supervisor level,  no  report is drawn  up. 
4)  No  report is drawn  up  although account is  taken of experience  gained. 
5)  Not  only when  work  is finished but in any  case either weekly,  monthly or annually. 
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- to  settle upon  the  method  of work 
1.2.2 The  workers  concerned  should  be  informed by 
the  most  appropriate means  of  the method  of 
work  chosen. 
1.2.3 During  the  execution of  the  work,  the  manage 
ment  and  the  supervisory staff should  refer 
to  the  regulations  and  instructions  to  be 
observed  as  often as  necessary  to  counteract 
the effects of habit. 
1.2.4 If it is  considered necessary  to  issue  new 
safety  instructions,  these  should  be brought 
regularly  to  the notice of  every worker 
concerned. 
1.2.5 Reports  made  by  each of  the workmen  regard-
ing  dangerous  situations which  arise during 
the work  should be brought  to  the  notice of 
the  management  staff. 
1.3  Instruction in  the  manner  in which  the work 
is  to  be  carried out without  danger 
1.3.1  Every worker  assigned  to  underground work 
must  be  able  to  show  that he  has  : 
- a  general  training as  an  underground 
worker; 
- a  special  training for  the work  to  which 
he  is  to  be  assigned; 
- the  necessary  additional  training  to  cover 
the  special working  conditions  at  the 
point where  he  will work. 
1.3.2 Should  there be  a  change  in  the work  or in 
the working  conditions,  the  necessary ad-
ditional  training must  be  provided. 
1.3.3 Instruction in safety precautions  is  to  be 
considered  as  an integral part of vocational 
training 
1.4  Supervision  to  check  that safety  regulations 
are  observed  during work 
1.4.1 During  the work,  the  safety conditions  must 
be  subject  to  continual  supervision. 
1.4.2 The  duty  to  see  that  safety  regulations  are 
observed,  and  the  responsibilities  resulting 
from  this  duty,  fall  upon  the management 
and  supervisory  staff. 
1.4.3 The  supervision,  which must  be  exercised 
with authority,  should  in its every-day 
action seek  to  improve  the  training and 
education of  the  workmen  on  the basis of 
daily  experience,  and  should  give rise  to 
fines  or penalties  only  in very  serious  or 
repeated  cases  of  infringement. 
V,  39 
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3)  By  means  of service instructions_ issued by  the management  of the mine,  or of service notes  issued by 
departmental  heads  and  supervisors. 
4)  Convention of the  Joint  National Mines  Commission. 
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2.  Training  the  management  and  supervisory staff 
in the matter of  safety 
2.1  General 
2 .1.1  Steps  must  be  taken  to  ensure  that  the  super-
visory staff does  not  change  posts  frequently  c'  c'  c'  C'  C'  c'  C' 
2.1. 2  The  vocational  training should be  adapted  to 
the particular features  of  the  staff member's 
task  and  his  responsibilities,  and  in parti-
cular  to  the  requirements  of his place  in  the 
C+C' 1)  hierarchy of  management  or supervisory staff.  C'  c  C  r  C+C'  C'  c' 
2 .1.3  The  transition from  one  grade  to  another 
should be  possible for  a  given person only 
after he  has  actually proved  to  have  the  2) 
required  knowledge  and  ski  11.  C'  c  c'  C  r  C r  C  r  C' 
2.2  Guidelines  for  the  vocational  training of  the 
management  or  supervisory staff 
2.2.1  The  management  and  supervisory staff must 
have  an  adequate  knowledge  of  : 
- the  safety  regulations;  c  c  c'  c  C'  c  c 
- the  safety  precautions  to  be  taken;  c  c  c'  c  C r  c  c 
- the  available safety  equipment  and  its 
use;  c  c  c'  c  C'  c  c 
- the  instructions  in force  for  the  different 
I  vocational  groups  whose  work  they  are 
called upon  to  supervise,  and  the  instruc- ! 
tions  for  the  exercise  of activities at 
the working points  for which  they  are 
res  pons ib  1 e.  c  c  c'  c  C'  c  c 
I 
2.2.2  The  management  and  supervisory staff must  be 
able  : 
- to  point out  in a  suitable way  to  the 
workers  under  their orders  the  dangers 
associated with  their work;  C'  c  c'  c  C'  C'  c 
- to  instruct  these  workers  as  to  how  best 
to  carry out  the  work  in order  to  avoid 
these  dangers.  c'  c  c'  C'  C'  C'  c 
2.2.3  The  management  and  supervisory  staff should 
3)  ·1) 
be  trained  in how  to  issue  instructions.  C'  C'  c'  c'  C'  C'  C' 
2.2.4  Special  attention must  be raid  to  the 
continual furthertraining of all management 
and  supervisory staff.  C'  c'  c'  C'  c'  c'  C' 
2.2.5  The  management  and  supervisory staff must 
both  : 
- account  for  and  report  on  the  execution of 
their work,  and  C'  c'  c'  C'  C'  C'  c' 
- account  for  and  report on all  accidents 
and  other notable  incidents which  have 
occurred  during  the working  period at  the 
points  for  which  they  are responsible.  c  c'  c'  C'  c  C'  C' 
2.2.6  The  management  and  supervisory staff must  be 
able  : 
- to  draw  accident  reports  correctly;  c  c'  c' 
5)  c'  C'  C  r  C'  up 
- to  assess  and  use  the  data  in  these  5) 
reports;  c'  c'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- to  study  and  establish  the  causes  of acci-
5) 
dents;  C'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1)  For  the shotfirer. 
2)  By  limited competition in the  E.N.E.L.  (Ente  Nazionale  per  l'Energia Elettrica). 
3)  For  the management  staff.  No  systematic training in management  for other grades. 
4)  This  is not  considered as a  subject  for  training.  Preference is given  to constant supervision of the staff. 
5)  For  the  management  staff.  For  supervision staff in certain cases only. Reconunendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Connnission 
- to work  out  means  to  avoid accidents; 
- to  receive  the  training necessary  to  this 
end. 
2.3  Staff  responsible  for  training 
2.3.1  The  staff responsible  for  the  training 
act1v1t1es  set out  in paragraphs  1.3 and  2 
must  be  numerous  enough  and  must  have  avai-
lable  the  necessary  means  and  time  to  carry 
out  their  task properly. 
2.4.  Drawing  up  of  an  accident  report;  tra1n1ng 
of  staff responsible  for  filling  in such 
reports 
2.4.1  The  accident  report must,  taking  into  account 
all  the  appropriate  human  and  technical 
factors,  give all necessary  information and 
in particular  : 
- the  circumstances,  the  consequences  of  the 
accident,  the  causes, 
- the  precautions  proposed  to  avoid  similar 
accidents. 
2.4.2  Each  of  these  items  of  information referred 
to  in point  2.4.1  must  be  capable  of  formu-
lation as  an  answer  to  a  clear  and  precise 
question. 
2.4.3  The  breakdown  and  layout of  the  form  used 
for  accident  reports  must  clearly  show  which 
questions  have  to  be  answered  by  each of  the 
members  of  the  staff contributing  to  the 
preparation of  the  reports. 
2.4.4  There  must  be  sufficient  room  on  the  form  for 
supplementary  remarks  or  sketches which  may 
be  provided  by  the  person or persons 
concerned. 
2.4.5  Each  of  the  persons  contributing  to  the 
preparation of  the  report must  be  informed 
with  regard  to  : 
- the  importance  of  each  question, 
- the  way  to  provide  correct  answers  to  the 
questions. 
2.4.6  Practical  instruction should be  provided  to 
draw  the  attention of  the  employees  concerned 
to  the  consequences  of omissions,  neglectful 
or unclear  answers  to  the  questions. 
2.4.7  Systematic  attention should be  paid  t0 
ensure  that  the  answers  are  complete, 
accurate  and  precise. 
2.4.8  The  accidents  reports  referred  to  in  this 
chapter  are  to  be  drawn  up  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  accident prevention. 
2.5  Appointment  and  promotion of management or 
supervisory staff 
2.5.1  Care  should be  taken  to  ensure  that  there  is 
available an  adequate  nuober  of  management 
or  supervisory staff possessed of  the 
requisite skills both  in  the  technical  and 
safety  fields. 
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2)  Systematic  training  courses  were  given up  to  1963.  After  1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged and  there:fore 
apprenticeship  and  training m'e  only  provided where  new  machinery  and equipment is introduced. 
3)  The  form  used by  the!  professional mining  organisation does  not comply  entirely with this provision. 
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5)  It is not considered necessary  to  provide  such  tra-t:ning. 
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2.5.2.  The  selection of  this  staff is  the  respon-
sibility of  the  employer,  who  must  at least 
inform  the  competent  authority of  the 
persons  entrusted with  supervision of work-
ing operations,  together with  the  necessary 
data  justifying  the  selection. 
2.5.3  To  ensure  a  selection which  promises 
success,  there  should  be  laid  down  the 
minimum  requirements  for  appointment  to  a 
post  in one  of  these  categories,  either by 
direct  appointment or by  promotion, 
together with  the  certificates  and  other 
documents  which  are  the  necessary  requisite 
for  such  an  appointment. 
2.5.4  The  competent  authority  should be  in a  pos-
ition to  check  the knowledge  and  skills of 
the  management  or  supervisory staff - both 
from  the  human  and  technical  points  of 
view  - should  this  authority consider it 
necessary,  at least  in  the  case  of  a  major 
failure  or  of  repeated  failures  in  the 
performance  of  duties. 
3.  Usefulness  of  psycho-technical examinations 
3.1 
3 .1.1 
3.2 
3.2.1 
3.2.2 
On  assignment 
It is  recommended  that  the  application of  a 
relatively  simple  psycho-technical  examina-
tion upon  assignment  should be developed  as 
far  as  possible,  in order  to  : 
- determine  the  general  intellectual  level 
of  the  candidate; 
- to  exclude  those  candidates  whose  intel-
lectual  level  lies  below  a  pre-determined 
minimum. 
Before  the  exercises  of specific duties 
In every  instance,  the  workmen  who  are  to  be 
made  responsible  for  the  execution of par-
ticular working operations 
- with which  there  is  associated  a  particu-
lar responsibility  in respect of collect-
ive  safety or 
- which  call  for particular intellectual or 
personality characteristics 
should  be  subjected  to  a  special  psycho-
technical  examination  to  determine whether 
they  have  the  capacities  required  for  this 
activity. 
The  competent authority must,  in co-oper-
ation with  the  representatives  of  the 
employers  and  employees,  keep  up  to  date 
the  list of  work  for  which  those  special 
examinations  are  to  be  prescribed  and,  to 
this  end,  should  list the duties  which 
have  been  shown  by  experience  to  call for 
such  tests  and  for  which  such  tests  can 
in practice be  carried out. 
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1)  The  managing  director of the  mine  informs  his chief engineer of the  name  of the  departmental  head in 
charge of technical matters. 
2)  As  regards  the  reasons  for  the  choice. 
3)  Does  not exist in practice. 
4)  The  law  lays  down  a  provision concerning the  academic qualifications of directors  and departmental  heads. 
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5)  Psycho-technical  examinations  are  required for  certain duties  only  (winding-enginemcn~  locomotive drivers). 
Other enterprises  have  these  types of examination  for other duties. 
6)  This  ceased when  recruitment was  discontinued. 
7)  Cf.  2)  on  previous page. 
B)  For  winding-enginemen  and  locomotive  drivers. 
9)  Ceased when  recruitment was  discontinued. v,  43 
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3.3  Before  any  Eromotion of  a  worker  to  a 
suEervisory  Eost 
3.3.1  Before  the  promotion of  any  workman  to  a 
supervisory  post,  a  suitable psycho-
A  1)  A  1)  2) 
technical  examination must  be  carried out.  c  C'  E  C'  A 
3.4  PrinciEles  underlying  the  various  psycho-
technical  examinations 
3.4.1  The  psycho-technical  examinations  listed 
under  3.2 and  3.3  should,  as  far  as 
possible,  aid  the  vocational  specialisation 
of  the worker  in question.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  A 
3.4.2  The  management  must  lay  down  the  criteria 
which  have  to  be  met  by  the  candidate  on 
assignment,  or later,  when  directed  to  c ,3) 
C+ 
special  tasks,  E  C'  C'  C'  C'  A 
and  must  seek  the  advice of  psychologists 
C'3) 
C+ 
when  so  doing.  E  C'  C'  C'  C'  A 
3.4.3  The  psychologist's  assessment will  be  valid 
only  for  a  restricted period  and  must  be 
compared with  the  assessments  of  the 
vocational  behaviour of  the  person  in 
C'3) 
C+ 
c I  2)  question.  E  C'  E  C'  A 
1)  Eligibility  for  promotion within the  supervisor grade  is determined during  the  vocational  training  laid-down  by 
the responsible authorities. 
2)  Where  there was  in fact  a  psychological department. 
3)  Psycho-technical  examinations  are  required for certain duties only  (winding-enginemen3  locomotive  drivers).  Other 
enterprises  have  these  types of examination  for  other duties. Recoonnendations, assessments  and  principles 
by  the Mines  Safety and  Health Coonnission 
II - RECOMMENDATIONS  AS  TO  PRINCIPLES  TO  BE  OBSERVED 
IN  VIEW  OF  THE  POSSIBLE  INFLUENCE  OF  PAYMENT  AT 
PIECE  RATES  ON  SAFETY  IN  COALMINES  (4th  report 
of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission, 
Annex  IV). 
1.  Piecework  arrangements 
1.1  Minimum  age;  medical  examinations 
1.1.1  To  be  assigned  to  piecework,  a  miner  must 
- be  not  less  than  18  years  of  age 
- have  underground  a  medical  examination  to 
establish his  fitness  for  such  work. 
1.1.2 Similar examinations  must  follow  at regular 
intervals. 
1.2  Make-up  of piece  rates 
1.2.1 Written particulars  of  the operations  to 
be  performed must  be  given  to  the men 
concerned,  including  such  information as 
is needed  to  calculate  the  amount  payable 
therefor. 
1.2.2 In  the  interests of  safety,  the  piecework 
arrangement  employed  must  either 
- provide  that operations  of  importance  to 
safety shall  be  paid  on  a  separate basis, 
or 
- contain equivalent financial  safeguards 
for  the proper  execution of  such 
operations. 
1.3  Fixing of  norms  and  of  rates  payable 
therefor 
1.3.1  The  men  must  have  the  right  to  discuss  the 
fixing  of  piecework  norms  and  rates  with 
the  employer. 
1.3.2 If agreement  is  not  reached,  the men  or 
their representatives  must  have  the  right 
to  start conciliation proceedings  under 
4  below. 
1.4  Forms  of piecework 
1.4.1  One-man  piecework  should preferably be 
permitted only  where  the  operations 
concerned  are  not  of  a  nature  to  allow 
any  other  form  of piecework. 
1.5  Determination of  the  norm 
1.5.1  The  norm  must  be  determined  in accordance 
with: 
the  amount  of  time  actually available 
during  a  normal  shift; 
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.3)  Pursuant  to  the  Mining  Regulation and  to  the  provisions relating to  young  workers. 
4)  Periodic  X-ray  examinations  (every  l5 months at most).  Periodic clinical examination  only where  signs 
of pneumoconiosis  are  detected or on medical advice. 
5)  Settled by  collective agreement. 
6)  For  certain  operations~  one-man  piecework is considered by  both sides to the  agreement  as  the  most 
2ppropriate  type of remuneration. 
7)  The  collective agreement  does  not provide  for  conciliation procedures,  although  such procedure exists 
and  the Ministry of Labour  and  Sbcial  Security acts as  an  arbitrator  (whose  decisions  are  not  binding). 
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the  amount  of  work  the  men  can  fairly be 
expected  to  perform during  this  time, 
having  regard  to  the working  conditions; 
the  amount  of  time  required  to  perform  the 
operations  properly. 
1.6  Calculation of  the  end  wage 
1.6.1  The  basis  and  mode  of  calculation must  be 
sufficiently  simple  for  any  worker  to  be 
able  to  work  out  for  himself  the  sum  due  to 
him  for  a  given period. 
1.7  Performance  in piecework 
1.7.1  Regulations  should be  laid down  requiring 
that periodic  checks  be  carried out  on  the 
amounts  of work  performed  for  the  purpose 
of  determining  the wages  payable  therefor. 
and  that  the  findings  be  duly  notified  to 
the  men  concerned. 
1.7.2 Particulars must  be  supplied  to  the  men  of 
all additions  and  deductions  affecting  the 
amount  of  the  end wage,  together with 
details  as  to  how  these were  calculated. 
2.  Changes  in conditions  at  the workplace 
2.1  A piecework  arrangement  may  be  terminated 
or  amended  if the  employer  and  the  men  are 
agreed  that  genuine  difficulties warranting 
this  course have been objectively  found 
to  exist. 
Failing  such  agreement,  the  men  must  have 
the  right  to  ask  nevertheless  that  the 
arrangement  be  terminated  or  amended 
forthwith. 
2.1.1  If  the  men  cannot be  paid at piece  rates 
for  so  long  as  the  difficulties persist, 
they  must  be paid  a  proper wage  appropri-
ate  to  their grade. 
3.  Managerial  and  supervisory  staff 
3.1  In  the  interests of  safety,  extra super-
vision must  be  provided  in workings  where 
men  are  employed  on piecework. 
3.1.1  Since  failure  to  carry out safety operat-
ions  in good  time  can  result  in particular 
hazards,  the  supervisory personnel  must 
give  the  men  strict and  relevant  instruct-
ions  to  this effect,  and  check  regularly 
to  see  that  these  are  carried out. 
3.2.  Payment  of managerial  and  supervisory staff 
3.2.1 Since  managerial  and  supervisory staff are 
responsible not  only  for  the organisation 
and  smooth  running of operations,  but 
also  for  the  safety of  the  men  engaged 
in  them,  they  should  as  a  rule be paid out 
1)  Sett~ed by  co~~ect~ve agreement. 
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on  a  basis  independent of  the  ups  and 
down  of production. 
They  may  be  granted production or output 
bonuses  provided  they  have  at  the  same 
time  a  sufficient financial  incentive  to 
devote  the  necessary  attention to  safety. 
4.  Settlement of  disEutes 
4.1  There  should be  a  conciliation system for 
dealing with  any  disputes  arising between 
management's  and  men's  representatives 
with  regard  to  piecework  arrangements  or 
their  implementation. 
4 .1.1  The  conciliation system  should operate  by 
means  of  a  board on which  employers  and 
workers  are  equally  represented,  and  which 
should  approach  disputes  in  the  light of 
the  present  recommendations. 
4.1.2  The  fact  that  proceedings  of  this  kind  are 
pending must  not  affect  the  terms  of 
employment  of  the  men  concerned, 
who  must  continue  to  be  entitled  to  a  fair 
wage  appropriate  to  their grade. 
1)  Cannot  be  subject of Mines  AuthoPity pPescPiptions. 
2)  Settled by  collective agPeement. 
3)  Systematic  training couPses  WePe  given up  to  l963. 
appPenticeship  and  training aPe  only pPovided when 
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GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  IMPLEMENTATION  BY  ITALY 
It should  be  noted  that,  pursuant  to Article  23  of  the Mining Regulations  in 
force,  the  subject referred  to  above  has  been  included  in the  collective agreements. 
The Italian coalmines,  which  as  is well  known,  are only  worked  in  the  Sulcis 
(Sardinia)  coalfield,  have  been  for  some  time  placed  under  the  control  of  the  "Ente 
Nazionale per  l'Energia Elettrica  (E.N.E.L)",  since  their total production is  intended 
for  the Porto  Vesme  (Cagliari)  thermal  plants.  The  staff in  these  mines  benefit  from 
the  guarantees  given by  the  collective agreement  applicable  to  workers  in  the  electricity 
sector,  which  is  among  the most  favourable  collective agreements  at present  in force  in 
Italy.  In particular,  this  agreement  excludes  piecework  and,  consequently  a  negative 
answer  should  be  given  to  the  questionnaire as  regard  the  application Qf  the  recommen-
dation  concerned  or,  in any  case,  the  latter should be  considered  as  not  complying with 
the  de  facto  situation. 
For  the  sake of  covering all contingencies,  however,  it was  considered advis-
able  to  include  the  rather  improbable possibility of  new  coalmines  being  opened,  which 
are  not  directly  linked with  the  production of electrical  energy,  and  to  answer  the 
questionnaire  on  the basis  of  the  collective agreement  of  13  May  1967  which  is  applicable 
in  the  mining  industry. 
It should  also  be  noted  that,  from  page VIII,  41  onwards  of  the  questionnaire 
concerned,  the  symbol  "C"  and  other  symbols  used  in  the  answer  refer  to  clauses  of  the 
collective agreement mentioned  above  and  not  to  standards  codified in  the  form  of 
legislation or regulations. V,  48 
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Memorandum  on  information necessary  for  the 
examination of  coal-dust  explosions  on  ignitions of 
firedamp  in mines(adopted by  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission,  6.2.73,  lOth Report,  Annex  VII) 
In  this  memorandum  used  by  the mines  inspectors 
when  investigating accidents  ?  yes  c  yes  yes  yes  c  c' INFORMATION  REPORT  ON  PROCEDURES  FOR  NEUTRALIZING  DUST 
USING  SALT  PASTES,  POWDERS  AND  FLAKES 
(Adopted  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  22  January  1974) 
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I.  PREAMBLE 
The  neutralization of  dusts  using  salt pastes,  powders  and  flakes  was  the 
object of  a  study  by  the  Working Party  on Electricity which  started  in 1966. 
With  reference  to  a  provisional  report  by  this  Working Party,  the  Standing 
Committee  instructed  the  Working  Party  on  Flammable  Dusts  to visit Dortmund  in order 
to  gain  an  impression of  experience  obtained  in  this  connection at  the  Tremonia 
esperimental pit and  the  Dortmund  collieries. 
The  Working  Party was  subsequently  advised  of  the  final  report  by  the  Working 
Party  on Electricity,  entitled "Policy  statement  on  the deleterious  effects  of  dust 
binding processes  using  saline pastes  and  powders  upon  electrical plant  underground". 
(Doc.  No  304/2/71)  published  as  Annex  IX  to  the  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission. 
The  report  concludes  that:  In view  of  the  advantages  of  using hygroscopic 
salts  to  prevent  the  propagation of  coal  dust  explosions  the  few  problems  which  they 
cause with electrical equipment  should  not  be  regarded  as  an  obstacle  to  their use. 
There  then fell  to  the  Working  Party  on  Flammable Dusts,  whose  terms  of 
reference  are  quoted  in  the Appendix,  The  task of  examining  the  procedure  from  the 
point  of  view of its efficacy as  a  protection against  dust  explosions. 
Based  on  experience  obtained  in Germany  and  the  Netherlands  - the  only  two 
countries  in  the  Community  using  the  procedure  - the  Working Party  laid  down  in  the 
following  document  the  opportunities  for  applying  the  procedure,  its  sphere  of 
application  and  its limits,  its advantages  and  disadvantages  as  well  as  the  measures 
to  reduce  the  drawbacks. 
In particular  the  report  stresses  the visual  advantages  of  the  procedure  when 
combating  dust  explosions.  However,  it also mentions  the  drawbacks  which consist 
primarily of  the  corrosion of materials. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Comission  shares  the  view of  the  Working  Party 
that  the  process  is  an  effective  one  for  neutralizing  inflammable  dusts  and  an 
additional  method  to  the  presently accepted  ones.  The  Commission  considers  that  the 
process  could  also be  used  in other  countries.  The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission 
therefore  decided  to  circulate  the  report widely  for  the  information of all interested 
parties  and  in particular  to  those  responsible  for  m1n1ng  act1v1t1es.  In addition  the 
Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission will  publish it in its 11th Report. 
Terms  of  reference  (approved  on  23  November  1970) 
In view  of  the  mechanism of  dust  ignition and  flame  propagation,  and  of  the 
various  factors  which  influence  then,  and  the  frequent  presence  of  firedamp  in this 
phenomenon,  the  Working  Party  is  charged with  studying methods  of protection against 
d~st ignition and  explosion,  with  special  reference  to: 
the  neutralization  of  dust  (on  the  spot  dust  control,  stone-dusting,  spraying, 
laying  the  dust  by  means  of  salts and coagulating pastes  etc.);  this  study  includes 
the  comparative  analysis  of  statutory regulations  in the  Community  countries  and  the 
United  Kingdom  as  well  as  regulations  governing  the  application of  the various  proce-
dures; 
- the variously  constructed barriers  to  contain dust  explosions,  mixed  coal dust-
firedamp  explosions  and  firedamp  explosions  proper. 
The  Working Party  may  propose  any  research it considers  necessary  to  further 
knowledge  of  the  phenomena  concerned  and  contribute  to  improved  safety  in this  connection. VI,  7 
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1.  Introduction 
The  Luisenthal  mine  disaster during which  7,200  km  of  galleries were 
affected by  coal  dust  explosions  in spite of  the presence,  at  a  great  number  of 
places,  of  stone  dust  barriers,  wet  zones  and  stonedusted  zunes,  led  to  resumption 
of  the  study  of  problems posed  by  the  risk of  dust  and  of  firedamp  explosions. 
While  explosion barriers  are  supposed  to  quench  a  coal  dust  explosion, 
the  purpose  of  dust-binding procedures  is  to  prevent  the  occurence  and,  if 
necessary,  the  propagation of  an  explosion. 
The  use  of water  as  a  permanent  binding  agent  for  the  coal  dust  is not  a 
very  effective measure,  for  its power  of  combining with  the  dust  is  low;  ~n 
addition,  it evaporates  rapidly  and  must  thus  be  constantly  renewed.  The  result 
may  be  a  great  increase  in  the  humidity  of  the  galleries,  more  rapid  wear  in  the 
coalgetting machinery  and  considerable  inconvenience  to  the  personnel. 
In  tests  conducted  in  Germany,  dust  binding with hygroscopic  salts  proved 
very  effective against  explosions. 
In view  of  the  fact  that  in certain countries,  the  two  methods  are 
approved,  it seems  the  right moment  to  explain  the  advantages  and  disadvantages 
of  this  new  method  of  dust  binding  so  that  the  competent  authorities  may  choose  the 
most  suitable process  for  each  field of  application. 
The  present  document  is based  on: 
1.  Tests  carried  out  at  the  Tremonia  Experimental  Mine,  Dortmund  (tests carried 
out with  financial  assistance  from  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities). 
2.  Practical  experience. 
3.  Information provided  by  the  German,  British and  Dutch  delegations. 
4.  The  laboratory  tests  carr~ed out  by  SILEC  at Montereau  (France) 
(Resistance  of electric cables  to  aqueous  salt solutions  and  pastes). 
2.  Dust  binding procedures 
2.1  Characteristics 
These  procedures  consist  in binding  the  deposited  coal  dust  by  means  of  very 
hygroscopic  saline  substances  so  that  the  dust  is  no  longer  dispersable  and 
can  thus  no  longer participate  in  a  coal  dust  explosion.  The  hygroscopic 
substances  may  be  adjusted  to  given percentages  of  relative humidity  and  will 
then  remain wet  and  active  for  a  fairly  long period.  The  saline  substances 
are  applied  by  means  of  suitable devices  to  the walls,  roofs  and  floors  of 
gate  roads. 
2.2  Pastes 
The  salt pastes  generally  used  in coal  mines  are  based  on either calcium chloride 
or  magnesium chloridt:  these  are  of practically equal  value.  In  view  of  the 
fact  that  these  pastes  hav~ not  a  very  high wetting  power,  one  adds  a  wetting 
agent,  which  greatly  reduces  their surface  tension  and  permanently wets  the 
deposited  dust. 
The  nature  of  the wetting agent  and  the  proportion in which it is  added 
determine  the  effective duration of  the  binding  substances.  The  deposited 
dust  is  bound  only  as  long  as  there  remains  sufficient surface-active  solution 
to  bind  the  dust  that  is  constantly being  produced.  Generally,  the  percentage 
of wetting agent  is  about  1  %. VI,  10 
However,  the  solution and  the wetting agent  do  not  themselves  provide 
sufficiently thick  (2-5  mm)  adhering  layers.  It is  for  this  reason  that  one 
adds  a  supporting  substance  (magnesium hydroxide  for  instance).  1  kg  of  paste 
neutralises  approximately  1  kg  of dust. 
In  the  coal  mines  two  products  have  so  far  given  good  results: 
- Magnesium chloride  paste  consisting of  22%  MgC1
2 
+  1  % wetting agent  + 
12- 14%  supporting substance+ water  (remainder);  and 
- Calcium chloride paste,  consisting of  27  - 29  % Cacl
2 
+  1  % wetting  agent  + 
2%  supporting  substance+ water  (remainder). 
2.3  Powder 
As  well  as  salt pastes  calcium chloride powder  is  being  increasingly  used  for 
dust  binding because  of  the  low  cost  of  transport  and  investment.  It consists 
81  - 85  % CaC1
2 
+  3%  wetting  agent  +  crystallization water.  In  this  case it 
is  the  deposited  dust  that  serves  as  the  support.  This  very  hygroscopic,  very 
fine-grained  powder  absorbs  the water  contained  in the  mine  air and  because 
of  its  large  surface area  changes  into  a  surface-active  solution of  CaC1
2
. 
Its water-absorption capacity  and,  consequently,  its dust-binding  capacity 
depend  on  the  humidity  of  the  mine  air.  1  kg  of  powder  neutralizes  between 
3  and  7  kg  of  dust,  depending  on  the  relative humidity. 
The  dispersability of  this  powder  during application,  which  represented  a  great 
inconvenience  in  the  downwind  workings,  has  been  considerably  reduced  by  the 
addition of  sodium  chloride. 
The  NaCl  also plays  the part of  a  support  and  replaces  the  dust  when  the  latter 
is  absent. 
2.4  Flakes 
For  the  treatment  of  the  floor 
points,  one  often uses  flakes. 
agent  +  crystallization water. 
is  comparable with  that of  the 
3.  Application of  binding  substance 
3.1  Application of paste 
near  the  conveyor  transfer points  and  loading 
These  consist  of  76-78%  CaC1
2 
+  2  % wetting 
The  efficacy of  this coarse-particle  substance 
powder. 
The  paste is brought  to  the  pumping  stations  or  ~s brought  directly  to  the 
point of  application in specially fitted  trucks  (with  lid)  or  in trucks  with 
an  injection device.  At  the point of  use  the  paste  is  spread  on  the  walls  and 
roof  by  means  of  flexible  tubes.  According  to  conditions  one  can  apply  20  to 
80  1/min of paste.  In order  to  regulate  the  speed  of  application,  stop  devices 
(stop  taps  for  instance)  and  nozzles  are provided.  For  a  2  - 3  mm  layer,  one 
uses  2  to  4  kg/m2  paste or,  according  to  the  road  cross-section,  20  to  60  kg/m, 
linear.  According  to  the  equipment  and  the  contours  the  amount  covered 
(including  secondary  operations)  is  about  25  - 100  m  road/man-shift. 
3.2  Application of  powder 
The  powder  is delivered in plastic bags with  jute cover,  weighing  30  kg.  These 
bags  may  be  brought  into  the  galleries  by  the  available  haulage  media  and 
placed at  intervals of  5  to  20  m  according  to  the  dust  incidence  and  the  shape 
of  the  gallery.  For  the first  treatment  one  must  reckon  on  using  about 
2  300  - 500  g/m2;  for  later  treatment  one  reckons  with  about  200  - 300  g/m  ; 
The  powder  is applied  to  the walls  and  roof  by  means  of  ejector  tubes  which VI,  11 
have  a  suction pipe  for  drawing  the  powder  directly  from  the slit bags.  The 
powder  is  then  applied  by  means  of  an antistatic hose  6  m long with ejector 
tube  NW  SO  (nominal  internal diameter  SO  mrn).  The  compressed  air necessary 
for  the  operation of  the ejector must  be  dry;  a  water  separator  is  therefore 
necessary.  The  rate of  application of  the  powder  is  about  100  m gallery/man-
shift,  including subsidiary operations.  In  a  roadway  of  11  m2  cross-section 
S  kg  powder  per  linear metre  are  used. 
3.3  Application of  flakes 
The  flakes  are  delivered  in water-proofed paper  bags,  generally  2S  kg.  In 
view  of  the  fact  that  the  flakes  are  very  hygroscopic,  one  must  be  careful 
to  place  then  in  a  dry  spot.  Transport  to  the  place of use  is by  existing media. 
The  flakes  may  be  distributed by  hand  or  by  means  of  pneumatic  appliances. 
One  uses  about  1  to  4  kg/m2.  Flakes  were  ~sed on  the  floor  after it had  been 
cleaned  of  its accumulated  dust. 
3.4  Frequency  of  treatment 
The  frequency  with which retreatment with salt  takes  place varies 
widely depending  on  the  incidence  of  dust,  but  in general  it is  every 
4  - 6  weeks.  Whether  retreatment  is  necessary  can be  determined  by 
visual  inspection  and  particularly by  blowiag  on  the  dust. 
4.  Protection against  corrosion 
4.1  Protection against corrosion of  machines  and  equipment 
All  the  aforementioned  dust neutralization products  have  a  corrosive effect on 
metals.  One  may  reduce  the  corrosive effects  considerably when  applying  the 
binder; 
(a)  by  avoiding,  if possible,  the  application of  the  product  at places  where 
there  are  machines  or by  covering  the  latter with  a  watertight cover; 
(b)  by  protecting connecting bolts with  grease  or with plastic  hoods  filled ~th 
lubricant;  and 
(c)  by  allowing only  responsible  and  trained personnel  to  apply  the  neutralizing 
products. 
4.2  Protection of  underground electrical installations against corrosion 
4.2.1  On  this  subject  one  may  refer  to  the  following  report: 
"Policy  statement  on  the  deleterious  effects of  dust-binding processes  using 
saline pastes  and  powders  upon electrical plant  underground''  drawn  up  by  the 
Working  Group  "Electricity",  Doc.  No  304/2/71  and  in Annex  IX  of  the  9th report. 
The  report was  adopted  at  the  plenary  session of  the  MSHC  on  29  June  1971. 
Sections  IV  +  V of  this  report are  given below: 
IV.  Measures  to  control deleterious  effects 
The  Working  Party  sets  out  below measures  which may  reduce  these  effects  to  an 
acceptable  minimum.  Electrical appliances  should,  as  far  as  possible,  be 
installed in areas  which  are  not  treated with hygroscopic  salts. 
1.  Measures  concerning electrical appliances 
Casings  and  marker  plates  on  them  should  be  made  of  corrosion resisting material 
or alternatively,  the  surfaces  of  the  casings  should  be  well  protected  by 
galvanizing phosphate  coating or primer. 
Threaus  and  gaskets,and  the  surfaces  of  flame-proofed  appliances,  should  be 
protected by  a  non-corrosive  grease with  a  low  vapour  pressure,  for  example  a 
fluorinated  resin-based grease.  Inlets  for  cables  and  lines  should  be 
effectively sealed using  some  impermeable material. VI,  12 
2.  Measures  concerning  cables  and  leads 
Armouring  should  be  protected  by  galvanizing  and  a.  sui table plastic  should  be 
used  to protect  sheathings.  If the  leads  to mobile  machines  are  exposed  to  the 
effects of  hygroscopic  salts,  it should  be  remembered  that  the  Recommendation 
of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  of  26  Juni  1970  is applicable. 
Automatic  tripping  in  the  event  of  insulation failures  should  be  guaranteed 
immediately  a  fault  occurs. 
3.  Measures  concerning  the  use  of  dust  binders  and  the  maintenance  and 
inspection of electrical plant 
It is advisable  to  provide protective casings  for electrical  appliances,  apart 
from  cables  and  leads,  used  in areas  to  be  treated with  hygroscopic  salts.  The 
direct  spraying of electrical appliances with  hygroscopic  salts  should  be 
avoided. 
Effective  cooperation between  the  electrical  engineering department  and  the 
department  concerned witu  the  use  of  dust  binding processes  is essential. 
Electrical  plant  inspection  should  be  intensified. 
V.  Conclusions 
The  use  of  hygroscopic  salts certainly has  deleterious  effects  on electrical 
equipment  but  these  effects  should  not  be  exaggerated.  They  can  be  controlled 
by  the  following  means: 
1)  use  of electrical equipment  1n perfect condition, 
2)  special  measures  to  protect electrical equipment, 
3)  precautions  to  be  taken during  the  application of  hygroscopic  salts, 
4)  effective  inspection procedures, 
5)  general  use  of  insulation monitors,  which  ensure  automatic  tripping 
immediately  a  fault  occurs  in  the  power  lines  to  mobile  machines, 
6)  good  cooperation between  the electrical engineering department  and  the 
department  concerned with  the  use  of  dust  binding processes. 
4.2.2  The  Working  Party  on  "Inflammable  Dusts"  considered  that  the  advantages  of 
using hygroscopic  salts  to  prevent  the  propagation of  coal  dust  explosions 
outweighed  the  few  problems  which  they  cause  with electrical equipment,  which 
should  therefore not  be  regarded  as  an  obstacle  to  their use. 
5.  Limits  to  the  use  of hygroscopic  salts 
5.1.  General 
There  is  no  formula  offering absolute protection or  remedy  against  coal  dust 
explosions.  Care  must  be  taken  to  avoid  the presence of: 
1.  flammable  mixtures, 
2.  sources  of  combustion, 
3.  coal  dust  to  propagate  the  explosion. 
At  3.: 
Consequently,  as  well  as  the  dust  binding procedures  there  are  other possibi-
lities,  such  as: 
1.  Spreading of  stone  dust,  (1) 
2.  Water  sprays,  for  instance at  loading points  and  conveyor  transfer points, 
fixed  tipping  apparatus,  screening  and  crushing plant, 
3.  Wet  mine  workings  and  humid  areas. 
The  combined  use  of  dust  binding processes  and  processes  based  on  spreading 
(1)  Of course  this does  not refer to  barriers~  which  are  the  subject of other reports. VI~  J3 
stonedust  is  not  advisable  1n  the  same  road  sector. 
In view  of  the  fact  that,  since  1965,  the  dust  binding procedures  have  been 
obligatory  in all  gate  roads,  by  order of  the  mining authorities  in West 
Germany,  (exceptions  to  this  may  be  permitted  by  the  Mining Authority  (1) 
a  considerable  fund  of  experience  has  been  assembled  in  this  field.  This  1s 
also  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that,  in  the  Ruhr  for  example,  the  annual 
consumption  is: 
- 30  000  t  paste  (dust binding  about  1  :  1), 
7  500  t  powder  (binding  5  x  7  500 
4  500  t  flakes. 
37  500  t  dust), 
5.2  Zones  suitable for  application of  this  method 
The  dust  binding method  may  be  used  most  successfully: 
1.  In all gate  roads  with  the  exception of  the  loading points  and  conveyor 
transfer points, 
2.  In other  roads  in  so  far  as  the  dust  incidence  is high  and  where  the 
stonedusting method  is not  used, 
5.3  Less  suitable  zones. 
In  the  following  sectors,  the  dust  binding method  offers  few  or  no  advantages: 
1.  All  shafts. 
2.  The  section of  the  roof  of  a  road  fitted with  a  suspended  monorail 
operating with friction rollers. 
3.  All  roads  with little or very little coal  dust. 
6.  Advantages  and  disadvantages  of  dust  binding  (salt-based process) 
6.1.  Advantages 
We  would  mention  in passing  the  advantages  of  salt pastes  from  the 
health point  of  view,  since  respirable dust  is  also  bound  to  the  floor 
in  the  test conditions. 
Where  the  dust  is  bound  there  is no  risk of  a  coal  dust  explosion.  If an 
explosion is propagated  from  the  face  into  the  roadway,  the  knowledge  gained 
since  the Luisenthal  disaster  shows  that  a  zone  of  limited  length  treated with 
salt  substances  may  be  sufficient  to  extinguish  the  flame. 
If there  is  no  deposit  of  flammable  dust  in  the  roadway,  no  coal  dust  explosion 
can  occur  and  coal  dust  explosions  occurring elsewhere will  be  contained.  The 
dust  binding methods  are  also  easy  to  use.  The  deposited  coal  dust  cannot  -
as  long  as it is  fixed  - attenuate  the  effect of  these methods.  The  problem 
of  stone  dust  agglomeration does  not  arise.  Finally,  additional protection 
against  spontaneous  combustion  and  heating has  also  been  observed,  because 
of  the  fact  that  calciumchloride-based  powder  not  only  ensures  effective 
binding of  the  dust but  likewise  reduces  the  spontaneous  oxidation of  the  coal. 
This  effect is probably  due  to  the  fact  that  the  very  fine  powder  and  the 
solution,  which  gradually  forms,  penetrate  into all  the  cavities  and  fissures 
in  the  coal.  Samples  of  air  taken  from  caved workings  and  roads  closed  by 
stoppings  and  treated with  calcium chloride powder,  have  produced  a  much  lower 
content  of  CO  than  in untreated workings.  A  bank  of  coal  remaining  in place 
in  a  seam  threatened with  fire  has  been worked  round without  incident after 
(1)  See  9th Report of the  Mines  Safety and Health  Commission~ Annex  IX~  page  5 
(middle  of page). VI,  14 
treatment with  calcium chloride powder.  At  present  members  of  the Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Commission  Working  Party on  "Mine  Fires" are  discussing  their 
experiences  regarding  these matters. 
6.2.  Disadvantages 
The  great  disadvantage  of  dust  binding with  hygroscopic  salts is  their  corrosive 
effect.  Naturally all  equipment  present  in  the  gate  roads  treated are  subject 
to  these  effects.  The  risks  to  which  the electrical installations are  exposed 
have  been  dealt with  in Paragraph  4:  Protection against  corrosion. 
In addition,  the  team  entrusted with  the  application of  the  salt pastes  and 
powders  should  wear  special  footwear. 
Finally,  when  salt powders  are  being applied,  one  must  be  careful  to  evacuate 
all  the  personnel  over  a  length of  some  100  m of  road  (this  can vary  according 
to  the  type  of powder),  since  the  powder  may  be  raised  by  the  ventilation with 
undesirable  effects. 
7.  Summary. 
The  dust  binding process  based  on  hygroscopic  salts is  an  effective  technique 
neutralizing  inflammable  dusts  and  is  an  additional  method  to  the  ones 
presently accepted. VI,  15 
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P  R E  F  A C E 
At  its meeting  on  22  January  1974  the  Commission  decided  to  make  this  report 
available  to all  interested bodies,  especially mines,  to  inform  them  of  the  results  of 
research  and  tests with  concentrated  and  wide-action water barriers  in the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany. 
This  report  does  not  explain all  the details  of  the  processes  for  preventing 
dust  explosions,  nor  does  it contain  the  other,  latest processes  in this  field. 
The  state of  research  on  triggered barriers  and  the  use  of  salt pastes  and 
powders  for  binding dust  - also  in Germany  - will  be  published  in separate  reports. 
It is  not  intended  that  this  report  should  give  details  of  the  design  and 
layout  of  water  barriers.  The  documents  listed in  the  bibliography  may  be  obtained 
free  of  charge  from  the  Secretariat of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission. 
It is pointed  out  that  this  report,  to  which  the  Commission wishes  to  draw 
attention on  account  of  its usefulness,  is merely  for  information  and  is not  a  recommen-
dation  since  research  in  this  field  is still continuing. VII,  5 
Water  barriers  for  containing dust  explosions  underground  ~n the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
Protection against  dust  explosions  underground  is  dependent  on  avoiding 
the possibility of  ignition and  making  deposits  of  coaldust  safe.  Explosions  of  dust 
occurring despite  these precautionary measures  should  be  stopped  by  explosion barriers. 
Virtually  the  only  type  of  explosion barrier used  in  the past was  the  stone 
dust  barrier.  It is  true  that water barriers  had  been  known  for  a  considerable  time 
as  well,  but  they  were  only  installed in  a  few  cases.  The  reason  for  this  was  that 
insufficient was  known  about  their effect or  about  the  must  suitable design,  and  the 
necessary  operational  facilities,  in particular water pipes,  were  not  yet  available. 
In  1962  investigations were  started in  the  German  coal  mining  industry,  to: 
(a)  test  the  efficiency of water barriers  and  to  establish whether  or not  they  are  at 
least as  good  as  stone  dust  barriers,  and 
(b) develop  water barriers  for  operational  use. 
The  investigations produced  good  results,  and  the Mining  Authorities~ 
approval  was  granted  for  water  barriers  for  the  first  time  in  1967  (Designs  1* 
and  2*)  and  again  in  1970  (Designs  3  and  4).  Design  3  is mainly  a  conbination  and 
further  development  of Designs  1  and  2.  Thus  nowadays  only  the  concentrated water 
barriers of  Design  3  and  the wide-action water  barriers of Design  4  have  any  practical 
importance. 
Concentrated water barriers  (Design  3) 
The  barriers consist  of water-filled  troughs  arranged  in  groups  (Annex  1). 
The  troughs,  which  are  covered  by  lids,  hang  in or  stand  on  racks  or  on  trough  supports. 
Generally  speaking  troughs  with  a  content  of  90  litres, or  occasionally  40  litres 
are  used. 
A  group  of  troughs  comprises  all  troughs  distributed within  a  section of 
roadway  3  m long.  Depending  on  the  size of  the  crosssection,  the  group  of  troughs  must 
cover  at  least  35%,  50%  or  65%  of  the  roadway  width. 
Several  groups  of  troughs  form  a  concentrated barrier.  The  barriers contain 
at least  200  litres of water  per  square metre  of  roadway  crosssection.  The  amount  of 
water  is at  least  5  litres per  cubic  metre of  roadway  volume  in  the  barrier area. 
The  layout  of  the  barriers  in  the  mine  workings  is based  on  the  knowledge  that 
dust  explosions  can  occur  in  any  roadway  and  at any  point.  Therefore barriers  are 
installed  (Annex  2,  Part a): 
(a) at  distances  of at  least  50  m and  not  more  than  75  m from  roadway  junctions  and 
crossings,  and 
(b) in gate  roads  at distances  of  not  more  than  200  m,  in all other horizontal  and 
sloping  roadways  at distances  of  not  more  than  400  m. 
Wide-action water barriers.  (Design  4) 
The  wide-action water barrier is  a  further  development  of  the  system described 
for  covering  the  whole  of  the  mine  workings  with  a  network  of  explosion barriers.  The 
*  Design  1 
*  Design  2 
standing-type  troughs. 
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wide-action water barriers  are  installed  throughout  the  mine  workings,  in particular 
1n  gateroads  (Annex  2,  Part b). 
Where  this  system is  used,  no  attempt  is made  to  bring  together  several  groups 
of  troughs  to  form  a  barrier and  to  require  a  certain volume  of  water  for  them. 
Instead,  the  groups  of  troughs  are  spaced  at  intervals of  up  to  30  m  from  each  other. 
The  volume  of water  1n  each  group  of  troughs  is at  least  1  litre per  cubic metre  of 
the  roadway  section  up  to  the  next  group  of  troughs. 
The  distance  from  roadway  junctions  and  crossings  to  the  nearest  group  of 
troughs  must  not  be  more  than  30  m.  A  minimum  distance,  as  demanded  in  the  case  of 
concentrated barriers,  is  not  specified. 
In  gate  roads,  the  distance  between  the  point  at  which  the  roadway  passes 
over  into  the  coalface  and  the  nearest  group  of  troughs  should  be  as  small  as  possible 
and  not  more  than  35  m.  It can  be  increased  to  90  m if additional  troughs  with  a 
certain volume  of water  dependent  on  the  actual  distance  and  the  cross-section of  the 
roadway  are  installed in  this  area. 
For  the  rest  the  same  regulations  apply  in particular with  regard  to  the 
groups  of  troughs,  and  the  arrangement  of  the  troughs,  as  for  Design  3. 
Advantages  of water barriers 
Compared  to  stone  dust barriers,  both  the  concentrated  and  the  wide  action 
water barriers  have  various  operational  advantages: 
(a)  The  volume  of  the  extinguisr.ing agent  is  only  about  half.  In  stone  dust barriers, 
400  kilogrammes  of  dust  per  square metre  are  necessary.  The  volume  of water  in 
concentrated water barriers is,  by  contrast,  200  litres per  square  metre. 
(b)  transport  of  the  extinguishing agent  requires  no  additional  expense.  Whilst  dust 
for  dust barriers  n1ust  be  brought  along  in sacks  or silo  trucks,  the  water  can 
nowadays  be  taken  from  the  universally  installed water pipes. 
(c)  the  construction of  the  barriers  is  considerably  less  expensive. 
(d)  the  operational  state can  be  seen  immediately  from  the water  level.  The  maintenance 
involved  is  slight:  water evaporation is  prevented  by  lids  on  the  troughs,  whereas 
dust  absorbs  moisture  in particular and  has  to  be  renewed. 
(e) the possibilities of  adapting  to  the  size  and  shape  of  the  crosssection in question 
are  very  large,  as  the  group  of  troughs  can  comprise  individually  installed  troughs. 
By  comparison  stone  dust  barriers  require  long  dust  racks  with  not  inconsiderable 
headroom  above  the  rack0. 
The  advantages  are  reflected  in  an  appreciable difference  in costs.  The  costs 
for  water barriers  are  estimated at present  to  be  about  30%  lower  than  those  for  stone 
dust  barriers. 
For  this  reason,  water barriers  have  in  recenL  years  largely  superseded  dust 
barriers.  While  as  recently  as  in  1967  stone  dust barriers were  almost  exclusively 
employed,  it is  estimated  that  nowadays  the  ratio of  this  type  of  barrier  to  water 
barriers  is  about  1  :  4. 
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Preamble 
Research  on  triggered barriers  has  been  in progress  for  several  years  1n 
Community  countries with  the  object of providing  a  further  means  of  controlling  the 
coal  dust or  firedamp  explosions  which  can occur  in mines. 
A  triggered barrier consists  of  an  explosion detection device,  which  activates 
an  extinguishing device.  Several  types  of  sensors  have  been  tried,  as  explosions  can 
be  detected  by  an  increase  in pressure,  an  increase  in temperature,  an outburst of  flame 
or air movement.  Several  types  of  extinguishing  systems  have  also  been devised,  using 
inert suppressants,  inhibiting powders  and  water.  The  suppressants  are  dispersed  by  an 
explosive or  by  gas  under  pressure. 
This  research has  been  carried out by  experimental  units  in Belgium,  France, 
Germany  and  Great  Britain,  all working  in close  collaboration.  They  have  coordinated 
their programmes  of work,  compared  ideas  and  results  and  exchanged  equipment  for  tests 
in  the  different  laboratories. 
The  exchange  of  equipment  and  in particular  the  comparison of  test results 
obtained  in  the  different  test galleries  have  created certain difficulties when 
experimental  conditions  have  not  been  exactly  identical,  as  in  the  case of  CERCHAR's 
extinguisher,  when  the  original  equipment  was  not  itself used,  but  reconstructed  from  a 
blue-print. 
The  ma1n  subjects  of  research  have  been: 
- the  functioning  of  the  sensor  systems.  The  reaction  time  and  reliability of  the 
sensors  had  to  be  checked; 
- functioning  of  the  extinguishing  systems.  The  time  taken  to  fill  the  roads  with 
suppressant  has  been  studied  and  the  reliability of  the  systems  evaluated; 
the  efficiency of  triggered barriers  in controlling explosions  under  varying conditions. 
In most  cases  the  optimum positions  of  the  sensor  and  extinguishing  systems  have  to  be 
determined  so  as  to  ensure  that  the  suppressant blanket  is  fully  formed  by  the  time  the 
explosion produces  a  flame.  The  optimum positions  may,  a  priori,  depend  on  the  violence 
of  the  explosion  and  the  shape  of  the working  areas.  Numerous  tests  have  been  and will 
be  necessary  over  a  period of years,  to  define  the  conditions  under which  triggered 
barriers  can  be  used; 
the  hazards  arising  from  inadvertent operation.  It is possible for  a  triggered barrier 
to  be  operated  accidentally  and  for  men  nearby  to  be  injured.  Tests  show  that  the  risk 
is  remote.  Nevertheless  it should  not  be  ignored,  and  work  is still needed  on  this 
problem; 
- "Administration des  Mines  et  des  Houilleres"  surveys.  Surveys  have  been made  to  obtain 
a  picture of  the  conditions  under  which  this  equipment  can be  used  in mines,  and  more 
specifically  to  establish  locations  where  the  use  of  triggered barriers would  be  most 
effective. 
Research  work  to  date  leads  to  the  following  conclusions: 
Triggered barriers  may  be  more  efficient  than  conventional  methods  of  suppressing 
explosions  at certain points  in  the  mine,  such  as  headings,  gallery  and  face  junctions, 
gate  roads,  limits  of  ventilation districts  and  at particular danger points.  There  may 
be  slight differences  in  the  aims  of  research work  in  the various  countries.  These  aims 
were  defined  by  agreement  - to  avoid  duplication of work  - and  determined  for  each  separate VIII,  6 
country  in accordance with  the most  urgent  requirements  there.  Some  countries,  e.g. 
France,  are particularly concerned with perfecting  simple  equipment  for  suppressing 
incipient  explosions;  the  use  of  such  equipment  would,  for  example,  improve  safety  in 
development workings.  Other  countries,  such  as  Germany  and  Great  Britain,  prefer  to 
perfect  more  sophisticated  triggered barriers which  can  be  more  widely  used. 
Lastly,  Belgium  is  developing its own  answer  to  the  problem,  which  is  to  use 
a  continuous  extinguishing device,  to  be  applied  on  special  points  but which  could  also 
be  used  on  a  broader basis.  All  these  investigations  taken  together make  it possible  to 
develop  a  number  of  techniques  applicable  in all countries. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  Working  Party  on  'Flammable Dusts'  ~s 
very  interested  in  this  research work  and  asks  that it should  be  actively pursued.  It 
considers  that  the  use  of full-scale  equipment  underground will  assist its  technological 
development,  on  the  assumption  however,  that  the  other safety  devices  are  retained. 
To  enable  the  technical  staff of  the Mines  and  Inspectorate administrations  to 
form  a  better idea of  the  research work  which  has  been  done,  five  reports  from  the 
testing units  are  appended. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  has  adopted  these  proposals  and  requests: 
- the  Commission  of  the  European  Community  to  continue  to  support  and  actively further 
research  in this  field; 
- the  mining  administrations  and  the  mine  owners  to  use  the  appliances  already  available 
and  to  study  their performance  in actual  practice; 
that  this  report  be  distributed  to all  interested bodies  and  that it be  published  ~n 
its 11th Report.  (Certain parts  of  this  report date  from  1972,  and  have  not  been 
changed  to  expedite publication.  This  updating will  be  done  in  due  course). VIII,  7 
Addendum  1 
Brief  report 
on  the  most  significant results  of  tests  carried 
out by  the Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  TREMONIA  1n  1972  1n  the 
field of  triggered barriers with critical comparisons  and  conclusions VIII~  9 
The  intention behind  the  development  of  triggered barriers was  to  improve  mlne 
safety.  It is  certainly  true  that  triggered barriers  are  capable of  extinguishing 
explosions againstwhich  the  explosion barriers  in use hitherto  are more  or less  ineffect-
ive.  This  applies  in particular  to  very  low-intensity,  deflagrating  explosions  or  even 
for  deflagrations without  pressure.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact must  not  be  overlooked 
that  triggered barriers  complicate  the  safety  system.  Also  the possibility can  not  be 
ruled out  that  explosion barriers  may  even  introduce additional  hazards  into  the  mine. 
The  considerations  involved  in  the  introduction of  triggered barriers  are  thus  not 
exclusively positive,  there  are  also  some  negative aspects,  and  a  critical assessment 
needs  to  be  made  to  determine whether  the  safety  advantage  to  be  achieved  by  the  new  type 
of barrier is  great  enough  to warrant  toleration of  certain disadvantages. 
This  report will  discuss  the  special  advantages  of  triggered barriers,  with 
reference  to  tests  carried out  last year at  the  Tremonia  Experimental  Pit,  along with 
hazards  arising with  the  different methods  of  construction.  The  result will  form  a 
complement  to  the  report  submitted  by  Mr  Roesgen. 
The  advantages  of  triggered barriers  in very  mild,  deflagrating explosions  are 
obvious  and  no  longer  need  to  be  demonstrated  by  tests.  Of  course,  the  following 
consideration is  not without  significance  in  this  connection:  according  to  the  view 
current  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  explosions  may  arise at any  point  in  the mine, 
and  the  most  that  can be  said is  that  there  is  a  greater  probability at particular 
points,  e.g.  in  roadway  drivage  or at T-junctions.  The  aforementioned  advantages  of 
trigger barriers would  accordingly  come  into  their own  if a  trigger barrier were  present 
at  the  site of  an  explosion.  In this  connection,  however,  the  advantage  would  lie in  a 
barrier system which  applies  extinguishing medium  at all  danger  points  in  the  working 
and  not  at  isolated points,  as  in  the  case  of  individual barriers. 
The  extinction of  firedamp  explosions  is  a  special  problem.  According  to  the 
view  which  has  been  accepted  to  date,  neither  traditional  stone-dust nor water-trough 
barriers  are  capable of  extinguishing  the  flame  from  firedamp  explosions.  At  Tremonia 
we  therefore  carried out  some  series  of  tests with various  types  of  triggered barriers 
to  combat  firedamp  explosions.  It has  been  shown  that not  only  the automatic  barrier at 
the  Mine  Association Experimental  Roadway  in Dortmund-Derne  (which  uses  highly  effective 
chemical  extinguishing  powder),  is  capable of  extinguishing firedamp  explosions,  but 
also  the  monitor  developed  by  the  SMRE  in Sheffield  with  the water barrier  (with water 
distribution by  explosives  designed  by  the  Tremonia  Experimental Pit). 
The  tests  concerned  the  deflagration of  CH4  roof  layers;  and  secondly  explosions  of 
homogeneous  mixtures  of  about  7~  % and  about  12  - 13  % CH4.  The  most difficult condition in 
this  connection is  imposed  by  the  last-mentioned.  Although only  flame  propagation speeds  of 
between  300  and  400  m/s  and  pressures  of  a  few  bars  arose,  80  1  of water per  m2  roadway  cross-
section were  required  to  extinguish  these  explosions.  With  the  use  of  extinguishing  powder 
only  one  fifth of  these quantities of extinguishing medium was  required. 
In  the  Tremonia  tests particular emphasis  was  given  to  the  problem of 
extinction tests at special critical points  in  the working,  e.g.  T-junctions  and  roadway 
forks.  It is well-known  that at  these  points  conventional  barriers  have  very  small 
chances  of  success  or  even  none  at all. 
Explosion  tests  at T-junctions  took  place at  the  entrance  to  cross-cut  2  (Qu.2) 
driven in rectangular  form  after  the  manner  of  a  coal  face  into  the  3rd  eastern lateral 
(R3)  (see annex).  Coal  dust  explosions  were  staged here  and  tests were  conducted  in VIII,  10 
which  firedamp  accumulations  were  present  in Qu.  2,  whilst  coaldust was  scattered in R3. 
The  object  in  the  latter instance was  to  prevent  the  spread of  the  firedamp  explosion  to 
the  coaldust.  Both  tasks  could  be  accomplished  by  triggered water barriers using  the 
Tremonia  Experimental  Mine  system,  although  about  four  times  the quantity  of water was 
necessary  for  the  firedamp  explosions,  using  8  water  troughs  (640  1),  as  compared with 
the  pure  coaldust  explosions.  Tests with  extinguishing  powder  could  not  be  carried out 
using  this  arrangement.  It is  hoped  that  they  can be  carried out  in  the  course  of 
this  year. 
Triggered water barriers  also  proved  considerably  superior  to  normal  barriers 
at  the  T-junction entrance of  cross  cut  3  (Qu.  3)  into  the  3rd  eastern lateral.  Whereas 
concentrated barriers at explosion velocities of  400  m/s  upwards  regularly failed  and 
barriers  spaced  at  intervals were  only  able  to  arrest  the  flame  after about  100  m of 
propagation,  triggered barriers were  effective  in all tests with  80  1  water per m2 
roadway  cross-section,  and  to  some  extent contained  the  explosion  flame  within  the 
barrier zone. 
·The  fact  that  the  Tremonia  tests were  carried out under  identical  conditions  on 
all  triggered barriers  in use  in Western  Europe  affords  the possibility of  a  comparative 
examination.  Following  on  from our  report  of  20.1.1972,  we  can  add  the  following: 
A  comparison of  the  threematerials  proposed  as  extinguishing substances:  stone 
dust,  extinguishing  powder  and  water. 
Stone  dust actually only  possesses  disadvantages  compared with water or extin-
guishing  powder,  namely  appreciably  lower  extinction effect,  difficulties  in storage  and 
its higher price by  comparison with water.  Stone  dust  would  therefore probably  not  be 
worth  considering as  an  extinguishing medium  for  triggered barriers. 
The  highly  effective extinguishing  powders  have  the  advantage  over water  that 
smaller quantities  are  required.  They  do,  moreover,  have  a  distinctly better extinguishing 
effect in CH4-explosions.  One  disadvantage which  needs  to  be  singled out  is  that  extin-
guishing  powders  need  storage cylinders  and  that  the price of  the  powder  is  considerably 
1n  excess  of  that of water. 
The  main  advantage  of water  lies  in its abundant  availability in all parts of 
the  pit.  A  disadvantage  is  the  greater space  requirements  due  to  the  greater quantities 
required  for  extinction purposes. 
With  regard  to  distribution methods,  extinguishing  powder  can only  be  sprayed 
from high-pressure  cylinders.  Water,  on  the  other hand,  can  be  both  sprayed  from 
cylinders  and  distributed by  means  of  explosives.  Distribution  from  cylinders  has  the 
advantage  that  there  is  no  danger  from  a  detonator  in  the  event  of  premature  firing. 
High-pressure  cylinders present  a  not  inconsiderable hazard  due  to  the  jet of  extin-
guishing medium  as  it is  expelled. 
An  advantage  of  projection from  cylinders  may  in  some  circumstances  lie in  the 
possibility of  dispensing  the  extinguishing medium  in accurately  determined  doses.  A 
disadvantage  is  undoubtedly  that  the  cylinders  constitute  a  relatively  labour-consuming, 
cumbersome  and  costly  item of  equipment  and  that,  in  the  event  of  failure of  the 
detector,  the  extinguishing medium  is  not  released  and  the barrier is  completely 
ineffective. 
When  water  is  used  as  an extinguishing medium,  distribution can be  achieved 
without  difficulty by  small  amounts  of explosive,  and  this  has  the  advantage  that  the 
whole  system is  easy  and  cheap  to  set up.  Moreover,  the barrier is effective even 
in  the  event  of  failure of  the  triggering  system in  that  the  water,  as  with  a  normal 
barrier,  may  be  left  to  act  under  the  pressure of  the  explosion.  A  disadvantage  is  the 
fact  that  the  use  of  explosives  is  not possible  in every  case  under  existing regulations 
and  that premature  triggering  of  the barrier naturally constitutes  a  certain hazard.  In 
our view,  this  must  not  be  overestimated. VIII,  11 
As  a  result of  consultations which  have  taken place  recently with  the  Mining 
Inspectorate  in Dortmund,  ways  have  been  found  of  bringing  the  triggered barrier 
developed  by  Tremonia  into  conformity with  the  explosives  regulations  in  force. 
The  light detonating  fuse  envisaged by  the  Experimental Pit for  the  distribution of 
extinguishing medium  may  be  regarded  in its present  form  as  a  firedamp-proof  special 
detonator.  Fuse  and  detonator  are sealed  in  a  water-tight plastic tube.  The  complete 
assembly  is  embedded  in  a  water  trough  in such  a  way  that it cannot  be  removed  without 
destruction of  the  trough.  In addition,  the  trough  is  enclosed  in such  a  way  that it 
cannot  be  opened without destruction.  Moreover,  supervision of  the  system by  the  pit 
remote  control  centre  is  envisaged. 
Future prospects 
According  to  the  present state of  our  knowledge  we  can  say  that  triggered 
barriers will very  probably  not  give  general  protection against  explosions.  For 
explosions  occurring  in longer  roadways,  in which  there  is  ample  room  for  the  extinction 
of  the  explosion,  barriers  spaced  at intervals  probably constitute an  equally  good  and 
probably  even better explosion protection  than  individual  triggered barriers  set up  in 
the  roadway.  In all  cases,  however,  in which  it is  important  to  stop  mine  explosions  at 
a  determined point  or  in  a  narrow  or  restricted  roadway  section,  the  triggered barrier 
has  a  genuine  chance  of  increasing explosion safety  in underground  workings.  We  think 
here  in particular of  safety at T-junctions  and  of  explosion protection in relatively 
short  connecting  roadways  between air intake  and  air return  roadways. 
It would  thus  be  a  mistake  to  expect  a  revolution  in explosion protection 
underground  from  the  triggered barrier.  On  the  other hand,  it is  important  and 
interesting enough  to  justify further  intensive  research  and  development  work  at  the 
institutes  concerned with  this question.  Therefore it is  to  be  hoped  that  the  follow-up 
research projects  in respect  of which  the  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft has  applied  to  the 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  for  aid  to  facilitate  the  further  development 
and  testing of  trigger barriers will  receive  early approval. I 
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Addendum  2 
Possible  applications  of  triggered  explosions barriers VIII,  15 
1.  Preliminary  Remarks 
The  Special  Committee  for Mine  Safety of  the  Steinkohlenbergbauverein 
(Fachausschuss  Betriebssicherheit beim Steinkohlenbergbauverein)  at  the  beginning of 
1971  considered it necessary  - after a  lecture by  Dr  Steffenhagen on  the  state of  devel-
opment  ~f  triggered explosion barriers  - to  obtain clear  information  regarding  the  true 
possibilities of  using  these barriers;  this  information  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  and  a 
guide  to  further work.  The  special  committee  therefore  entrusted  the  task  to  a  small 
group,  comprising  representatives  of  the Versuchsstrecke,  of  the  Versuchsgrube,  several 
mining  companies  and  the  Steinkohlenbergbauverein,  requesting  them  to  determine  the 
possible applications  of  triggered explosion barriers. 
The  working  party has  produced  the  attached Tables  1  and  2  as  the  fruits  of  its 
work.  The  present  document  provides  explanatory notes. 
As  a  preliminary,  it should  be  stated that  the working  group  considered  (and 
therefore  included  in  the  attached Tables)  only  those  triggered barriers  intended  to 
provide protection across  the  entire cross-section of  the mine workings  where  they  are 
installed,  i.e.  types  which  can be  compared  in action with  the  conventional  types  of 
explosion barriers;  these  conventional  types  have  also been  included  in the  two  Tables 
for  purposes  of  comparison,  in each  Table  in columns  I,  II  and  III. 
On  the  other hand,  the working  group  did not  consider  devices  which  serve 
simply  to  suppress  local  ignitions  of  coaldust or CH4.  Devices  of  this  kind  are  known 
from  countries  abroad,  e.g.  for  use  on coal-cutters or roadway-heading machines,  but 
cannot  be  compared with  the  conventional  explosion barriers  known  here. 
Table  1:  Survey  of  triggered explosion barriers  (as  at March  1972) 
To  clarify  the  possible applications  of  triggered barriers it was  in  the  first 
place  necessary  to  list the  technical  and  other characteristics which  needed  to  be  taken 
into  account.  This  resulted  in drawing  up  Table  1,  the  'Survey of  triggered  explosion 
barriers',  showing  the  position as  at March  1972. 
As  already  pointed out,  the  first  three  columns  (I,  II  and  III)  show  for purposes 
of  comparison  the  conventional barriers,  while  columns  1  to  6  show  the  various types  of 
triggered barriers.  In detail,  the  types  listed are as  follows: 
Design  1: 
The  barrier developed  by  the Versuchsstrecke  together with  the  Total  company, 
using quenching  powder,  contained  in pressure bottles  and  distributed by  fan  jets. 
Design  2: 
The  so-called  'Bergbau-Gene~ator'  developed  by  the  Versuchsstrecke  which  also 
works  with quenching  powder.  This  is  contained in a  special vessel  200  mm  in diameter, 
and  discharged by  a  fan  jet by  means  of  a  propellant. 
Design  3: 
This  barrier was  developed  by  Cerchar.  It consists  of  containers  for  stone-
dust  in which  is  laid  a  detonating cord. 
Design  5: 
This  design  is  a  variant of  the water-thrower,  which  is only  in  the  design  stage: 
the  pressure bottles  contain a  quenching  medium,  instead of water,  and  this  medium  is 
discharged  through  fan  jets rather  than  through  3"  tubes. VIII,  16 
Design  6: 
This  type  of  triggered barrier was  developed  by  the Versuchsgrube  and  tested 
by  them.  It derives  from  the  conventional water  trough barrier:  the  individual 
troughs  contain detonating  cords  which  serve  to  distribute  the water. 
The  essential  common  features  of  these  six designs  of  triggered barriers  are: 
- a  detector or detector  system reacting  to  the  approaching  explosion,  and 
- the  fact  that  the  distribution of  the  quenching  medium  is initiated by  this  system at 
the  appropriate  level. 
The  characteristic differences  between  the  six designs  of  triggered  explosion 
barriers  are  - like  the  corresponding  features  of  the  conventional  barriers  - set out 
in  lines  a  to  k  of Table  1. 
Before  elucidating  these details  individually, it should  as  a  precautionary 
measure  be  pointed  out  that  they  are  not  in all  cases  definitive or  fully  reliable,  and 
that it is  much  more  likely that corrections will  be  found  necessary  during  further 
development  work. 
2.1  Line  a:  Detector  system 
By  detector  system we  must  understand  a  combination of various  types  of 
detectors.  It has  been  found  necessary  to  use  such  combinations  to  compensate  for  the 
disadvantages  associated with  the  individual  types  of  detector,  e.g.  in respect  of 
selectivity or  delay  time. 
It must  be  emphasized  that  the  detector  systems  currently  in use  as  listed in 
Table  1  are  not  to  be  considered  as  finalized,  and  that all  these  systems  are still very 
much  1n  the  development  or  trial  stage. 
2.2  Lines  b,  c,  d:  Quenching  mechanisms 
The  various  design  forms  of  triggered  explosion barriers  use  either chemical 
quenching  substances  - e.g.  ammonium  phosphate  - or  stone-dust  or water. 
These  quenching  media  are  stored  in pressure bottles  in designs  1,  4  and  5. 
Here  nitrogen is  used  as  the  propellant;  in design at  a  pressure of  120  bars,  and  in 
designs  4  and  5  at a  pressure of  20  bars. 
In  the  Bergbau-Generator  (design  2)  the  quenching  medium  is stored at 
atmospheric  pressure  in its container.  It is expelled by  means  of  a  rocket propellant, 
at  a  constant  pressure over  a  period of  60  ms. 
2.3  Line  e:  Total  length of  structures 
Included  under  the  total  length of  structures of  a  triggered barrier is  the 
zone  in which  the  quenching-medium containers  and  the detectors  are  installed.  By  reason 
of  the  inevitable delay  time,  the detectors  must  of necessity be  installed at fixed 
minimum  or  maximum  distances  from  the quenching-medium  containers.  If  these  distances  are 
chosen  in  respect of action against  CH4  explosions,  they  can be  kept  constant.  However, 
they  will  then be over-dimensioned  in respect of coal-dust  explosions. 
In design  1,  it is necessary  to  maintain specified distances  not  only  between 
the  quenching-medium  containers  and  the  infra-red detector,  but also  between  the  latter 
and  the  'upstream'  thermoelement.  This  consequently  involves  a  total  length of  structures 
of  some  60  m. 
In designs  4  and  5,  the pressure detectors  and  the  'downstream'  infra-red 
detector  can  be  installed at  the  same  point.  It is  not  necessary  for  them  to  be  separated 
by  any  distance;  the  sequence  of  their action is  achieved  much  more  by  the  time  lag VIII,  17 
between  the  pressure wave  and  the  tip of  the  flame.  Consequently,  the overall  length of 
structures of  this  design is not more  than  50  m. 
2.4  Line  f:  Layout  of quenching-medium  containers 
It is  clear  that  the  special  quenching-medium containers  used with  designs, 
l,  2,  4  and  5  occupy  a  not inconsiderable space.  Where  the barriers  are set up  stationary 
at sites  in  roadways  etc.,  the  numerous  relatively  small  bottles  for  design  l  can be  set 
along  the  circumference of  the  roadway,  while  the  large quenching-medium containers  for 
designs  2,  4  and  5  are preferably  located in niches,  but  such possibilities cannot  be 
used  at other sites,  e.g.  in  the  face,  etc. 
For  design  3  and  6,  the  containers  for  the  quenching-medium  can be  set  up  in 
a  manner  similar  to  that  for  conventional barriers;  they must  be  located  in  the upper 
part of  the  roadway  cross-section,  and  in such  a  manner  that  they  are  freely  suspended 
in  the  cross-section and  not  appreciably hindered  by  fittings  etc. 
2.5  Lines  g  and  h:  Power  supply  and  special  requirements 
It is  inherent  in  the  nature of  triggered  explosion barriers  that all  designs 
require  a  supply  of  energy.  The  most  suitable  form  of  energy  transmission,  and  in 
particular  the  arrangement  of  necessary  leads  and  adequate protection  thereof,  is not yet 
finally  fixed,  but it is  hardly  to  be expected  that  there will  be  any  essential differences 
between  the  various  designs  of  barriers.  It will  also  be  necessary  in  the  future  to 
investigate whether  and,  if necessary,  how  triggering off  the barriers  can be  achieved 
without  the  use  of wires,  i.e.  by  a  radio  system. 
It is  already possible  to  see  that all designs  of  triggered  explosion barrier 
must  be  subject  to  certain standard  requirements.  These  in particular cover  such  points 
as:  maintaining  the  detectors  continuously  free  and  in operational  readiness,  as  well 
as  ensuring  that  the  entire  roadway  cross-section is  covered  both by  the  detectors  and 
by  the  discharged  quenching  medium.  In  addition,  it is necessary  to  envisage  the 
installation of  a  battery as  an  emergency  supply  if the mains  current fails.  The  opera-
tional  readiness  of  the  detectors  can be  determined  by  checking  their starting circuits 
or amplifier  circuits by  means  of  test equipment. 
As  far  as  maintenance  requirements  are  concerned,  experience  ~s  available only 
withthe pressure bottles  such  as  are used  in design 1.  This  experience- obtained  in 
surface  trials - shows  that  a  basic  inspection once per year  should  be  adequate. 
Design  6  has  hitherto  made  use  of  the  conventional  trough  found  in water-trough 
barriers.  It is  however  advisable  to  consider developing,  sooner or later,  containers 
which  considerably  reduce  the  maintenance  requirement,  and  in particular ensuring 
protection of  the  explosive  cord  against  the  action of  the waters. 
2.6  Lines  i  and  k:  Costs  and  range  of  effect 
The  costs  given  in Table  1  for  triggered  explosion barriers  are based  solely 
on  estimates  and  in  consequence  can  only  give  a  guide  to  the  actuel  level  of  costs. 
Economies  would  be  possible  by  manufacturing  in series,  but  are  not  likely  to  be  very 
large. 
Fundamentally,  all designs  of  triggered barriers are  - in  the  nature  of  things  -
dearer  than  the  conventional  barriers,  and  the  estimated costs  are  at present considerably 
higher  than  the  costs  incurred  in actual  fact  for  such  conventional barriers.  As  against 
this, it is however  true  that  the  triggered barriers  currently have  a  considerably better 
range  of effect  than  the  conventional barriers.  However,  the  efficacity of barriers  1 
and  2  could still be  considerably  increased,  if the  quenching  medium  (ammonium  phosphate) 
used  hitherto were  replaced by  a  better material. 3. 
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Table  2:  Survey  of  the possibilities of  application of  triggered  explosion 
barriers  (as  at March  1972) 
Starting from  the  technical  and  other characteristics  enumerated  in Table  1 
and briefly explained  in the  foregoing  remarks,  an  assessment  was  made  of  the possi-
bilities of application of  triggered  explosion barriers.  Table  2  therefore contains  -
like Table  1  - three  columns  (I, II  and  III)  listing the  conventional  barriers  and  the 
subsequent  six  columns  (1  to  6)  listing  the  connedted  designs  of  triggered  explosion 
barriers. 
Lines  A  to  G present  a  total  of  seven  zones  of application.  These  zones  are 
grouped  according  to  the  different degree of risk and  the different operating conditions 
which  they  involve.  This  classification does  lean  towards  the  current  German  mines 
inspectorate  regulations,  but must  not  be  treated  as  equivalent  to  the classification 
contained  therein. 
The  working  group  based its assessment  on  the possibilities of  application on 
this  classification system of  designs  and  zones  of application,  as  presented  in Table  2. 
Three  criteria of  assessment  were  applied,  namely: 
- desirable  from  the  safety angle, 
- technically  achievable, 
- economically  justifiable. 
The  first essential  result of  this  assessment  is  that design  3  cannot  be  said 
to  have  any  practical possibilities of  application.  This  design is,  in fact,  intended 
for  sealing-off heading  faces.  In addition,  as  compared with  the  other designs,  it has 
a  very  restricted  range  of  effect.  It therefore  seems  impossible  to  recommend  its use. 
The  remainder  of  the  discussion  can  therefore be  concentrated on  designs  1, 
2,  4  and  6;  these  remarks  will  for  simplicity's  sake  be  given under  each  of  the  separate 
headings  for  the  different  zones  of  use. 
3.1  Line  A:  Face 
According  to  the  current  regulations  in  the  German  mining  industry  - and  with 
the  means  available  today  - it is virtually  impossible  to  protect  the  fact  against  the 
provocation of  explosions.  It  ~s  in fact  not  possible  to  apply either measures  to 
render  the  coal-dust harmless,  or  to  install conventional  explosion barriers.  Moreover, 
we  are  dealing with  an  area  extending  for  some  300  m,  especially if we  include  - in 
addition  to  the  actual  face  length,  which  is  generally about  200  m - the  unprotected or 
insufficiently protected vicinity of  the  T-junctions;  in this  entire area  there  is  no 
protection against  propagation of  coal-dust  explosions.  The  very  high possibility of  there 
being both  ignitable material  and  a  source of ignition in this  region must  be  assigned  to 
this  region  in  comparison with others. 
For  these  reasons  the  working  group  examined  the possibilities of  using 
triggered  explosion barriers  in  the  face  area.  As  box  Al  shows,  the  group  decided  that 
it was  desirable  from  the  safety angle.  However,  there  are  at present still such  large 
technical  difficulties  in  the  way  of  this  that it appears  impracticable at  the present 
time.  Above  all, it is  not  possible  to  see  how  one  could  accomodate  the  requisite  large 
number  of bottles  for design 1,  or  the  requisite  large quenching-medium containers  for 
designs  2  and  4  in  the  confined  face  area.  At  the present moment  it seems  even  less 
likely  that  the water containers of design  6  could  be  installed in  the  face  area. VIII,  19 
3.2  Line  B:  Seam-road  drivages 
Considering  this  region,  it 1s  necessary  to  draw  a  distinction between 
- sealing-off  the  roadway  face  and 
- stationary installation at regular  intervals  of  some  200  or  400  m extended  over  the 
full  length of  the  roadway. 
The  working  group  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  last-named  possibility,  i.e. 
replacing  the  conventional  barriers  in  the  roadways  every  200  or  400  m by  triggered 
barriers  could  be  eliminated  from  the beginning. 
The  considerably  higher costs  of  triggered barriers  must  be  first counteracted 
by  any  equivalent  requirement,  or  even  any  equivalent  increase  in safety. 
A special  sealing-off of  any  of  the  faces  by  means  of  explosion barriers  has 
not hitherto been  prescribed,  as  it does  not  seem  called  for  as  a  general  rule.  Under 
special  conditions,  specifically in headings  with higher-than-average risk of  the  ignition 
of  coal-dust  and/or  CH4,  sealing off of  this  kind  could be  justified.  It would  serve  to 
prevent  the  transmission of  an  explosion initiated in  the vicinity of  a  heading  face  to 
the  rest of  the  mine  workings. 
However,  we  must  not  ignore  the  fact  that  such  an  installation of  a  triggered 
barrier might  in some  cases  be  technically very difficult.  Apart  from  the  fact  than both 
the  detectors  and  the  distribution of  the  quenching  medium  must  cover  the  entire cross-
section of  the  roadway- in spite of  the  presence  of ducts,  haulage  systems  etc.  - it 
wou~d be  necessary  to  install  the barrier in mobile  fashion,  and  to  allow it to  advance 
as  the  heading  advances.  No  technical  means  of  achieving  this  are  at present available. 
3.3  Line  C:  Gate-roads 
For  the  reasons  already  quoted  in  connection with  seam-road  drivages  it is 
equally  impossible  to  consider  the  use  of  triggered explosion barriers  in gate-roads  instead 
of  the  conventional  barriers at regular  intervals  of  200m.  As  against  this, it is enti-
rely desirable  from  the  safety angle  to  install  such barriers  in the vicinity of  the 
T-junctions.  This  is  in  fact  the  zone  which  is  generally either entirely unprotected or 
else insufficiently protected.  On  the  other hand,  installation of  such  equipment would 
considerably  restrict  the  area of  risk  'face'  which  we  described earlier (3.1). 
It must  however  not  be  overlooked  that  this  type  of  installation,  of  necessity 
mobile  in nature,  would  encounter  considerable  technical difficulties.  Above  all,  the 
installation of  the  relatively  large water containers  of  design  6  would  frequently  be 
impossible  owing  to  shortage of  space.  It would  be  easier  to  envisage  the  accommodation 
of  the  quenching-medium bottles or  containers  of  designs  1,  2  or  4. 
The  last-named  designs  are,  it is  true,  dearer  than  design  6;  overall  however 
the higher safety performance,  coupled with  the  relatively  small  total  number  of 
T-junctions,  imply  that  the  cost  is  not  an  overriding factor. 
3.4  Line  D:  Other  roadways 
The  remarks  made  in connection with  seam  roadways  drivages  also  apply  to  all 
other  roadways.  Here  too,  replacement  of  the  regularly  spaced  conventional barriers  by 
the  very  expensive  triggered barriers  cannot  be  envisaged. VIII,  20 
3.5  Line  E:  Sealing-off ventilation districts 
The  present pattern of  installation of  explosion barriers  in  German  coal-mines 
is  no  longer  based  on  the  principle of  sealing-off  individual  sections  of  the  mine 
workings  from  each  other by barriers of  stone;  instead it depends  on  the  provision of 
as  close  a  network  of barriers  as  possible over  the  entire  system of  mine  workings. 
Nonetheless,  sealing-off of  the  ventilation districts  is of  increasing  importance,  both 
in actual  fact  and  in the  relevant Mines  Inspectorate Regulations. 
Consequently,  replacement  of  the  conventional  explosion barriers  used  hitherto 
by  triggered  explosion barriers would  be  decidedly  desirable  from  the  safety angle, 
because of  the  considerably grater range  of  effectiveness  of  the  latter.  Sealing-off of 
the  ventilation districts  could  be  considerably  improved  by  the  use  of  triggered 
explosion barriers. 
In addition  to  this  direct safety effect,  operational  advantages  could  also  be 
expected  from  the  introduction of  triggered barriers.  For  instance,  it is  possible  to 
install  the  triggered barriers  in vertical workings  which  is  not possible with  the 
conventional barriers.  It is also  conceivable  that- bearing  in mind  the  increased 
safety  to  be  expected  from  the  use  of  triggered barriers  - other  requirements  could either 
be  eliminated or at least  reduced,  such  as  e.g.  the  requirement  for  a  minimum  distance 
of  200  m separating  the  beginning  and  end  points  of  the  ventilation districts  from  the 
actual working points  (para.  147,  Section 3,  General  Mining  Regulations). 
The  cost viewpoint  need  not  have  any  overriding  influence  in  this  connection, 
particularly not  in  the  case  of  the  installation of  the  relatively less  expensive 
design  6.  But  even  the  higher  costs  of  designs  1,  2  and  4  would  not  be  of  decisive 
influence,  when  this  is set against  the  considerable  safety benefits  and  the possible 
technical  advantages,  and  also  in view  of  the  relatively small  number  of beginning  and 
end  points  of ventilation districts. 
3.6  Line  F:  Other  branches  in  the  mine  workings 
The  German  regulations  require  that all  roadway  crossings  and  branches  should 
be  sealed-off by  means  of  explosion barriers.  This  involves  a  large  number  of mandatory 
barriers,  intended  to  prevent multiplication of  the  scale of  an  explosion. 
This  function is  generally adequately performed  by  the  conventional barriers. 
Replacement  of  these barriers  by  triggered  explosion barriers  would  demand  an  exceptionally 
high  outlay,  which  would  not  be  associated with  any  corresponding  requirement  or  any 
corresponding  improvement  in  the  general  level  of  safety overall.  For  these  reasons,  the 
working  group  was  in  this  respect against  the  introduction of  the  triggered  explosion 
barriers. 
3.7  Line  G:  Areas  of  special  risk 
Areas  of  special  risk  can  for  instance occur  in  auger mining workings  or  in 
bunkers.  Whereas  the  use  of  conventional  barriers at  such points  is  frequently  faced 
with  technical  difficulties by  reason of  the  large  amount  of  space  required  by  the 
barriers,  or  even  impossible  to  achieve  for  this  reason,  added  to which it is often 
unsatisfactory  because  of  the  reduced  range  of effect,  the  introduction of  triggered 
explosion barriers  in individual  cases  might  be  logical  and  desirable.  However,  it is 
not  possible  to  make  any  generally-applicable  statement on  this  point  because  of  the 
widely  differing prerequisite conditions. 
4.  Summary 
Making  a  summary  assessment  of  the  opinions  formulated  by  the working  party,  as 
presented  in Table  2,  reveals  in  the  first  instance  that  there  is  a  notably  restricted 
number  of  possible  applications  for  triggered  explosion barriers. VIII,  21 
1.  An  unrestricted  recommendation  to  use  triggered barriers of designs  1,  2,  4  and  6 
in place of  conventional  barriers  is made  in respect of  the beginnings  and  ends  of 
ventilation districts  for  sealing-off purposes.  By  reason of  the  great  importance 
of  these points,  and  also  by  reason of  the  considerably  greater  range  of  effect of 
triggered  explosion barriers,  such  an  application seems  desirable  from  the  safety 
angle,  so  that  the  increased financial  outlay would  be  justified;  this measure  should 
be  easy  to  achieve  technically. 
2.  Mobile  installation of  triggered barriers  to  protect  the  T-junctions  appears  desirable 
from  the  safety angle;  in this  respect,  the  increased  financial  outlay  should  not 
assume  decisive proportions.  Such  an  application in however difficult from  the 
technical  point of view,  and  these difficulties  are best overcome  by  the  use  of 
models  1,  2  and  4. 
3.  In  seam  roadway  drivages,  sealing-off of  the  heading  face  by  the  use of  triggered 
barriers  can be  desirable  from  the  safety angle,  but  in individual  cases,  namely  to 
the  extent  that  exceptional  risks  of  explosion initiation are  present.  To  this 
extent,  the  increased  financial  outlay  should  not  be  considered  as  of  decisive 
importance.  Nevertheless,  the  requisite mobile  method  of  installation still presents 
technical  difficulties. 
4.  According  to  the  location of  the  individual  case,  the  use  of  triggered barriers  to 
seal-off points  of particular risk  can  be  desirable  from  the  safety  angle.  It is 
however  impossible  to  make  any  more  spe&,ific  pronouncement. 
\ 
If these  views  regarding  the possible applications of  triggered barriers  are 
accepted,  it may  be  expected  that  they will  have  very  considerable  influence  on  further 
developments: 
a)  On  the  one  hand,  it will  be  necessary  to .abandon  the  very  high hopes  someties  reposed 
in  these barriers  that  they will  produc~ a  .fundamental  transformation  in  the  field of 
protection against  coal-dust explosions,  and  that  they will  render  the  methods  which 
have  been  normal  and  mandatory  hitherto virtually  unnecces~ary. 
b)  On  the  other hand  the  interested parties  in the  profession will  and  should  concentrate 
in  their future  work  on  the possibilities of  application already  listed,  in order  to 
achieve  the  soonest possible operational  use  of  these methods.  Obviously,  this  would 
make  extension of  the  range  of  applications  of  triggered barriers  unnecessary  for  the 
time  being.  This  should  be  left as  a  subject  to  be  included  in a  subsequent  devel-
opment  phase. 
c)  The  possibilities of application envisaged  for  the  time  being make  it unlikely  that 
any  large  number  of  individual  installations will  be  called  for.  Consequently,  even 
series manufacture  cannot  be  expected  to  produce  any  appreciable  reductions  in cost. 
d)  Finally, it must  not  be  overlooked  that  there are certain fundamental  misgivings 
regarding  the  introduction of  triggered barriers.  These  misgivings  follow,  on  the 
one  hand,  from  the  requisite use of  explosives,  which  need  to  be  used  in non-enclosed 
form  and  would  be  unsupervised.  On  the  other hand,  even certain favourable  information 
now  available has  not yet  completely  eliminated  the  fear  that  the  triggering of  an 
explosion barrier could  constitute  a  danger  to  a  person  in  the  near vicinity. 
Bearing  these  facts  in mind,  it would  be  desirable  that  the  views  formulated 
for  the  time  being  by  the  German  coal-mining  industry  regarding  the  possible applications 
of  triggered barriers  should  also  be  critically discussed  by  the1r  colleagues  in  the 
Member  States,  with  a  view  to  reaching  to  closest possible  community  of views;  this 
would  then  become  the basis  of  and  the  guiding principle for  subsequent work  in this 
field. STEINKOHLENBERGBAUVEREIN 
Mine  Safety Department 
For  comparison  :  Conventional  explosion barriers  Experimental  Roadway  Experimental  Roadway 
Stone-dust barriers  Water  through barriers  'Water  trough  barriers  Total  Quenching  "Mining  Generator" 
(set  close)  (designe  (wid"ely  spaced)  Powder  in pressure bottles  Quenching  Powder  as 
CERCHAR 
Stone-dust  container 
with  explosive cord 
SMRE 
Water  thrower 
Water  in  pressure 
bottles 
Table  1  Summary  of  Triggered  explosion barriers 
(as at March  1972) 
SMRE  Experimental  Mine  water 
Quenching  powder  containers with explosive 
in  pressure  cord 
bottles  1,2,3)  (design 4)  propellant 
• 
~  f----------+----+---1~--+-~---------+-----------+-------l-----------l 
II  III  4 
Detector  system 
Quenching material 
and  container 
Distribution  of 
quenching material 
Quantity  of  quen-
ching  material  re-
lated  to  roadway 
cross-section 
Total  length of 
structure 
n.a. 
b  Stone-dust  on  planks 
c  By  explosion  shock-wave 
d  400  kg/mz 
e  Generally  60-100  m 
Layout  of  containers  f  In  roadway  cross-section 
Power  supply  n.a. 
Special  requirements  h  As  design  specification 
Estimated  costs  per 
barrier  (for  10m2 
cross-section  of 
road) 
Range  of effect 
1  600  DM 
k  Against  coal-dust  explosions 
with  explosion  rate  of 
100-500 m/ sec 
n.a. 
Water  in  troughs 
c  l 
200  1 itres/mz 
Generally  15-35  m 
n.a. 
ll.S  design  specification 
l  100  DM 
as  k  I 
u.a. 
as  b  II 
as  c  I 
at  least  1  litre per  cu.m.  of 
roadway 
equal  to  length  of  roadway 
protected 
1)  Infra-red detector  (flame  de-
tector)  armed  by  "upstream" 
thermoelement  (or  pressure 
detector)  and  then triggers 
the barriers; 
2)  Thermoelement  (or  pressure 
detector)  ar-ms  the  Hdown-
strearn"  Infra-red  detector 
{£lame  detector)  or  itself 
triggers  the barrier 
Ammonium  phosphate  in battles 
(at  present  4  kg  per  bot:tle). 
Nitrogen  (120  bars)  as  propel-
lant 
Bottle valves  blown  open  by 
explosive  capsule;  powder  is-
~ue~  through  fan  jets  (2  jets 
per  bottle;  1800 angle  of 
spread) 
against 
Coal-dust  explosions  :  8  kg/m~ 
CHL,/ coal-dust  10  kg/m
2 
CH4  only  :  l3  kg/ m 
as  a 
Ammonium  phosphate;  all  the 
quenching  medium  is  in  two 
non-pressurized  containers 
Propellant  pressure  produced 
by  a  rocket  drive unit; 
powder  issues  through  fan 
jets  (at  present  3  jets per 
container) 
In  course  oi  calculation 
Distances  :  Detector  d1stances  in 
Thermoelement  IR detector  :  8  m  of  calculation 
Infra-red detector 
bottles  40  m 
Roadway  length for 
against  coal  dust  ;0  m 
CH4/ coal-dust  40  m 
bottles  :  3 51 
----~~-------------lrC~H_ 4 _o_n_l_Y~'----~--~4_s_m_m_inim.  _ 
as  f  I  Along  roadway  circumference bet- Over  ruadway  cross-section 
-I--
n.a. 
As  design  specification 
Maximum  as  in  II 
At  least  as  in  k  I  but  early 
action  resulting  from  ap-
proaching  (from  100 m/ sec) 
and  increased  act ion  from 
powerful  (over  500  m/ sec) 
explosions 
ween  supports 
Triggering  current  :  24  V, 
1, 5-2  A  Mains  connection, 
emergency bat:tery  supply 
Detectors  must  be  free  and 
cover  the  entire  roadway  cross-
section  (if necessary  larg~r 
number  of units).  Flame  d~tec­
t:ors  must  be  kept  clean.  Angle 
of  spread  of  spray  jets must 
cover  entire  cross-section  of 
roadway 
7  000  - 12  000  DM 
Costs  can  be  reduced  by  some 
30  /,  by  doing  various  work  on 
a  ''pit  rnaden  basis 
In  circular  roadways  up  to  5  m  .... 
cross-section  with  homogeneous 
mixture  of  combustible  material 
and  air,  against  coal-dust 
CH4/ coal-dust  and  pure  coal-dust 
explosion.  Up  to explosion  rates 
of  maximum  400  m/ sec  (no  suc-
cessful  underground  trials 
hitherto) 
in  special  niches 
Still  undet~rmined 
as  h  l 
cheaper  than 
as  k  1 
Ultraviolet detector  a) 1  Pressure detector  arms  "down-
stream''  Infra-red  detector 
(trips  only  for  fairly  heavy 
explosions) 
Infra-red detector  armed  by 
pressure detector and  trig-
ger  barrier 
b)  Thermoelement  triggers  bar-
riers  for  weak  explosion 
Stone-dust  in metal  troughs  Water  in bottles  (50 litres each) 
of  triangular cross-section,  nitrogen  (20bars)  as  propellant 
covered with foil  and wire  4  bottles  in  box  (total weight 
netting;  the  troughs  are  set  without  contents  - 500  kg) 
on  their  s 1des  with  the 
covered  side vertical 
Blown  open  by  explosioe  cord 
embedded  in  the  stone-dust 
4  30-kg containers 
4  kg/m2  per  container 
15  kg/m2  per  barrier 
8  m2  roadway  cross-section 
Distances 
Detector  - lst container  10  m 
Betw~en containers  5  m each 
Total  length 25  m 
The  upper  part of  roadway 
cross-section with  longitu-
dinal  axis  across  roadwa"; 
axis;  the wire netting/foil 
covered  side  is  towards  the 
direction  uf  the  explosions 
Battery operated 
2  000  - J  000  DM 
Bursting membrane  blown  open  by 
explosive  capsule.  Water  ejected 
via  3"  tube 
4  30-litre containers 
15  1 itresfm2 
(8  m2  roadway  cross-section) 
Distance  : 
Detector-container  battery 
maKimum  50  m 
In  roadway wall,  e.g.  next  to  the 
power  train 
Mains  connection with  emergency 
supply 
15  000  DM 
Against:  Transfer  of  CHL,  Against  coal-dust  explosions  up 
ignition to coal-dust  to  a  maximum  of 400  mlsec  ex-
Against:  approaching  coal-dust plosion rate and  CR4  explosions 
explosion with  a  maximum  rate  up  to  a  maximum  of  300m/sec 
of  50 m/ sec  (designed  to act  (undergoing  underground trial) 
only  in  one  direction) 
a  4 
Ammonium  phosphate;  bottle 
system  and  propellant as 
b  4;  containers  must  how-
ever  be  fitted wit:h  fan 
jets  (20  bars) 
Bursting  membrane  blown 
open  by  explosive  capsule 
which  must  be  irrunersed  in 
the water;  powder  issues 
through  fan-jets 
4  30  ki,  containers 
15  kg/m2 
(8  m2  roadway  cross-sect ion 
as  e  4 
as  f  4 
as  g  4 
15  000  DM 
presumably  as  k  4 
(not yet  tested) 
as  a  4  - tested  only with Infra-
red detector 
Water  in containers  (80  litres 
each);  at present,  troughs  to 
DIN  21576,  size  2 
Blown  open  by  explosive  cord 
if automatic  system fails,  the 
container  is  destroyed  by  the 
explosivn  shock-wave 
~~l~r::~~a~~e~~ i:  ~~t:::~~2 
per  barrier 
Distances  : 
Detector-beginning  of barrier 
maximum  50  m 
Between  container  groups  1. 2m 
each 
Total  length  :  maximum  60  m 
as  f  1 
as  g  4 
Development  of  special  containers 
required  to  ensure  that  the  ex-
plosive  cord does  not  have  to be 
left  for  long  periods  in  the 
water 
3  000  DM 
In working  of  8  m2  cross-section 
in  present  state of  research mini-
mum  of  :  against coal-dust-explo-
sion with natural whirling-up-of-
coal-dust  up  to 800 m/sec, 
against  coal-dust  explosion with 
homogeneous  distribution  of  coal-
dust  up  to 400  mlsec.  against  Cll4 
explosions with  homogeneous  mix-
ture  of  CH4/ air with an  average 
of  some  8  % CH4  (maximum  10 % CHL,) 
up  to 400 m/sec.  Tests  currently 
being made  on  expected  effect  at 
'higher  explosion rates. STEINKOHLENBERGBAUVEREIN 
Mine  Safety Department 
For comparison  :  Convention  explosion barriers 
Face 
Seam  road  headings 
(including rise and 
dip  headings)  (ex-
cepting advance 
gates  up  to  lOOm 
ahead) 
Gate-roads,  part i-
cularly T-junctions, 
(including advance 
gates  up  to  lOOm 
ahead) 
Stone-dust barriers 
A  impracticable 
B  prescribed  in  general  for  seam 
road  every  400m,  in  steep dips 
difficult  to  erect  and  action 
uncertain. 
C  prescribed  forT-junctions, 
50-150m,  otherwise  every  200m, 
desirable  to erect  at  T-
junctions  - but difficult 
"V;ater-trough  harriers 
(set  close)  (design  1,2,3) 
II 
as  A  I 
Water  troup,h  barriers 
(widely  spaced)  (design  4) 
Ill 
as  A  I 
as  B  I  - but better action can  Possible as  alternative  to  BI 
be  expected at fairly  steep  or  B  III but  dearer 
dip  and  therefore only  justifiable 
occasionaly 
as  C  I  Possible as  alternative to Cl 
and  CII  frequently  better 
safety and  cheaper 
Experimental  Roadway 
Quenching  powdor  in 
pressure bottles 
Desirable  from  sc..fety  angle,  but 
not  yet  technically  achievable 
(impossible  to accommoddte quen-
ching-medium  conta~ners  tn  face 
at  present) 
Installation every  400m  (as  BI 
and  B  III)  too  expensive  in 
technical  and  financial  outlay. 
Mobile  installation solely  to 
seal  off  heading  faces  tech-
nically difficult,  but  desirable 
from  safety  angle  in  special 
circumstances 
Experimental  Roadway 
"Mining  Generator 11  Ouencr.ing 
Powder  as  propellent 
as  A  1 
as  B  1 
CERCHAR 
Stone-·dust  container 
with  explosive cord 
impracticable 
Exclusively  to seal  off  heading 
faces,  not  recormnended,  as 
against  the  other  desic;ns 
Mobile  installations  to protect  as  C  l  Not  recommended at T-junctions 
T-junctions  desirc..ble  even  al- because  uf  low  range  and  dif-
though technically difficult.  ficulties  of  erection  (no 
SMRE 
Water  throver 
Water  in pressure battles 
as  A  1 
as  B  l 
as  C  l 
Table  2  Summary  of  possible applications 
of  triggered  explosion barriers 
(as  at March  1972) 
SMRE  Experimental  Mine 
Quenching  ?DWder  in  Water  containers with 
pressure bottles  explosive  cord 
impracticable 
Use  instead  of  conventional  bar-
riers is much  more  expensive and 
therefore  justifiable only  for 
special  safety  requirements 
Use  to protect T-junctions  gives 
better safety  than  conventional 
barriers;  cheaper,  but  technical-
ly more  difficult  to  erect  than 
roadways  over  entire  length  conventional  barriers)  Possible  applications  cannot  C  l  and  C  2 
Fixed  installations  to  protect  li  appreciable advantage  over 
~-----------------4--+-------------------------~-------------------------t--------------------------~t_o_o  __  ex~p_e_n_s_iv_e  ________________  ~------------------------+--------------------------4--------------------------~ yet  be  assessed 
Other  level  and 
inclined roads  (ex-
cept  B,  C) 
Beginning and  end-
points  of  ventila-
tion districts 
Other  brar.chcs  in 
mine  workings 
(roadway  crossings, 
staple  landings 
etc) 
Special  risk areas 
(e. g.  Auger-mining, 
bunkers) 
0  prescribed  generally  every 
400m;  in  fairly  steep dips 
difficult  to ei-ect,  action 
uncertain 
prescribed 
F  prescribed at  intervals  of 
50-15m,  but  frequently  en-
counters  difficulties be-
cause  of  inadequate  length 
available  in  roadway 
G  not  generally  prescribed  -
not  generally usahle be-
cause  large  space  requi-
rement  and  restricted 
action 
H 
as  D  I 
but  better  action  can  be 
expected  at fairly steep 
dips 
as  E  I 
as  F  I  - but difficulties in 
erection  can  be  expected  L:.e-
cause  the barriers are  short 
as  G  I 
Possible  as alternative to DI 
and  DII  but  dearer,  generally 
no  safety  requirement  to  im-
pose  it 
Possible as  alternative to El 
~  but  justifiable only 
if associated with widely-
spaced barriers  in  neighbou-
ring workings 
F  Ill 
as  G  I 
Fixed  installation  i.nstead  of 
conventional  barriers  involves 
high  outlay,  not  normally 
quired  from  safety angle 
Fixed  installation instead  of 
conventional  harriers desi-
rable  from  safety  angl~­
latively easy  to achieve 
technically;  the  increased 
cost  seems  justified 
Regular  installations  instead 
of  conventional  barriers  in-
volves  very high  outlay  because 
·of  the  large  number  of  units, 
which  is  nut  justifiable from 
a  safety angle 
Installation may  be  technical-
ly  achievable and  desirable 
from  safety  angle,  in  indivi-
dual  cases 
as  D  l 
as  E  1 
as  F  l 
as  G  l 
Since design mainly  only  for 
sealing-of£ heading  faces,  not 
to be  used  as  re~: ::..acernent  for 
conventional  barriers 
No  point  in  installing at 
11spe-
cial risk points''  by  reason  of 
low  range 
as  0  1 
as  E  1 
as  F  l 
as  G  l 
Use  instead  of  conventional  bar-
riers more  expensive,  and  general-
ly  unnecessary  from  safety angle 
as  E  l 
but  cheaper 
as  F  1 
as  G  l VIII,  27 
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Progress  report  on  research at  INIEX  into  triggered barriers 
1.  INITEX  Mechanical  Detector 
1st version 
It was  tried out  at Tremonia  in January  1972.  This  detector functions  by  the 
displacement  of  a  mobile  shutter about  a  horizontal  axis  on  impact  from  the  shock wave 
of  an  explosion at  a  pressure of at least  30  g/cm2  (value  determined  by  testing at 
Tremonia  and  regarded  by  Dr  Meirbach  as  sufficiently  low).  It is  to  be  noted  that  this 
value  is  not  too  low,  having  regard  to  the  tests  previously  carried out  by  Cerchar with 
the  detector placed  15  m away  from  a  shotfiring front.  This  mechanical  detector would 
thus  be  the  only  one  at present  triggered  off by  the  shock  wave  of  an  explosion. 
A  ribben of celluloid is  also  provided,  designed  to  trigger  the  shutter when  the 
pressure of  the  explosion  is  not  sufficient  to  set  the mobile  shutter  in motion.  In  this 
case it is  the  flame  which  should  cut  the  ribbon.  The  results  obtained at Tremonia 
during  tests  effected with  flame  fronts  not  preceded by  any  major  shock wave  have  shown 
that  the  response  time  was  then  too  long  (0.5  sec  and  over). 
2nd  version 
We  have  tried  to  devise  a  mechanical  detector of  the  same  type  but more 
sophisticated,  for which we  hope  that  the  response  time  to  the  flame  will  be  sufficiently 
short.  This  device would  take  the  form of  a  case  1  m  long  and  of  sides  about  0.30  x  0.30  m, 
which  would  be  positioned either vertically or with  an  inclination up  to  45°,  at  the 
discretion of  the  user,  depending  on  the  topography  of  the  area.  Inside  the  case  would  be 
a  long mobile  shutter,  the  axis  of which  is parallel  to  the  length of  the  device,  and  a 
combustible wire  of  small  diameter.  Sensitivity  to  the blast would  be  the  same  as  that 
of  the  1st version  and  we  hope  that  flame  sensitivity will  be better.  When  it triggers, 
this  detector will  set off  a  small  percussion detonator  capable of  firing  a  detonating 
fuse  of  10  g  of  explosive per metre. 
2.  The  extinguisher 
This  was  presented  for  the  first  time  at  the  meeting of  experts  on  trigger 
barriers held  in Sheffield  in June  1972.  Since  then one  or  two  changes  have  been made 
in it to  improve  its practical utility. 
It takes  the  form  of  a  flexible pipe arranged  along  roadways  on  cradles 
suspended  from  the  supports.  It consists  of  a  polyethylene  sheath of  0.3  mm  thickness 
conta1n1ng  a  prism of  square  cross-section measuring  20  to  25  em  in reticulated  foam  of 
flame  resistant quality  and  appropriate porosity housing  Dynamit  Nobel  AG  firedamp-proof 
fuse  of  appropriate  power  (10  g/m). 
This  device  contains  50  to  75  litres of water per metre  and  provides  good 
dispersion of  the water,  having  regard  to  the  characteristics of its various  elements, 
such  as  have  been determined  by  tests  (films  at 3- 4  000  pictures/sec). 
On  the  other hand,  the  results  so  far obtained  indicate  that  the pressure point 
at  the  approaches  to  these  extinguishing devices will not  be  dangerous  for  personnel. 
3.  It is  clear  that it will  only be possible  to  use  the  extinguisher  together 
with other  types  of detectors. VIII,  30 
We  plan  to  present  this year at  the  Tremonia  experimental  pit the  2nd  version 
of  the mechanical  detector and  the  continuous  extinguisher,  within  the  framework  of  the 
ag~eement following  which  the  effectiveness of  trigger barriers  as  proposed  by  the 
different  institutes will  be  tested  in  the  experimental  pit. 
It appears  to  us  that  the  continuous  trigger barrier which  we  are presenting 
could  be  convenient  and  efficient,  especially  to  protect  roadways.  It is  to  be  noted 
that  local  reinforcements  are  always  easy  to  realise  (for  example  by  means  of  derived 
detonating  fuses). 
Where  the  extinguisher  ~s  to  be  used with  the  mechanical  detector which  we 
propose,  the  latter is  sufficiently simple  and  inexpensive  for us  to  be  able  to  use  it 
at different places  at intervals  along  the  continuous  extinguisher. VIII,  31 
Sketch  of  the extinguishing  device 
1  Detonating  fuse 
2  Reticulated  foam  saturated with water 
3  Polyethylene  sheath 
4  Suspension  device VIII,  33 
Research  on  triggered barriers  in 
Great  Britain 
Addendum  4 VIII,  35 
1.  Introduction 
There  is  a  fairly  long history of  research on  triggered barriers at  the  Safety 
in Mines  Research Establishment.  A system was  described  as  long  ago  as  1938-39  by 
Allsop,  Hartwell  & Wheeler  (1)  in which  dust  contained in a  mortar was  blown  explosively 
into  the  flame  of  the  explosion on  receipt of  a  signal  from  d  sensing  device which 
depended  for  its operation on  the  heat of  the  explosion causing air in a  container  to 
expand.  Some  success  was  obtained with  the  system in suppressing explosions  of  homoge-
nous  mixtures  of methane  and  air.  The  development  of  a  triggered barrier was  taken  up 
again  in the  early  1950's  when  various  types  of  sensing devices  for  detecting explosions 
were  examined  and  experiments  were  made  to  examine  the  efficacy of water  as  a  material 
for  suppressing methane/air and  voal-dust  explosions  (2,  3).  However,  no  attempt was 
made  to  construct  an  integrated barrier system,  incorporating both  sensor  and  disperser. 
The  chief  problems  identified at that  time were: 
(i)  The  design of  an  apparatus  that would disperse  the water  (or whatever  other 
suppressant material was  being used)  quickly without  risk of  injury  to  men  in the 
neighbourhood  if the  device  operated  inadvertently. 
(ii)  The  choice  of  the  sensor position in relation to  the disperser  to  ensure  that  the 
suppressant material  was  released at  the  correct  time  to  deal  effectively with  the 
whole  range  of  explosions  that was  likely  to  be  encountered. 
(iii)  The  relative difficulty of  suppressing methane/air,  as  compared with coal-dust, 
explosions,  and 
(iv)  The  task of  providing an  electric current  to  actuate  the  disperser when  once  an 
explosion had  been detected by  the  sensor,  bearing in mind  that  in  those  aays  one 
had  to  rely on  thermionic  valve  amplifiers,  with consequent difficulties of 
stability and  power  drain.  In  this  connection,  it was  envisaged  that a  triggered 
barrier would  need  to  have  its own  power  supplies  since  the  colliery mains  supply 
might  not be operative at  the  time of  an  explosion.  This  requirement meant  that 
the  quiescent current drain in the  electrical  system would  have  to  be  small.  The 
equipment would  have  to  be  intrinsically safe electrically and  there would  have  to 
be  some  simple  means  of  checking  that  the  apparatus  was  always  in a  state  to 
function  effectively.  Furthermore,  it was  envisaged  that  there  should  be  some 
audio  or visual  alarm which would  indicate if the  system were  not  in a  state to 
function.  All  these  features  would  have  presented difficulties in design,  and, 
additionally,  the  relatively sophisticated  systems  that would  have  emerged  would 
have  posed  the  mines  with  serious  problems  of maintenance. 
2. 
Another  obstacle in the way  of  developing  a  triggered barrier system at that  time 
was  the  lack of means  in Gt.  Britain for  adequate  testing.  This  has  now  been 
partially remedied  by  the  construction of  the  new,  large,  coal-dust  explosion of 
testing  that  is  required  in the  development  and  approval  of  a  device  like  a 
triggered barrier and  we  find  today  that we  wish  to  carry out  tests  in  the  low 
roadway  at  the  Experimental Mine,  Tremonia. 
Recent  Developments  on  triggered barriers 
In  the  late 1960's  the  problem of  triggered barriers was  taken up  again with 
renewed  vigour.  The  background  to  the  problem had  by  this  time  changed somewhat, 
especially  in  that  there was  now  considerable  experience of  the  use of  the  conventional 
type  of  stone-dust barrier in British mines;  under  the  terms  of  an  NCB  Production VIII,  36 
Department  Instruction of  1953  stone-dust barriers  had  been  provided  in National  Coal 
Board  mines  and  their installation became  a  statutory requirement  in 1960.  The  efficacy 
of  stone-dust barriers  in suppressing coal-dust  explosions  had  been demonstrated  in  two 
underground  explosions  (4),  but at  the  same  time it was  recognized  that  they  had  certain 
limitations  and  also  some  practical difficulties  had  become  apparent.  In addition  to 
their limited effectiveness  against methane/air explosions,  tests  had  shown  that  they 
would  not  suppress  some  coal-dust explosions  that were still in  a  weak  stage of  devel-
opment.  Furthermore,  new  developments  in mining,  which  meant  that  roadways  and  faces 
were  being  advanced  or  retreated at  a  much  more  rapid  rate  than  previously,  had  made  more 
difficult  the  task of  ensuring  that barriers were  moved  so  as  to  be  sited  in  the  correct 
position.  Lastly,  many  roadways,  especially  those  being  used  for  in-seam mining,  have 
only  a  low  head  room  and  this,  together with  the  presence  of  a  conveyor  and  machinery, 
can  make  the  installation and  moving  of  a  dust barrier a  difficult and  costly  task. 
The  problem of  designing  triggered barriers  had  now  become  easier  in  two  ways. 
So  far  as  instrumentation was  concerned,  the  development  of  transistors  had  solved  many 
of  the  problems  associated with  the electrical circuitry.  Also,  the  greater knowledge 
that had  been acquired,  principally as  a  result of  large-scale experiments,  of  the 
behaviour  of  coal-dust  explosions  had  enabled  the  range  of  explosions  against which  it 
was  considered  a  barrier would  have  to  be  effective  to  be  defined more  precisely.  It is 
now  considered realistic  to  consider  that  the  maximum  flame  speed  in  a  coal-dust  explosion 
within  a  distance of  a  couple  of  hundred  metres  from  a  coal  face,  in  the  region where 
light stone-dust barriers  are  now  sited,  is  unlikely  to  be  more  than  300 m/s,  given our 
present  standards  of  stonedusting and  the  extreme  unlikelihood  of  the  source  of  ignition 
being  as  violent as,  say,  an  explosive  detonating  in  a  large volume  of homogeneous  methane/ 
air.  At  the  other  end  of  the  scale,  it is  considered unlikely  that  a  coal-dust  explosion 
can  propagate  at  a  speed of  less  than  about  30  m/s.  Previously  the  upper  and  lower  speeds 
were  given more  extreme  values,  usually  based  on  theoretical  calculations.  The  range  of 
possible  speeds  of methane/air explosions  is  of  course  greater. 
An  account  of  the  recent work  done  at  SMRE  up  until  1971  has  been  given  in  a 
paper by  Ramsay,  Hinsley  and  Waterhouse  (5).  Two  types  of  sensor,  both  actuated  by  the 
heat  or  flame  of  an  explosion,  have  been developed.  The  preferred  type  is  a  thermocouple. 
When  set  to  operate at  80°  it has  a  response  time  of  about  15  ms;  the  response  time  is 
not  affected seriously  by  dust  and water,  but when  covered  by  a  film of oil it increases 
appreciably.  The  electrical  system draws  only  2ruilliwatts of  power  and  is  battery 
operated,  the batteries  needing  changing  only  every  two  years.  No  problems  have  arisen 
with  respect  to  its electrical intrinsic safety.  The  device  has  worked  well  in several 
hundred  experimental  explosions  and  a  model  has  been  installed underground  for more  than 
two  years  in order  to  see whether  there are  any,  as  yet  unrecognized,  practical  problems. 
A  sensor  actuated  by  ultra-violet light was  also  tried,  but it proved unreliable  in 
explosion  tests  and  was  liable  to  spurious  operation. 
Following  experiments,  it was  decided  to  use water  as  the  suppressing material 
rather  than dusts  or powders.  Two  types  of disperser were  developed.  In one,  a  cylinder 
of  dust  or water  enclosed  in plastic was  dispersed  by  an  explosive  charge.  This  system 
was  not  however  developed  fully  because it was  not  easy  to  protect against  unauthorized 
interference  and  also  because it was  considered  that  there would  be  too  much  danger  to 
men  in  the  event  of  its inadvertent operation.  The  second  type  consisted of  a  container 
from which water  can be  ejected  through  a  nozzle  under  the  action of  compressed  nitrogen. 
The  nitrogen is  admitted  to  the water  chamber  by  the  rapid operation of  a  valve which  1s 
in  turn actuated by  the  firing o:  a  detonator on  receipt of  a  signal  from  the  sensor. 
A  system employing  a  gas-powered disperser and  a  thermoelectric  sensor has  been 
tested  against  coal-dust explosions  in  the  Buxton  gallery  (this  has  an  arch-shaped  cross 
section  and  an  area of  5.6  m2)  with results  that were  encouraging.  In  the majority of 
experiments,  four  gas-powered  cylinders,  containing  in all  about  110  kg  of water,  were 
used;  the  total  mass  of  such  a  suppressor unit,  when  full  of water,  was  680  kg.  The 
overall  time  for  the  whole  mass  of water  to  be  discharged after  the  initial receipt  of 
a  signal  from  the  sensor was  250  milliseconds.  In subsequent  tests,  a  unit  consisting of 
three  cylinders,  but holding  the  same  total  amount  of water  as  the  previous  arrangement, 
was  used  and  there were  indications  that  a  two  cylinder version  could  be  effective.  The VIII,  37 
suppressor was  subsequently  tested at  the  Tremonia Experimental  Mine  on both  low  and 
arched  roadways  and  against methane/air  and  coal-dust explosions.  Again  the  results 
were  encouraging. 
3.  Current  developments 
The  so-called  'Mark I'  suppressor,  described above,  was  thought  to  be  unaccept-
able  for  use  in mines  because  the  relatively high  speed of  ejection of water  could 
constitute  a  danger  to  personnel  in  the  neighbourhood  if it went  off accidentally. 
A more  compact  version of  total weight  460  kg,  in which  the  gas  pressure has  been  reduced 
from  30  to  7  atmospheres  and  in which  the  area of  the orifice has  been  increased,  has 
therefore  been built.  It is  currently undergoing  development  trials  in the  large Buxton 
gallery.  The  object  of  the  trials  is  to  explore  the  effect of varying parameters  such 
as  the  discharge rates,  timing,  and  the  shape  and  size of  the  nozzle,  on  the  total  amount 
of  water  that  is  required  to  effectively quench  explosions.  Tests  are  also  being  made 
of  a  blast-operated sensor because it is  foreseen  that  there may  be  circumstances  in 
which  this  would  be  preferable  to  a  flame-operated  device.  The  blast-operated device  ~s 
essentially a  hinged plate  that  responds  to  the  dynamic  pressure  developed  in an 
explosion. 
The  current  feeling  is  that  no  single  arrangement  of  a  triggered barrier system 
will meet  all  underground  requirements.  For  example,  it is  likely  that it will  be 
necessary  to  specify different sitings of  the  sensor  and  disperser depending  upon  the 
place  in  the  mine  where  the barrier is  placed.  Possibly,  also dispersers  employing 
different numbers  of  cylinders  of water will  have  to  be  used,  again  depending  on where 
the  barrier is  located.  SMRE  is  therefore  engaged  on  a  programme  of  continuous  devel-
opment  of  triggered barrier systems,  as  has  been necessary with  stone-dust  and  water 
barriers,  in Britain and  in other countries. 
In Britain  the  chief  need  at  the  present  time  is  for  a  triggered barrier that 
could be  used  in place of  stone-dust barriers  in  low,  wide,  roadways,  especially in 
in-seam mining.  In particular,  there  is  a  need  to  find  a  replacement  for  light stone-
dust barriers  in such  conditions,  because  the  rate of  advance  and  retreat of  these 
roadways  makes  the  task of  moving  the barriers,  in order  for  them  to  be  sited within 
the  prescribed distances  from  the  face,  exceptionally difficult.  In order  to  be 
acceptable  in such  conditions  it is  clear  that  a  triggered barrier would  have  to  be 
readily portable.  We  have  no  facilities  in Britain for  testing barriers  in  low  roadways, 
and,  as  has  been mentioned,  it is  for  this  reason  that we  wish  to  carry out  tests  at 
Tremonia. 
Tests  on  triggered barriers fall  into  two  categories.  Firstly,  development 
tests,  arranged  so  as  to  give  information about  the  design  and  performance  of  the 
apparatus  and  secondly,  approval  tests,  on  the basis  of which  advice  could be  given  on 
whether  the  apparatus  was  acceptable for  use  underground.  It is  accepted  that it will  be 
required  to  be  demonstrated  that  triggered barriers  should  be at least as  reliable  and 
efficacious  under  modern  mining  conditions  as  the  stone-dust barriers  that  they will 
replace.  This  requirement would  be  additional  to  their being  acceptable  as  regards  cost, 
ease of  maintenance,  etc.  It is  recognized  that  stone-dust barriers may  not  always  be 
effective against methane/air  explosions,  but  triggered barriers  may  be  more  successful 
in  this  respect;  the  ability  to  deal  reliably with  gas  explosions  would  be  a  point  in 
favour  of  triggered barriers when  the  time  comes  to  consider  their use  in coal mines.  In 
addition  to  gallery  tests,  handling  trials  in a  mine,  are  soon  to  begin.  Approval  tests 
should  be  based  on  a  comparison of  triggered barriers  and  the  stone-dust barriers  they 
are  intended  to  replace when  operating against  the  range  of  explosions  that it is  considered 
could  be  encountered.  When  the  present  series of  development  tests  in  the  Buxton gallery 
are  completed  tests will  be  done  to  compare  the  behaviour of  the  triggered barriers  and 
light stone-dust barriers  in an  arched  roadway.  Whilst,  as  already  indicated,  the  prime 
need  for  triggered barriers  is  for  use  in  low  and  rapidly moving  roadways,  it may  well 
be  that  the first  triggered barrier that will  be  recommended  for  underground  use will  be 
one  meant  for  installation in arched  roadways  in  the more  conventional  mining  situation VIII,  38 
of  a  conveyor  road  leading  to  a  ripping.  At  a  later time  attention will  probably  be 
given  to  designing  triggered barriers  that are meant  to  be  located much  further  away 
from  the  coal  face,  at places where  one  would  envisage  that coal-dust explosions  would 
be well  developed.  Clearly  the  testing of  these barriers will pose  serious  problems 
and it is  to  be  hoped  that  the  information  that  is  being  gathered of  the behaviour of 
triggered barriers might  make  it possible  to  extrapolate  to  these more  exacting conditions 
and  to  reduce  the  need  for  extensive full-scale  testing. 
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Addendum  5 
Triggered barriers VIII,  41 
When  the  Working Party of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  on  inflammable 
dusts  met  on  30  January  1973  in Luxembourg,  experts  were  reminded  that  they  should  supply 
the  results  of  the  investigations  made  in  the  coalmines  of  their own  countries,  so  that 
their recommendations  and  wishes  on  the  use of  trigger barriers  could  be  noted.  (1) 
The  opinion of  the  authorities was  likewise  to  be  sounded.  Here  it should  be 
pointed  out  to  the  Working  Party  that  the  French mining  authorities,  (Administration des 
Mines  Francaises),  have  always  encouraged  our work  in  this  field.  The  topic  approved  by 
the Administration was  research  into  a  means  of  suppressing  explosions  as  they  begin  to 
develop.  Statistics  show  that  accidents  in France  have  often been  caused  by  shot-firing 
in closed-end workings. 
In  this  report,  Table  I  gives  the  results  of  investigations  made  in  the  mines. 
This  Table  shows  on  examination  that  this  method  of  extinguishing is  desirable  in many 
coal-fields. It would  be  used  mainly  in closed-end workings  and  possibly  to  separate 
close-lying working-areas,  where,  because  of  shortage of  space,  it would  be  impossible  to 
use  conventional  explosion barriers.  This  system can only be  developed  if the  cost  is 
not  too  high  and  if certain concessions  can be  obtained  from  the  authorities. 
Research  into  trigger explosion barriers has  led  to  close collaboration between 
European  testing stations,  by  exchanging  results obtained  in each  laboratory  and  exchange 
of  trigger barriers  or detector  systems,  so  that  these  devices  can be  examined  from 
various  angles,  ideas  exchanged  and  research work  coordinated. 
The  results  of  tests  carried out  at  CERCHAR  on  various  types  of detectors  appear 
in Table II.  The  SMRE  experimental  detectors  have  produced  fairly  good  results.  The 
UNIEX  detector  is  simple  and  cheap.  The  CERCHAR  ultraviolet ray  detectors  can only  be 
operated at a  distance of  15  m  to  35  m from  the  site of  the  explosion  (on  this  point 
differences  between  results  obtained by  the  Tremonia Mine  and  our  own  should be  noted. 
These  have  remained  hitherto  inexplicable.  Regular  cleaning of  ray-type  detectors  has 
been  found  to  be  necessary). 
Should  an  explosion occur,  the detector must  not  only  function properly,  but 
also  not  be  liable  to  trigger itself off prematurely.  In  this  respect  the  CERCHAR  DUV 
type  1  detector is more  reliable  than  the  DUV  type  2,  which  is why  the  former  will  be 
chosen  in  the  immediate  future. 
All  the  equipment  must  be  guaranteed  electrically safe.  This  ~s  true of  the 
CERCHAR  DUV  type  1  detector which  is  the  only  one  considered operational  at  the  present 
time,  as  it has  been  approved  in France  for  use  in mines. 
Recent  tests  in our Mondaville  roadway  - 8  to  12  m2  in cross-section have  shown 
that  an  explosion of  pure  coal  dust,  initiated by  an  8  kg  coaldust  cloud  igniting on  the 
shot being  fired,  can be  contained with  the  following  equipment: 
- DUV  type  1  detector  situated 15  m to  35  m from  the  end  of  the  roadway 
(1)  A  trigger explosion barrier consists basically of  a  detector  (reacting  to  pressure, 
combustion,  flame  or heat  increase)  which  controls  the  expulsion of  an  extinguishing 
substance  generally  released by  a  pyrotechnical  device. VIII,  42 
- containers  for  extinguishing powder,  triangular in cross-section and  placed  5  m apart, 
the  first container lying between  10  m and  20  m from  the  detector 
- the  containers  hold  25  kg  of  extinguisher  which~ is  dispersed  by  means  of  a  detonating 
card 
- the  number  of  containers  necessary  to  suppress  an  explosion varies  according  to  the 
type  of extinguishing substance used: 
mono-ammonium  phosphate } 
sodium bicarbonate 
calcium 
3  to  4  containers 
6  containers 
- if it is  impossible  to  place  the  containers  at  the  centre of  the  roadway,  or if the 
gallery is  congested,  then  the  number  of  containers  may  be  slightly increased. 
We  shall  be  presenting  the  French authorities with  a  detailed  report  of  our 
work  so  that we  can  carry out practical  tests  in  the  mines. 
We  consider  these  tests  in  the  mines  indispensable  for  the  assessment  of  the 
sturdiness  of  the  equipment  and  for  improving it from  a  technological  point of  view. 
As  a  rule,  the  equipment  for  these  tests will  not  be  put  into  operation  in 
closed-end workings  until  the moment  of  firing,  after  the  detector  tubes  have  been 
cleaned.  Although  a  study has  indicated  that  the  1  m from  the  containers  there  should 
be  no  risk of bodily  injury,  we  have  not yet  enough  faith  in this  result  to  allow  personnel 
near  equipment  under  pressure. 
As  this  is  a  Community  research project,  our  final  choice will  obviously  come 
from  the  equipment  tested  in the  various  laboratories  depending  on which  is  the  safest, 
the  cheapest,  and  the  most  reliable. Coal  Field 
Lorraine 
Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Centre-Midi 
Blanzy 
Loire 
Auvergne 
Aquitaine 
Inte-
rested 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
Testing site 
Close-end workings 
Sealing off working 
area  in very  concentra-
ted workings 
Used  to separate isola-
ted  sections  (in place 
of  conventional  explo-
sion barriers) 
Closed-end workings. 
Particularly in road-
ways  ahead  of  the 
strike face 
T  A  B  L  E 
Opinion  of collieries  on  trigger  explosion barriers 
Category  of  explosion 
Low-power  incipient  ex-
plosion 
Low-power  explosion 
High-power  explosion 
(or more  powerful  than 
previous  explosions) 
Low-power  explosion 
Advantages  of  equipment 
Possible disadvantages 
of  equipment 
Low  power  explosions ar- Cost.  Detection  system 
rests.  Use  in congested  unreliable  (e.g.  because 
areas  of detection cells be-
coming  dustclogged). 
Frequent  cleaning neces-
sary 
Employment  of  trigger 
explosion barriers where 
the use  of  traditional 
explosion barriers would 
be  impossible 
Arrest  of  explosions  be-
fore  they  can  reach  the 
coal  face 
A  detector device  easily 
affected by  dust would 
not be  suitable for  this 
type  of  working area 
Too  expensive 
Suggestions  from  mine 
Easing  of  certain regula-
tions,  particularly  those 
governing  the  operation  of 
blasting  roadways 
This  equipment  should not  be 
used  in working areas with  a 
petrol  humidity  level  (in 
steep  seams  with hydraulic 
stowing methods).  These 
Research work  suggested 
by  mine 
Development  of  a  detection 
system not  liable to become 
dust-clogged.  Research work 
to  find  extinguishing device 
most  sui  ted  to this  type  of 
areas are neutralized natu- use 
rally. Utilization should be 
limited  to semi-steep  gra-
dients with  low  humidity  le-
vel 
Study  of this  type does  not 
appear  desirable at present 
Contamination  of  active re-
search welcomed 
Extinguishing agent bet- High cost.  Problems  Easing  of regulations 
Closed-end workings, 
concentrated  coal  road 
workings  sealed off 
ter conserved  arise with use  of deto-
nating  cord 
Can  be  placed close  to 
working  faces.  Use  in 
places where  traditional 
explosion barriers could 
not  have  been used 
The  use  of  explosion barriers is  excluded  as  the workings  are not  dusty  or are naturally humid. 
Although  the coalfield uses  explosion barriers,  there are no  closed-end working areas.  Sections are separated  from  one  another  thus it is possible to use  tradi-
tional methods,  i.e.  normal  explosion barriers. Cerchar 
Cerchar 
Cerchar 
Testing 
place 
Type  of 
detector  Principle 
INIEX  Breaking  of  a  celluloid 
strip either by  a  blade 
activated by  a  shutter 
or  by  burning.  The  shut-
ter is motivated by  the 
blast  of  the  explosion 
SMRE  Thermo-couple  detector 
SMRE  Three ultraviolet ray 
detector  tubes 
SMRE  Three ultraviolet ray 
detector  tubes 
CERCHAR  Two  ultraviolet ray 
DUV  tubes  in series 
Type  1 
Form  of  explosion 
TABLE  II 
Testing  of detectors 
Characteristics  of 
explosion 
Shot  of 40-50 kg  of  ex- Very  low  overpressure 
plosive fired  (6  kg  of 
rock  explosive  and  impro-
ved  coal  explosive)  in 
the  limestone  roadway, 
which  measures  10  m2  in 
cross-section and  150 m 
in length  (no  coaldust 
present) 
8  kg  dust  cloud  ignited  Speed  of  flame  at  96  m  : 
by  explosive metallife- 70  to  170 m/ s 
rous  gallery measuring 
2.5  m2  in cross-section 
and  144  m  in  length.  Dust 
condition:  400  g/m3  of 
pure  coal 
8  kg  dust  cloud  ignited 
lbY  explosive metallife-
rous  ~allery measuring 
2. 5  m  in cross-section. 
jnust  condition:  400  g/m3 
of  pure  coal 
8  kg  dust  cloud  ignited 
jby  explosive metallife-
ous  ~allery measuring 
2.  5  m  in cross-section. 
Dust  condition:  400  g/m3 
of  pure  coal 
8  kg  dust  cloud  ignited 
by  explosive.  Metallife-
ous  gallery of  2.5  m2. 
Dust  condition:  400  g/m3 
of  pure  coal 
Speed  of  flame  at 60  m  : 
60  to  85  m/s 
Speed  of  flame  at  96  m  : 
140  to  200  m/ s 
Speed  of  flame  at  72  m  : 
120  to  180 m/ s 
S~tuat~on at  aetector 
(In  relation to  the 
end  of  the roadway) 
8  m to  12  m 
96  m 
60  m 
96  m 
72  m 
Results  Remarks 
Functioned  3  times  in  6  tests·  Detector slightly sensitive 
failed  to  function  during  2  to  the  effects  of  a  normal 
tests at  12  m  shot being fired.  It should 
be  placed at  over  15  m  from 
the  face 
Detection  time  varying bet-
ween  -55  ms  to  +40  ms  compa-
red with detection time  by 
photodiode  OAP  12  (20  tests) 
Detection  time  varying  from 
-35  ms  to  -15  ms  compared 
with detection  time  by  photo-
diode  OAP  12 
Detection  time  varying bet-
ween  -40  ms  and  0  compared 
with detection  time  by  photo-
diode  OAP  12 
0  to +15  ms  compared with de-
tection time  by  photodiode 
OAP  12;  3  failures  out  of  7 
tests. 
3  failures  due  to cells not 
having  been  cleaned  (traces 
of tar and  dust) Cerchar 
Cerchar 
Cerchar 
Cerchar 
Cerchar 
Cerchar 
Cerchar 
Testing 
place 
Type  of 
detector 
GERCHAR 
DUV 
Type  1 
CERCHAR 
DUV 
Type  1 
CERCHAR 
DUV 
Type  1 
CERCHAR 
DUV 
Type  1 
CERCHAR 
DUV 
Type  1 
CERCHAR 
DUV 
Principle 
Two  ultraviolet ray 
tubes  in series 
(tubes  non-embedded) 
Two  ultraviolet ray 
tubes  in  series 
(embedded  tubes) 
Two  ultraviolet ray 
tubes  in series 
Two  ultraviolet ray 
tubes  in series 
Two  ultraviolet ray 
tubes  in series 
Type  2  Two  ultraviolet ray 
tubes  in parallel 
CERCHAR  Two  ultraviolet ray 
DUV  tubes  in parallel 
Type  2 
Form  of  explosion 
8  kg  of  dust  ignited by 
explosive.  Metalliferous 
gallery of  2  5  m2  Dust 
condition:  4~0  g/~3  of 
pure  coal 
8  kg  dust  cloud  ignited 
by  explosive.  Metallife-
rous  gallery  of  2. 5  m2 • 
Dust  condition:  400  g/m3 
of  pure  coal 
8  kg  dust  cloud  ignited 
by  explosive.  Limestone 
roadway  measuring  10  m2 
in cross-section.  Dust 
condition:  400  g/m3  of 
pure  coal 
8  kg  dust  cloud  ignited 
by  explosive.  Limestone 
roadway  measuring  10 m2 
in cross-section.  Dust 
condition:  400  g/m3  of 
pure  coal 
Section measuring  60  m3 
containing  10%  CH4  sea-
led  off and  ignited by 
10  g  of blasting powder. 
Roadway  measuring  10  m2 
in cross-section 
8  kg  dust  cloud  ignited 
by  explosive.  Metallife-
rous  ~allery measuring 
2.5  m  in cross-section. 
Dust  condition:  400  g/m3 
of  pure  coal 
8  kg  dust  cloud  ignited 
by explosive.  Limestone 
roadway  of  10 m2  in 
cross-section.  Dust  con-
dition:  400  g/m3  of  pure 
coal 
TABLE  II 
Testing  of  detectors  (Cont' d) 
Characteristics  of 
explosion 
Speed  of  flame at  96  m  : 
average  125  m/s 
Speed  of  flame  at  96  m  : 
150  to  200  m/ s 
Speed  of  flame at  15  m  : 
50  to  90  m/s 
Speed  of  flame  at  35  m  : 
55  to  90  m/s 
Speed  of  flame at  35  m  : 
30  to  60 m/s 
Speed  of  flame  at  15  m  : 
50  to  90 m/s 
Situation of  detector 
(In relation to  the 
end  of  the roadway) 
96  m 
96  m 
15  to  17  m 
35  m 
35  m 
72  m 
15  to  17  m 
Results  Remarks 
Time  varying  from  0  to 40  ms  The  UV  tubes  tend  to  become 
compared with detection  time  dust-clogged.  Frequent  clea-
by  photodiode  OAP  12;  failure ning necessary 
in  3  tests  out  of  14 
Time  varying  from  -350 ms  to 
35  ms  compared with detec-
tion  time  by  photodiode  OAP 
12.  5  failures  out  of  18 
tests 
-30 ms  to +240  ms  (average 
+55  ms)  compared with detec-
tion  time  by  photodiode  OAP 
12  (32  tests) 
4  tests.  Detection  time va-
rying  between  +50  ms  and  +80 
ms  in relation  to  time  by 
photodiode  OAP  12 
11  tests.  Detection  time  va-
rying  from  -10 ms  to +60  ms 
compared with detection  time 
by  photodiode  OAP  12 
The  dust  created by  the ini-
tial explosion has  a  consi-
derable effect.  Premature 
functioning  is probably  due 
to static electricity caused 
by  the air-blast 
-15  ms  to  -55  ms  compared  Detector  less affected by 
with detection  time  by  photo- dust 
diode  OAP  12 
-170  ms  to  -10 ms  compared 
with photodiode  OAP  12 
(10  tests) ANNEX  IX 
REPORT  ON 
•HAULAGE  POWERED  BY  LINEAR  MOTORS• 
(Adopted  by  the Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  at the  plenary  session  of 
3  rd  t1ay  1  9  7  4) . IX,  3 
1  Introduction 
At  its meeting  on  29  June  1971  the Mirles  Safety  and  Health Commission  studied 
and  adopted  the  report by  the  Working  Party  on Electrification on  the  task assigned  to 
it following  a  serious  accident  due  to  ignition of  firedamp  by  sparks  from  a  contact 
line of  an  electric haulage,  namely: 
'Comparison of  safety prov1s1ons  concerning 
electric  trolley  locomotives  underground; 
in particular, possibilities of  reducing  the 
incidence of  trolley sparks'. 
This  report  (1)  concluded  that it was  not  possible,  with present  knowledge,  to 
be  certain  to  avoid  all  sparks  in wire-contact haulage  transport. 
Having  learnt of  the  successful  work  carried out  in Gardanne  (Provence)  with 
ECSC  aid  on  a  system of  roadway  transport using  a  linear motor  trolley pan  system,  which 
excluded  the  formation  of  sparks  under  normal  circumstances  the Mines  Safety  and Health 
Commission  gave  the  Working Party  the  following  additional  terms  of  reference: 
'To  follow  the  development  of  techniques  designed 
to  eliminate entirely  the  production of  sparks 
on electrical contact  lines  (battery  locomotives 
excluded)  and  in particular  to  take  note of  the 
new  technique  of  traction by  linear motors'. 
In  compliance with  this  the  Working Party  on Electrification visited Gardanne 
to  examine  the  design  and  operation of  this  type  of  transport  and  especially  the  safety 
measures  put  in hand. 
After  a  study  1n  depth  the  Working Party  submitted  the  following  report. 
2  The  linear-motor  trolley pan  system 
2.1  p_~scription of  the  Gardanne  trolley pan  system. 
Metal  sections  of  1.5 m in length,  shaped  like gutters  are  attached  to 
one  another by  flexible  connections  to  form  a  continuous  trough  225  m long  along  the 
whole  length of  the  train;  this  train can operate  in winding  roadways.  Each  pan has 
a  two-wheel  bogie  and  a  ball-joint coupling  to  attach it to  the  axle of  the  preceding nan. 
The  train  thus  formed  runs  along  a  circuit  (Fig.  1  and  Photo  1){2)  consisting of  a  metal 
structure which  supports  two  superimposed  tracks  (one  outgoing,  one  return),  terminated 
by  large  'tipping wheels'(3}  (Photos  2  and  3).  In  the  loaded position  the  pans  run  on 
the  upper  track,  and  return upside  down  on  the  lower  (Fig.2). 
Technical  and  economic  studies  resulted  1n  the  selection of  the  optimum  length 
of  trains  at  225  m and with  four  units  to  achieve  an hourly  discharge  rate of  460  tonnes, 
required  to  load-out all  the  production  from  this  district. 
Other  factors  can be  variable  (increase of  speed,  greater length of  trains) 
according  to  changes  in  the  working  conditions. 
(1)  See  9th Report of the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission~ Annexe  X. 
(2)  see pages  IX~  11  nnd following. 
(3)  Of course  there is no  reason why  the  haulage  ways  should not be  laid side  by  side 
or even in separate  headings. IX,  4 
The  trains  are  propelled  by  linear motors. 
Safety braking  is  achieved  by  electrically controlled air brakes  (Photo  4) 
which  are  activated in  the  event  of  loss  of  power,  complete  failure  of  power  or  speed 
decrease  below  a  specified minimum  level. 
Braking  and  normal  deceleration are  achieved  by  reversal of  the  direction of 
traction of  the  motors. 
The  linear motor  used  in Provence  is  the  first  m~n~ng application in  the world 
of  a  system whose  original  patents were  taken out at  the  beginning of  the  century. 
It is  none  other  than  the  asymchronous  motor,  with  short-circuited rotor,  rolled out  in 
a  single plane(]).  The  linear motor  works  on  the  same  principle,  but  the  stator,  or  the 
inductor  (Photo  5),  comprises  the windings  and  emits  the  sliding  (no  longer  rotating) 
magnetic  field.  The  'rotor',  or  armature,  comprises  the  iron part necessary  for  closing 
the  lines  of  flux  emitted  by  the  inductor;  there  is  also  the  conducting  metal  elements, 
now  in  the  form  of  a  copper plate.  The  force  generated  by  the  sliding field acts  directly 
to  produce  the  transitory movement. 
The  inductor  is  a  compact  elastomer block,  provided with  a  terminal  box  for 
connection of  the  power  cable  and  a  second  terminal  box  for  attachment of  the  auxiliary 
circuit cables. 
The  armature  consists  of  a  steel plate on  the  bottom of  each  pan  into which  a 
2  mm  thick  copper plate is  cemented. 
The  air gap  between  the  inductor  and  the  armature  is  5  mm  for  the  upper  track 
and  7  mm  for  the  lower  track,  which  gives  a  'magnetic'  gap  of  7  and  9  mm  respectively, 
taking  into  account  the  2  mm  thickness  of  the  copper plate. 
There  is  thus  no  mechanical  connection between  the  inductor  (fixed)  of  the 
linear motor  and  its armature  (moving),  which  is part of  the  trolley  pan. 
The  power  supply  to  the  inductors  is  1  kV. 
2.2.  Operation 
The  inductors  are  placed between  the  rails of  the  haulage  track  and  along  its 
ax~s.  They  are  arranged  at intervals  around  the  whole  circuit in such  a  way  that  each 
train overlaps  a  certain number  of  inductor stations  (one  inductor station comprises 
two  inductors  on  the  upper  track  and  one  on  the  lower  track)  which will  ensure  that  the 
propulsive  effort  is  continuously  sustained.  All  inductors  are  identical. 
The  system is  automatically  controlled.  It is monitored  from  a  central  control 
room with  a  display  panel  (photo  6).  Each  inductor has  a  train presence  detector which 
only  allows  current  to  be  passed  to  the  inductors  when  armatures  are  present. 
(1)  An  ordinary  asynchronous motor is composed of a  stator and  a  rotor.  The  stator is 
is furnished  ~ith a  coil  ~hich can  create  a  rotating magnetic field.  The  rotor 
comprises  an  iron element  to  enclose  the  flux  lines  emitted by  the  stator and  a 
squirrel  cage  made  of a  conductive metal in  ~~ich the  induced current circulates. 
The  field emitted by  the stator intersects  the  bars of the  rotor squirrel cage  at 
right-angles  so  that  the  rotor contains  the  induced current.  The  interaction  bet~een 
the  rotating  field emitted by  the  stator~  and  the  current generated in the  rotor~ 
creates  forces  called Laplace  forces  ~hich act  on  the  bars of the  squirrel  cage~ 
normal  both  to  the  rotating field and  to  the  current.  These  forces  cause  the rotor 
to rotate  around its ax-ts. applied: 
IT,  5 
In order  to  avoid  collisions between  trains  the  following measures  are 
(a)  Automatic  speed  regulation: 
- 3  m/sec  1n  the  loading area, 
- 7  m/sec  1n  the  transfer area, 
- 2.3  m/sec  in the  unloading  area. 
These  lower  speeds  are  obtained  by  varying  the voltage  supplied  to  the 
inductors  by  means  of  thyristors; 
(b)  Automatic  traffic control: 
- By  chronometric  relays  which  cut off  the  supply  of  current  to  an 
inductor station immediately  beneath  a  pan,  if  insufficient  time  has 
elapsed  since  the  passage of  the  previous  train above  this  station; 
(c)  By  locking out: 
At  the  circuit ends,  cutting off all voltage  supply  to  the  inductor 
stations at least  250  m  ahead  of  the  last inductor  station of  a  train 
being  loaded  (or unloaded); 
-In a  transfer  zone  (at  7  m/sec),  causing  a  sudden  stop  if  two  speed 
reference  generators  400  m  apart are  affected simultaneously. 
A  train presence detector,  consisting of  two  permanent magnets  at  the  head  of 
the  pan  and  activating fixed  magnetic  circuit breakers,  ensures  the  abovementioned  control. 
2.3  Safety 
As  with  the  other  studies  carried out at  the  request  of  the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  the  Working  Party  on Electrification has  taken  into  account  the  three 
risks  which  may  arise  from  the  use  of  electricity  i.e.:  electrocution,  fire,  explosion. 
2.3.1  Electrocution hazard 
The  risk of  electrocution by  direct  contact  is  eliminated because  the  live 
parts  are  placed out  of  reach  either by  being  embedded  or  covered with  a  protective 
envelope.  The  risk of  indirect contact  is  eliminated  by  normal  methods  of  earthing  and 
equipotential  linking  of  simultaneously  accessible masses. 
2.3.2  Fire hazard 
The  risk of  fire  of  electrical origin is virtually eliminated  by  devices 
installed  to  reduce  overheating.  Thus  the  supply  of  current  to  the  inductors  is  only 
possible provided: 
(i)  sufficient  time  has  elapsed  s1nce  the  passage  of  the  preceding  train  (controlled 
by  chronometric  relays); 
(ii)  a  pan  is  present  above  them  (detected by  means  of  the  Permanent  magnet)  and  1s 
passing  at  a  speed  in excess  of  a  certain threshold  (0.3 m/sec). 
Below  this  speed  the  system as  a  whole  is  cut out); 
(iii)  their  temperature  is  below  the  detection  threshold of  the  temperature  probe  incorpor-
ated  into  the windings,  i.e.  10°C  less  than  the  maximum  temperature  for  the particu-
lar category  of  insulation. IX,  6 
The  precautions  taken  to  limit  inductor overheating also  cover  the  risk of 
armature overheating. 
It may  therefore  be  stated that  the  safety of  linear motors  in  terms  of  thermal 
hazards  is  at least equal  to  that of other electric motors. 
The  propagation of fire by  way  over  the  pans  is  impossible  owing  to  the  fact 
that  the  pans  are made  of metal  and  that  the  flexible  connections  are  discontinuous  and 
only  amount  to  one  third of  the  total  length of  a  train.  There  is  no  greater risk of 
fire  propagated  along  electrical  cables  than  in other installations,  owing  to  the  use 
of  flame-resistant  sheathing. 
2.3.3  Explosion  hazard 
Ignition of  an  explosive  atmosphere  surrounding  an  inductor station would only 
arise  from  the  overheating of  an  inductor or  an  armature  or  from  sparking or  arcing. 
However,  the  safety measures  applied  to  limit overheating  likely  to  cause  fire  (see  2.3.2 
above)  are  equally  applicable  to  the  explosion hazard. 
The  prevention of  arcing  and  sparking  due  to  electrical  causes  is  achieved  for 
the  inductors  by  insulation protection,  which  is  a  method  recognized  in France  for  the 
approval  of  equipment  for  use  in gassy  mines:  the windings  are  insulated with  class  H 
materials;  the  ends  of  the windings  are protected by  glass  cloth pre-impregnated with 
elastomer  and  by  fibreglass  screens  also  impregnated with  elastomer.  All  of  the windings 
are  then  embedded  under  vacuum  and  under pressure with  a  layer of  elastomer  and  placed 
in  a  solid metal  cradle which  protects  the  side  and  bottom surfaces  of  the  inductor. 
In  the  version presented for  acceptance  for  use  in gassy  mines,  the  completely 
sealed  terminal  boxes  were  given one  of  the methods  of protection which  may  also  be 
used  in  this  case. 
Arcing  and  sparking caused  by  friction of  the  armature  on  the  inductor  ~s 
prevented by: 
(a)  4  rollers  placed  around  each  inductor;  if the  2  forward  rollers  rotate,  owing  to  a 
reduction  in  the  airgap,  this  trips  the whole  system, 
(b)  the  use  in  the  air-gap of  a  couple  of anti-sparking metals  (copper/steel).  Arcing 
or  sparking  could  also  occur  in (i)  cracks  in the  copper  plate of  the  armature  (ii), 
across  gaps  between  two  consecutive plates or  (iii)  be  caused  by  induction of  current 
into metal  elements  other  than  those of  the  armature.  Cracking  of  the  copper plate 
is,  by  the  very  nature  of  the  design,  highly  improbable.  Nevertheless,  it has  been 
ascertained  that  the  voltage which  may  appear between  the  edges  of  an artificial 
split in  the  copper plate of  an  armature  is very  low:  calculations  carried out  under 
conditions  of  starting under  load of  the  trolley pan  system  indicated  that  a  voltage 
in the  order of  0.9  volts  could  be  expected.  Tests  showed  much  lower voltages  (in 
the  calculations  the  induced  currents  have  a  rectangular distribution,  whereas  in 
reality  they  are mainly  contained within  the non-split part of  the  copper plate). 
Arcing  between  two  consecutive  copper plates  (armatures  of  two  pans)  is  unlikely 
because  the  gap  of  about  2  em  caunot'be mechanically  reduced;  measuring  the  electromotive 
force  under  the  same  conditions  as  above  gives  similar results. 
Outside  the  space  bounded  by  the magnetic  circuit in the  inductor,  the  induction 
falls  sharply,  and  it is practically  zero at  the rails of  the  trolley pan  system.  It 
should  be  noted  that  induction only  exists when  a  train is  present  and  all  the  flux  is 
then  concentrated  in the  armatures.  The  small  distance between  armatures  (2  ern)  also 
prevents  any  induction in  the metal  parts  coupling  the  train components. IX,  7 
Inside  the  space  bounded  by  the  magnetic  circuits  in  the  inductor,  any  foreign 
body  may  act  as  an  'parasitic armature'  and may: 
(i)  cause  damage  to  the  inductor  and  the  armature  by  incrustation,  jamming  or  tearing; 
(ii)  heat up  owing  to  eddy  current effects. 
The  head  of  the  trolley pan  system is  equipped with  a  plough  to  sweep  away 
foreign bodies  more  than  about  10  mm  in  thickness.  This  plough also  has  a  flexible  apron 
which  moves  between  the  rollers  of  the  gap  control  device  and  brushes  the  surface of  the 
inductors,  thereby  removing  small  foreign bodies. 
This  prevents  the  continuing presence of all but very  thin  'parasitic armatures 
(not more  than  a  few  millimetres  thick)  on  the  inductors  which  are unable  to  cause 
mechanical  damage  to  the  surfaces  of  the  armature  or  the  inductor  by  jamming. 
If the  'parasitic armature'  is non-conductive  (coal,  rock)  its presence  does 
not  constitute a  hazard. 
If  the  'parasitic armature'  is  conductive but non-magnetic,  it is  expelled  from 
the  air gap  by  the  action of  the  moving  field  as  soon  as  the  inductor  is energized. 
If  the  'parasitic armature'  is  conductive  and magnetic,  it remains  attached 
to  the  inductor  and  heats  up. 
Tests  have  been  carried out with  a  'parasitic armature'  consisting of  a  mild 
steel plate  5  mm  thick covering  the  entire conductor  surface,  with  a  blocked normal 
armature- i.e.  the  most  unfavourable  case.  These  tests have  shown  that  the maximum 
temperature  reached was  600°C.  This  temperature was  only  reached after the  inductor  had 
been energized  for  15  minutes,  with  a  blocked  armature,  a  situation entirely ruled out 
by  the  various  precautions  mentioned  above. 
In view of  the  sweeping of  the  inductors  not  only  by  the  plough  apron  but  by 
the air stream caused  by  the vibrations of  the  trolley pan movement,  there is  no  danger 
of a  'parasitic armature'  making  contact with  coal  dust  thick enough  for  this  to  ignite. 
2.4  Operational  advantages 
The  trolley pan  is  a  system for  the  transport of bulk materials which  combines 
characteristics of both  conveyor belts  and mine  car  trains. 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
It is  capable of: 
complete  automation, 
installation in winding  roadways, 
continuous  loading, 
high  speeds,  high  rates  of  acceleration and  effective braking,  unaffected  by  the 
degree of wheel/rail  contact, 
use  in gassy  atmospheres. IX~  8 
3.  Conclusions 
Complying with  the  supplementary  remit(l}  given  to it by  the  Mines  Safety 
and  Health Commission  on  29  June  1971  to  follow  the  development of  techniques  designed 
to  eliminate entirely the  production of  sparks  in electrical haulage  (battery  locomotives 
excluded),  the  Working  Party on Electrification,  in its report  on  firedamp  explosion 
risks,  noted  that  in  the method  of linear motor  propulsion,  as  seen  and  described  above, 
there is  no  spark production  in normal  operation.  Moreover,  thanks  to  measures  initiated 
during  installation and  operation of  this  new  transport  system,  the hazard  of accidental 
spark production can only  be minimal. 
The  study  of  this  method  of  transport has  also  enabled  the  Working  Party  on 
Electrification to  establish  that other electrical hazards,  i.e.  electrocution and  fires, 
are  avoided.  In addition,  the  absence  of  friction sources  and  the  composition of  the 
trolley pan  system do  not  favour  fire propagation,  which  are  advantages  compared  with 
belt conveyors. 
Lastly,  the  Working  Party noted  that  the  French Ministerial  Safety Commission 
was  1n  favour  of  the  linear motor. 
In  conclusion,  the  Working Party,  in compliance with its supplementary  terms 
of  reference,  thus  considers  that  this  new  form  of  transport  should  be  encouraged, 
where  conditions  are  appropriate. 
(1)  Cited in the  Introduction. IX,  9 
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MINISTRY  OF  ECONOMIC  AFFAIRS 
MINES  INSPECTORATE 
SUBJECT:  PREVENTION  OF  OUTBURSTS  OF  FIREDAMP 
Brussels,  1st March  1973 
To  Divisional  Inspectors 
of Mines 
Outbursts  recently occurring  in France,  Germany  and  Belgium have  led  me  to 
recall  certain principles  aimed  at preventing such  accidents  in  the  future. 
Studies  carried out  in our  country  and  by  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities  during  recent  years  have  led  to  a  better understanding of  the  mechanism of 
outbursts  and  to  the  adoption of  preventive measures. 
This  circular aims  to  explain  the  mechanism of  an outburst,  to  focus  the  atten-
tion  of  the  management  on  the  zones  where  this  is  likely,  to  give  the  warning  signs  of  a 
seam with  such  outbursts  and  especially  to  seek preventive  and  precautionary measures 
against  such  accidents. 
1.  Mechanism of  an  outburst 
The  mechanism of  a  sudden  outburst  1s  readily  deduced  from  an  understanding of  normal 
gas  emission  in  a  coal  seam. 
Firedamp  originating  from  the  decomposition of  organic  matter  1n its biochemical  and 
geochemical  stages  of  transformation of vegetable matter  into  coal,  will  be  found 
captive  between  the  coal  particles  (below  .03  micron)  and  adsorbed  on  the  internal 
surface  of  the  cavities  formed  between  the particles. 
At  the  prevailing temperature  of most  underground workings  the  concentration of  coal 
gas  as  a  function  of pressure presents  an  asymptotic  picture,  the  asymptote  of  which 
will  be  found  at about  thirty cubic  metres  of  firedamp  per  tonne  for  very  gassy  coal. 
This  1s  called  the  "adsorption isotherm". 
Due  to  the  opening  up  of  a  seam,  the  captive  and  adsorbed  firedamp  in  the  seam  is 
progressively  and  slowly  emitted  by  a  simple  grain separation as  the  coal  is dislodged. 
The  fissures  forming  near  the  working  increase  the  permeability of  the  solid  thereby 
enabling  the  slow  and  progressive release  of  firedamp  held  and  adsorbed  in under  and 
overlying strata.  This  is  known  as  normal  emission. 
A  sudden  outburst  occurs  when  the  grains  of  coal  break  up  and  separate  1n  a  very  short 
time. 
A block  of  coal which  is  crushed  breaks  up  into  a  number  of  smaller  sized  grains.  If 
such  coal  is  introduced  into  a  metal  tube  (i.e.  into  a  container where  pressure  of  a 
piston  crushes  this  coal  into  infinitely small  powder  (particles or flour)  and  an 
orifice  is made  in  the  tube,  the  powdered  coal  is  expelled  by  this pressure.  An 
outburst  is  therefore  a  form of  emission.  in  a  very  short period of  time,  of  the X,  4 
firedamp  which  carries with it the  fine  coal  as  it escapes  through  the  hole,  1.e. 
by  rupturing  the  container  encasing  the  coal. 
Outbursts  are  violent disruptions  of  the  equilibrium. 
They  are  characterized  by  the  sudden  liberation of  a  large quantity of  firedamp  and 
the  violent  ejection of  coal  and  possibly  rock. 
Three  factors  operate  simultaneously  in  the  causation  and  progress  of an  outburst: 
(i)  Presence  of  firedamp 
Firedamp  pressure  and  concentration  in  the  seam are  interlinked  by  the  adsorption 
isotherm,  referred  to  above,  but  their roles  in outbursts  are different.  The 
adsorbed  gas  which  expands  up  to  atmospheric  pressure acts  in  a  way  which 
assists  the  progress  of  the  outburst by breaking out  and  ejecting  the  product 
over  a  distance~ 
(ii)  Rock  stress,  which  acts  on  the  mechanical  degradation of  the  coal  solid  and  on 
the  circulation of  gas  in this  solid. 
Ahead  of  the  face  there  is  a  stress gradient  on  which  the  gas  pressure  gradient 
depends,  since  the  coal,  being microfissured,  is  that  much  more  permeable  as  it 
is  subjected  to  increased stress. 
(iii) Structure  and  fissurizations  of  coal 
On  fissurization  depend: 
- tensile  resistance; 
- initial desorption rate  of  the  gas; 
- and  the  permeability  of  the  solid  ahead  of  the  face.  Here  it should  not  be 
forgotten  that  certain fissured  coals  undergo  a  lowering  in permeability 
under  exceptional  stress,  as  already  stated. 
To  sum  up,  an  outburst  occurs  in  a  zone  of  fissured  coal  and  under  stress at 
the  moment  the  containing  'ring' (1) is broken 
Thus  it is  the  pulverization of  coal  which  allows  abundant  gas  emission  and  the 
process  only  stops  when  counteracted  by  the  high  resistance  to  flow  of pulverised material 
1n  roadway  or  face. 
The  ejection of  coal  can  be  anything  from  a  few  tonnes  to  several  thousand 
tonnes  and  the  amount  of  gas  released  can  therefore  reach  anything  from  a  few 
hundred  cubic  metres  to  several  tens  of  thousands. 
2.  Locations  liable  to  outbursts 
Are  there  sites where  sudden outbursts  may  occur  more  frequently? 
Seam  intersection  and  driving roads  etc.  in  seams  liable  to  outbursts  are  particularly 
dangerous. 
In  a  given  seam,  the  liability to  sudden  outbursts usually  increases with  greater 
depth  because  the  pressure  and  concentration of  gas  increases  proportionately  to  the 
depth  of  the  deposit. 
Since  outbursts  occur  in  zones  under  stress,  any  location where  the  stresses  may 
increase  is  a  site liable  to  such  an  event. 
The  proximity  of  faulted  zones,  shattered  zones,  zones  in which  the  seam has  irregular 
configuration,  pinched-out  zones,  'wash-out'  zones  are  sites where  additional  tectonic 
or  sedimentary  stress obtain. 
(1)  'ring'  in this  sense is the solid coal in advance  of the  head~  which retains  the 
occluded gas. X,  5 
It is  known  that  a  face  being worked  is preceded  by  a  zone  of  heavy  pressure or 
frontal  abutment.  Zones  with  lateral  abutments  of  over  or  underlying strata which 
have  been already worked  are  also  subject  to  considerable  stresses. 
The  intersections  of  face  ends  and  gate  roads,  where  the  relief is  counteracted 
because  it acts  in both vertical directions,  are  also  suspect  locations. 
In  addition,  the  action  of  the  pressure  on  rise headings  may  break  the  'ring' (1)  by  a 
simple  roof  fall  in  the  presence  of  personnel,  and  this  must  be  taken  into  account. 
In strata particularly prone  to  outbursts it is better  to  carry  out  development 
work  to  the  dip. 
Lastly,  too  great  a  weakening  of  the protective  'ring'  may  also  arise if too  large 
relaxation boreholes,  too  close  to  one  another,  are drilled or  when  water  infusion 
under  heavy  pressure  is  carried  out  in holes  at right angles  to  the  face  and  of  short 
depth. 
It should  be  noted  that  an  outburst  is often preceded  by  sounds  similar  to  cracking 
or  a  roll of  thunder  and  by  crackling of  the  strata. 
3.  Indices  of  susceptibility of  a  seam  to  outbursts 
The  liability of  a  seam  to  show  signs  of  outbursts  can  be  defined  by: 
(i)  the  methane  concentration which  can  be  emitted by  the  coal  (C);  it is expressed 
in  m3  firedamp  per  nett  tonne;  and 
(ii)  the  fissurization of  the  coal  expressed  by  the  index of  the  liability of  the  coal 
to  release its methane  rapidly  (index  6P:  see Annex  1). 
The  hazard  may  also  be  assessed  by  means  of  two  supplementary  indices: 
(i)  initial desorption rate  (V1)  expressed  in  cm3  per  10  gram of  calibrated 
drillings  (see  Annex  2). 
This  initial desorption rate  is  a  good  danger  index  since it depends  both  on 
the  methane  concentration  ~n coal  (C)  and  its liability to  release its methane 
rapidly  (6P). 
(ii)  the  volume  and  the  force  of  the  ejected material  when  relaxation boreholes  are 
drilled with diameters  between  85  and  115  mm. 
For  coals whose  meghane  concentration  (C)  lies between  10  and  20  m3  per  tonne  it 
can  be  said  that: 
(i)  if the 6P  percentages  of  indices,  obtained  by  an  appropriately representative 
sample  range,  of  over  20  do  not  exceed  15%,  the  seam is not  dangerous; 
(ii)  if the  percentages  of 6P  indices  of over  20  do  exceed  15%,  the  seam  may  be 
dangerous; 
(iii)  every 6p  index of  over  30  may  be  the  sign of  the  imminence  of  a  geological 
disturbance  or of  an  increased  risk of  sudden outburst. 
In  any  event,  panels  in which 6P  indices  are  above  20  may  be  considered  as  no  longer 
liable  to  outbursts  provided it can be  established  that: 
(i)  the  initial desorption rate  (V1)  values  at  3  m depth are  below  1  cm3/10  gram 
of  coal; 
(ii)  large  diameter  boreholes  do  not  cause materials being ejected. 
{1)  'rin7'  in this  sense is  the solid coal in advance  of the  head~  which retains  the 
occ  (uded gas. X,  6 
On  the  other  hand,  an  initial desorption rate  (V1)  at  3  m depth  containing between 
1  and  2  cm3/1/  grams  of  coal  is  considered  suspect,  while  a  rate  equal  to  or  over 
2  cm3/10  grams  is  regarded  as  dangerous. 
4.  Preventive Measures 
The  understanding of  the  mechanism of outbursts  enables  several  types  of  preventive 
measures  to  be  distinguished: 
(i)  prior working  of  a  'master'  seam; 
(ii)  roof  control  by  caving  in  longwall  faces; 
(iii)  inducer  shotfiring; 
(iv)  relaxation boreholes; 
(v)  satisfactory positioning of  the  roadhead  in relation  to  the  face; 
(vi)  inducing shotfiring and/or prior hydraulic  undermining  to  intersect  a  seam 
by  means  of  a  cross-cut. 
At  the  winning  stage  certain precautions,  dealing with  the  positioning of  roadways  1n 
relation  to  tectonic  faults,  to pillars  and  to  winning  limits,  can  reduce  risks. 
'Inducing shotfiring',  or  the  'offensive'  method,  consists  in  breaking  the  'ring'  when 
all personnel  is withdrawn. 
Relaxation boreholes  ahead  of  the  'ring',  i.e.  in  the  compressed  zone,  are  regarded 
as  a  'defensive'  method  consisting  in  relaxing  the  solid. 
Inducing  shotfiring,  known  for  some  forty years,  has  already been  the  subject of 
recommendations  contained  in my  circular of  27th  March  1957,  No.  110.  1/113/856, 
implementing  the  Royal  Decree  of  12th  September  1955  on  the  use  of  explosives  in 
underground  mine  workings  - Section II - supplementary  recommendations  on  outbursts 
of  firedamp. 
The  method  of relaxation boreholes  of  large  diameter  consists  in preceding  the  drivage 
of horizontal  or  inclined  drivages  in  the  seam  by  a  pattern of boreholes,  85  to 
115  mm  in diameter,  which  have  to  be  renewed  once  the  area  covered  by  the  previous 
pattern is  reduced  to  5  m. 
With  roadways,  although  each  case  is different,  it is often possible  to  work  out  a 
drilling pattern consisting of  boreholes  radiating out  in  the  direction of  the 
heading.  Lateral  boreholes  should  be  sufficiently divergent  to protect  roadway  walls. 
Large  diameter  relaxation boreholes  should  be  drilled  in adequate  but  not  excessive 
numbers.  In highly  reactive  seams  the drilling of  holes  is  accompanied  by  heavy 
furrows  and  an  abnormal  enlargement  of  the  holes.  If  the  boreholes  are  too  numerous 
or  too  close  together,  large cavities  ahead  of  the  face  result  and  the  loss  of 
cohesiveness  in  the  solid  to  a  point where  it can  no  longer  resist  the  dynamic  effect 
of  an  outburst originating at depth,  for  example,  when  new  relaxation boreholes 
h&ve  been drilled.  Outbursts  may  then  occur due  to  the  absence  of  the  ring or  a 
break  in  an  unduly  fragile  ring. 
To  reduce  stress effects  the  headings  of  faceroads  should  be  outside  the  zone  of 
frontal  abutment  which  precedes  the  face. 
In  the  face,  boreholes will  usually be drilled  with diameters  between  85  and  115  mm. 
Boreholes  should  be  kept  5  min  advance  of  the  face  at all  times.  The  distance 
between boreholes  should  be  fixed  according  to  the  seams  susceptibility and  whether 
it is  being exploited  in  an  unworked  area  or  are protected  by  a  'master'  face.  As X,  7 
with  roadways,  it is advisable  to  avoid  drilling an  excessive  number  of  holes  which 
may  lead  to  lost  cohesiveness  in  the  solid  and  the breaking of  the  ring. 
In certain particularly difficult cases,  in both  faces  and  roadways,  the diameter 
of boreholes  may  be  reduced  to  60  mm.  In  such  cases  the depth  may  be  reduced,  but 
not below  3  m. 
The  effectiveness  of  the  protective measures  may  be verified  by  the  measurement: 
(i)  of  the  lowering of  the  gradient  of  gas  concentration  ahead  of  the  face; 
(ii)  of  the  lowering of  gas  concentration at  a  constant  depth  ahead  of  the  face; 
(iii)  of  the  lowering  of  the  vl  indices; 
(iv)  of  firedamp  emission  ln  the  ventilation air  stream after  inducing  shotfiring; 
and  by  establishing the  absence  of  reaction  to  exploratory boreholes. 
All  relaxation boreholes  and  sites of  sampling  to  determine  the  fissurization  index 
(6P)  and  desorption rate  index  (Vl)  should  be  carefully plotted  on  a  plan of  suitable 
scale,  for  example  1/200 or  1/100.  The  results  of  samplings  should  also  be  recorded 
on  these  plans  using  the  following  conventional  symbols: 
a  triangle  to  represent  6P  and  a  circle  to  represent desorption  rate.  (V1).  The  6P 
valuPs  equal  or above  30  to  be  coloured  red  as  also  the  V1  values  equal  or  above 
2  cm3/10  gram.  6P  values  equal  or  above  20  but  below  30  should  be  coloured  orange, 
as  also  the  Vl  values  equal  or  above  1  cm3/10  gram but below  2  cm3/10  gram.  Finally, 
6P  values  below  20  shall  be  shown  in green  as  also  the v1  values  below  1  cm3/10  gram. 
5  Precautionary Measures 
The  provisional  lagging of  the  face  is desirable  to  extinguish  an  incipient outburst. 
Water  dispersion with  compressed  air during drilling is  an  effective means  of  dust 
suppression.  It improves  visibility if  the  withdrawal  of  personnel  is  required.  The 
water  also  consolidates  the  walls  of  the  hole  and  thereby  reduces  the  erosion noted 
during  ejections. 
Roadway  obstruction  should  also be  reduced  to  allow  easy  and  quick withdrawal  of 
personnel. 
During drilling a  good  assessment  of  the  possible volume  of  ejected material  should 
be  made  to  ensure  that  excessive  cavities  are  not  being  created  in  the  seam. 
If  the  boreholes  are  very  reactive it is  advisable  to  reduce  the  diameter  to  limit  the 
total  volume  of material  ejected  and  thereby  the  extension of  cavities. 
Deformed  drill  rods  should  be  rejected  so  as  to  limit  the  distortion of holes. 
The  ventilation of  faces  and  drivages  should  be  augmented  so  as  to  be  able  to  dilute 
a  fast  firedamp  emission quickly.  If it is  substantial,  it is  likely  to  reduce  the 
oxygen  concentration  in  the  air  to  a  value  below  17%,  leading  to  asphyxia  due  to 
oxygen  deficiency  in  the  bloodstream. 
Finally,  maintaining  an  auxiliary air intake way  a  few  metres  above  the air intake 
way  is  conducive  to  good  ventilation in  the  face  and  enables  personnel  to be with-
drawn  readily,  if an  outburst  should  close  the  face  end. 
Divisional  Inspectors  together with  the  management  are  requested  to establish  which 
coal  seams  are  most  liable  to  show  signs  of  outburst of  firedamp. X,  8 
If,  in  such  seams,  the  indices  of  fissurizations  (6P)  or  desorption rate  (Vl), 
forecast  a  certain risk of outbursts  of  firedamp,  one  or  other,  or  several 
simultaneously,  of  the  preventive  or precautionary measures  indicated  above  should 
be  applied. 
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Annex  1 
MEASUREMENT  OF  ~p  INDEX 
Measurements  are  to be  carried out  as  follows. 
Samples  of  3  g  of  coal  (8  at one  time),  of  a  chosen size,  are first degassed 
with  a  vacuum  pump.  They  are  then  saturated with helium,  under  atmospheric  pressure, 
then  in  turn  connected with  a  vessel of  known  volume,  in which  a  vacuum  is  created  each 
time.  The  increase  in pressure  (p1)  in the  vessel  is measured,  which  is  produced 
almost  at once  by  the  expansion of  the  helium.  The  pressure  increase  (pl)  in  the vessel 
equals  the  pressure  caused  by  the  release  of  the  free  fraction of  any  gas  contained  in 
the  coal. 
After  the  helium measurement,  the  containers  are  again  degassed  and  then  the 
samples  are  saturated with  methane  at atmospheric pressure.  The  samples  are  in  turn 
connected with  the  vacuum vessel  and  the  increase  in pressure  in  the  vessel  is measured 
after  60  seconds  (p2). 
~2 
From  these  two  pressures,  the  index  ~p 0-60  or  ~p  1s  measured: 
pressure  increase  1n  the  vacuum vessel  due  to  helium  expansion. 
pressure  increase  due  to  methane  expansion initially,  augmented  by  its desorption, 
read  after  60  seconds. 
Annex  to  my  circular No  181,  ind.  73/B/67  of 1st March  1973. 
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Annex  2 
MEASUREMENT  OF  DESORPTION  RATES  V1 
The  V1  index of desorption rate  is  the  amount  of  firedamp  expressed  in  cm3  which 
a  10  gram  coal  sample  of  size  500-800  microns  emits  into  the  atmosphere  between  the  35th 
and  70th  second  after it has  been broken  away  from  the  solid. 
This  index  is measured  underground with  the  aid  of  a  desorbometer with dial 
where  the  volume  measurement  is  replaced  by  measurement  of  p~essure increases  caused  by 
by  the  emission of  gas  in an area of  constant  volume,  the  dial  of  the  device  recording 
cm3/10  gram directly. 
The  depth of  sample  taking  is  generally  3  to  4  m.  Once  the  borehole  reaches 
the  selected  sampling  depth,  the  hole  is  quickly  cleared of drillings.  Drilling is 
resumed  and  a  timing  device  started.  This  is  0  time  of  the  measurement  - and  the 
drillings are  recovered  onto  a  double,  square-meshed  screen,  0.8  mm  and  0.5  mm. 
After  screening,  10  gram  of  the  coal  remaining  on  the  0.5  mesh  screen  is  taken 
with metal  or plastic measuring  gauge,  which  has  been  carefully  checked  for  volume. 
This  sample  is  introduced  into  the  hollow  sleeve of  the  desorbometer which  is  then 
sealed  by  a  rubber  stopper  pushed  in  10  mm. 
When  35  seconds  have  elapsed  the orifice set  1n  the  desorbometer  sleeve  is 
sealed with  the  thumb  and  the  second-hand  is observed  to  move  from  35  to  70.  At  70 
seconds  the v1  (cm3/10  gram)  is  read  from  the dial. 
Note  that  the  first  35  seconds  (0  to  35)  comprise: 
- the  time  of  moving  the  drillings  into  the  sampling; 
- the  time  of  screening and  gauging  the  sample; 
- the  time  of  introducing  the  sample  into  the  sleeve of  the  desorbometer  up  to  the 
sealing of  the orifice. 
Annex  to  my  circular No  181,  ind.  73/B/67  of 1st March  1973. 
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GUIDE  LINES  CONCERNING  THE  DESIGN  AND  USE  OF  COAL  GETTING  AND  HEADING  MACHINES 
RELATING  TO  THE  REDUCTION  OF  AIRBORNE  DUST 
(adopted  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission 
at its meeting  of  3rd.  May  1974) XI,  3 
Guide  lines  concerning  the  Design and  Use  of Coal  Getting  and  Heading Machines, 
relating  to  the  reduction of  airborne dust 
INTRODUCTION 
(adopted  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission at its peniary meeting of  3rd.  May  1974, 
and  in accordance with Articles  1  and  4  of its 
Mandate,  proposed  for  implementation to  Governments 
of  member  countries) 
1.  In its  position statement'  of  26th  June  1970  on  the  need  to  reduce  the  make  of  dust 
arising  from  the  use  of  coal  getting and  heading machines,  the Mines  Safety  & Health 
Commission stated  that  the  increased mechanisation  imposed  on modern undertakings 
brought  about  an  increased  make  of  dust  at ,,JOrk  places  because machines  were  used 
which  right  from  the  design stage,  lacked  adequate  means  of  preventing  an  unaccept-
able  make  of  dust;  the  additional  steps  which  producers  were  forced  to  take  are 
often no  more  than partial palliatives. 
2.  It is  clear  therefore  that  close  collaboration between producers  and manufacturers 
is  both  necessary  and  urgent  if machines  are  no  longer  to  be  introduced underground 
which,  though  giving  the  necessary  productivity,  often cannot  be  used  because  they 
produce  excessive dust.  The  Commission  accordingly  advocated  drawing  up  a  model 
specification for  the  use  of producers  to  help  them  to  formulate  their requirements 
in  the  dust  field vis  a  vis manufacturers. 
3.  The  purpose  of  the  present  recommendations  is  to  promote  this  collaboration by  drawing 
the  attention of  the  users  to  the  minimum  requirements  which  they  should  demand; 
constructors  should  respect  these  guidelines  when  designing  their machines.  They 
should  also  give  guidance  to  the  users  concerning  the utilisation of  their machines. 
The  requirements  for  the  constructors  are  contained  in paragraphs  10  to  16,  19  and 
20. 
4.  At  this  stage  there  is  no  question of  laying  down  common  conditions  for  the  approval 
of machines  nor  of  defining  Community  dust  levels  but  only  of  setting out  technical 
conditions  for maintaining  a  consistently acceptable  atmosphere  at work  places  for 
the  purposes  of  current  legislation.  On  the other hand,  because  of  the  rapidity of 
technical  evolution,  the  recommendations  contain only  those  principles which  look  like 
remaining valid however  mining  techniques  may  develop;  they are  therefore  to  be 
elaborated  as  and  when  progress  is made  with  research. 
5.  It is  useful  to  recall  that  the  principal parameters  which  bear on  the  release  and 
concentration of  dust  are:  the  dust  content  of  the  intake air;  the  characteristics 
of  the mineral  to  be  won;  the water  content  of  the  seam;  the  hardness  of  the  coal 
or  rock;  the  method  of  coal  getting and  the  degree  of  fragmentation of  the  coal; 
the  methods  of  spraying  toese  places  and  removing  the  cut  coal;  and  finally  the 
volume  and  speed  of  the  air passing over  the machine. 
6.  In order  to  take  account  of  the  different working  conditions  of  each  type  of machine, 
a  distinction must  be  made  between coal-getting and  road-heading machines  (1). 
(1)  The  users of special purpose machines  such as  inpact machines  and  ANF  type  machines~ 
should in each  case make  known  their special requirements  to manufacturers basing  them 
on  the  general  considerations  in this  document. XI,  4 
7.  Since  the Mines  Safety  & Health Commission's  statement  in 1970,  the  development  of 
powered  supports  and  of  crushing plant have  resulted  in new  and  important  sources 
of  dust  in working  places. 
These  problems  are being  studied but  no  account  1s  taken of  them  in the  present 
recommendations. 
COAL-GETTING  MACHINES 
8.  General 
8.1  The  concentration of dust  in  the  intake air  to  production faces  must  be  kept  as 
low  as  possible. 
8.2  In working  areas  the  moisture  content of  the  coal  to  be  won  has  an  important  influ-
ence  on  the  make  of dust.  It is made  up  in part of  the  natural  moisture  of  the 
coal  to  be  won  and  in part of  additional  moisture  infused  into  the  seam;  infusion 
when  necessary  and  practicable  should  be  carried out  independently  of  coal-getting 
cycles. 
8.3  Since  the  make  of  dust  fundamentally  depends  on  the  breakage  of  the  coal  and  stone 
it is  essential  that all machines  be  designed  and  operated  so  as  to  minimise 
fragmentation both  during  the  getting operation  and  during  transfer between  the 
machine  and  the  conveyor. 
8.4  Cutting  in stone produces  a  disproportionate  amount  of harmful  dust.  Unnecessary 
cutting  in  roof  or  floor  should be  avoided  in normal  conditions  by  maintaining 
proper  cutting horizons. 
9.  Drum  Power-Loaders-Operation 
9.1  Water  spraying  must  be  provided  on  power  loaders. 
9.2  Sprays  should  be  directed as  closely as  possible  to  the  places  where  the  dust  is 
produced  and  raised. 
Spraying  can be  of  two  kinds: 
a)  Spraying  from  the  interior of  the  ~utting drum  to  limit dust  pr®duction  during 
the  cutting operation - by  sending water either  through  jets near  the  picks  or 
through  holes  in  the picks. 
b)  External  spraying  to  neutralise  the  dust  raised by  the  projection of products 
into  the  airstream and  during  transport. 
9.3  To  avoid blockage  clean water must  be  brought  to  the  jets at  a  minimum  pressure of 
10  atmospheres  and  at  a  rate of at least  50  litres  a  minute  for  each  drum  and  20 
litres  a  minute  for  external  sprays.  An  auxiliary  pump  may  prove  necessary  to 
provide  the  pressures  and  outputs  needed  for  effective spraying.  Experience  has 
shown  that water  supply  pipes  must  be  at least  25  mm  in diameter. 
9.4  To  minimise  fragmentation  the  speed of  travel  of  power  loaders  should  be  kept  as 
high  as  practicable  and  the  drum  speed  as  low  as  practicable.  The  condition of  the 
picks  should  be  checked  regularly  and blunt picks  replaced. 10. 
10.1 
10.2 
10.3 
10.4 
10.5 
10.6 
11. 
11.1 
11.2 
11.3 
11.4 
11.5 
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Construction of  Power  Loaders 
To  ensure minimal  breakage  of  the  coal: 
Picks  should be  as  few  as  possible;  their shape  and  distribution on  the  drum 
should  be  such  that  the  coal  is  not  broken unnecessarily. 
The  body  of  the  drum  should be  designed  to  transfer continously  the  cut  coal  to 
the  conveyor  as  to  avoid build-up,  the  need  for clearing up  and  consequent  secondary 
breakage  of  the  product,  as  well  as  unnecessary  projection into  the  airstream. 
The  drum  should be  capable  of  removing  more  coal  that it cuts. 
The  speed of  travel  of  the  power  loader  should be variable while  ~n motion. 
The  drum  speed  should  be variable;  a  maximum  pick speed of  4  metres/second  ~s 
suggested. 
Provision should  be  made  for  adjusting  the height  of  the  drum  to  avoid  cutting in 
roof  and  floor.  It is  an  advantage  to  provide  facilities  for  automatic  control 
by  suitable sensing  devices  wherever  these  can be  used. 
To  ensure  effective  spraying,  machines  should be  provided with: 
a  water filtering arrangement; 
piping  to  take  the water  to  the  inside of  the  drum.  The  junction between  the  body 
of  the  machine  and  the  drum  should  be  made  by  a  gland  designed  for  a  pressure well 
above  the  working  pressure; 
distribution channels  in  the  drum  to  take  the water  to  the picks; 
pipes  with  a  sufficiently large  internal diameter  to  allow  an  adequate  supply  of 
water without  excessive  loss  of pressure.  Account  must  be  taken of  the  fact  that 
already  or  in  the  near  future  production methods  may  call  for water  supplies  of, 
for  example,  200  litres  a  minute  at  a  pressure  of  15  atmospheres; 
one  or more  systems  to  feed  the  external  sprays.  The  position of  the jets,  (for 
example  on  the  body  of  the  machine  and/or  on  the  cowl),  the  direction of projection, 
the  diameter  and  operating angle  of  the  jets - should all be  adaptable  to  operating 
conditions. 
12.  To  complete  the  dust  suppression arrangements,  particularly in view of  the  use  of 
more  and  more  powerful  machines  it is  necessary: 
- to  provide  an  automatic water  control  system  to  ensure  that water is  flowing  before 
the  drum  can  rotate.  An  'override'  system  should  be  provided,  for  use  by  fitting 
staff only; 
to  design  the  machine  to  permit  the  fitting of  a  cowl. 
The  possibility of  fitting  a  dust  extractor  to  the  machine  should  be  allowed  for 
in  case  the  means  already  described  prove  inadequate. 
13.  Coal  Ploughs 
While with  power  loaders  the  release of  dust  depends  primarily on  the  construction 
and  operation of  the  machine,  in  the  case of ploughs  the main  factors  are  the natural XI,  6 
moisture  content  of  the  coal  and  the  degree  of water  infusion of  the  seam OJ. 
It is  therefore  fundamental  on  ploughed  faces,  to  infuse  the  seam  correctly.  Where 
infusion is  impossible or insufficient plough  runs  should be  sprayed either perma-
nently  or during  the  passage  of  the  plough  only;  alternatively sprays  should  be 
fitted  on  the  plough itself.  The  methods  outlined  for  external  spraying  on  drum 
power-loaders  apply  equally  to  ploughs.  In  addition spraying must  be  adequate  on 
the  plough  runs  and  at  the  discharge points  between  faces  and  transport  roads. 
ROAD  HEADING  MACHINES 
General 
14.  Different considerations  apply  to  the  construction of  machines  depending  on whether 
they  cut exclusively  in coal  or  in stone.  The  measures  to  be  observed  for  certain 
machines  cutting exclusively  in the  seam  and  in conditions  similar  to  those where 
power  loaders  are  used,  are  in  line with  those  advocated  for  shearers  except  that 
special  arrangements  are  needed  for  ventilation. 
15.  For  the  great majority  of machines  cutting  in coal,  in stone  or  in both,  fragmen-
tion of  the  product  is  much  greater  and  involves  a  corresponding  increase  in  the 
make  of  dust;  adequate  de-dusting  should  be  obligatory.  Makers  of  de-dusting 
equipment  should  instruct  the  technical  services  of  producers  in its use  and 
maintenance. 
16.  Collaboration between  coal  producers  and  the  makers  of  machines  and  of  de-dusting 
equipment  is  accordingly  essential.  It is  noted  that  in practice machine  manufact-
urers  do  not  usually  make  de-dusters  and  that  the manufacturers  of  de-dusters  are 
insufficiently informed  of  the particular problems  of  de-dusting on machines 
operating underground. 
Recommended  Technical  Measures  Relating  to  Ventilation and  Air Filtration (2) 
17.  Dust  released  on  the  face  must  be  prevented  from  diffusing  to  the  place where 
miners  are working. 
a)  In  the  case  of  forcing ventilation  through  ducts,  the  de-dusting  equipment  should 
be  matched with  the  machine;  the  following  sketch  shows  examples  of heading 
machines  and  ~ull face  cutting  (b)  (Sketch A). 
(1)  ~~e the  recommendation of the Mines  Safety & Health  Commission  of 26  June  1970 
containing directives  on  the methods of combatting dust in underground workings. 
(2)  Without  prejudice  to  the measures  to be  taken  to reduce  other hazards  - methane  noise~ 
heat~  humidity~  etc.  ~ S  Dust  cloud 
a)  open 
b)  closed  by  dust 
screen 
SV  Heading  machine 
E  De-duster 
XI,  7 
A  Extraction  ducts 
1  Ventilation duct 
LV  Dividing duct 
V Total  air output 
VA  Extracted air 
Diagram of ventilation  and  de-dusting of  road  heading machines 
Sketch A XI,  8 
b)  In  the  particular case of auxiliary extraction ventilation the result  can be 
got  by  the suitable placing of air intakes  very  close  to  the  face;  the  air is 
then de-dusted  by  fixed  apparatus  behind  the  face.  (See  sketch B). 
de-duster 
Sketch  B 
18.  When  air 
18.  When  air filtration is necessary  the  choice  of filter will  depend  on  the  concen-
tration of  respirable dust  upwind  of  the  filter and  the quantity of air brought 
to  the  face.  It is  always  important  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  prevent  dust 
being released during  transport of  the  product. 
Recommendations  on  the  construction of Heading Machines 
19.  The  number  of  cutting picks  on  a  heading machine  should  be  reduced  to  a  minimum; 
they  should be  of  such  shape  and  so  arranged  on  their mountings  as  to  reduce 
fragmentation  as  far  as  possible. 
20.  A water  supply  should be  provided  on  the machine  to  give  sufficient output  and 
pressure at  each  cutting  tool;  the  arrangements  are  similar  to  those  for  power 
loaders. 
Recommendation  regarding  Research 
21.  Further  research  is still needed  to  find  the best means  of minimising  dust  produc-
tion and  dispersion  and  making  the application of water  as  effective as  possible. 
Research  is  also  needed  into  the  design of  de-dusters  for  mounting  on  power  loaders 
and  heading machines. ANNEX  XII 
NOTES  CONCERNING  THE  STATISTICAL  COMPARISON  OF  SERIOUS  AND  FATAL  ACCIDENTS 
DUE  TO  ROCK  AND  COAL  FALLS  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  COAL  MINING  INDUSTRY 
OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  FROM  1969  TO  1971;  FALLS  OF  GROUND 
ACCIDENTS  WHICH  HAD  OCCURED  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN XII,  3 
1.  In accordance with  the  terms  of  referen~e of  the  Working Party  on  Roof  Control,  ways 
and  means  have  to  be  sought  of  reducing  the  frequency  of accidents.  Falls of  rock 
and  coal  are  of particular  significance  in  this  connection. 
2.  The  enclosed  tables  provide  a  survey  of  the  number  of accidents  and  how  they  occurred 
in  the  bituminous  coal  producing countries  of  the  Community,  from  1969  to  1971. 
3.  The  tables  show  under  figures  1  (a)  and  (b)  the  varying annual  production and  under-
ground  working  force  in  the  separate  Community  countries.  It can  be  seen  from  this 
that  in production and working  force  the  United  Kingdom-s  bituminous  coal  mining  indu-
stry is much  the  same  as  the  joint continental  bituminous  coal  mining  industry. 
4.  From  1969  to  1971  there was  a  decline  in production in all countries,  with  the  exeption 
of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  While  there  was  a  minimal  increase of  0.09%  in 
production in  the  Federal  Republic,  there  was  a  decline of  6.75%  in  the  UK,  16.67%  in 
Belgium,  18.72%  in France  and  34.48%  in  the  Netherlands.  The  reduction  in  the  working 
force,  in the  same  order,  was  2.59%  (FRG),  8.79%  (UK),  15.38%  (B),  17.35%  (F)  and 
37.50%  (NL). 
5.  Because  of  the  different values  used  by  the  Member  States,  only  the  number  of  accidents 
based  on  one  million working  hours  underground  (figure  2  (b))  can  provide  a  valid 
comparison.  These  figures  show  that  fatal  and  serious  accidents  in Germany,  Belgium 
and  France  differ but  slightly  from  one  another,  whereas  those  in  the  UK  and  the 
Netherlands  differ substantially  from  the  first named  countries.  A  comparison of  the 
years  1969  to  1971  shows  a  steady  decrease  in  the  frequency  of  accidents. 
6.  Serious  and  fatal  accidents  due  to  rock  and  coal  falls  as  a  proportion of  the  total 
serious  and  fatal  accidents  may  be  obtained  from  figure  4.  Proportions  for  1971  are 
as  follows  (in order  of  importance): 
Serious  accidents  Fatal  accidents 
B  29.4%  NL  100% 
D  28.5%  UK  36.4% 
NL  27.5%  D  31.9% 
UK  26.0%  B  30.8% 
F  22.4%  F  25.0% 
These  figures  show  that  the  bituminous  coal  mining  industry of France  has  the  lowest  pro-
portion,  both  in serious  and  fatal  accidents. 
7.  If one  examines  the  absolute  numbers  of  accidents  due  to  rock  and  coal  falls 
(figure  3  (a)),  taking  into  account  the  proportion of  accidents  due  to  falls of  rock 
and  coal  at  faces  (figure 5),  there  is  a  notable  difference  between  the  figures  for 
the  United  Kingdom  on  the  one  hand  and  the  continental  Community  countries  on  the 
other.  Thus,  for  example,  the  total  number  of  serious  accidents  in  the  Community 
countries  amounted  to  1  695  for  1971  compared with  148  in  the United  Kingdom, 
representing  a  ratio of  approximately  11  to  1.  In  the  same  year  there  were  55  fatal 
accidents  in  the  above  mentioned  Community  countries  as  against  24  fatal  accidentJ  in 
the  United  Kingdom,  representing  a  ratio of  approximately  2.3  to  1. 
It should  be  noted  in  connection with  these  figures  that  the  statistical  system of 
the  UK  coal  mining  industry  does  not  correlate directly with  that of  the  European 
Community.  But  in spite of  this  limitation  the  UK  accident  rate  is  showing  a  more 
favourable  trend. XII,  4 
For  an  explanation of  this  difference  reference  should  be  made  to  the  operating 
statistics for  1972  (Doc.  643/2/73).  According  to  this,  in  the  UK  coal  winning  by 
mechanical  cutting predominates  (90.9%  of  the  total  production),  in connection with 
powered  support  (86.9%).  In  the  British opinion  the  reduction  in  the  number  of 
accidents  due  to  rock  and  coal  falls  could  be  attributable  to  this  combination of 
winning  and  support  methods.  The  UK  is  even hoping  for  a  further  reduction. 
The  representatives  of  the  other  countries  take  note  of  the  opinion of  the  British 
representatives  in  the  "Roof  Control"  Working Party  as  to  the  reasons  for  their 
success  in  the  prevention of  rock  and  coal  fall  accidents.  However,  because  of  the 
different  geological  conditions  in  their own  countries,  the  representatives  see  few 
possibilities of  following  the  British extraction methods  on  the  same  sort  of  scale. 
8.  When  accidents  due  to  rock  and  coal  falls  are  divided  up  according  to  accident  location-
faces  (figure 5),  roadways  (figure  6)  and  other areas  (figure  7)  -in all countries  the 
great majority  of  accidents  occur  in extraction,  accidents  in  roadways  being  less 
frequent.  Accidents  in other areas  are  of  minor  importance. 
9.  The  members  of  the  Working  Party are  of  the  opinion  that  when  breaking  down  accident 
locations  into  faces,  roadways  and  other areas,  a  more  discriminating  listing is 
required.  The  UK  uses  the  distribution system  reproduced  in  the  annex  A,  "Accidents  due 
to  rock  and  coal  falls  in  the  UK.  The  British mining  authorities  classify accidents 
due  to  rock  and  coal  falls  according  to  29  accident  locations  in  the  extraction area. 
This  system of  listing is  tailored  to  the  extraction methods  used  in  UK  and  without 
modification  does  not  lend  itself  to  all  the  extraction methods  used  on  the  continent. 
But  this  system does  provide  a  basis  for  a  method  of  listing accident  locations  and 
thereby  the  main  areas  of  accident  frequency.  It is  therefore  recommended  that  this 
method  be  orought  to  the  attention of  the  National  Mining Authorities  in  the  Member 
States,  for  them  to  develop  the  same  or  a  similar method  of  subdividing  the  extraction 
area  into  accident  locations  for  the  classification of  accidents  due  to  rock  and 
coal  falls. D 
1. (a)  Annual  production in 
million  tons  (metric)  117.0 
(b)  Employed  persons  under-
ground  at  the  end  of 
the  year  (thousand)  150.4 
2. (a)  Underground  accidents 
(absolute  figures)  4  276 
(b)  Underground  accidents 
(million man-hours)  16.1 
3.(a)  Accidents  due  to  roof  falls 
(absolute  figures)  1  258 
(b)  Accidents  due  to  roof  falls 
(million man-hours)  4.74 
4.  Part of  the  accidents  due  to 
roof  falls  on  total  accidents 
(%  of  number  2(a))  29.4 
5.  Accidents  due  to  roof  falls 
(stables  included)  % of 
number  4))  72.5 
6.  Accidents  due  to  roof  falls  in 
roadways  (%  of  number  4)  20.7 
7.  Other  accidents  due  to  roof 
falls  (%  of  number  4)  6.8 
Importance  of  the  serious  and  fatal  accidents 
due  to  roof  falls  in coal  mines  of  the 
European  Communities 
1969 
Serious  accidents  to-
B  F  NL  UK  gether  D  B 
13.2  40.6  5.8  145.1  321.7  117.0  13.2 
2) 
31.2  77.6  9.6  326.4  595.2  150.4  31.2 
681  2  081  161  638  7  837  134  17 
13.2  14.8  9.4  1.6  0.5  0.3 
261  569  47  188  2  323  51  11 
5.07  4.04  2.7  0.5  o.l9  0.21 
38.3  27.3  29.1  29.5  29.6  38.1  64.7 
1)  73.7  83.0  77.2  66.7  1) 
1)  17.3  17.0  10.6  25.5  1) 
1)  9.0  - 12.2  7.8  1) 
Fatal  accidents  to-
F  NL  UK  gether 
40.6  5.8  145.1  321.7 
2) 
77.6  9.6  326,4  595.2 
54  4  84  293 
0.4  0.2  0.2 
21  1  28  112 
0.15  0.06  0.07 
38.9  25.0  33.3  38.2 
77.6  - 75.0 
7.4  100.0  10.7 
15.0  - 14.3 
Note:  The  figures  mentioned  under  points  1  to  3  (excepted  those  for  UK)  are  communicated  from  the  Statistical Office  of  the 
European  Community 
1)  The  data required  cannot  be  obtained  from  the  available  documentation 
2)  Persons  employed  underground  and  surface  including clerks 
:X: 
H 
H  .. 
lJ1 1. (a)  Annual  production in million  tons 
(metric) 
(b)  Employed  persons  underground  at 
the  end  of  the  year  (thousand) 
2. (a)  Underground  accidents 
(absolute  figures) 
(b)  Underground  accidents 
(million man-hours) 
3. (a)  Accidents  due  to  roof  falls 
(absolute  figures) 
(b)  Accidents  due  to  roof  falls 
(million man-hours) 
4.  Part of  the  accidents  due  to  roof 
falls  on  total  accidents  (%  of 
number  2(a)) 
5.  Accidents  due  to  roof  falls  in faces 
(stables  included)(%  of  number  4) 
6.  Accidents  due  to  roof  falls  in 
roadways  (%  of  number  4) 
7.  Other  accidents  due  to  roof  falls 
(%  of  number  4) 
Importance  of  the  serious  and  fatal  accidents 
due  to  roof  falls  in  coal  mines  of  the 
European Communities 
1970 
Serious  accidents 
to-
D  B  F  NL  UK  get  her 
117.0  11.4  37.4  4.5  135.4  305.7 
2) 
150.8  28.0  69.8  7.2  304.4  560.2 
4  069  497  1  903  108  562  7  139 
15.80  12.10  15.10  8.89  1.6 
1  113  192  474  32  170  1  981 
4.32  4.67  3.76  2.63  0.51 
27.3  38.6  24.9  29.6  30.2  27.7 
72.0  1)  77.8  84.4  78.3 
20.8  1)  16.2  12.5  7.0 
7.2  1)  6.0  3.1  14.7 
Fatal  accidents 
D  B  F  NL  UK 
117.0  11.4  37.4  4.5  135.4 
2) 
150.8  28.0  69.8  7.2  304.4 
105  19  61  3  82 
0.41  0.46  0,48  0.25  0.2 
29  11  18  1  26 
0.11  0.27  0.14  0.08  0.08 
27.6  57.9  29.5  33.3  31.7 
51.7  1)  55.6  100  80.8 
34.5  1)  33.3  - 7.7 
13.8  1)  11.1  - 11.5 
Note:  The  figures  mentioned  under points  1  to  3  (excepted  those  for  UK)  are  communicated  from  the  Statistical Office  of  the 
European  Community 
1)  The  data  required  cannot  be  obtained  from  the  available  documentation 
2)  Persons  employed  underground  and  surface  including clerks 
to-
get  her 
305.7 
560.2 
270 
85 
31.5 
::< 
H 
H 1. (a)  Annual  production in million  tons 
(metric) 
(b)  Employed  persons  underground at  the 
end  of  the  year  (thousand) 
2. (a)  Underground  accidents 
(absolute  figures) 
(b)  Underground  accidents 
(million man-hours) 
3. (a)  Accidents  due  to  roof  falls 
(absolute  figures) 
(b)  Accidents  due  to  roof  falls 
(million man-hours) 
4.  Part of  the  accidents  due  to  roof  falls 
on  total  accidents  (%  of  number  2 (a)) 
5.  Accidents  due  to  roof  falls  in faces 
(stables  included)(%  of  number  4) 
.,-. 
6.  Accidents  due  to  roof  falls  in 
roadways  (%  of  number  4) 
7.  Other  accidents  due  to  roof  falls 
(%  of  number  4) 
Importance  of  the  serious  and  fatal  accidents 
due  to  roof  falls  in  coal  mines  of  the 
European  Communities 
1971 
Serious  accidents  Fatal  accidents  to-
D  B  F  NL  UK  gether  D  B  F 
117.1  11.0  33.0  3.8  135.3  300.2  117.1  11.0  33.0 
1) 
146.5  26.4  64.0  6.0  297.7  540.6  145.6  26.4  64.0 
3  747  544  1  848  91  570  6  800  116  13  52 
14.89  13.56  16.61  9.20  1.6  0.46  0.32  0.47 
1  096  160  414  25  148  1  843  37  4  13 
4.35  3.99  3.72  2.53  0.44  0.15  0.10  0.12 
28.5  29.4  22.4  27.5  26.0  27.1  31.9  30.8  25.0 
69.3  91.8  73.9  96.0  73.0  61.1  100  76.9 
23.7  7.5  19.5  2.0  10.8  27.8  - 7.7 
7.0  0.7  6.6  2.0  16.2  11.1  - 15.4 
NL  UK 
3.8  135.3 
1) 
6.8  297.7 
1  66 
0.10  0.19 
1  24 
0.10  0.07 
100  36.4 
100  66.7 
- 12.5 
- 20.8 
Note:  The  figures  mentioned  under  points  1  to  3  (excepted  those  for  UK)  are  communicated  from  the  Statistical Office  of  the 
---- European  Community 
1)  Persons  employed  underground  and  surface  including clerks 
to-
gether 
300.2 
540.6 
248 
79 
31.8 
:><: 
H 
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Accidents  due  to  rock  and  coal  falls 
in  the  British coalmining  industry 
ANNEX  A XII,  Jl 
1.  As  will  be  apparent  from  the  notes  to  document  604/73,  the  Working Party  on 
'roof  control'  has,  under  its  terms  of  reference,  carried  out  its computation of 
accidents  in  1969,  1970  and  1971  due  to  rock  and  coal  falls  using  a  uniform method, 
~n order  to  establish  a  valid  point of  departure  for  its future  activities. 
2.  In  connection with  this  the  British member  of  the  working party,  Mr  CARVER,  made 
available  documents  which  strictly speaking  go  beyond  the  uniform method  and  show  how 
rock  and  coal  fall  accidents  are  computed  in  the  UK  coalmining  industry.  The  method 
used  is  a  differentiated classification of  the  individual  accident  sites in  the 
winning  area,  aimed  at  identifying  the  most  dangerous  jobs  so  that  suitable measures 
can  be  taken.  The  various  accident  sites,  a  tocal  of  29,  are  shown  with  the  help  of 
diagrams 
3.  The  working party  is of  the  v~ew that  this  method  of  recording accidents  should  be 
brought  to  the  attention of  all  interested circles,  including  those  outside  the 
working party. Hand  loaded  faces 
Power  loaded  faces 
XII,  12 
FALLS  OF  GROUND  ACCIDENTS 
POWERED  SUPPORTS 
L  o  c  u  s 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6  R 
6  s 
7 
8 
9  R 
9  s 
10 
11 
12 
Power  loaded  stables  and  Roadheads  13 
Narrow workings 
Advance  headings 
Power  loaded  faces 
1) 
2) 
fatal 
non  fatal 
R 
s 
Roof 
Side 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18  R 
18  s 
19 
20 
21  - 25 
Roads 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Y  e  a  r 
"F 1)  NF 2) Hand  Filled Longwall  Faces  and  Roadheads 
Locus  1  - 8 
l.a.  Fast-end 
b.  Old waste-adge 
2.  Roadhead  in advance 
of  ripping 
3.  Ripping  face 
4.  Outbye  of  ripping 
F-Fatal  R-Roof 
H. F.  S-Side  Locus 
1 a 
b 
Operations 
in Progress 
See Note  1 
2 
Type  of 
Props 
support 
Bars 
Note  1  - (a)  Work  being carried out  by  person  involved 
(b)  Other  operations  in vicinity  likely  to  have 
contributed  to  the  fall. 
Note  2  - Mean  dimensions:  L  - Parallel  to  face 
W - right angles  to  face 
H  - height  above  normal  roof 
5.  General  Face-line 
6  6.  In  front  of  permanent  supports~' 
5 
7.  Waste-edge 
8.  Pack  areas 
Caved  Size  of  fall 
Strip packs  L.  w.  H.  Pack  to  face  Colliery 
Use  of  chocks  Solid  stowed  See  Note  2  distance 
Date 
>:: 
H 
H Power  loaded  faces  (A  OB  B) 
(excluding stables  and  roadhands) 
Locus  9  - 12 
Type  of  machine 
tick where 
appropriate 
Note  1  a)  Work  being  carried out  by  person  involved 
Shearer  - with  segmented  drum  Bi-directional  Shearer 
- without  segmented  drum  Trepanner 
Trepan  Shearer  Plough 
Slicer 
Maca-Moore 
Disco 
Flight  Loader 
Other 
b)  Other operations  in vicinity likely  to  have  contributed  to  the  fall 
Note  2  Mean  dimensions:  L  - parallel  to  face  W - right  angles  to  face 
9.  In  advance  of  front  row  of  props 
11.  Waste  edge 
Operations 
Support  System  Types  of  Support  F-Fatal  R-Roof  in Progress 
N.F.  S-Side  Locus  See  Note  1  in line Staggered  Props  Bars  Powered 
H  - height  above  normal  roof 
Caved 
Use  of  Strip packs 
chocks  Solid  stmved 
10.  Between  the  front  row  of prop  and 
waste  edge 
12.  Pack  areas 
Size  of  fall 
L.  w.  H.  Pack  to  face 
See  Note  2.  distance  Coillery  Date 
::X: 
H 
H Stables  and  Roadheads 
Power  Loaded  Faces  (A  OR  R) 
Locus  13  - 20 
13  a.  Fast  end 
b.  old waste  edge 
14.  Road head  in  advance  of  ripping 
15.  Ripping 
16.  Roadhead  outbye  of  ripping 
Operations 
F-Fatal  R-Roof  in Progress 
N.F.  S-Side  Locus  See  Note  1 
13 a 
b 
Stables 
see  above 
a./b. 
Stables  - a.  hand  filled  Ripping  - a.  hand  worked 
b.  mechanised  (Type)  b.  mechanised  (Type) 
Note  1  a)  ~lark being  carried out  by  person  involved 
b)  Other  operations  in vicinity likely  to  have  contributed  to  the  fall 
Note  2  Mean  dimensions:  L- parallel  to  face  W- right angles  to  face 
H - height  above  normal  roof 
18 
17.  Stable entry 
18.  In  front  of permanent  supports 
20 
Ripping  Types  of  see  above 
a./b.  Props  Bars 
17 
19  I 
-L-------
1 
I 
I 
19.  Waste  edge 
20.  Packs 
Distance: 
Support  Size of  fall  ripping  to 
Use  of  L.  w.  H.  last permanent 
Powered  chocks  See  note  2  support 
Pack  to  face 
distance  Call iery  Date 
:X: 
H 
H Narrow working 
Locus  21  - 25 
Type  of working 
A - Unripped 
B - Stone Drift 
C  - Ripped 
D - Pillar extraction 
F-Fatal  R-Roof 
N.F.  S-Side  Locus 
A 
21 
8 
21 
Operations 
in progress  Type  of 
See  Note  1  A.  B. 
Note  1  a)  Working  being  carried out  by  person  involved 
b)  Other  operations  in vicinity likely  to  have  contributed  to  the  fall 
Note  2  Mean  dimensions:  L- parallel  to  face 
W - right angles  to  face 
H - height  above  normal  roof 
Section 
c 
23  21  22  23  Locus 
21  - Involving permanent  supports 
22  - Involving  supports  in advance 
23 
working 
c.  D. 
of  ripping 
25  -------.-- ...... -----
23  - In  advance  of  supports 
24  - Ripping  face  D 
21 
Handworked(a) 
Mechanised 
(Type)  (b)  Types  of 
1 
I 
I 
I  23 
I 
I 
support 
Use  of 
chocks 
25  - Waste-edge 
Distance 
Distance  ripping  to  Size  of  fall 
face  to  permanent  L.W.H. 
supports  support  see  note  2  Colliery  Date 
:X: 
H 
H ROADS 
F  - Fatal  R - Roof 
N.F.  s - Side 
Type  of working:  A - Back  Rippings  B - Junctions  C  - Fall Cavities  D - Others 
Note  1  a)  Work  being carried out  by  person  involved 
b)  Other  operations  in vicinity  likely  to  have  contributed  to  the  fall 
Note  2  Mean  dimensions:  L  - Parallel  to  face  W - right  angles  to  face  H - height  above  normal  roof 
Type  of  Working  Operations  in 
progress  Size  of fall 
A.  B.  c.  D.  See  Note  1.  Type  of  support  See  Note  2.  Colliery  Date 
:::< 
H 
H  .. Locus  26  - 29  Face  of  Heading  (a)  Coal  and  rock  fired  simultaneously 
(b)  Coal  and  rock  fired  separately  Advance  Headings 
Power  Loaded  Faces  (c)  Coal  and  rock  got  and  filled  by  power  loader  (Type) 
(d)  Coal  and  rock  Hand-filled 
(e)  Coal  and  rock  filled 
mechanically(Type) 
Note  l  (a)  Work  being  carried out  by  person  involved 
(b)  Other  operations  in vicinity likely  to  have 
contributed  to  fall 
i  i 
I 
I  28  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  ---
I 
29 
1------
Note  2  Mean  dimensions:  L  - parallel  to  face 
27  I  I  26 
I 
I 
W - right angles  to  face 
H - height  above  normal  roof 
Locus 
26  - In  advance  of supports 
27  - Involving  supports  in advance  of 
longwall  face  line 
28  - Junction of  heading  and  longwall  face 
29  - Side  of  junction of  heading  and  longwall  face 
F-Fatal  R-Roof  Locus  Ope;:-ations  in  Type  of  working  Types  of  support  Distance  face  to  Size  of  fall  Colliery  Date 
S-Side  progress  A.B.C.D.E.  (a)  Hand  set  (Rigid)  L.  w.  H. 
N.F.  See  Note  1  (b)  Hand  set  (Yielding)  permanent  support  See  note  2 
(c)  Power  operated 
~ 
H 
H EXPLANATORY  NOTES 
ON  OPERATING  STATISTICS  IN  THE  COAL  MINING  INDUSTRY  OF  THE 
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  COUNTRIES  AS  ESTABLISHED  FOR  1972 
ANNEX  XIII XIII,  3 
1.  Thequality of  roof  control mainly  depends  on  geological  conditions,  support  methods 
and  winning  techniques  and  on  the  effect of winning methods  previously  and  presently 
in application. 
2.  The  purpose  of  the  enclosed  table  is  to  provide  an  outline of  the extent,  distribution, 
geological  conditions  and  technical  methods  of  coal mining  in the Community  countries 
as  established  for  1972. 
3.  Figure  1  of  the  table  indicates  the  carying number  of  independent  collieries and  annual 
production in  the  various  Community  countries.  It will be  seen  that  coal  production  for 
Great  Britain is approximately  the  same  as  production  for  the  continental  Community 
countries  taken  together.  The  United  Kingdom's  coal mining  industry,  however,  has  more 
than  twice  as  many  independent  operating units  (collieries)  as  the rest of  the  Community 
together.  Production per colliery on  the Continent  is thus  about  double  that of Great 
Britain. 
4.  The  average  production per working unit differs  in some  cases  considerably  from  the 
average  for  the  countries because of certain factors  (length of  face,  progress  in coal-
winning,  thickness  of worked  seams  etc.). 
5.  As  regards  working methods,  it is apparent  that  face  working predominates.  Working 
methods  other  than  face  working  are  only  important  in France  (Figure  3). 
6.  It is not  easy  to  give  a  clear explanation of  the varying  face  length  (Figure  4)  in  the 
Community  countries.  No  doubt  geological  conditions,  technical,  economic  and  safety 
questions  are of significance. 
7.  As  regards  stowage  procedures  (Figure 5),  caving  is predominant  in all countries. 
8.  Seams  more  than  4  m thick are only worked  in France.  Their exploitation requires  special 
methods  (Figure  6). 
9.  Semi-pitching  seams  (between  20°  - 40°)  are  found  only  in France  and  Germany,  and  in  a 
single  case  in Belgium where  they  require  special winning procedures  (Figures  7). 
10.  Winning  methods  are for  the  greater part mechanized  in all Community  countries.  The 
degree  of mechanization  (Figure  8)  depends  very much  on  the  disposition of  the  seams. 
Mechanization is  least developed  in France where  the  position of  the  seams  is diffi-
cult.  The  various  percentages  of work  done  by  the various winning methods  should  be 
noted. 
11.  Working  methods  in Great  Britain and  France  reveal  two  striking departures  from  the 
norm  in Great  Britain powered  support predominates,  whilst in France  other methods 
play  a  considerable part  (Figure  9). 
12.  Average  working  depth varies between  456  m in the  Netherlands  and  792.3  m in Germany 
(Figure  11). 
X 
X  X 1.  Number  of pits 
Total  production 
2.  (a)  Number  of  coal-getting workings 
(b)  Average  production per working  unit 
(1  000  t) 
3.  Breakdown  of total production according 
to  system of working  (%) 
(a)  Long  wall  working 
(b)  Other  systems 
4.  Mean  length of  face  (m) 
5.  Stowage  system  (%  total production) 
(a)  Caving 
(b)  Solid packing 
(c)  Other  stowage  systems 
Operational  Statistics Questionnaire 
(up  to  date  to  1972) 
D 
62 
108.4 
402 
268 
100 
214 
85.4 
8.5 
6.1 
B 
22 
11.0 
223 
49 
100 
159 
86.6 
11.1 
2.3 
F 
42 
30.4 
346  (2) 
86  (2) 
75.0 
25.0 
145 
65.5 
32.9 
NL 
4 
2.9 
20 
i45 
100 
164 
91.3 
8.7 
1.6  -
6.  (a)  Seam  thicknesses  (em)  (from .•.  to ...  ) 
(b)  Mean  thicknesses  of worked  seams 
66  - 320 
166 
53  - 221 
133 
60  - 2  000  80  - 220 
160  137 
(1)  Figures  for Belgiwn refer to  the position at  the  end  19?1. 
UK 
286 
119.5(3) 
973 
123 
97.5 
2.5 
171 
96.0 
COMMUNITY 
416 
272.2 
1  964 
138 
96.2 
3.8 
185 
88.1 
9.3 
4.0(4)  2.6 
61  - 274  53  - 2  000 
137  147 
(2)  Excludingseamsmore  than  400  em  thick in the  Dauphine~  BZanzy~ Auvergne  and Loire  coalfields with  15  041  tons 
per day =  11%  of total production. 
(3)  Influence of a  strike of ?  weeks. 
(4)  Partial packing. 
:X: 
H 
H 
H  .. Operational Statistics Questionnaire  (continued) 
(up  to  date  to  1972) 
D  B  F 
7.  Breakdown  of total production according  to 
groups  of  seams 
(a)  0  - 20°  (%) 
(b)  21  - 40°  (%) 
(c)  41  - 100°  C'O 
8.  Methods  of winning  (%  total production) 
(a)  mechanized 
(1)  shearing and  trepanning 
(2)  ploughing 
(b)  by  hand 
9.  Support  systems  used  in workings 
(%  of  total production) 
(a)  single-prop  system 
(b)  self-advancing  systems 
(c)  other systems 
10.  Depth  of  working  (m)  (from ..•  to ••• ) 
NL 
11.  Mean  weighted  depth  of working  792.3  778.7  630  456 
(1)  Other winning methods  (faces  using 'ramming equipment'  and  hydraulic winning)  :  1.4%. 
(2)  21  - 35°. 
(3)  36  - 90°. 
(4)  Plus  2.5%  mechanized room  and pillar method and  0.8%  smaller workings. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  THE  WORK  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION XIV,  3 
I  - TECHNICAL  PROBLEMS 
A - Mine  rescue 
1. Organjzation  of  mine  rescue  arrangements 
- Report  on  tour  of  central  rescue  stations  1n  the Community  countries  and  Great 
Britain  (First Report  on  the  organization of mine  rescue  services  1958/59) 
(2nd  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  and Health Commission,  Annex  B,  June  1961); 
- Second Report  on  the  organization of mine  rescue  services  1960  (3rd  Report  of 
the  MSHC,  Annex  V a,  November  1966); 
- Third  Report  on  the  organization of  m1ne  rescue  services  1961  (3rd  Report  of  the 
MSHC,  Annex  VI  a,  November  1966); 
- Fourth  Report  on  the  organization of  m1ne  rescue  services  1962  (3rd  Report  of  the 
MSHC,  Annex  VII  a,  November  1966); 
Fifth Report  on  the  organization of mine  rescue  services  1963  and  1964 
(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VIII  a,  November  1966); 
- Sixth Report  on  the  organization of  mine  rescue  services,  1965/66  (5th Report 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  V,  October  1968); 
- Seventh  Report  on  the  organization of mine  rescue  services,  1967/68, 
(7th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IV,  September  1970); 
- Recommendations  regarding  the  provision of  advice  from  foreign  experts  in  the 
case  of  major  accidents  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III,  November  1966); 
- Communication  links  between  the  rescue  base  and  the  rescue  team  (3rd Report  of 
the  MSHC,  Annex  IV,  November  1966); 
List of  regulations  and  directives  concerning  the  organization of mine  rescue 
services  in  the  countries  of  the  Community  and  the United Kingdom  (Doc.  3845/1/70; 
to  be  published  in  the  9th Report  of  the  MSHC). 
2.  Rescue  equipment 
- Interim report  on  the  continued  development  of  the CO-filter self-rescuer  (Doc. 
1872/68/1,  lOth October  1968); 
Results  of  the  research  carried out with  financial  assistance  from  the  Commission 
of  the  European  Communities  into  the  improvement  of  the  physiological  conditions 
for  the  wearing  of breathing apparatus  (8th Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IV, 
June  1971). 
3.  Research  work  at high  temperatures 
Final  report  on  research  into  the  establishment of  simple  criteria for  the 
selection of  rescue  team personnel  for  heavy  work  in high  temperatures  (3rd Report 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IXa,  November  1966). XIV,  4 
4.  Rescue with borehole 
List of specialists  for borehole  rescue work  and  equipment  available  1n 
Community  countries  (8th Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III,  June  1971) 
B - Fires  and  underground  combustion 
1.  Shaft  fires  at great  depth 
- Recommendations  on  the  equipment  having  regard  to  the  prevention of  open fires 
(1st Report  of  the  MSHC,  April  1959); 
- Fighting of  fires  in shafts by  bringing  in water  (2nd  Report of  the  MSHC, 
page  24,  June  1961); 
- Final  report  on  experiments with shaft fires  carried out  by  the  Experimental 
Roadway  Association in Dortmund,  with  the  financial  aid of  the High Authority, 
at Dorstfeld Colliery,  Dortmund  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III a,  November 
1966); 
- Explanatory  notes  and  views  of  the  Working Parties  on  Underground  Combustion  and 
Fires  and  Mine  Rescue  Organization,  and  their expert  sub-committees,  concerning 
the  final  report of  the  Experimental  Roadway  Association,  Dortmund,  on  the  shaft 
fire  experiment at Dorstfeld Colliery  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III b, 
November  1966). 
2.  Ventilation 
- Study  of  the  Group  of  Experts  on Ventilation:  Stabilization of Ventilation  in 
Pit Fires  - investigation in  the  light of Prof.  Budryk's  theory  (this  study 
consists  of  two  separate parts:  the Report  itself and  Annex  III  to  the  6th Report 
of  the  MSHC,  September  1966); 
- Practical  conclusions  of  the  application of  the  theory  of stabilisation of ven-
tilation (6th Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III,  September  1969). 
3.  Fire  stoppings  (dams) 
Sealing-off  of mine  fires  and  underground  combustion by  dams  (2nd  Report  of  the 
MSHC,  page  51,  June  1961); 
- Report  on  trials with  explosion-proof  dams  carried out by  the  Experimental Road-
way  Association in Dortmund  at  the  request of  the  Safety Commission  and with 
financial  aid of  the High Authority  - Statement  of policy  regarding  the  erection 
of  advance  dams  of  plaster as  a  fire fighting measure  (3rd Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  I,  November  1966); 
- Final  Report  on  trial8 with explosion-proof  dams,  carried out by  the  Experimental 
Roadway  Association  in Dortmund  with  the  financial  aid of  the  High Authority 
(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  I  a,  November  1966); 
Instructions  for  the  construction of plaster stoppings  by  the method  developed 
by  the  Essen-Kray  Main  Rescue  Station  (3rd Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  X a, 
November  1966); 
Instructions  for  the  hydro-mechanical  method  of constructing plaster stoppings 
developed  from  the Central  rescue station of  the  Saarbergwerke  AG  (8th Report of 
the  MSHC,  Annex  V,  June  1971). XIV,  5 
4.  Fire-resistant fluids 
- Report  on  the  establishment of criteria for  fire-resistant  fluids  used  for  power 
transmission  (hydraulic  fluids)  and  on  the  tests  to  be  carried out  for  that 
purpose  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  A,  June  1971); 
- Second  Report  on  specifications  and  testing conditions  relating  to  fire-resistant 
fluids  used  for  power  transmission  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IV  a, 
November  1966); 
- Third  Report  on  specifications  and  testing conditions  relating  to fire-resistant 
fluids  for  power  transmission  (pamphlet  lOth  October  1967); 
- Fourth Report  on  specifications  and  testing conditions  relating  to  fire-resistant 
fluids  for  power  transmission  (pamphlet  26th March  1971). 
5.  The  reopening  of  fire  areas 
- Report  on  the  opening of  sealed-off fire  areas  and  the  rules  applicable  thereto 
(3rd Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  II,  November  1966); 
- Study  on  the  reopening  of  sealed-off  fire  areas  by  Bergassessor  a.D.G.  Lehmann 
(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  II a,  November  1966). 
6.  Use  of  urethane  foam  for  sealing 
- Opinion  on  the  use  underground  of  polyurethane  foam  in  the  coal  mining  industry 
(7th Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VI,  September  1970). 
C  - Electricity 
- Decision on  the  removal  of  oil  from  resistors,  condensers,  transformers,  switches 
and  relays  used  underground  (1st  Report  of  the  MSHC,  April  1959); 
- The  use  of  non-flammable  materials  for  the manufacture  of  electric cables  and 
leads  for  underground  use  (2nd  Report of  the  MSHC,  page  5,  June  1961); 
- Requirements  which  must  be  met  by  electrical shotfiring leads  (2nd  Report of 
the  MSHC,  page  8,  June  1961); 
- Protection of  the  underground  electrical  network  against  the  danger  of electric 
shocks  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  page  11,  June  1961); 
- Report  on  investigations  into  the  protection of underground  electrical network 
against  dangers  arising  from  fires  or  from  firedamp  explosions  (3rd  Report  MSHC, 
Annex  VII,  November  1966); 
- Report  on  firedamp-proof  electrical switchgear  for  nominal  voltages  above  1100 volts 
(3rd Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VIII,  November  1966); 
- Notes  on  the  problem of heat  transmission in an  insulated conductor  (3rd  Report  of 
the  MSHC,  Annex  IX,  November  1966); 
- Report  on  characteristics  and  the electrical protection of  power  feed  cables  for 
mobile  machines  (cutters,  loaders,  etc.)  used  underground  in the  coalmines  of  the 
countries  of  the  Community  (7th Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  V,  September  1970); 
- Comments  and  recommendations  arising out  of  the  report  adopted  by  the Mines  Health 
and  Safety  Commission  on  20  June  1969  on  the  characteristics  and  electrical protec-
tion of  cables  supplying mobile  machines  (coal  cutters,  loading machines  etc.)  used 
underground  in coalmines  in  the  Community  countries  (8th Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  IX,  June  1971). XIV,  6 
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- Policy statement  on  the  deleterious  effects of  dust-binding processes  using  saline 
pastes  and  powders  upon  electrical plant  underground  (9th Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  IX,  July  1972) 
- Comparison of  safety prov1s1ons  concerning electric trolley  locomotives  underground 
and  in particular,  possibilities of  reducing  the  incidence of  trolley sparks 
(9th Report  of  MSHC,  Annex  X,  July  1972) 
-Report and  conclusions  on overvoltages  caused  by  lightning  (9th Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  XI,  July  1972) 
D - Winding  ropes  and  shaft guides 
- Report  on  the  electro-magnetic  examination of winding  ropes  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  VI,  November  1966); 
- Final  report  on  electro-magnetic  tests carried out with  the  financial  aid of  the 
High Authority  in  the  Bochum  Rope-testing Station  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XI  a, 
November  1966); 
- Report  on  the  use  of accelerometers  for  testing winding  installations  (3rd  Report  of 
the  MSHC,  Annex  V,  November  1966); 
- Report  on  measurement  and  testing procedures  for  shaft- and  roadway  winding  ropes 
and  for  guides  for  shaft- and  roadway  haulage  installations  (7th Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  VII,  September  1970). 
E  - Combustible  dusts 
- Report  on  work  done  on  the  neutralization of  combustible  dusts  and  dusts  barriers 
(7th Report  of  the MSHC,  Annex  VIII,  September  1970). 
F  - Mechanization 
Recommendations  concerning  the  equipment  of  locomotives  (1st Report  of  the  MSHC, 
April  1959); 
Recommendations  concerning  the  neutralization of  exhaust  gases  from  diesel  engines 
(1st  Report  of  the  MSHC,  April  1959). 
II - HEALTH  PROTECTION  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  FACTORS 
- Explanatory  notes  to  the  recommendation  on  "Fixing of climatic  limits" 
(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  X,  November  1966); 
- Recommendation  on  "Fixing of  climatic  limits"  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XI, 
November  1966); 
Recommendation  embodying  directives  on means  of suppressing  dust  concentrations  in 
underground  workings  (8th Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VI,  June  1971); 
- Recommendation  on  the  organization of  special  services  responsible  for  the  inspection 
of  dust  conditions  in underground  working  (8th Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VII,  June 
1971); XIV,  7 
- Statement  on  the  need  to  reduce  the  dust  concentration resulting  from  the  use  of 
coal-cutting and  getting machinery  and  roadway  drivage  (8th Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  VIII,  June  1971). 
III - HUMAN  FACTORS 
A - Medical  problems 
- Report  on pre-entry  and  routine medical  examinations  and  recommendations 
(2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  page  74,  June  1961); 
- Colliery medical  services  in  the  countries  of  the  Community  and  the United 
Kingdom  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  C,  June  1961). 
B - Psychological  and  sociological  factors  in mine  safety 
- Report  on  the  psychological  and  sociological  factors  affecting safety 
(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XII,  November  1966); 
- Recommendations  on  the  psychological  and  sociological  factors  affecting safety 
(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XIII,  November  1966). 
C  - Effects  of  remuneration methods  on safety 
Report  on  the  implications  of payment  at piece rates  for  mine  safety 
(4th Report  of  the MSHC,  Annex  III,  December  1967); 
- Recommendations  as  to  principles  to  be  observed  in view  of  the  possible  influence 
of  payment  at piece  rates  on  safety  1n  coal  mines  (4th Report  of  the MSHC, 
Annex  IV,  December  1967). OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
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